



RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

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The Al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus

On June 6, the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) hosted a discussion on al-Qaeda's role vis-à-vis the Taliban from 1996 – 2011 featuring Dr. Anne Stenersen, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Drawing from records captured from Afghanistan and Pakistan, including those within the CRRC archival database, Dr. Stenersen analyzed al-Qaeda's different relationships with the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or the TTP), as well as the future of al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region.

With respect to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime from 1996 – 2001, Dr. Stenersen proposed that al-Qaeda played a subordinate role during this time period due to the bureaucratic and formal nature of the relationship. Osama bin Laden exercised limited control in the relationship, but succeeded in gaining considerable influence among many Arab foreign fighters in Afghanistan. The Taliban viewed bin Laden as best suited to protect its national interests. In exchange for rooting out spies and anti-Taliban infiltrators among Arab immigrants who came to train in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda gained unfettered access to the most eligible recruits who best served its operational purposes.

Following the allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent loss of Afghanistan as a safe haven, al-Qaeda's relationship to the Afghan Taliban grew increasingly distant and formal due to geographical separation and the need to secure permission from Mullah Mohammed Omar, the spiritual leader of the Taliban, before conducting military operations in Afghanistan. The mutually beneficial relationship, in which al-Qaeda controlled the Arab immigrant population in exchange for its pick of top training camp recruits, no longer existed because the conflict had shifted from Afghanistan to neighboring Pakistan. The degree of cooperation between al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban decreased after 2001, not because they moved further apart ideologically, but because there was not a specific need to cooperate.

On the issue of al-Qaeda and the TTP after 2001, the much newer and inexperienced TTP relied on al-Qaeda for religious guidance and military direction. In this relationship, al-Qaeda exercised much more direct influence over the TTP, as opposed to the Afghan Taliban, partly because it did not depend on

the TTP for sanctuary. Records released from bin Laden's Abbottabad compound indicate that al-Qaeda had access to a variety of sanctuaries independent of the TTP. These records also convey al-Qaeda's concern over operations by the TTP that bin Laden considered misguided, such as its use of indiscriminate violence and killing of Muslim civilians. Dr. Stenersen argued that al-Qaeda will likely continue to dominate the relationship with the TTP and, at the same time, further distance itself from that organization due to al-Qaeda's autonomy in Pakistan and its disdain for the TTP's extreme brutality toward fellow Muslims.

Dr. Stenersen also noted that the Arab Spring led to a clear change in bin Laden's thinking. Records indicate that bin Laden wanted to reduce al-Qaeda's military participation in Afghanistan and other local conflicts and focus on propaganda and terrorist attacks against the United States. Dr. Stenersen argued that al-Qaeda's primary goal in the region was to "make America bleed" in order to pave the way for Islamist revolutions in the Middle East. This objective aligns with bin Laden's theory that withdrawal of American influence from the Middle East is a prerequisite for Islamist revolution, whether violent or nonviolent. According to Stenersen, all of this implies that al-Qaeda's role in Afghanistan will diminish after NATO pulls out. At the same time, however, some al-Qaeda operatives may continue to fight even after the withdrawal of the "foreign occupier" such as jihadi foreign fighters did from 1989-1992 following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Moreover, dependent factors, like personal ties, opportunity, and ideology may influence the decision to wage jihad, whether or not occupation continues.

According to Dr. Stenersen, the al-Qaeda-Taliban nexus has taken many shapes from 1996 – 2011; mainly from one of mutual interest and dependence with the Afghan Taliban, to one of distance and independence from the Pakistani Taliban. Due to local support, such as from Harkat ul-Mujahideen (a Kashmiri-based Islamic militant group), al-Qaeda does not need the TTP to operate in Pakistan. Despite its autonomy in Pakistan

and ability to wage attacks in the region, al-Qaeda lacks a replacement for Ayman al-Zawahiri, its ideological leader, should he be killed or seriously injured – causing militant Islamists concern for the future of the global jihadi movement.

The Iraqi Nuclear Program

On June 14, the Conflict Records Research Center hosted a discussion on Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, and what that might mean for Iran's development of nuclear power, featuring Dr. Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Assistant Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Dr. Braut-Hegghammer addressed the attack's consequences for Iraq's nuclear program, the implications for understanding the potential role of preventative attacks on nuclear proliferators, and lessons for policymakers. She concluded that the Osirak attack was ultimately counterproductive, triggering the establishment of a covert program that was not detected by the international community before it was interrupted by the 1991 Gulf War. While the attack had mixed effects, the most important consequence was a transformation and intensification of Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. This development supports Dr. Braut-Hegghammer's theory that preventive attacks may cause delays in a state's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, but that they can also have unintended consequences that intensify and complicate proliferation risks in the long-term.

