



RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

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U.S. Grand Strategy Options

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) has been exploring grand strategy options in times of austerity as well as complementary implications for U.S. defense strategy, force posture, deterrence and U.S. alliance relationships. NDU hosted a major conference in December, 2011, to gather insights from academic, policy, and international perspectives, and absorbed numerous insights for the Institute's self-initiated strategy options assessment. While many commentators now argue that America's power is in relative or absolute decline, the research project emphasizes that its global leadership position remains strong with many enduring advantages, but faces a period of strategic readjustment, not retrenchment. However, retaining our influence and preserving our ability to protect and advance U.S. interests does require clear strategic priorities to ensure the efficient development and employment of the components of U.S. national power as well as adapting our collective security mechanisms to preserve critical capabilities and minimize gaps in institutional performance.

A variety of strategies, particularly "Off Shore Balancing," have been offered to better balance ends, ways, and means. These alternative strategies suffer from policy, historical, and implementation challenges. An evaluation of these various options has identified their underpinnings and general strengths and implications. A new strategic option emerged from this research which may best meet the future strategic environment and longstanding U.S. core national interests. This strategic framework offers general guidance for U.S. efforts to design affordable and balanced security capabilities to advance and secure those interests. This assessment was presented at the NDU Grand Strategy conference by Hans Binnendijk and Frank Hoffman, and was provided to OSD Policy as input to the Defense Department's development of new strategic guidance.

The hybrid solution, which we call "Forward Partnering," avoids the shortfalls of the other options and balances the aims of U.S. policy within projected resource limits. Moreover, it offers a framework within which the U.S. can sustain its alliance relationships with carefully designed initiatives to preserve critical mission capabilities. This strategy is a synthesis of the

historical major approaches used by great powers in the past to sustain global engagement and leadership. “Forward Partnering” emphasizes the need to engage broadly with designated partners and friends to preserve regional stability without extensive forward stationed forces. The strategy focuses on critical national interests in the global commons, ensuring access to critical markets and resources, and fulfilling commitments to America’s allies.

As suggested by the name, this strategy operates forward with alliances and partners to leverage cooperative and preventive actions to preclude conflicts before they occur. It uses forward deployed naval power and special operations forces assets to generate and sustain relationships and reassure friends, and promote true partnerships (vice dependents). This posture works to sustain relationships while maximizing freedom of action for our support to alliances and partners, and preserves responsiveness to crises that we cannot accurately predict today.

This proposed grand strategy is very consistent with the direction of the Defense Department’s “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.” INSS is crafting a policy paper capturing its assessment and examining how this approach can be implemented in each of the key regions defined by DOD’s strategic guidance.

The Iran-Iraq War: Insights from Baghdad

From October 25 to 27, the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars co-hosted a conference on the Iran-Iraq War. To better understand what happened during the war, the conference brought together a wide array of scholars and former policymakers to discuss insights from captured Iraqi records, transcripts of recent interviews with Saddam’s senior military officers (in “Saddam’s Generals,” released by NDU Press in conjunction with the conference), and the French, Jordanian, East German, and Soviet archives. Over the two-and-a-half days of discussions, several important themes emerged:

1) Saddam carefully chose the timing of the invasion, but grossly miscalculated his ability to force Irani-

an concessions. The 1979 Iranian Revolution wreaked havoc on Iran’s security apparatus and brought to power an antagonistic, diplomatically isolated, regime. Judging that the balance of military power had shifted decisively, Saddam launched the invasion on September 22, 1980, believing he could force Iran to quickly concede. Instead, Ayatollah Khomeini manipulated the situation to consolidate power and unite what had been a deeply-divided Iranian populace against the external threat. Rather than a quick victory, the war turned into an eight year battle of attrition.

2) Internal regime structure contributed to the war’s longevity. Despite drastic differences in their style, ideology, and personality, Khomeini and Saddam shared in common an insistence on personally controlling national policy. As one former Iranian diplomat told conference attendees, “It wasn’t a war between two peoples; it wasn’t even a war between two regimes.” Rather, it was a prolonged battle of wills between two leaders insensitive to the human cost of the war and accustomed to a legion of subordinates incapable of grounding them to practical reality.

3) The contributions of the U.S. were important, but were only part of a much larger picture. For the U.S., the Iran-Iraq War was seen through the lenses of the broader regional context and the Cold War. Most senior U.S. policymakers were preoccupied with implementing the Camp David Accords and dealing with the Lebanese civil war and subsequent Israeli invasion; the Iran-Iraq War began to garner attention only after it threatened to involve America’s Arab allies and provided the Soviets with an excuse to expand their regional presence.

