



RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

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Raising Our Sights: Russian-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

In the Center for Strategic Research's Strategic Forum No. 274, David C. Gompert and Michael Kofman state that although the United States and Russia are no longer adversaries, their relationship has failed to evolve from the Cold War-framework based on mutual deterrence and the threat of retaliation. Sustaining this approach is inadequate given new strategic vulnerabilities brought on by technological change. Both the opportunity and the need now exist for a different, more ambitious approach to avoiding strategic conflict—one designed for new possibilities as well as new vulnerabilities. Accordingly, while not discarding mutual deterrence or nuclear arms control, Gompert and Kofman call for widening the scope of the effort to include space and cyberspace. The aim should shift from controlling capabilities to eliminating the danger of those capabilities being used. The political premise is that both countries claim to seek a nonadversarial relationship; each can agree not to be the first to attack the other or its allies in any of these strategic domains.

The need for change stems from the growing vulnerability of the United States and Russia to serious national harm from attack in space, cyberspace, and the traditional nuclear realm. Because all three domains are offense-dominant, and the inhibition against attack is low in space and cyberspace, restraint represents the best prospect for lowering the threat of future conflict. A framework for mutual restraint would start on a foundation of deterrence and include explicit reciprocal pledges and meaningful confidence-building measures. It would address the growing vulnerabilities and dependence of both countries and serve to redirect the Russian-American strategic agenda.

Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program: Replay or Breakthrough?

Despite protests across Russia sparked by last December's reportedly fraud-filled parliament elections, Vladimir Putin is preparing to return to the presidency this May. In the Center for Strategic Research's Strategic Perspectives No. 9, Dr. John Parker examines whether upon his return Putin will replay his 2004–2008 approach to Iran, during which Russia negotiated the S-300

air defense system contract with Tehran, or if Putin will continue Russia's breakthrough in finding common ground with the United States on Iran—which was seen under President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the S-300 contract.

Dr. Parker finds most Russian experts now believe that Iran is advancing toward a military nuclear weapons program—though it has not made a final decision—and a ballistic missile program to accompany it. Russia sees these programs as a threat to its interests. Russia therefore will continue to insist that Iran comply with its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and cooperate fully with International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. However, Russia is wary of pushing so hard on compliance lest Iran entirely abandon its treaty obligations and walk out of the NPT.

On regional issues, Russia and Iran will continue at least to appear to pursue neighborly engagement with each other. The Arab Spring has pushed forward overlapping but not identical challenges and opportunities to the positions of both countries, including how to deal with Syria. The impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan has raised the prospect that Russia and Iran may once again have to partner closely in resisting Taliban threats to their regional equities, as they did before 9/11.

The 80 Percent Solution: The Strategic Defeat of bin Laden's al-Qaeda and Implications for South Asian Security

In this New America Foundation monograph, Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III of the Center for Strategic Research argues that the May 2011 death of Osama bin Laden was devastating to three of the five most critical features of bin Laden's al-Qaeda: its legitimacy as a core organization capable of choreographing catastrophic global terrorist events; its brand-name rights as the ultimate victor should any of its loosely affiliated Salafi jihadist regional movements ever achieve success in a local insurgency; and its ability to claim that it was primarily responsible for victory in the area most critical to its own mystical lore—Afghanistan and western

Pakistan. Bin Laden's demise also degraded by half—but did not eliminate—the fourth and fifth elements of al-Qaeda's essence: its role as a “vanguard” of a wider network of Sunni Salafi groups and its ability to serve as a key point of inspiration for “lone wolf” terrorists around the globe. As a result of these impacts, Dr. Lynch asserts that bin Laden's death produced an 80 percent solution to the problem of al-Qaeda for Western policymakers.

Dr. Lynch finds that the most immediate impact of this historic development challenges the current framework of U.S. and coalition strategy in Afghanistan and questions the U.S. policy approach toward Pakistan. First, the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda's core leadership long ago diverged in goals and aspirations. These differences were papered over by the personal history between bin Laden and key Afghan Taliban. With bin Laden's death, the covering over these fissures is gone. Second, bin Laden's death means that Afghan Taliban leaders are ever more dependent on Pakistani intelligence and security services for the support required to sustain their insurgency. As Afghan Taliban leaders adapt to this dominant reality, the risks of al-Qaeda's return to sanctuary in Afghanistan or western Pakistan must drop dramatically. Third, absent the onset of a stark proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan, Pakistan's military and intelligence leadership will have little interest in seeing al-Qaeda again set up shop for international terrorism and will use the tools at their disposal to constrain this possibility. Ominously, the risks of a devastating proxy war between India and Pakistan over their relative positions in Afghanistan continue to grow.