Dr. Braut-Hegghammer characterized Iraq's nuclear activities from 1975 – 1981 as "drifting toward the bomb," a time during which Saddam Hussein established a nuclear power program dedicated to exploring technical options for mastering the nuclear fuel cycle and reprocessing plutonium. Yet despite Saddam's decision to pursue nuclear weapons, he failed to implement a viable plan, staff, budget, or program. By 1981, Iraq had made significant advances toward mastering the nuclear fuel cycle, but could not produce fissile material in large quantities.

While the strike against Osirak eliminated the option of developing a plutonium route, the Iraqi scientists

had realized that the targeted reactor was not suitable for the purposes of a weapons program. As a result, they set out to design a more technologically feasible nuclear weapons program that utilized a series of different technologies, including the use of indigenous resources and electromagnetic isotope separation with diffusion. However, the research program was hampered by the arduous technological routes taken and poor management, resulting in years of delay. In 1987, Saddam decided to restructure the program. From 1987–1990, the Iraqis made substantial advances toward establishing a weapons capability. Finally, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Iraqis launched a crash program to attempt to rapidly assemble a nuclear weapon by diverting safeguarded reactor fuel. By 1991, Iraq posed a much larger proliferation risk than it did ten years before due to a stronger mandate, larger budget, better organization, stronger technological base, more fissile material, and weaponization ability.

Dr. Braut-Hegghammer argued that the Israeli attack against the Osirak reactor strengthened Saddam Hussein's resolve to develop nuclear weapons by rallying support to intensify Iraqi efforts. The attack offers valuable lessons on preventative strikes and nuclear nonproliferation in general, including: 1) air strikes on states' nuclear weapons infrastructure do not always produce the desired results; 2) preventative attacks may temporarily halt nuclear programs, but targeting states with advanced nuclear capabilities may also intensify proliferation risks; and, 3) attacking a state's nuclear infrastructure can force its nuclear weapons program underground and create a false sense of security in the international community.

Dr. Braut-Hegghammer cautions that comparing a preventative strike against Iran today to Iraq in the 1980's is problematic because of Iran's superior infrastructure, more robust program, and lower degree of vulnerability to an airstrike. She argues that a strike would, at best, delay Iran's efforts to develop nuclear

weapons by a year, unlike that against Iraq which proved more debilitating. But similar to the attack against Iraq, a preventative attack against Iran, or any country seeking nuclear weapons, could create consensus among the population in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, she argues, the only viable solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge is diplomatic, rather than military.

Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach

The United States and China have a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship where substantial areas of cooperation coexist with ongoing strategic tensions and suspicions. One manifestation involves disputes and incidents when U.S. and Chinese military forces interact within China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Three high-profile incidents over the last decade have involved aggressive maneuvers by Chinese military and/or paramilitary forces operating in close proximity to deter U.S. surveillance and military survey platforms from conducting their missions. In China Strategic Perspectives No. 5, Dr. Phil Saunders and CAPT Mark Redden, U.S. Navy, address why these incidents continue to occur despite mechanisms designed to prevent such dangerous encounters and explore if new or different procedures or policies help avoid future incidents.

The problem in the U.S.-China case lies not with inadequate rules (for maritime operations) or history of practice (for air operations), but rather in the motivations that sometimes drive the Chinese to selective non-compliance with their provisions. China regards military surveillance and survey operations in its EEZ as hostile, threatening, illegal, and inappropriate. China's harassment of U.S. naval vessels and aircraft conducting surveillance and survey operations is intended to produce a change in U.S. behavior by raising the costs and risks of these operations.

The U.S. military has confronted this problem before. U.S. doctrine and operational practice in conducting and responding to surveillance operations derives

primarily from Cold War interactions with the Soviet military. The two countries were eventually able to develop a mutually beneficial protocol, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), for managing air and naval interactions, thereby reducing the potential for an incident to occur or escalate. Given the success of INCSEA and tactical parallels between U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-China interactions, the factors that led the Soviet Union to seek an agreement provide a useful prism for evaluating the current situation.