4) Intelligence played an integral role in the conflict. Iraq received equipment and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and Japan, including crucial assistance in cracking an Iranian code-making machine. This assistance provided Iraq with a clear advantage over Iran. As highlighted in open source literature, U.S. intelligence agencies also provided intelligence support to Iraq, and, on occasion, to Iran. Although

the public revelation of the Iran-Contra affair in November, 1986 complicated U.S. interactions with Iraq, bilateral intelligence collaboration between the two nations actually strengthened during the final two years of the war. Even prior to Iran-Contra, though, the United States had cultivated intelligence ties to Iran. According to Mark Gasiorowski, a political scientist at Louisiana State University, from May to October, 1979, U.S. intelligence warned Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan that the Iraqi military appeared to be making preparations for and practicing to invade Iran. This warning came only weeks before Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy and ignited the hostage crisis, which forced Bazargan to resign. Bazargan and his deputy neglected to pass the warning to the successor government.

5) Iran-Contra revelations had detrimental effects. Iran-Contra revelations that the U.S. had been selling weapons and providing intelligence to Iran while also supporting Iraq not only angered Saddam, who called it a “stab in the back,” but it dramatically injured the relationship between the U.S. and Jordan. King Hussein had been a crucial interlocutor between Iraq and the U.S. throughout the war, and he felt personally betrayed by the revelation. Participants at the conference were divided, though, on the extent that Iran-Contra, or “Irangate” as Saddam referred to it, affected the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. Some felt that the actions of the U.S. foolishly reinforced Saddam’s worst suspicions and convinced him that the Americans could not be trusted, which made future cooperation nearly impossible. Others believed that Saddam never really trusted the U.S. to begin with and that actions he pursued to improve relations, such as moderating his rhetoric on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and deepening commercial and cultural ties, were designed to court U.S. assistance in his time of need and were never genuine attempts at accommodation.

Iran-Iraq War Records Released

On October 25, the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) released to its webpage digital cop-

ies of 20 key captured documents (and translations) centered on the Iran-Iraq War from Saddam Hussein’s regime. The majority of these records were taped conversations Saddam had with his Revolutionary Command Council, which comprised Saddam’s inner circle of top advisers. Leading media outlets found much that was newsworthy in these records. The records, the *New York Times* emphasized, “depict a leader who was inclined to see enemies everywhere” and had a deeply “conspiratorial mindset,” and who believed that the U.S. sought to prolong Iraq’s war with Iran. British publications such *The Guardian*, *The Telegraph*, and the BBC noted that Saddam had issued a direct order, caught on tape, to punish Margaret Thatcher by executing an Iranian-British journalist accused of spying. The *Washington Post* highlighted material from a captured Iraqi intelligence report, written by Iraq’s military intelligence director, describing three instances of Iranian chemical weapon use against Iraq and assessing that Iran was probably receiving international assistance with its chemical weapons program.

The 20 captured records reveal numerous additional developments and insights into the war. For instance, an intelligence assessment prepared by the Iraqi military in mid-1980, only months before Iraq launched the invasion, concluded that “at present, Iran has no power to launch a wide offensive against Iraq or to defend itself on a large scale.” The night before Saddam publicly abrogated the 1975 Algiers agreement, he informed his advisers of his intentions and revealed his own overconfidence by stating: “We have to stick Iran’s head in the mud and force them to say, “Yes,” so that we can get done quickly with this matter.” Besides releasing these 20 records, the CRRC also released to its webpage an index of all records in its Saddam Hussein collection.

A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan

In the Center for Strategic Research’s Strategic Perspectives No. 8, Senior Military Fellow

Colonel Mark Fields and Institute for National Strategic Studies intern Ms. Ramsha Ahmed analyze the process that produced the 2001 Bonn Agreement, that set in place representative government for Afghanistan following the expulsion of the Taliban, and offer recommendations on how U.S. policymakers should shape future conditions in Afghanistan, beginning with the 2011 Bonn conference. The analysis highlights the leadership and initiative of Ambassadors Lakhdar Brahimi and James Dobbins at Bonn 2001 and five additional factors that led to success: 1) the military advantage; 2) effective U.S. interagency synchronization; 3) thorough bilateral preparation with key international actors; 4) effective multilateral negotiations; and 5) limited conference objectives. Recommendations for Bonn 2011 and the decade beyond included: 1) announcement of a formal strategic partnership between the U.S and Afghanistan that reflects continued U.S. military and economic commitment; 2) measures that must be undertaken to set conditions for successful negotiations with insurgents; and 3) specific Afghan political reforms. Most important of these reforms is the devolution of power and authority from the centralized federal government to provincial governments. The authors' analysis of the first Bonn conference through documentary sources and interviews provides an ideal primer for leaders and action officers on how to work effectively in an interagency context.

Alliance Politics in Afghanistan

In this *International Studies Quarterly* article, National War College faculty member David Auerwald, with Stephen Saideman of McGill University, discuss the role of alliance politics in Afghanistan — and specifically, restrictive national “caveats” applied to units deployed to the war. The article, based on an extensive research study including numerous interviews, argues that NATO, the most deeply institutionalized alliance in the world, nonetheless has faced significant problems in running the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. NATO’s coalition effort has been plagued by caveats—restrictions on what coalition militaries can and cannot do. Caveats, the authors argue, have diminished the Alliance’s overall effectiveness and created resentment within the coalition. The article traces the reasons for various caveats, which, they argue, vary predictably according to the political institutions in each contributor to ISAF. Troops from coalition governments are likely to have caveats; troops from presidential or majoritarian parliamentary governments tend, on average, to have fewer caveats, but specific caveats depend on the background of key decision makers in those countries. The study concludes with implications for both research and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s future.