Dr. Lynch asserts that American policy must wake up to the grave risks of the India-Pakistan dynamic playing out in Afghanistan, reduce its late 2011 policy focus on killing every last al-Qaeda affiliated leader or mid-level Haqqani network operative in Pakistan, and pay far more attention to the factors necessary to inhibit proxy war in Afghanistan: 1) a tense but enduring U.S. diplomatic relationship with Pakistan designed to calm its fears that growing Afghan National Security Forces will become an Indian-directed dagger aimed at Pakistan's back; and 2) diplomatic engagement with Pakistan and India on an acceptable politi-

cal and security framework for Afghanistan into the next decade. These vital outcomes require earnest and difficult negotiations with the Pakistanis, Indians, Afghan Taliban, and northern ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Negotiations focused on these vital outcomes have not even begun. Dr. Lynch concludes that it is time that they do.

Post-Asad Syria: Opportunity or Quagmire?

In the Center for Strategic Research's Strategic Forum No. 276, Dr. Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, examines what would be the strategic consequences if Syrian President Bashar al-Asad fell from power and what would be the strategic implications if he was able to muddle through Syria's current difficulties.

Dr. Clawson states that U.S. policy toward the continued rule of Asad is partly based on the impact his rule has had in Syria. Asad's fall might not bring improvement for the Syrian people. But the argument that Asad, odious as he may be, provides stability now looks less and less convincing. Whether Asad stays or falls, the current Syrian unrest could have profound implications on the Middle East in at least four ways: 1) the impact on Iran, Asad's closest strategic partner; 2) the perception of the power of the United States and its allies, particularly Turkey; 3) the stability of neighboring states, especially Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan; and 4) the impact on Israel. The more Asad falls on hard times, the more Tehran has to scramble to prevent damage to its image with the "Arab street" and to its close ally, Lebanese Hizballah. Dr. Clawson concludes by noting that Asad's overthrow is by no means assured, and U.S. instruments to advance that objective are limited. The U.S. decision to call for his overthrow seems to have rested on a judgment that the prospects for success were good and the payoff in the event of success would be high.

Contrasting Causal Mechanisms: Iraq and Libya

In recent years, the United States has placed economic sanctions on Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran

in pursuit of U.S. nonproliferation goals. Mr. David Palkki, deputy director of the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), and Dr. Shane Smith, research fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), draw on newly available sources to explore the role of international pressure in shaping Saddam Hussein's and Muammar Qadhafi's proliferation decisions in their co-authored chapter "Contrasting Causal Mechanisms: Iraq and Libya" in Etel Solingen's *Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation* (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Their chapter focuses on how, as opposed to merely whether or to what extent, external inducements and domestic distributional effects led to WMD reversal decisions. One key finding is that Saddam and Qadhafi were sensitive to issues of legitimacy and morale among the masses out of concern for their legacies and fears that disgruntled masses would offer fertile recruiting ground for opposition groups. In the case of Libya, in particular, important evidence indicates that sanctions limited the ability to manage elite elements. In both cases, comprehensive sanctions worked.

The authors note, however, that the promise of additional evidence to come renders some of their conclusions more preliminary than conclusive. The work of the CRRC is particularly important in this regard. It has already made copies and translations of nearly 1,000 captured Iraqi records available to scholars, including audio files of meetings on the sanctions between Saddam and his senior advisers, yet this constitutes only a small fraction of the records captured by U.S. forces. Additionally, developments in Libya, resulting in Qadhafi's downfall and a new government in Tripoli, could also lead to new evidence of the previous government's internal deliberations and processes. Future research will certainly offer additional insights.

Insights into Saddam Hussein's Iraq

On April 1, 2012, the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) hosted a roundtable of distinguished scholars at the International Studies Association's an-

nual convention to discuss Dr. Kevin Woods (Institute for Defense Analyses), Mr. David Palkki (CRRC), and Dr. Mark Stout's (The Johns Hopkins University) *The Saddam Tapes, 1979–2001: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime* (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Dr. John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago), Dr. Timothy Naftali (former director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library), and Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi (Minerva scholar) joined the editors in commenting on the study, which is based on records available at the CRRC.