Three primary factors motivated the U.S.-Soviet agreement: 1) concern over the escalation potential of future incidents; 2) a growing parallelism in the nature and scope of surveillance operations; and 3) a burgeoning period of détente. These factors do not presently exist in the U.S. – China relationship to the degree necessary to induce mutual restraint in maritime and air interactions within China’s EEZ. This situation may change over the next 10 to 15 years as Chinese global economic interests expand and naval modernization produces a more capable and active Chinese navy, but waiting for change is not an attractive solution given continuing operational risks and potential for an incident to badly damage bilateral relations.

If U.S. policymakers seek a faster change in Chinese behavior, they need to understand the underlying Chinese policy calculus, how it may change over time, and potential means of influencing that calculus. Based on Chinese policy objectives, official statements, patterns of behavior, and logical inferences, Saunders and Redden identify seven decisionmaking variables: 1) sovereignty/security concerns; 2) intelligence/counter-intelligence; 3) geostrategic considerations; 4) Chinese domestic context; 5) global commons access; 6) escalation control; and, 7) relations with the United States.

U.S. policymakers have several broad avenues of approach to alter the Chinese policy calculus and thereby influence Chinese behavior: 1) intelligence/counter-intelligence approaches – these approaches link China’s own ability to gather intelligence with its tolerance of U.S. intelligence-collection activities. Options include

creating direct parallels between U.S. operations in China’s EEZ and Chinese operations in Japan’s EEZ; linking Chinese tolerance of U.S. surveillance operations in its EEZ with U.S. tolerance of select Chinese intelligence-collection activities in other areas or using other means; and linking the frequency of U.S. surveillance operations to Chinese concessions or cooperation in other areas; 2) maritime cooperation/coercion – these approaches play on the distinction between contentious U.S.-Chinese interactions within China’s EEZ and more cooperative interactions in distant waters. Cooperative options include highlighting the value of agreed operational norms and expanding U.S.-China maritime cooperation, including via surveillance cooperation in support of counterpiracy operations; coercive options include responding to Chinese harassment with “tit for tat” responses against Chinese navy ships or commercial shipping outside China’s EEZs; and 3) geostrategic and bilateral considerations – these approaches play on Chinese geostrategic interests in maintaining a stable regional environment and a U.S.-China relationship conducive to economic and social development. Options include a more structured, consistent, and sustained U.S. strategic communication plan that highlights international norms of airmanship and seamanship; drawing parallels between the rights of military units to conduct operations in EEZs under the freedom of navigation principle and the more general issue of commercial access to the global commons; and challenging the Chinese assumption that military incidents inside China’s EEZ are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict or seriously threaten bilateral relations.

Given the importance that China places on sovereignty, no single option is likely to be sufficient. A mixed approach, particularly one that influences a larger number of Chinese decisionmakers, may maximize the probability of success. Cooperative approaches require time for the benefits of cooperation to accrue and for normative arguments to be heard and heeded, both in China and internationally. Some potential coercive approaches require violating preferred U.S. norms of freedom of navigation and U.S. military standard practice of

safe airmanship and seamanship to generate the leverage necessary to alter Chinese behavior. This risks shifting international norms in undesired directions and would create greater tension and friction in military-military relations and bilateral relations generally.

The study does not attempt to weigh the intelligence value of U.S. operations in China's EEZ against their negative impact on U.S.-China relations or the costs of the coercive options identified above. U.S. policymakers will need to carefully consider whether the status quo is tolerable, the costs and risks of various approaches, and what mix of policies might move China in desired directions at an acceptable cost. There is some logic to beginning with softer, more cooperative policy options and holding more coercive options in reserve in case cooperative options fail or Chinese harassment increases. However, some might argue that the United States has already employed some soft options with limited results.

Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict

China's antiaccess/area-denial capabilities resulted in the Pentagon writing an Air-Sea Battle concept as part of its Joint Operational Access Concept. Unfortunately, rather than exploring potential strategies in the event of a conflict with China, the discussion surrounding Air-Sea Battle has focused on its operational aspects outside of any strategic context. In the Center for Strategic Research's Strategic Forum No. 278, T.X. Hammes proposes Offshore Control as a military strategy for what is an unlikely, and also undesirable, U.S. – China conflict.