Elevating the Role of Socioeconomic Development in Afghanistan Transition

In the Center for Technology and National Security Policy’s Defense & Technology Paper No. 85, Michael Baranick, Albert Sciarretta, Cyrus Staniec, and John Applebaugh examine key documents, including the *Afghanistan National Development Strategy*, the *Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan*, and the U.S. Department of State *Regional Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan*, to determine focal areas for socioeconomic development in Afghanistan. By applying those priorities to Afghan demographic data from various sources, a decision support model was employed that categorizes Afghan provinces into prioritized “cohorts” for transition back to sovereign Afghan control based on their contributions to the socioeconomic objectives from the source documents. The effect of this model is to create a focus on where to apply resources to put transition into affect with the greatest benefit and potential for future stability. Following this top-down selection of cohorts, the authors described the use of Provincial Development Plans and District Development Plans to help place focus on local development activities, including allocation of resources. The result is a reproducible approach to

selecting and planning for provincial transitions that gives greater consideration to socioeconomic objectives, while allowing for other security-based considerations.

Task Force Stryker Network-Centric Operations in Afghanistan

In Defense & Technology Paper No. 84, Colonel Harry Tunnell presents a case study on the application of network-centric operations in Afghanistan. Tunnell argues that network-centric operations, when used by properly trained leaders, soldiers, and units, significantly reduce the asymmetric advantage of insurgents, terrorists, and guerillas. This case study is the result of Colonel Tunnell's command of the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, headquarters for Task Force Stryker, and includes three vignettes based on events that occurred during 2009 in Arghandab District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

The case study demonstrates how network-centric operations not only offer the commander an advantage in fighting the Taliban with kinetic operations, but also support of defensive Information Operations (IO) as well as development efforts in Afghanistan. The first vignette describes a scenario where the commander was able to identify enemy combatants correctly via unmanned aerial systems, order an attack, and then conduct successful follow-up operations with Afghan Elders. In the second vignette, by using predictive software (and metadata including information inputted from the first vignette), Task Force Stryker was able to coordinate a response with Afghan National Police to apprehend Taliban seeking medical treatment. Video from the incident was then used to conduct defensive IO. The final vignette shows the versatility of network operations. By using decision making tools and historical analysis, Task Force Stryker was able to show USAID officials that Afghanistan District was a place safe to begin development projects.

Buy, Build, or Steal: China's Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies

In China Strategic Perspectives No. 4, Philip Saunders and Joshua Wiseman present a model

outlining military technology procurement strategies available to developing countries. They then apply the model to explain Chinese Air Force procurement and aviation technology acquisition efforts over the last 60 years. The study identifies three main technology procurement avenues: purchase (buy), indigenous development (build), and espionage (steal), and three subavenues: reverse engineering (combining buy/steal and build), coproduction (combining buy and build), and codevelopment (combining buy and build, with an emphasis on build). It examines the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs inherent in each approach. Four variables influence decisions about the mix of strategies: 1) a country's overall level of economic development, in particular the state of its technical/industrial base; 2) the technological capacity of a country's military aviation sector; 3) the willingness of foreign countries to sell advanced military aircraft, key components, armaments, and related production technology; and 4) the country's bargaining power vis-à-vis potential suppliers.

The study analyzes Chinese military aviation procurement strategies over five different periods, concluding with a discussion of China's current progress towards producing state-of-the-art military aircraft. The study focuses primarily on fighter aircraft as they incorporate the most sophisticated aviation technologies a country is able to produce. China has used coproduction, selected purchases of advanced aircraft, reverse engineering, and foreign design assistance to build a capable military aviation industry with a significant indigenous design and production capacity. The Chinese military aviation industry can now produce two fourth-generation fighters roughly equal to those in advanced air forces: the J-10 (indigenously developed with Israeli assistance) and the J-11B (based on coproduction and reverse engineering of the Su-27). Both aircraft still rely on imported Russian turbofan engines. Test flights of the new J-20 stealth fighter prototype demonstrate Chinese ambitions to build fifth-generation fighters, but the extent to which

the J-20 will match the performance of state-of-the-art Russian and Western fighters is unclear.

Producing state-of-the-art fighters requires an aviation industry to master a range of highly advanced, military specific technologies. China's legitimate access to cutting-edge Western military technologies will likely remain curtailed and concerns about China's long-term strategic objectives and ability to compete for third party arms markets will increase Russian reluctance to supply advanced military technologies. This supports two important conclusions. First, the Chinese military aviation industry will have to rely primarily on indigenous development of advanced "single-use" military aviation technologies in the future. The Chinese government is pursuing a range of "indigenous innovation" and technology development programs, but mastering advanced technologies becomes more difficult and expensive as a country moves closer to the technology frontier. This leads to a second, related conclusion: China will likely rely more heavily on espionage to acquire those critical military aviation technologies it cannot acquire legitimately from foreign suppliers or develop on its own.