According to Dr. al-Marashi, most scholarship on Iraq in the decade prior to 2003 was based on inference and guesswork. During this period, he noted, there were only three scholars in the United States who drew on primary source Iraqi records to understand Saddam's Iraq. *The Saddam Tapes* fills an important gap in this literature, he emphasized, predicting that CRRC records would enable much follow-on research. Dr. al-Marashi agreed with the editors that, contrary to popular belief, the captured records show that the information in Saddam's public statements generally differed little from what he told his trusted advisers in private. Nevertheless, he predicted, the large amount of captured records will provide abundant opportunities for future research.

Dr. Mearsheimer stated that after reading *The Saddam Tapes*, he found Saddam much more interesting but was left with a few questions. In some transcripts, he and Dr. Naftali observed, Saddam's advisers readily corrected their boss. Were there certain issue areas, but not others, in which Saddam's lieutenants could correct their boss? How and with whom did senior officials share and discuss information in Saddam's regime? Dr. Naftali noted that while Saddam expressed some far-fetched ideas, overall he comes across as intelligent in the tapes. Dr. Naftali shared many insights and questions stemming from his extensive research on U.S. Presidents' secret recordings. For instance, he encouraged scholars to investigate where Saddam acquired the technology to record the meetings and suggested that Iraq learned to record from the Soviet Union or another regime that secretly recorded its meetings. Who was in the room when the

recordings were taking place, he wondered. Did Saddam always speak freely among his most senior subordinates, or, like Nixon, did he withhold information from all but two or three of his most trusted advisers? Dr. Naftali noted that approximately 95 percent of citations of the Nixon tapes refer to recordings found in Stanley Kutler's *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes* (Touchstone, 1998), even though Kutler's book cites only 5 percent of the total tapes and does not reference many of the most insightful recordings. Similarly, he warned, *The Saddam Tapes* samples only 75 of the 2,300 captured recordings of Saddam's meetings. The book is an extremely useful window into Saddam's world, he concluded, yet as the CRRC's collection of Saddam tapes grows, many new insights will become available.

New Research on Authoritarian Regimes

As envisioned by Robert M. Gates, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, civilian access to copies of captured records from Saddam's Iraq has generated important insights regarding the functioning of authoritarian adversaries. Two recent studies, both based heavily on records available to scholars at the CRRC, provide novel insights into the domestic politics of Saddam's regime and the role of political Islam in Saddam's Iraq. In *Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Dr. Joseph Sassoon presents the following findings: 1) the regime was not merely a "Republic of Fear" in which a handful of leaders intimidated the masses; rather, an extensive and underappreciated system of monetary and nonmonetary rewards created a parallel structure to the punishment and violence that the regime used against opponents; and 2) while the regime pretended from the late 1980s on that it had become more religious, in reality, Saddam continued to be very secular; repression of religious groups continued unabated. Dr. Sassoon also argues that Saddam was a natural ally of the United States because both opposed Islamic fundamentalism and saw Iran as a strategic rival.

In contrast to Dr. Sassoon, Dr. Amatzia Baram argues in *From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba'ath*

Regime 1968–2003 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholar’s History and Public Policy Program, October 2011) that Saddam become more religious throughout his rule. Dr. Baram finds his key evidence in an audio recording, available to scholars at the CRRC and on the CRRC Web site, of a previously unknown meeting between Saddam and pan-Arab Ba’ath Party leaders. In 1986, due to the seemingly endless war with Iran and a serious strategic defeat on the Faw Peninsula, Saddam recommended that the Ba’ath Party agree to a truce and possibly enter a tacit alliance with the Sudanese and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. While Ba’ath Party doctrine is opposed to mixing religion and politics, Saddam was willing to open a dialogue with Islamists as early as 1986 in light of the changing circumstances. The central questions of when and why the Ba’ath Party began flirting with Islamists plagued historians since Saddam publicly announced his Faith Campaign in 1993. The “why?” was easy to infer. The Iraqi public’s religiosity was growing because of the hardships from two wars and socioeconomic difficulties stemming from international sanctions. According to Dr. Baram, the question of “when?” was unknown until the emergence of this recording. Dr. Baram believes that Saddam’s Faith Campaign contributed to an authentic Islamization process in Iraq, thus helping to explain why the U.S. found a more sectarian Iraq in 2003 than it would have found in the 1970s or 1980s.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Cohort 1 Study

The Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands (APH) Cohort 1 study, conducted jointly with Joint Staff, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, and Center for Complex Operations personnel, evaluated the mission accomplishments of the first cohort (206 joint Servicemembers and civilians) of the APH, who deployed to Afghanistan and Pakistan between March 2010 and January 2012. The study was based on 113 surveys and 39 interviews of Cohort 1

Hands conducted between November 2011 and January 2012.

