

# TENTATIVE PLAN OF A WAR PORTFOLIO.

STUDIES OF POLICY.			STUDIES OF ENEMY FORCES			STUDIES OF OUR OWN FORCES.		
ENEMY POLICY	INTERNATIONAL LAW	OUR POLICY.	ARMY.	NAVY.	RESOURCES.	ARMY.	NAVY.	RESOURCES.
(a) A full exposition of the enemy policy in question. How valuable is that policy to the enemy? How injurious is that policy to us? What is the attitude of other nations toward enemy policy? How strong is the support accorded enemy policy by the enemy people? (b) A statement of other enemy policies that might be involved if war came; their relations to the war. (c) A statement of redress or compensation the enemy will probably demand in case of victory. (d) Do the demands of enemy policy impose upon him a geographical objective? (e) A statement of the attitude of the various powers toward the enemy. Will their attitude impose upon him any military restraint not comprehended in International Law. (f) A statement of the temper of the enemy people.	(a) Treaties regarding the conduct of the war that have been entered into with the enemy. (b) Conventions bearing on the conduct of war that have received the ratification of both powers in possible theaters of war. (c) Questions of neutrality likely to be raised and how far we may count on liberal interpretations of international law in the theater of operations. (d) The bearing of the present practice of international law on our interests. (e) A series of typical situations likely to arise in the proposed war and their solution according to existing international law.	(a) A full exposition of our policy in question. How valuable is it to us? How injurious is it to the enemy? What is the attitude of other nations towards this policy? How strongly is it supported by the people? (b) A statement of other of our policies that might be involved if war came. (c) A statement of redress or compensation that will be demanded in case of victory. (d) Do the demands of our policy impose upon our forces a geographical objective? (e) A statement of the attitude of various powers toward us. Will their attitudes impose upon us any military restraint not comprehended in International Law? (f) A statement of the temper of the people.	(a) A statement of forces in readiness and their present distribution. (b) Statement of time necessary to deploy forces in readiness in various theaters. (c) Statement of forces in reserve and their present distribution. (d) Statement of time necessary to mobilize forces in reserve. (e) Statement of time necessary to deploy reserve forces in various theaters. (f) Statement of efficiency and morale of forces in readiness. (g) Statement of efficiency and morale of reserve forces. (h) Statement of abilities of available commanders. (i) Statement of peace organization of forces. (j) Statement of the changes necessary to pass to a war organization, and a full exposition of the friction entailed. (k) Statement of transports and supply vessels necessary to a strategic deployment in each area. (l) Statement of transports and supply vessels in service. (m) Comprehensive studies of each possible theater of operations both from an offensive and a defensive standpoint. Military geography. Sanitary conditions. Statistical information upon the resources of all kinds which the various theaters of operations afford. Fortifications and field works. (n) Comprehensive studies of lines of communication and operation to possible theaters of operations. Location of principal bases. (o) Transportation facilities.	(a) Statement of forces in readiness and their present distribution. (b) Statement of time necessary for forces now ready to reach various theaters. (c) Statement of forces in reserve and their present distribution. (d) Statement of time necessary to mobilize forces in reserve. (e) Statement of time necessary to deploy reserve forces in various theaters. (f) Statement of efficiency and morale of forces in readiness. (g) Statement of efficiency and morale of reserve forces. (h) Statement of abilities of available commanders. (i) Statement of the changes necessary to pass to a war organization, and a full exposition of the friction entailed. (j) Statement of transports and supply vessels necessary to a strategic deployment in each area. (k) Comprehensive studies of each possible theater of operations both from an offensive and a defensive standpoint. Military geography. Sanitary conditions. Statistical information upon the resources of all kinds which the various theaters of operations afford. Fortifications and field works. (l) Comprehensive studies of lines of communication and operation to possible theaters of operations. Location of principal bases. (m) Transportation facilities.	(a) Statement of funds. (b) Statement of credit. (c) Statement of merchant vessels available. (d) Statement of accumulated military stores and their location. (e) Statement of reserve arms and ammunition. (f) Statement of producing capacity for military stores, guns and ammunition. (g) Statement of land transportation capacities. (h) Statement of what may be obtained by importation. (i) Statement of capacity for road and railroad construction and equipment. (j) Statement of maintenance, repair and building facilities. (k) Statement of probable or possible allies and the support they would afford.	(a) Statement of forces in readiness and their present distribution. (b) Statement of time necessary for forces now ready to reach various theaters. (c) Statement of forces in reserve and their present distribution. (d) Statement of time necessary to mobilize forces in reserve. (e) Statement of time necessary to deploy reserve forces in various theaters. (f) Statement of efficiency and morale of forces in readiness. (g) Statement of efficiency and morale of reserve forces. (h) Statement of abilities of available commanders. (i) Statement of the changes necessary to pass to a war organization, and a full exposition of the friction entailed. (j) Statement of transports and supply vessels necessary to a strategic deployment in each area. (k) Comprehensive studies of each possible theater of operations both from an offensive and a defensive standpoint. Military geography. Sanitary conditions. Statistical information upon the resources of all kinds which the various theaters of operations afford. Fortifications and field works. (l) Comprehensive studies of lines of communication and operation to possible theaters of operations. Location of principal bases. (m) Transportation facilities.	(a) Statement of funds. (b) Statement of credit. (c) Statement of merchant vessels available. (d) Statement of accumulated military stores and their location. (e) Statement of reserve arms and ammunition. (f) Statement of producing capacity for military stores, guns and ammunition. (g) Statement of land transportation capacities. (h) Statement of what may be obtained by importation. (i) Statement of capacity for road and railroad construction. (j) Statement of maintenance, repair and building facilities. (k) Statement of probable or possible allies and the support they would afford.	
By State Department	By State Department & Special Advisers	By State Department	By Military Information Division	By Naval Intelligence	By Joint Plan Making Body	By General Staff	By General Board	By Joint Plan Making Body