Drawing Lines at Sea

In the November 2011 edition of the U.S. Naval Institute's *Proceedings* magazine, National War College's Dr. Bud Cole details China's possible naval strategy. In the article Dr. Cole traces the history of Beijing's effort to deploy a modern navy with new capabilities. This effort, he explains, "has been marked by three milestones. The first was the theory developed during the 1980s by Admiral Liu Huaqing, who advocated a three-stage plan for building a modern Chinese navy. The second was the 1995-1996 diplomatic crisis when, in response to Beijing's application of military pressure against Taiwan, the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region; this brought home to Beijing that U.S. acquiescence would be required for any application of naval or

air power against Taiwan. The third, and most recent, has involved the successive deployments of Chinese naval task groups to the Gulf of Aden, which began in December 2008 and continue today." Despite these developments, which suggest an effort to extend the reach and sea-control capabilities of the Chinese navy, Dr. Cole remains agnostic on the question of "whether China's maritime strategy of defending fixed and limited areas at sea will prove successful." He sees their strategy as still defensive, designed to deny the U.S. the accomplishment of key missions.

NATO Reassurance and Nuclear Reductions: Creating the Conditions

In this *Transatlantic Current* (reprinted from *Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action*), Hans Binnendijk and Catherine McArdle Kelleher examine the relationship between efforts to reassure NATO's eastern allies and efforts to further reduce the remaining U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe. In particular, the authors argue that the task for NATO will be to find the right mix of reassurance for the Allies and reset with Russia to create the conditions for additional NSNW reductions on the part of both NATO and Russia.

The NATO 2010 Strategic Concept reconfirms the commitment that Article 5 remains fully operative. It also commits the Alliance to the goal of creating conditions for further reductions in NSNW. A key issue in making further reductions will be reassuring allies that doing so can enhance the security of member states, including Central and Eastern European (CEE) allies. Binnendijk and Kelleher argue that future NATO NSNW reductions and reassurance can be undertaken if they are carefully orchestrated, which would involve undertaking a set of balanced steps designed to reassure CEE states; continuing to promote opportunities to reset relations with Russia; and making those remaining nuclear systems safe, secure, and sustainable. The paper concludes by detailing seven specific sets of measures designed to enhance

confidence in Article 5 and by assessing the impact that they might make for creating the conditions for further nuclear reductions. These measures include: 1) building confidence through operational success and declaratory statements; 2) enhancing conventional plans, exercises, and decision making procedures; 3) strengthening conventional forces and the Article 5 mission; 4) enhancing support for training and installations in Eastern Europe; 5) broadening deterrence to meet new challenges; 6) maximizing deterrent capabilities of remaining U.S. NSNW; and 7) modifying Russian deployments and doctrine. The seventh measure—involving approaches to achieve Russian actions relating to transparency, location, and numbers of NSNW—will be central to reassurance of allies.

NATO Capabilities Project

This Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) project offers substantive ideas both in terms of how to “organize solidarity” and “prioritize” in terms of collective capabilities in the face of economic constraints and budgetary cuts, in order to ensure that NATO continues to provide the necessary political will and defense capabilities. The principal idea conveyed in the study is the concept of Mission Focus Groups (MFGs). MFGs are offered as an innovative response to the risk of widening gaps in mission capabilities being generated by national budget decisions taken without an understanding—by either member nations or NATO—of their impacts on mission requirements until after the fact. The study is devoted to analyzing current developments in the face of new austerity measures, what the impact has already been, and what it could continue to be, especially in regard to NATO’s collective military capabilities and hence its ability to respond to crises or other challenges the allies will face, individually and collectively. The study also points out the NATO military capabilities that are most essential; what to do about the expanding gap between ambitions and the means to achieve them; and how developments in regard to NATO fit

within a broader concept both of transatlantic relations and of global security, writ large.

The study’s findings highlight the fact that focusing on missions and not just capabilities drives Alliance cohesion, solidarity, and mission preparation, as well as capabilities improvement. Groups of nations will discover ways to hone mission performance, conserve resources, cooperate more closely, deepen interoperability and, where appropriate, discover valuable specialization. Most of all, focusing on missions relevant to their national strategic interest gives national leaders a well-grounded logic for defense spending. MFGs that support national interests highlight NATO’s direct contribution to national priorities. Moreover, where nations have the lead on, or are a major driver in a specific MFG, they help directly shape how their capabilities are supported by those of their allies. Results of the study are also designed to help with agenda-setting, alternatives-posing, and decision-taking ahead of NATO’s May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago.

The Transatlantic Bargain Project

This project, co-sponsored by the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies and the NATO Defense College in Rome, aims to stimulate constructive debate and public interest surrounding NATO’s May 2012 Summit in Chicago, and to explore the *raison d’être* behind the transatlantic relationship itself. Within the context of this transatlantic relationship, the summit will address questions such as how the Alliance can maintain its efficiency and capability to act when faced with severe budgetary constraints on the part of its members; how one can strengthen the transatlantic consensus on future tasks and challenges; and finally, how a fairer distribution of costs and benefits among all NATO members can be achieved.