Overall, the study found APH mission accomplishments were significant during Cohort 1’s initial deployment. However, at the conclusion of their first year in theater, the Hands had not yet achieved the strategic impact envisioned by the program’s architects. The study also concluded that Hands were more likely to achieve mission success when they were placed in billets and given opportunities by their in-theater commands to sustain frequent contact with their Afghan partners, imparting concrete operational experience that strengthened the capacity of their Afghan counterparts to operate independently. However, especially during the early stages of Cohort 1’s deployment, Hands’ assignments were sometimes unstructured, with limited upfront planning as to how each billet would contribute to the Hands’ three-fold mission to build relationships, teams, and capacity.

The study team recommended several program adjustments to the Joint Staff, including linking the APH mission to the ongoing security transition and U.S. responsibilities under a future strategic partnership agreement; placing the program’s weight of effort on those coalition organizations that are already established to cut across levels and lines of operation to delivery security, governance, and development at the local level; fully leveraging a new in-theater billet/personnel “optimization” process to get the right Hands into the right positions; creating a cross-command, cross-cohort Hands team to generate strategic, enduring effects; and working with the Services to recruit and retain personnel with the ideal Hands profile of operational competence, language aptitude, intellectual and emotional flexibility, cross-cultural communication skills, empathy, and an entrepreneurial mindset. The study team will continue to supplement this research through surveys and interviews of Cohort 2 Hands currently redeploying from Afghanistan.

Boko Haram: An Evolving Threat

A surge in large-scale attacks over the past year has shown the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram to con-

stitute a serious threat to stability in West Africa's most populous state and the world's fourth largest oil exporter. Over the course of 2011, the group successfully expanded its geographical reach, mastered new tactical advances, and fully reemerged following a vigorous crackdown by Nigerian security forces in 2009. Boko Haram's leaders have since adjusted their rhetoric, adopting themes espoused by international jihadist groups. In the Africa Center for Strategic Studies' Africa Security Brief No. 20, Peter Pham argues that these factors, the arrests of Boko Haram militants in Niger in possession of contact information for al Qaeda affiliates, and Boko Haram's newfound ability to conduct complex operations lend credence to claims that the group has collaborated and trained with al Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and other international terrorist groups.

The Nigerian government has moved aggressively in recent months both to offer the possibility of negotiations and threaten the rigorous application of force to deal with the evolving Boko Haram threat. However, it must carefully measure its response, as previous heavy-handed security operations have inflamed public opinion and diminished support for the police and military. Improved intelligence and investigative techniques should be key priorities so as to more carefully target responses. Information-sharing with regional and international partners will also be critical to understanding Boko Haram's diverse financiers, multiple factions, and evolving links with foreign groups. To redress core grievances that motivate Boko Haram supporters in northern Nigeria, the government must better stimulate the region's stagnating development and widespread frustrations with official corruption.

Addressing Côte d'Ivoire's Deeper Crisis

Overcoming the polarization caused by conflict and the risk of recurrence are fundamental challenges facing many African countries. Côte d'Ivoire's traumatic and deadly 2011 postelection standoff was ultimately resolved, but the country must still grapple with underlying disputes that propelled it toward conflict. In the

Africa Center for Strategic Studies' Africa Security Brief No. 19, Dr. Thierno Mouctar Bah, a historian of African militaries, examines the widespread ethnic, religious, and land rivalries that continue to contribute to fragmentation in the security sector and political system in Côte d'Ivoire. These rivalries, moreover, have transnational relevance—stability in Côte d'Ivoire, an economic engine in West Africa, is vital to the subregion, which is struggling to recover from civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as a legacy of coups.

Though the country enjoys rich traditions of tolerance and social diversity, a weak institutional framework set the stage for a tumultuous political transition following the 1994 death of Côte d'Ivoire's first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who had led the country for 33 years. Leaders jockeyed for power amid the resulting political vacuum and many exploited ethnic and regional divisions to mobilize support, including in the military. The manipulation led to a breakdown in state structures and a civil conflict in 2002 that divided the country into two halves until the political resolution in 2011.

Côte d'Ivoire is now physically reunited, but the newly elected government must draw from the country's traditions of openness to realize social reunification. Critical security sector reforms must extend beyond conventional standards to build a professional force based on the concept of the "Army-Nation" (that is, instilling the ethos that the military exists to serve the nation). Establishing a capable and independent electoral commission and national legislature will also create important checks against the abuse of state power and ensure smoother political transitions in the future. Support from regional neighbors will be crucial in preventing crises from spilling across borders.

Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's Pivotal Ambivalence

Risks of instability currently loom large over the Maghreb and Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has grown more capable and mobile while Boko Haram

is proving more lethal and resilient than in years past. Both may now be working together. Heavily armed mercenaries have also dispersed from Libya into neighboring states following the fall of Qadhafi and arms and drug trafficking continue to spread. Meanwhile, regional security cooperation to address these converging transnational threats remains fragmented. Most countries in the region disagree over the nature and origin of the threats and trust is very limited.

In the Africa Center for Strategic Studies' Africa Security Brief No. 18, Laurence Aïda Ammour explores how Algeria is well positioned to play a central role in redefining regional cooperation. The country lies at the crossroads of North Africa, Europe, and the Sahel, and its military capabilities and industrial base surpass those of its neighbors. But before it can be an effective regional leader, it must first reconcile the complex and, at times, competing incentives it faces to combat insecurity. The government must reform its military-dominated political structure, which limits the government's capabilities by forcing it to justify the military's political position by presenting terrorism and other regional threats as indefinite, elusive, and interminable. Once the military retreats from political and economic affairs, the country will then find it can broaden its economic investments and military cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel so as to forge more comprehensive partnerships and better manage the growing security threats in this region.

Horn of Africa Food Security Crisis: Implications for U.S. Africa Command

On March 8, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy hosted a conference on the ongoing relationship between food security and human security in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region. Bringing together representatives from across the U.S. Government as well as the nongovernmental organization (NGO) and academic communities, the conference's five panels addressed political and security issues in the HOA, environmental issues, open information-sharing, the role of NGOs and international organizations, and

U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) role.

As was noted during the conference, the recent HOA food security crisis in 2011 was not an isolated incident, but rather was representative of the complex challenges facing Africa on both the development and security fronts. As General Carter F. Ham, USAFRICOM commander, and several subsequent speakers reiterated, food and security are related and the destabilizing effect from food security results in conflict over scarce resources. Conversely, the presence of protracted armed conflict disrupts normal life for the millions of Africans who would otherwise be working in agriculture, thus furthering structural food deficits. The HOA is currently the most food insecure region in the world (with the Sahel region expected to follow) and all of the civil conflicts in recent history in the region have been over food, land, and water.

The Future of Complex Operations

On March 13, 2012, the Center for Complex Operations gathered the board of its quarterly journal *PRISM* to discuss the future of complex operations. What might future complex operations look like? How does the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, with its focus on counterterrorism and emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, affect the future composition of the force, and concomitantly the capacity for complex operations? How can we create organizational efficiencies in the face of budget cuts at the Pentagon and elsewhere in the national security establishment to enable us to retain some capacity? What do developments in such countries as Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Iran mean for the future of complex operations? There is an assumption in some defense and foreign policy circles that there will be no more Afghanistans and that we should return to a more traditional paradigm for protecting national security and "go back to our core competencies." Is this a viable assumption for strategy or for force structuring?

It was widely observed that there was no political appetite for large-scale counterinsurgency (COIN) operations such as in Iraq and Afghanistan in the years

ahead. Future operations are more likely to have a small footprint, like the “COIN-lite” operation in the Philippines, or no on-the-ground footprint at all, like the recent intervention in Libya. The military is in the early phases of a 10-year drawdown on a path to a period of constrained growth. This first period of drawdown is not the endstate, but if the current trend continues, U.S. forces will no longer be sized for large stability operations. Though the intention is to preserve reversibility—to enable the force to be enlarged and to expand capacity quickly—this drawdown will have significant impact on the U.S. capacity for extended land-based interventions. The same contraction in expeditionary capacity is evident in the civilian agencies. However we exercise choice and selectivity in the interventions we engage in, we do not control the flow of events, which for the past two decades has drawn the United States into a new complex operation approximately every 3 years. Budgetary choices and resulting capacity contractions will mismatch our capabilities, and the challenges we are most likely to face. Conference results will be published in coming months.

Grand Strategy and International Law

In the Center for Strategic Research’s Strategic Forum No. 277, Senior Director Nicholas Rostow examines the relationship between grand strategy and international law, particularly U.S. grand strategy and international law. He starts with John Lewis Gaddis’s definition of *grand strategy* as the “calculated relationship of means to large ends,” and analyzes the way in which grand strategy and international law interact. As grand strategy deals with subjects that touch the sources of sovereignty, is there—can there be—a relationship between law, much less international law, and grand strategy? The answer, of course (despite the skeptics), is yes; it is a different yes than advocates of this or that legal or other international institution might intend.