### GRAND ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

This Estimate of the Situation is the solution, under the conditions tabulated, of the war problem resulting from the conflict of the policies outlined.

A statement of what it has been determined to accomplish by the war.

A complete analytical examination of the general situation from the enemy point of view and the deduction therefrom of his probable intentions.

A complete analytical examination of our situation having constantly in view our mission and the enemy's probable intentions, and the deduction therefrom of the courses of action open to us.

A comparison of these courses of action, and the determination of the course of action to adopt.

The grand decision comprehends the strategic plan of the war. It covers the following points:—(a) Character of the war to be undertaken. (b) Time of beginning of the war. (c) Forces to be employed. (d) Times and place for strategic deployments. (e) Direction of subsequent effort. (f) Strategic objectives. (g) Nature and extent of cooperation between Army and Navy. (h) Strategic studies of possible phases of the war. (i) Initial allotment of resources. (j) Information service.

By Joint Plan Making Body.

### COMBINED LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS.

FROM SUPREME AUTHORITY

Comprehends a statement of the Strategic Plan as embodied in the Grand Decision. This forms the first part of the letter. Then instructs the War and Navy Departments as to their duties in the execution of the general plan. Lastly makes the initial distribution of resources.

By Joint Plan Making Body.

### NAVAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

This Estimate of the Situation is a solution, under the conditions tabulated, of the war problem which the instructions of Supreme Authority present to the Navy.

A statement of the task assigned the Navy by Supreme Authority. Here follows a study of the conditions from which is determined the—

FIRST MISSION.

A statement of the initial task of the Navy. The first mission is that part of the general mission, the accomplishment of which can be planned with reasonable certainty. It is not considered as detached from the General Mission, except for the purpose of limiting arrangements to conditions that can be foreseen.

A complete analytical examination of the naval situation from the enemy point of view and the deduction therefrom of his probable intentions.

A complete analytical examination of our naval situation having constantly in view our naval mission and the enemy's probable intentions and the deductions therefrom of the courses of action open to us. A comparison of these courses of action and the determination of the course of action to adopt.