The study’s key judgment is that strengthening the transatlantic bonds in the future will require new champions of NATO and renewed defense spending on both sides of the Atlantic. It will likely entail

doing less of what the U.S. wants beyond Europe, at least under a NATO flag. However, the U.S. still bears the mantle and the cost of being the world's leading power. It needs the Alliance's treasures of political cohesion and military interoperability among 28 members, 35 formal partners and many informal ones. The European allies need the U.S. to lead NATO. In sum, the study highlights the fact that a future transatlantic bargain will see Europe and North America agreeing to nurture each other's strategic peace of mind by sustaining a healthy, cohesive NATO. Such a bargain would allow the pursuit of national interests such as rebuilding the global economy, assured of a world mainly at peace and fully capable of responding to crises.

Whither the Medvedev Initiative on European Security?

The past 20 years have been marked by several U.S. and NATO attempts to reach out to the Russian Federation to develop a cooperative security framework aimed at facing common threats and challenges through joint actions. European security, however, remains marred by significant security challenges. As Dr. Isabelle François, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, points out in this Transatlantic Current publication, however, there is a good story to tell. In 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev launched an initiative that invested considerable efforts in redefining the European security architecture in an inclusive and comprehensive manner, but fell short of identifying and addressing common interests.

The paper revisits Medvedev's initiative on European security, one of the few comprehensive approaches to reshaping the framework to address the new security environment, and offers new ideas in an attempt to develop a genuine strategic partnership between NATO and Russia beyond the positive rhetoric of the 2010 NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Lisbon summit. As the Alliance prepares for its May 2012

summit in Chicago, NATO and Russia have yet to develop a mutually agreeable framework for European security that reflects the interests of all NRC members. The paper's key judgment is that a broad dialogue on "hard security" issues that addresses Russian perceptions and concerns is required with a genuine attempt to reconcile differences.

Whatever may be the specific areas of progress in NATO-Russia practical cooperation, the overall relationship remains fragile without a broad strategic dialogue. The paper acknowledges the limits and the main reasons behind the lukewarm reaction among allies to the Medvedev initiative. At the same time, it points to the current challenges in facing European security without an adequate framework, as the Euro-Atlantic community addresses the stalemate to revive the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty following Russia's unilateral suspension of its CFE commitments.

Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) launched its inaugural Special Report, "Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations," in November at a roundtable event that drew 120 attendees from the U.S. Government interagency, African diplomatic corps, and nongovernmental organizations, among others. Special Report working group chair Joseph Siegle, of ACSS, and working group members, Chris Fomunyoh of the National Democratic Institute and Edward McMahon of the University of Vermont, led the discussion assessing the influence of the Arab Spring on African democracy.

With its demands for greater political freedom, economic opportunity, and an end to systemic corruption, the Arab Spring has shaped public debate, news coverage, and the work of political reformers across the continent for much of the past year. This has been accompanied by notable democratic advances in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Nigeria, Zambia, and

elsewhere. Such advances reflect the increasingly robust forces driving democratic change in Africa such as strengthened checks on the executive branch, the rapid expansion of information and communications technology, and a more active civil society. Still, resistance to change remains deeply-seated via legacies of personalized leadership, a concentration of natural resource wealth within the region's autocracies, and weak notions of national identity. To navigate these complex crosscurrents, the Special Report calls for greater investments in Africa's election systems, independent media ownership, upholding presidential term limits, sanctioning security sector leaders who fire on peaceful protesters, and negotiating exits for longtime authoritarian leaders, among other actions.

Africa's Militaries: A Missing Link to Democratic Transitions

Democratization in Africa has been severely inhibited by armed forces that regularly intervene in political and economic matters. This is prominently in view in Egypt where even in the clamor for greater democratic freedoms, the military is attempting to maintain a privileged role for itself and to limit the authority of a new civilian government. Elsewhere on the continent, armed forces have violently suppressed opposition activists or sought to directly influence politics and policymaking. Even where legitimate civilian rule predominates, civil-military relations in Africa often remain strained due to a legacy of distrust. This Africa Security Brief by Mathurin Hounnikpo, academic chair of civil-military relations at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, examines how and why military acceptance of civilian authority—the doctrine of civilian control—remains a “missing piece” of Africa's democratic transition puzzle.

Not only is this state of affairs counter-productive to democratic governance, but it undermines the interests of Africa's militaries. Enhanced democratic oversight of the armed forces reduces the likelihood that political actors will manipulate the security sec-

tor for ulterior motives—to the detriment of the reputation of security institutions. In order to develop a more professional and effective security sector, Africa's parliaments and civil society actors must more assertively set standards for military recruitment, appointments, planning, and spending. Africa's regional organizations can also better enforce norms to limit the military's role in politics. Likewise, international partners can have a positive impact by ensuring security partnerships favor security sectors that abide by democratic principles.