Effective strategies include a coherent ends-ways-means formulation. Current budget issues place definite limits on U.S. means. China's nuclear arsenal restricts the choice of ways. Thus, to be achievable, the ends must be modest. The strategy of Offshore Control, which works with willing Asia-Pacific nations to ensure that the United States can interdict China's energy and raw material imports and industrial exports while protecting our partners, recognizes that any conflict with China will be measured in years, not weeks or months. It aligns

U.S. strategic requirements with the resources available; takes advantage of Pacific geography to provide strategic, operational, and tactical advantages for U.S. forces; and provides a way for the conflict to end that is consistent with previous Communist Chinese behavior. Additionally, by reducing reliance on space and cyber domains, Offshore Control is designed to slow a crisis down and reduce escalatory pressure in a crisis and potential ensuing conflict.

Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference

The Center for Strategic Research's Strategic Perspective No. 11, by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, is one in a series of case studies examining small interagency groups to understand the factors that best explain their performance. It evaluates the "Active Measures Working Group," a national-level interagency committee established in the 1980's to counter Soviet disinformation. This study explains how this interagency committee effectively accomplished its mission. Interagency committees are commonly criticized as ineffective, but the Active Measures Working Group is a notable exception.

The group successfully established and executed U.S. policy on responding to Soviet disinformation. It exposed some Soviet covert operations and raised the political cost of others by sensitizing foreign and domestic audiences to how they were being duped. The group's work encouraged allies and made the Soviet Union pay a price for disinformation that reverberated all the way to the top of the Soviet political apparatus. It became the U.S. government's body of expertise on disinformation and was highly regarded in both Congress and the Executive Branch, and it cost the U.S. Government next to nothing.

The working group also changed the way the United States and the Soviet Union viewed disinformation. With constant prodding from the group, the majority position in the U.S. national security bureaucracy moved from believing Soviet disinformation was inconsequential to believing it was deleterious to U.S. interests and on occasion could

mean the difference in which side prevailed in closely contested foreign policy issues. The working group pursued a sustained campaign to expose Soviet disinformation, and helped convince Gorbachev that such operations against the United States were counterproductive.

The case demonstrates that despite their generally poor reputation some interagency committees can be highly productive. The study also explains the factors that limited the group's performance, and why replicating the group's success could be difficult. Finally, the study yields insights on strategic communications. It explains why national security leaders and experts disagree over the value of strategic communications, and why high performance in the discipline requires dedicated interagency collaboration.

Assessing Ballistic Missile Defense for European Regional Security

On April 23, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy's "Emerging Challenges" series brought together more than two hundred senior industry, foreign, interagency, and military officials to discuss regional Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in the European theater. During the one day event, representatives from the White House led discussions over regional cooperation with Russia, members of private industry examined emerging BMD technologies, and representatives from allied nations described their country's anticipated contributions. The event focused primarily on issues related to the implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and relations with the Russian Federation, which views the development of SM-3 missile as a potential challenge to its deterrent force.

Russia's technical concerns over the capabilities of the SM-3 (Block IIA) are related to the weapon's high interception velocity and burnout altitude, which critics have argued could offset the balance between the ICBM boost phase and midcourse interception when the missile is finally deployed, sometime after 2018. Supporters of the EPAA have objected to the notion any anticipated BMD system in Europe would alter the strategic balance. Instead, they assert the system's effectiveness

would be limited to countering relatively small salvos launched from regional adversaries (rogue states), such as Iran, Syria, and (eventually) North Korea. Supporters of the EPAA believe the system would help counter the destabilizing proliferation of missile technology and perhaps deter rogue states from investing in ballistic missile systems.

Energy Security as a Grand Strategy

On May 7 and 8, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, in cooperation with Argonne National Laboratory and the University of Chicago, convened a two day workshop, as part of the "Emerging Challenges" seminar series, on the subject of energy security with the goal of forecasting U.S. operational and strategic goals based on current resource driven models. Organizers described the current energy system as a "wicked problem" whose unique challenges can rarely be broken down into discretely solvable parts. The workshop's roughly 150 participants broke up into working groups comprised of industry, interagency, academic, and Department of Defense representatives. Using a scenario designed by Argonne experts, the small groups examined the relative scale and complexity of the current energy system, modeling potential vested interests that influence market forces, and discussed the government's role in spurring new developments. Throughout the simulation, participants were encouraged to consider the necessity of protecting the entire energy supply chain, minimize future disruptions, incentivize sustainability and conservation, and realistically account for the less quantifiable role of politics and culture.

Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Strategies and Metrics for the Threat

In the Center for Technology and National Security Policy's Defense & Technology Paper No. 94, Dr. Samuel Musa argues that Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) networks pose a growing threat to national and international security. This is reflected by the

World Bank's estimate that TOC spends roughly \$1 trillion per year to bribe public officials, a number only likely to increase in coming years. TOC refers to those individuals and organizations that operate transnational for obtaining power and monetary gains by illegal means, including drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, intellectual property theft, cybercrime, and human smuggling. Dr. Musa seeks to address this international security threat by providing an overview of the strategic and policy initiatives that the international community has taken, followed by metrics of one aspect of TOC – drug trafficking – and evaluating its relative magnitude and threat to the United States over a 5-year period.

Based upon the scoring of experts, this study indicates that the risk factors of the threat remain constant over a 5-year period, implying that TOC threat actors are willing to take the same risk in 5 years as they are now. The African region has the highest ratio of impact to risk factors or potential contribution of the TOC threat to national security, leading one to believe that more attention is needed to address the threat in this region. Additionally, detection and monitoring should be maximized when the target has the highest value, which in this case is during the transport phase via air, land, or sea.

Modeling the Combined Terrorist-Narcotics Trafficker Threat to National Security

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy's Defense & Technology Paper No. 93, by Alexander Woodcock and Samuel Musa, builds on the argument that narcotics traffickers and terrorist groups can be natural allies. Woodcock and Musa develop models that may assist in characterizing potential levels of interaction that can occur between traffickers and terrorists, as well as how to disrupt these activities. They cite four areas of convergence as a justification for the importance of conducting their model-building exercise: 1) similarities in facilitators; 2) financial gains; 3) logistical support; and 4) personnel protection.

The paper investigates counter-narcotics activities and the role of efforts aimed at converting traffickers

into double agents. The models the authors build to predict activities closely resemble real-world data of drug interdictions between 2008 and 2010. Models produced for this study include four major decision-making feedback cycles; three deal with the creation of environments that are conducive to either trafficking or terrorist activity, and the last model examines the policy cycles effects on the previous three feedback models. The authors use their model-generated data to create a policy cycle model to study the impacts of increased policymaking support on the ability to create double agents and further disrupt the trafficking cycle.

The results from Woodcock and Musa's study indicate that "policymaking can lead to a reduction in the level of deprivation, disaffection, and violence and that policy-related effects can be inhibited by corruption..." Additionally, the models suggest that the terrorist organizations are limited by their availability of trained personnel to run operations and that filling these operational gaps may be the focus of future collaborations between narcotics traffickers and terrorist organizations.

Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in the Great Lakes

Despite more than a dozen major peace agreements and negotiation efforts over the last decade, conflict has persisted in Africa's Great Lakes region. The fighting has been concentrated in the provinces of North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) along its shared border with Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Millions have been displaced; tens of thousands killed in combat, and manifold more have died due to a collapse in health services and livelihood opportunities. In this Africa Center for Strategic Studies' Africa Security Brief No. 21, Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, a participant in several of the region's peace negotiations, explains why a string of peace initiatives have been unable to resolve such instability.

The current fighting in the eastern DRC is an outgrowth of the Rwandan genocide. The new Rwandan government conducted a series of cross-border military

operations beginning in 1996 to neutralize militants linked to the genocide who had fled to the Kivus. The Rwandans subsequently established a series of proxy militias in the DRC. Other states in the region followed suit, leading to the proliferation of militant groups. Meanwhile, trafficking in the region's rich natural resources surged as militias sought funding, and waves of displacement led to intercommunal tensions over land and resources. Previous negotiation efforts have achieved some gains in resolving these challenges, but none have addressed the full range of geopolitical and local level conflict drivers. Any framework for peace in the Great Lakes must prevent states, particularly Rwanda, from supporting proxy militias, which tend to be counterproductive and precipitate new crises. The minerals trade also requires proper regulation to ensure it does not fuel militancy but rather promotes needed regional development. The representation of local communities in any peace process will be essential to successful disarmament and reconciliation efforts.

Africa in the Future Conditional

In the wake of the disruptive and often violent period of colonization and decolonization, Africans must reflect on the history of their civilizations in order to uncover their historical means of recovery and reconciliation. In this recently released French language book published by l'Haramattan Press, Dr. Mathurin Houngnikpo, academic chair of civil-military relations at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, calls for renewed dialogue among Africa's intellectuals, political leaders, and citizens to identify viable approaches to cooperation on the continent that are drawn from its rich past. He highlights the strengths of Africa's expanding civil society as the driver of increasing political participation and an enriched public dialogue that is reenergizing political discourse and reform efforts in many African countries.