The naval decision comprehends the strategic plan of naval operations. It covers the following points:—(a) Character of Naval War to be undertaken. (b) Forces to be employed. (c) Times and place for strategic deployment. (d) Direction of subsequent effort. (e) Strategic objectives. (f) Manner of cooperation with the Army. Appended are:—(a) Strategic studies of possible phases of the war. (b) Tactical studies of localities.

By Naval Plan Making Body.

<h4 style="text-align: center;">PLAN OF ORGANIZATION FOR WAR.</h4> <p>This plan shows—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The flow of authority in all its ramifications.</li> <li>The administrative grouping of the forces.</li> <li>The tactical grouping of the forces.</li> <li>The personnel of command.</li> <li>The staff personnel of chief command.</li> <li>Orders necessary for execution of plan.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;">By Naval Plan Making Body</p>	<h4 style="text-align: center;">PLAN OF MOBILIZATION FOR WAR.</h4> <p>This plan must show—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The vessels to be mobilized.</li> <li>The composition and sources of their crews.</li> <li>The names of their chief officers.</li> <li>The dates when mobilization must be completed.</li> <li>The place of assembly.</li> <li>Plan of recruiting organization.</li> <li>Orders necessary for execution of plan.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;">By Naval Plan Making Body</p>	<h4 style="text-align: center;">LOGISTIC PLAN FOR WAR.</h4> <p>This plan must show—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The initial requirements as to supplies of all kinds.</li> <li>The probable requirements for subsequent phases of the war.</li> <li>The sources of supply, and supplies available.</li> <li>The organization of the transportation.</li> <li>The organization of the Naval train.</li> <li>A list of available vessels, their characteristics, whereabouts, and places of assembly and alteration, and period required to place them in readiness.</li> <li>Detailed plans for necessary changes in the vessels of the train.</li> <li>Detailed plans for the assemblage of supplies.</li> <li>Plan of the purchase, inspection and shipping organization.</li> <li>Orders necessary for execution of plan.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;">By Naval Plan Making Body</p>	<h4 style="text-align: center;">PLAN &amp; ORGANIZATION OF TEMPORARY BASES.</h4> <p>Plans and Organizations will be prepared for each temporary base that is likely to be occupied. The following points will be covered:—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A detailed tactical study of the locality.</li> <li>Forces necessary for its security and their organization.</li> <li>Detailed list of material required.</li> <li>Complete plans of Defensive Works.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;">By Naval Plan Making Body</p>
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### NAVAL LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS

FROM NAVY DEPARTMENT TO C-IN-C

Comprehends a statement of the strategic plan as embodied in the Grand Decision, then the instructions of the Department based on the Naval Decision and appended plans.

War Portfolios should be in the possession of Commanders in Chief.

By Naval Plan Making Body

### STATE DEPARTMENT.

During the period of strained relations there is a mission of paramount importance that requires the coordinate action of—

The President.  
The Congress.  
The State Department.

This is to so arrange that war shall be delayed until our forces may begin the war with advantage.

So soon as war begins and until the time has arrived for peace negotiations the State Department has a distinct and most important Mission:—

To conduct our international relations in a manner the most favorable to the action of our military forces.

The methods by which this mission is to be accomplished have no place in a war portfolio.

### ARMY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

This Estimate of the Situation is a solution, under the conditions tabulated, of the war problem which the instructions of Supreme Authority present to the Army.

A statement of the task assigned the Army by Supreme Authority. Here follows a study of the conditions from which is determined the—

FIRST MISSION.

A statement of the initial task of the Army. The first mission is that part of the general mission, the accomplishment of which can be planned with reasonable certainty. It is not considered as detached from the General Mission, except for the purpose of limiting arrangements to conditions that can be foreseen.

A complete analytical examination of the military situation from the enemy point of view and the deduction therefrom of his probable intentions as to operations of land forces.

A complete analytical examination of our army situation having constantly in view our Army mission and the enemy's probable intentions and the deduction therefrom of the courses of action open to us. A comparison of these courses of action and the determination of the course of action to adopt.