Rostow argues that we live in a world of rapid change, but that institutions such as the state show resiliency. As a result, the law governing their relations with each other must be equally resilient. Because neither

domestic nor international law is ossified, policymakers and citizens alike turn to it for help in sorting through competing priorities and challenges.

The Europeans built an international political system that became a system of laws. Specific, historical grand strategic decisions had legal consequences. This system became the present globalized, international, legal, and political regime, which is supposed to serve all states. However exceptional a state may believe itself to be, its stake in this regime is real, as it finds out when its independence is threatened.

Since World War II, international law, broadly understood, has never been far from U.S. policymaking and grand strategy because it has been consistent with U.S. interests in the balance of power in Eurasia and the prevention of another world war. A bedrock principle is that aggression cannot succeed—thus, the defense of Kuwait in 1990 and the European order in the Kosovo campaign of 1999. That the aggression technically did not cross international boundaries did not negate the conclusion that, if tolerated, Europe’s post-World War II order would be threatened. U.S. efforts to contain and resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, sustain regional balances of power in Asia and Africa, and maintain democracy in the Western Hemisphere reflected a global interest in a legal order that would minimize the risk of nuclear confrontations. These goals, which are both legal and strategic, remain core principles of U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy.

Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities

China’s rising power and increased global activism have attracted increasing attention, with particular focus on whether a stronger China is likely to be a revisionist or status quo state. Power transition theory highlights the potential for a dissatisfied rising power to challenge the existing international order, but it is difficult to evaluate whether a rising power is dissatisfied. Where Chinese leaders choose to travel can offer insights into

whether China's behavior is more consistent with that of a revisionist or status quo state and into China's broader diplomatic priorities. In this *International Studies Quarterly* article, Scott L. Kastner and the Center for Strategic Research's Dr. Phillip C. Saunders present a series of expectations concerning how the travel patterns of a challenger state are likely to differ from the travel patterns of a status quo state. Using a newly compiled data set, the two then analyze the correlates of travel abroad by top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2008. Their results are more consistent with a status quo conceptualization of China, though there are some important exceptions such as willingness to travel to rogue states. The authors also use travel data to test other hypotheses about Chinese foreign policy behavior.

The Philippines: Internal and External Security Challenges

In the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's February 2012 *Special Report* (Issue 45), the National War College's Zach Abuza surveys the security context in the Philippines and the recent history of government efforts to control various aspects of the insurgencies challenging government control. Dr. Abuza argues that there is little reason for optimism that negotiations will lead to a cessation of the insurgency. The report also surveys external threats, and concludes that the "reality is, of all the claimants, the Philippines have the fewest capabilities to defend their claims and prevent external aggression; and they know it. China has been able to act with near impunity, and there is little that the Philippines can do. So the 'diplomacy first' strategy for Manila is both necessary and realistic."

Engaging without Militarizing

The Center for Strategic Research hosted Dr. Frank Mora, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, as part of its long-standing Colleagues for the Americas Seminar Series. In February, Dr. Mora addressed the topic of "Engag-

ing without Militarizing," a sensitive issue raised when Latin American and Caribbean governments seek Department of Defense (DOD) assistance to develop their military's technical and doctrinal modernization required for today's missions. The United States and neighboring countries are at a crossroad because of the complexities involved in countering the violent challenge of transnational organized crime. DOD engagement is one important tool in a whole-of-government approach to partnering. Today's DOD support is focused on strengthening democracy and promoting rule of law. The region's armed forces have changed in many ways and deserve credit for the significant reforms that have been undertaken since the Cold War. Professional defense institutions have emerged under firm civilian control.

In Central America, several presidents have found it necessary to reinforce law enforcement with military forces because domestic law enforcement agencies have become overwhelmed. While DOD appreciates that this is not the role the United States would like to see militaries assuming, it would be irresponsible to ignore the realities facing these nations, especially Mexico and Guatemala. Disengaging from our partners when their leaders are specifically asking for U.S. help to educate and train the military is not a feasible way forward. In reality, such requests present an opportunity to demonstrate that the United States is a reliable and committed defense partner that can provide important support for the professionalization and modernization of the armed forces. DOD efforts can help U.S. partners ensure that their military forces are employed in ways that foster respect for the rule of law while strengthening democratic governance.