China: Angola's New Best Friend, For Now

China's investments and relations in Angola, one Africa's fastest growing economies, have sharply risen over

the last decade. Angola is now China's top oil supplier and China is extensively involved in major construction projects and Angola's retail and wholesale sectors. Despite this increased cooperation, the China – Angola partnership remains unclear. Dr. Assis Malaquias, academic chair for defense economics at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, in this book analyzes how these relations emerged and their impact on Angola's foreign policy and influence in Africa. While its relationship with China has bolstered regime stability and boosted its international standing, Angola does not necessarily regard China as a strategic partner. Rather, views of China in Angola are undermined by unpopular Chinese corporate practices, prompting the Angolan government to take a more pragmatic stance in its relations with Beijing. The still uncertain trajectory of the Angola-China relationship may have implications across the continent as China expands its investments in many African states.

Building Democratic Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood

Recent stabilization efforts have reinforced the importance of establishing viable domestic institutions of accountability if stability and development gains are to be sustained. However, the starting point for many fragile or limited states is one of autocratic legacies, low social capital, and cultures of impunity. In this paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting in April, Dr. Joseph Siegle, Director of Research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, offers a framework for understanding the formation of accountability structures in transition settings while examining accountability mechanisms that have emerged in selected contexts of limited statehood. Key findings are that in most transitional contexts, institutional checks and balances must be directed at the executive branch, which historically has monopolized power and defied oversight. While such institutional mechanisms can emerge, they typically take at least a decade. Reversing norms of impunity in the early years of a transition, therefore, depends on the commitment and resilience of non-state institutions –

often traditional authorities, media, civil society groups, and external actors.

Protecting NATO's Advantage in Space

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance enabled by space. NATO operations increasingly take advantage of space, but potential adversaries are seeking to negate that advantage. As Ambassador Gregory Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, highlights in *Transatlantic Current* No. 5, while NATO is critically dependent on space, its doctrine and planning have not kept up. NATO's doctrine and planning needs to evolve in order to preserve the operational benefits afforded by space-based capabilities and to minimize vulnerabilities. The paper concluded that as NATO is enabled by space, its doctrine and planning must reflect this reality, and with it, face the reality that space is an increasingly congested, contested, and competitive environment. In updating its doctrine and plans, NATO must take full advantage of the Allies' individual space capabilities, and it must retain the ability to operate successfully even if future adversaries contest these capabilities."

The Transatlantic Bargain and NATO: Defining the Mission for the Next Decade

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies ceased being concerned about a possible military attack from the East. Many became more eager to cash in rapidly on what was defined as "the peace dividend" – cutting defense expenditures, reducing numbers of military personnel and equipment, and turning inwards to domestic concerns. Ultimately, some began to argue that NATO was becoming outdated and might even be allowed to pass into history. This is shortsighted.

As Mr. Mark Ducasse, a Research Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, goes on to argue in this *National Strategy Forum Review* (Vol. 21, No. 1-2) publication, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and

European communism, the Alliance has continued to play an essential role in both transatlantic and international security. It has intervened in conflicts to bring an end to ethnic violence and genocide, enforced United Nations Security Council resolutions, stabilized and rehabilitated nations, fought against terrorism and piracy, brought former adversaries into the flock of Western democratic states, and allowed for security and stability to be taken as a given – a necessary underpinning to the development and prosperity of all. In the process, it has achieved things that, without the Alliance, the United States could well have had to do on its own to provide for its security, at much greater cost in both money and lives.

Ducasse concludes that NATO is destined to remain the mainstay of the transatlantic bargain. Whether future crises are responded to by NATO or by another organization (particularly the United Nations or the European Union), chances are high that, when successful, militaries and diplomats will be doing so by using familiar NATO processes, procedures, and standards. That more than 60 countries – the 28 NATO allies and a host of "partner" countries – are able to operate together, both militarily and politically, is a huge reservoir of potential response to any type of crisis, from humanitarian assistance to full-scale war. NATO standards, command and control, communications protocols, and interoperability procedures are the essential connections among military forces, disposing them to respond and enabling them to succeed. The allies need to play upon the successes of the Alliance, using this time of global austerity and defense cuts to reevaluate the transatlantic bargain, in addition to pushing forward and institutionalizing the notions of fair burden-sharing, specialization, and resource-pooling among allies.