Alternative Dispute Resolution in Africa: Preventing Conflict and Enhancing Stability

At the root of a number of Africa's societal conflicts is a failure of judicial systems to effectively adjudicate disputes over land, water, grazing rights, and other resources, leading to an escalation of violence. This often reflects the clogging of Africa's courts—where cases typically take years to resolve. Many Africans have lost faith in the ability of their nations' legal systems to provide timely and just closure to their grievances, motivating some to settle matters through their own methods, often with violent consequences. Confidence in a country's justice sector, in turn, is closely associated with confidence in national governments overall.

This Africa Center for Strategic Studies Africa Security Brief by Ernest Uwazie assesses how and why Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques can contribute to building more effective dispute settlement systems. The notion of ADR fits comfortably within traditional concepts of African justice, particularly its core value of reconciliation. Moreover, by reducing disaffection with the lack of access to justice—and the perceived need for disputants to take justice into their own hands—the potential for violence and rebellion is reduced. ADR may have particular value in stabilization and state-building efforts when judicial institutions are tenuous and social tensions are acute. Notwithstanding these benefits, ADR

programs in Africa face key challenges, and the author identifies practical steps needed by governments and donors to enhance political support, human resources, legal foundations, and sustainable financing for ADR initiatives.

Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace Fit?

In the Center for Strategic Research's Strategic Forum No. 272, Vincent Manzo explores how the emergence of space and cyberspace as new strategic domains affects deterrence and escalation in cross-domain operations. Manzo provides two definitions of cross-domain operations (one based on platforms/targets and one based on effects) and argues that most U.S. military operations are inherently cross-domain. The real questions underlying recent interest in cross-domain deterrence are how the U.S. can mitigate vulnerabilities that stem from its dependence on space and cyberspace and why threats to respond to counter-space and cyber attacks in other domains are considered less credible than cross-domain responses to air, land, or sea attacks.

Manzo uses Thomas Schelling's concept of "the idiom of military action" as a starting point for answering these questions. Both the U.S. Government and potential adversaries lack a shared framework for analyzing how counter-space and cyber attacks fit into an accepted escalation ladder. A shared framework that integrates actions in the emerging strategic domains of space and cyberspace with actions in traditional domains would give decision makers a better sense of which actions and responses are expected and accepted in real-world scenarios and which responses would be escalatory. This would support more coherent cross-domain contingency planning within the Government and deterrence threats that potential adversaries perceive as clearer and more credible.

Manzo concludes that attacks that strike targets in space and cyberspace and affect capabilities and

events in other domains should be judged on the basis of their real-world effects. This approach would help decision makers determine whether responses in different domains are proportionate or escalatory. Manzo argues that a shared framework for assessing deterrence and escalation in cross-domain operations that involve space or cyberspace must also address variables such as differing strategic objectives, cultures and capabilities, the balance between offense and defense in space and cyberspace, U.S. responses to cyber exploitation during peacetime, and the strategic context (peacetime, crisis, limited conflict, or full-scale war).

Muslims in Europe and in the U.S.: A Shared but Overrated Risk of Radicalism

National War College Minerva Fellow Jocelyne Cesari published "Muslims in Europe and in the U.S.: A Shared but Overrated Risk of Radicalism," in Rik Coolsaet (ed), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge, European and American Experiences*, second edition (Ashgate, 2011), pp. 101–116. The chapter, written in the light of the 2009–2010 surge in terrorist acts (or attempted acts) committed by American Muslims, discusses the similarities between the American and European Muslim communities and issues of possible convergences with radicalization. It explains how joining the jihad is a social process and not simply an individual decision, despite the romanticized narrative offered by the mujahideen themselves. The radicalization is made possible through the convergence of four main factors: 1) the pre-eminence of the salafi doctrine in the West; 2) a growing sense of discrimination in Europe against Muslims and Islam, as well as the sense of alienation felt by new generations of Muslims in the U.S. in response to U.S. foreign policy; 3) the culturally-marginalized status of some segments of urban European youth; and 4) the lack of credible ideologies to counter the decline of nationalism and liberalism.

State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem

In this *Georgetown Journal of International Law* (Summer 2011, vol. 42, no. 4) article, the National War College's Dr. Rich Andres, with Scott Shackelford, argues that it has been difficult to define "state responsibility in cyberspace," in part because of the anonymity of cyber attacks. "Sponsoring states may, for example, incite groups to commit cyber attacks and then hide behind a (however sheer) veil of plausible deniability to escape accountability." The article examines potential legal regimes of state responsibility to help hold state sponsors of cyber attacks more accountable. It discusses options including control standards termed "effective control" and "overall control" of activities, as well as reviewing lesser-known standards including the "governmental awareness" and the "sliding scale" approach. The authors apply these various options for legal regimes to real examples of state sponsorship, from the Estonian cyber militia to cyber criminals in Africa, including instances of neutral states allowing their networks to be used for launching cyber attacks thus giving rise to problems of neutrality and distinction that are analyzed under the Law of Armed Conflict. Andres and Shackelford conclude by arguing for a flexible standard of state responsibility for cyber attacks incorporating elements of the various proposed standards.