The Army decision comprehends the strategic plan of land operations. It covers the following points:—(a) Character of War to be undertaken. (b) Forces to be employed. (c) Times and place for strategic deployment. (d) Direction of subsequent effort. (e) Strategic objectives. (f) Manner of cooperation with the Navy. Appended are:—(a) Strategic studies of possible phases of war. (b) Tactical studies of localities.

By Army Plan Making Body

<h4 style="text-align: center;">PLAN OF ORGANIZATION FOR WAR.</h4> <p>(a) The organization as prescribed in Field Service Regulations, United States Army, except as specifically modified to fit special conditions of war or probable theater of operations. (b) Orders necessary for execution of the plan.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">By Army Plan Making Body</p>	<h4 style="text-align: center;">PLAN OF MOBILIZATION FOR WAR.</h4> <p>This plan shows—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The forces that are to be mobilized and their composition. The sources from which they are to be drawn.</li> <li>The plan of their assembling.</li> <li>The plan for their equipment.</li> <li>The recruiting plan.</li> <li>The names of regimental, brigade and division commanders.</li> <li>The names of this principal staff officers and their assignments.</li> <li>The logistics of the mobilization.</li> <li>Orders necessary for execution of plan.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;">By Army Plan Making Body</p>	<h4 style="text-align: center;">PLAN OF STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT FOR WAR.</h4> <p>This plan shows—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Localities where forces are to be deployed.</li> <li>Forces to be deployed in each locality.</li> <li>Times when successive steps of the deployment must be completed.</li> <li>Logistics of the deployment and subsequent support of the forces.</li> <li>Organization of communications.</li> <li>The manner of cooperating with the Navy.</li> <li>Orders necessary for execution of plan.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;">By Army Plan Making Body</p>	<h4 style="text-align: center;">PLANS &amp; ORGANIZATIONS OF TEMPORARY BASES.</h4> <p>Plans and organizations will be prepared for the principal temporary bases likely to be occupied.</p> <p>The following points will be covered:—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A detailed tactical study of the locality.</li> <li>The forces likely to be necessary for its security.</li> <li>Plans of defensive works.</li> <li>Detailed plans of depots and base facilities.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: right;">By Army Plan Making Body</p>
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### ARMY LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS

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By Army Plan Making Body

**EXPLANATORY NOTE.**

This plan of a war portfolio is based upon the idea that such a portfolio must not only comprehend the project for all the forces but it must also plainly trace the development of the project. As no project should be evolved that is not based upon the most complete examination of all modifying conditions it is first necessary to make studies of those conditions. These studies are contained in the first three grand divisions of the portfolio, viz. "Policy," "Enemy Forces," "Our Own Forces." These studies are not comparative, but more nearly abstract studies. The greatest importance attaches to the accuracy of these studies. If they are not accurate the attempted execution of the project derived from them may result disastrously. The "Grand Estimate of the Situation" must be made by a body trained to estimate accurately the value of all the factors. This body must be composed of the representatives of the two military services, officers imbued with the idea that the project is a whole. The "Naval Estimate of the Situation" may then be made by navy and army officers, planning in their respective spheres. But even here there must be the freest possible interchange of ideas to ensure thorough coordination of action. The plans of organization, mobilization, logistic arrangements and so forth are all based on estimates of the situation the factors of which appear in the introductory studies and the subsequent decisions. The estimates are not graphically outlined above, but the principle is recognized throughout, that each decision, no matter how minor, results from a careful weighing of the factors involved. To preserve the value of the Portfolio and to guard against the unwelcome abandonment of the project it contains it is necessary to recount its logic in a clear and concise manner. Moreover, the recital of the reasoning and data on which the project is based is an aid to the reconsideration of the project when new factors are introduced. Those charged with the work of preparing the portfolio will find advantage in the adoption of a form for the various parts. Such forms will facilitate comparisons and guard against omissions. Under nearly every sub-head in the above plan it will be found desirable to introduce more minute sub-divisions. Whenever great and complex subjects are to be examined FORM is important.

Approved for Criticism and Discussion  
signed... W. L. Rodgers...  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
President, Naval War College.