The United States, Russia, Europe, and Security: How to Address the "Unfinished Business" of the Post-Cold War Era

In 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense published "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." The strategy document outlines the new focus of U.S. efforts on threats emanating primarily

from South Asia and the Middle East, spelling out the U.S. commitment to address them by working with allies and partners, acknowledging Europe as the “home to some of America’s most stalwart allies and partners.”

As Dr. Isabelle François, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, points out in *Transatlantic Perspective No. 2*, the United States “has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is critical to the security of Europe and beyond.” Moreover, the document characterizes engagement with Russia as important and reiterates U.S. commitment to continue efforts toward building a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest, encouraging Russia to be a contributor across a broad range of issues. The strategic environment will therefore remain one of partnership with Europe and Russia as nations work out the consequences of a rebalancing of forces in the near future.

This paper provides concrete ideas for the United States, Russia, and Europe to take account of the 2012 agenda, and refine their relationships toward the goal of partnership and the ultimate emergence of an inclusive European security community. The paper first provides an honest assessment of the NATO – Russia cooperation of the past 20 years and concludes that this relationship has yet to deliver a truly “strategic partnership” in line with the current rhetoric, many documents, and political declarations. It attempts to shed light on the Russian outlook and reviews the limits of the current partnership. It points to a significant level of “unfinished business” from the post-Cold War, which will have to be addressed if there is any hope of building a whole Europe that is free, undivided, and at peace.

The second part reviews the current challenges facing NATO allies and Russia in three main areas: 1) the reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; 2) the stalemate regarding conventional forces in Europe; and, 3) limits of cooperation in missile defense. In reviewing the debate in these three areas, François offers options to move forward in each case but, in all three areas, concludes with the need for a broad political-military dialogue, reaching

beyond the confines of the NATO-Russia relationship to broadly address Russian concerns. In each area, the paper points to fundamental disagreements that reach well beyond the issue at hand to a basic difference of views on the European security construct and on threat perceptions that ultimately reflect a fundamental lack of trust, paralyzing the strategic community.

The third and last part of the paper spells out a confidence-building program to reassure Russia regarding Western intentions and to develop trust through operational cooperation, transparency in contingency planning and exercising, dialogue about deterrence and transparency on safety measures regarding tactical nuclear weapons, smart defense approaches and projects, and possible joint installations and co-ownership as cooperation develops. In conclusion, François argues for renewed bilateral and multilateral efforts toward a strategic partnership with Russia. She stresses, however, the requirement for a “confidence-building detour” on the road to an inclusive European security community. Today’s agenda ought to focus on creating the conditions for this genuine strategic partnership to develop.

NATO and the ICC: Time for Cooperation?

Following the wars in the Balkans, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established solid cooperation, whereby NATO supported ICTY in its quest to bring persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) to justice. NATO Headquarters has provided substantial material used as evidence in various ICTY cases. NATO members have participated as witnesses to ICTY. Personnel of the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo, have detained and handed PIFWCs over to ICTY personnel who arrested them based on indictments issued by the tribunal’s prosecutor. The solid working relationship, while possibly temporarily challenged, was not put in serious jeopardy when the ICTY prosecutor investigated NATO’s conduct of operations during Operation Allied Force (also known as the Kosovo Air Campaign). The

investigation did later clear NATO of the allegations of war crimes levied against it.

As Mr. Ulf Haeussler, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies NATO Fellow, points out in Transatlantic Current No. 4, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has opened a couple of preliminary examinations regarding theaters of NATO-led operations, and NATO's track record regarding its cooperation with the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is positive. The International Criminal Court (ICC) might be interested in cooperation of a similar nature since it is investigating the situation in at least one theater where NATO has led an international military operation and is reportedly conducting preliminary examinations regarding other theaters where NATO currently deploys forces. On the one hand, the ICC prosecutor was reported to have opened a preliminary file regarding Afghanistan and earlier conducted a preliminary examination regarding Iraq. For the purpose of analyzing the seriousness of any allegations that lead to opening these files, the ICC prosecutor may seek information from appropriate sources, including international organizations. Nothing, however, is publicly known as to whether some interaction between NATO and the ICC followed suit.

Mr. Haeussler makes the conclusion that if reciprocal goodwill is allowed to grow, NATO may well take the ICC seriously despite the non-membership of the United States and Turkey in the latter, but with their full understanding. Arguably, NATO has demonstrated goodwill on its part through the conduct of operations by Operation Unified Protector.