Capability Development in Support of Comprehensive Approaches: Transforming International Civil-Military Approaches

Edited by Derrick J. Neal and Linton Wells II from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, this book is the product of the Second International Transformation (ITX2) Conference, held in Rome at the NATO Defense College (NDC) in June 2011. This volume integrates papers and discussions from the conference co-hosted by NDC, Allied Command Transformation, and the International Transformation Chairs Network. The book addresses the following Comprehensive Approach issues:

1) concepts, policy, and organization; 2) technology, leadership, management, education, and training; 3) integrated approaches to complex operations; and 4) implementation, with Haiti as a case study.

In 2008, NATO agreed to develop and implement the Comprehensive Approach concept to address international security challenges involving civil and military actors. The growing importance of the Comprehensive Approach in NATO, and complex operations in individual nations, served as the impetus for the conference. The focus on capability development, rather than an agreed definition of a Comprehensive Approach, enabled the participants to identify "quick wins" at low cost for the Alliance.

Strategies for Defeating Advanced Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities

Part of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy's "Transformation Seminar Series," this November 2011 conference focused on strategy, operations, and programmatic considerations in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. Conference presentations included a range of geographic scenarios, links to domains such as cyber and space, budget impacts, and various weapon system utilities. Key take-aways from the conference included: 1) several key technologies can be engaged to minimize the risks of A2/AD capabilities, including directed energy weapons, missile defense, penetrating stealth, long-range strike, unmanned subsurface and air; 2) diplomatic and confidence building measures should be included in strategies to counter A2/AD, including regional initiatives; 3) systems such as the Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) with stand-off weapons are bringing swarm attacks within the grasp of middle and lesser capable powers, potentially over-taxing the capabilities of many naval defensive systems; 4) Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) can be countered by disrupting the kill chain; 5) Russia's strategy in A2/AD is political absorption via integrated air defense systems, which are widely regarded as among the best in the world.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

Building on previous Center for Complex Operations (CCO) efforts which led to the publication of *Monopoly of Force*, CCO has continued examining the lessons learned from global DDR programs, most recently by organizing a panel on the subject at the 7th International Lessons Learned Conference held on December 1. Panelists from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, World Bank, USAID, and the Institute for Inclusive Security first examined the two DDR experiences in Liberia, in 1996-1997 and in 2003-2005. While disarmament was implemented in the earlier effort, failed demobilization resulted in an early return to arms. The later DDR effort included a more successful demobilization component, and though reintegration has not been as effective as might be hoped, the peace in Liberia has held.

The multi-donor, World Bank-managed DDR program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been administered in the midst of an ongoing conflict. While removing many weapons from the region, results have been very modest due to the continuing conflict and the difficulty of reinserting ex-combatants into communities. Greater preparation for and involvement of the receiving communities themselves in the DDR program would constitute an advance. As in Congo, the DDR effort in Afghanistan takes place in an active conflict. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, initiated in 2010, is the latest in a succession of efforts to attempt DDR in Afghanistan. While enjoying a degree of “ownership” by the government of Afghanistan, the program suffers from poor integration within a broader security sector reform effort. Moreover, the reintegration component appears thus far ineffective. The panel also explored the pragmatic gains achieved by including women both as planners of DDR programs and as beneficiaries. The recent panel effort suggested several next steps related to DDR research including exploring the nexus be-

tween DDR and countering violent extremism, and moving from analytic description to programmatic prescription, focusing on a specific case, such as Libya. The DDR acronym itself is becoming somewhat limiting for the kinds of programs which are required to meet the varying challenges of 21st century violence—from breaking command and control to crime, violence, trauma, welfare, etc. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ look at second generation DDR is moving in the right direction—as is work beginning to adapt traditional DDR approaches to such contemporary challenges as urban conflict and gang violence.

Illicit Networks

The Center for Complex Operations hosted a panel discussion on November 30 that focused on the growing risks and transnational threats that illicit networks pose in the new global security environment. Panelists included Celina Realuyo of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Douglas Farah, author of *Merchant of Death*, and *Blood from Stones*, Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, and John Myrick of the Joint IED Defeat Organization. Criminal networks operate according to well understood economic logics; however, their supply chains are largely hidden, and their increasing interaction with terrorist and insurgent networks is alarming. For example, Taliban use of poppy revenues to finance their Afghanistan insurgency has created a sensitive nexus between counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics in the region. Poppy eradication has had unintended second and third order effects, among which is the alienation of large, impoverished rural populations, which complicated the counterinsurgency effort. A new development is the use of network analysis to better understand the networks involved in the production, planning, and use of improved explosive devices. The panel also explored the role of specific individuals as “enablers,” or even “super-enablers,” of illicit networks. These individuals constitute the connective tissue between local criminals and their activities, and international networks.