Space and the Joint Fight

In the Center for Strategic Research's Strategic Forum No. 275, Dr. Robert L. Butterworth explores the role of space capabilities in the joint fight. Dr. Butterworth explains that technology has extended space progressively deeper into warfare, while potential adversaries are working to extend warfare further into space. The former calls for new arrangements to provide tactical space re-

connaissance; the latter demands recognizing where and how space is essential to the joint fight. Arguing that the measure of merit for military space is enhanced combat capabilities, Dr. Butterworth concludes that military space capabilities must be designed, acquired, and operated to enable combat effects that achieve success on the battlefield. Substantial analytical work is needed to shape effective responses both to foreign threats to space capabilities and budget exigencies. As a guide for meeting future space requirements for the joint fight, Dr. Butterworth points to a quotation from a former commander of Air Force Space Command: the defense and intelligence space communities must shift to “a new architecture that accommodates the needs of both, with platforms that are purpose-designed for specific war fighter or national intelligence needs, and . . . makes individual satellites more affordable and easier to produce.”

Power to the Producers: The Challenges of Electricity Provision in Major Energy-Exporting States

The National War College’s Theresa Sabonis-Helf published “Power to the Producers: The Challenges of Electricity Provision in Major Energy-Exporting States,” as chapter 6 of *Beyond the Resource Curse*, ed. Brenda Shaffer and Taleh Ziyadov (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). Dr. Sabonis-Helf states that it may seem intuitive that petrostates, whose economies and federal revenues are based on oil and natural gas, would have energy to spare at home. In fact, however, she argues that many petrostates have persistent trouble keeping the lights on. Establishment and maintenance of a national electricity grid is a complex task that requires sustained commitment: electricity must be delivered as it is needed, and systems can be destroyed if demand and supply are not well matched. In oil-exporting states, there is a tendency to build ambitious grids and provide subsidized electricity as demonstrations of state strength and as a way to share energy wealth with the nation. Subsequently, the states discover that maintaining the grid, and controlling the extent of subsidies (which grow continually

over time in often unpredictable ways), is very difficult. Dr. Sabonis-Helf examines the experiences of Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan. In each case, the state has had ongoing and increasing trouble keeping the lights on. She argues that each state has pursued (with varying success) a mix of political and technological strategies to escape the trap of continually growing subsidies and continually declining quality of power.

Searching for a Strategy: How to Maintain Global Power in an Age of Austerity

In this *Armed Forces Journal* (March 2012) article, Dr. Joe Collins of the National War College argues that “We are not just cutting the budget—we are engaged in realigning the strategy, the defense program and the defense budget. How well we do this will be critical to global stability, deterrence and our ability, in extremis, to fight and win the nation’s wars, as well as to clean up after them.” Dr. Collins surveys a number of major strategic concepts in circulation today, including the proposed “shift” or pivot to Asia, about which he argues, for example, that areas of great power rivalry do not always produce the conflicts that demand U.S. attention and that forecasting regional demands on U.S. resources is extremely difficult to do. One major conclusion of the piece is that “Our allies all over the globe are our ace in the hole. Whether the issue is Europe, Asia-Pacific or the Middle East, we have greater possibilities for burdensharing and combined action with powerful friends and allies.”

Domestic Event Support Operations

In the Center for Technology and National Security Policy’s Defense & Technology Paper No. 89, Andrew Smith presents a framework from an Australian perspective for defense activities associated with supporting major peacetime events on domestic territory, such as the Olympic Games, Soccer World Cup, G8 Summit, and World Trade Organization meetings. Recognizing that governments may need to engage the

full range of national public and private sector agencies and capabilities, including their national defense establishments, to support the major peacetime domestic events, the author seeks to offer an organizational model for such operations. Domestic event support operations (DESO) differ from other forms of support that defense establishments provide in the domestic environment in that they relate to major preplanned activities that arise with significant notice. In this respect they differ from urgent, reactive tasks through which militaries often support dangerous and unpredictable domestic security arrangements. They can also include nonsecurity or general support but are different from other forms of nonsecurity defense assistance to civilian communities in that they are often associated with highly newsworthy international events with major national reputation implications.

Military involvement can be significant, and the complexity of military activities in any nation's domestic environment demands that DESO be well planned and organized. In a time of constrained national security spending, and heightened security concerns, DESO planning requires a robust intellectual framework. The paper draws heavily from the Australian experience in the last dozen years, to include the Summer Olympics and Paralympics (2000), Commonwealth Games (2006), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting, and a number of other events.