Working With a Local Patronage System in Stability and COIN Operations

In this Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (Vol. 38, No. 1) article, Tom Blau, National Defense University Academic Affairs, and Daryl Liskey, Culture and Foreign Language Advisor at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, propose that the United States

learn to work selectively with local patron – client relations in insurgency environments. They characterize such relations, building on the work of James C. Scott, as personal, “an instrumental friendship between two individuals of unequal power where obligations of loyalty and support are reciprocal: the client pledges loyalty to the patron in return for the patron's obligation to support the client.” In contrast to market or formal relations, with which US government agencies, including the military, are more comfortable, patron and their clients are in informal, open-ended relations, not case-by-case exchanges. Blau and Liskey explain these phenomena at different levels, and in an ends-ways-means analysis, they relate them to COIN operations, especially Afghanistan. This examination leads them to conclude by advocating patronage not as a strategy but as a selective tactic, “to increase support and stability in the short to intermediate term.”

Alcohol Abuse in the Military: Prevention Through Better Screening

One of the biggest problems faced by US military forces returning from deployment is alcohol abuse. Abuse of alcohol is devastating to individual lives, while also driving up health care costs and degrading the readiness of US forces. In addition, alcohol and substance abuse contribute to a range of other negative outcomes including family violence and suicide. This Center for Technology and National Security Policy study by Dr. Paul Bartone, Senior Research Fellow, and Ms. Kathleen Jocoy, Research Associate, was undertaken to improve screening methods for early identification of troops at risk for alcohol problems. Effective screening is essential in order for leaders to target preventive assistance to those who need it most. Current screening tools used in the Department of Defense Post Deployment Health Assessment are not sufficiently sensitive, failing to identify many at-risk soldiers. These tools, which ask directly about recent drinking behaviors, yield many false-negatives be-

cause troops tend to minimize or deny drinking for fear of negative repercussions, and there is restricted access to alcohol in theater. On the other hand indirect measures, which assess personal factors that are correlated with alcohol risk, are not vulnerable to these same validity problems. Psychological hardiness is a measurable human trait composed of commitment, control and challenge that distinguishes people who remain healthy under stress from those who develop various health and performance problems. Hardiness is also strongly linked to avoidance coping style, the tendency to avoid problems in life rather than working to solve them.

Bartone and Jocoy measured hardiness, avoidance coping, and alcohol use patterns in National Guard troops recently returned from deployment to Afghanistan. Results show that low hardiness and high avoidance coping predict alcohol abuse for these troops, with risk increasing 7% for each point drop in hardiness levels. These results were cross-validated in a large sample of Norwegian military personnel, where the same pattern emerged. This research indicates that alcohol screening programs can be significantly improved by adding brief measures of hardiness and coping style. The Defense Department's current approach for alcohol screening in troops returning from deployment should incorporate indirect measures for better identification of troops at risk.

Enhancing Army S&T Vol II: The Future

In 2007, the Army Team at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) published *Enhancing Army S&T: Lessons Learned From Project Hindsight Revisited* (referred to as Vol. I). This publication summarized critical technology contributions to the development of four Army war fighting systems; 1) Abrams main battle tank, 2) Apache attack helicopter, 3) Stinger missile system, and 4) Javelin missile system. Since then, Drs. John W. Lyons and Richard Chait of CTNSP have completed a number of studies of impor-

tant aspects of the Army science and technology (S&T) program with an emphasis on the Army laboratories. In CTNSP's Defense & Technology Paper No. 92 (referred to as Vol. II), Lyons and Chait integrate these findings into a set of recommendations for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASAALT).

Research for Vol. II was motivated as a result of the lack of knowledge and recognition from government and private sector research laboratories. For Army laboratory to obtain successful reputations, two factors come into play, outstanding quality and closer attention to external relations. After intensive research, the Army came to several conclusions that would help generate more interest in Army laboratories and their efforts in the fields of research and technology. These conclusions included; 1) that the Army maintain close relationship with labs and tech staff; 2) that the Army publicize the technical contributions of the laboratories; 3) better staff support of S&T and a significant level of funding; 4) utilization of retired managers from research and development, thus placing them in different areas of the Department of Defense and Federal laboratories; 4) require ASAALT to survey the quality of Army laboratories by using external, independent subject matter experts; and, 5) expand the use of high-performance computing in the design and manufacture of Army systems.