Constructive Convergence: Imagery and Humanitarian Assistance

In the Center for Technology and National Security Policy's Defense & Technology Paper No. 90, Doug Hanchard details the technical importance and utility of imagery, including that obtained from satellites, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, or ground views, to postdisaster humanitarian responders, looking specifically at developments since the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

The use of imagery has the power to change organizational command structures, especially since

the technology used to share and comment on these images is becoming increasingly available and adaptable. This allows individuals and groups, both in and outside of the government, to contribute to these new humanitarian efforts. The paper also details the available resources and current challenges that face humanitarian responders who use imagery, including interoperability challenges, lack of unified technical standards, governance structures, as well as personal privacy and intellectual property issues. Policy recommendations addressed in the paper cover transmission standards, short message service shortcodes, application programming interfaces, and data search techniques. Imagery use for humanitarian purposes requires coordination and collaboration between groups, and the paper provides an excellent basis for more detailed discussions on this new and constantly evolving topic.

Reflections on Over 50 Years in Research and Development; Some Lessons Learned

In the Center for Technology and National Security Policy's Defense & Technology Paper No. 88, Dr. John Lyons provides research insights based upon more than 50 years of scientific and engineering research—first in the chemical industry, then at two government labs, and later some years in science and technology policy. For Dr. Lyons, a highly competent staff is the most important factor in the success of a research laboratory. The director must be involved with all the staff and insist that subordinates stay close to bench-level personnel. Additional insights provided by Dr. Lyons include: 1) it is essential to establish general agreement on a laboratory's mission; 2) continuous long-range planning is important; 3) the organization of a laboratory should be consistent with the management style of its director and should facilitate communication and cooperation within the laboratory; and 4) outside experts should perform regular, formal, and external reviews of a laboratory's quality.

Dr. Lyons also makes suggestions for those entering or considering a research and development career. These

include 1) take as much math and physics as possible; 2) before starting serious study for a research career, some summer work in a laboratory would be helpful in understanding what the work entails; 3) a career in research requires a Ph.D. in a relevant discipline; 4) seek out a mentor or sponsor; and 5) take a fundamental scientific approach to solving problems.

Gedanken (Thought) Experiment

On January 18–19, 2012, staff from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy conducted a Gedanken (thought) experiment at Fort Benning, Georgia, focused on exploring how future network science (dynamic communications, information, and sociocognitive networks) capabilities could be used by small units (platoon and below) in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Additional areas examined were information overload and distraction/disruption to the command and control structure, which should be considered as these capabilities are developed. The experiment solicited feedback from 14 mid- /senior-level infantry noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and 14 captains (11 infantry and 3 armor). All had combat tours as squad leaders, platoon sergeants, or platoon leaders; with some of the NCOs having completed as many as six tours in Iraq/Afghanistan. Scientists and engineers from Army laboratories and engineering centers participated as subject matter experts and observers.

The highly successful event generated a tremendous amount of information from discussions and surveys. A future Defense & Technology Paper will be written to document the output of the event to include addressing the process of designing and conducting the Gedanken experiment, as well as the technical output—capability needs; potential operational issues; potential tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and recommendations for science and technology investments. For example, emerging findings indicate near-term needs of identification of critical information requirements for small units; real-time, point-to-point, non-line-of-sight

communications; information tagging (vetting, reliability, age); information prioritization; robotic systems for reconnaissance; and new TTPs. Mid- to long-term needs identified include full integration into the Army network and network-enabled intelligent “mission assist” tools (for example, alerts, reporting, assisting with mission planning and execution, and developing and visualizing sociocognitive networks). The participating Army scientists and engineers have already begun to use the experiment results in their respective programs.

Sociocultural Data Evaluation Summit

This Center for Technology and National Security Policy summit, conducted January 18, 2012, brought together over 100 attendees from a multitude of government departments and agencies to address specific aspects of criteria to be used for evaluation of the quality of sociocultural and related data. The summit, and its 11 working groups, also red teamed the concept of evaluating data, considered special challenges and concerns of collecting data in a warzone, archival research, and other variations in the method of collection.

Conference output is incorporated into threaded discussion boards on the DataCards wiki site (www.data-cards.org) so that the dialogue can continue virtually. One of the key summit takeaways is that it integrated factors to produce a rating system that provides objective criteria that aggregate into a single 5-star rating. These ratings are being applied to the roughly 1,500 data sources currently identified in DataCards in order of operational priority. Additionally, the summit included an initial set of criteria on documentation/transparency of the data collection process; completeness of the data source in terms of not having major “gaps” in information; proximity and familiarity of the data collector to the source; broad use of the data source beyond the data provider; clear and unbiased “sampling frame” for data; data vetting and quality control processes for the data source; access to the data providers; citation and traceability of the data source; and familiarity of the sociocultural context of the country(ies) studied by the data provider.