Planning Is Everything

In this *Joint Force Quarterly* (3rd Quarter 2011) article, National War College faculty member Mark Bucknam details a study of the Adaptive Planning process within DOD and the role of the Secretary of Defense in the process. Bucknam argues that Secretary Gates played an integral role in this important process of establishing defense priorities, and that future Secretaries would be required to “immerse [themselves] in the DOD planning process.” This will pose a continual challenge, Bucknam states, because of the arcane aspects of Adaptive Planning. But he argues that planning is essential for reasons that go beyond the plan itself—to force coordinated thinking among DOD components, for example—and that the Adaptive Planning process does a good job of achieving these multiple benefits.

Challenges to Leadership: Responding to Biological Threats

In the Center for Technology and National Security Policy’s Defense & Technology Paper No. 86, Paul Rosenzeig highlights the lack of a comprehensive survey of authorities and responsibilities in the arena of biological threats. With this in mind, the paper seeks to identify a series of gaps and overlaps in existing structures and mechanisms and to advance potential solutions that can be implemented. Beginning with an overview of the biological threat and the evolution of the U.S. bio-defense policy since 2001, Rosenzeig examines the Federal coordination structure and Federal/state coordination. Regarding the Federal structure, the author illustrates that the proliferation of Federal entities has created a bureaucratic gridlock that is detrimental to effective decision-making. There is no effective centralizing coordinating function for biological incidents, and the author suggests the establishment of a WMD coordinator at the cabinet level. At the Federal/state level, there is little un-

derstanding as to when an event of local significance transitions into an event on the national level, nor has there been an effort to understand the threshold for dividing Federal responsibility from state/local/private responsibility. Rosenzeig concludes by recommending that a more comprehensive set of planning and response exercises be developed in order to better understand and develop a doctrine of incident leadership suitable for a biological crisis.

The Use of High Performance Computing (HPC) to Strengthen the Development of Army Systems

In the Center for Technology and National Security Policy’s Defense & Technology Paper No. 87, John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and Charles J. Nietubicz examine how the expanded use of high performance computing can contribute to improving the design and production of weapons systems, leading to a more responsive, more economical acquisition process. High performance computing (HPC) generally refers to the use of the latest, most powerful supercomputers or clusters of computers to solve the largest and most demanding computational problems. Most of the HPC work in the Army has been primarily by users in the research and development laboratories, but the authors suggest that HPC become a routine factor in the entire acquisition process. This will involve close collaboration among the research, development and engineering laboratories, the program executive officers and program managers, and the contractors. Once the Army involves all participants in acquisition, the full benefits of physics-based modeling on high performance computers can be realized. The authors present a set of recommendations for actions by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology and the Army S&T community at large to establish an Army program on the use of HPC in the acquisition community for design and manufacturing.

Preparing the Pipeline: U.S. Cyber Work Force for the Future

This Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) workshop, organized with the National Defense University's iCollege and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, brought together approximately seventy participants from across the Department of Defense, other elements of the Federal Government (DHS, OPM, ODNI, etc.), industry, academia, and state and local government. The workshop's four panels addressed the size and growth of the future cyber work force; state and local work force issues; K-12, college and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education and training; and personnel credentialing for the cyber work force. After the panels, workshop participants engaged in break-out groups, where they answered a series of questions related to the panel topics. Following the break-out groups, participants presented their key findings to the workshop as a whole. A post-workshop "quick look" report detailed a number of key policy issues to be addressed by the workshop's final report. These issues include: 1) Federal Government hiring rules and authorities for cyber work force professionals; 2) state and local government cyber work force issues; 3) a streamlined security clearance process; 4) public-private solutions for enhancing the cyber work force pipeline; 5) broader educational initiatives to emphasize and improve STEM education nationwide; and 6) a national strategic communications campaign to emphasize the importance of cyber and STEM education.

Hidden Peril/Trojan Beacon Exercises

The Center for Applied Strategic Learning conducted its fourth and fifth National Security Policy Analysis Forum exercises, "Hidden Peril" and "Trojan Beacon," in the last months of 2011. "Hidden Peril" was developed to provide a forum to examine the U.S. ability to mitigate the effects of, respond to, and re-

cover from a complex natural catastrophe within the homeland. Among the key lessons learned from the exercise were the need to identify statutory authorities in advance of a disaster; ensure memoranda of understanding between agencies and organizations are integrated more efficiently; and ensure a smooth process for requirement prioritization.

"Trojan Beacon" allowed participants to examine U.S.-Turkey relations in differing future scenarios and gave participants a forum to discuss policy options for both continued and improved engagement in order to ensure the most effective bilateral and regional objectives are met. The exercise highlighted the importance of furthering dialogue with Turkey to ensure that it continues to help foster efforts to ensure a stable greater Middle East region.

Navy CJTF-HOA Exercise

The Center for Applied Strategic Learning conducted an exercise on November 4 for Navy personnel deploying to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, to fill Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) core staff billets. The exercise highlighted the many structural challenges that remain in HOA despite evolving events and participants, with discussion themes structured around security, governance, interagency relationships, and international partnerships. The opportunity to collectively reflect on the comprehensive pre-deployment training resulted in an increased understanding of the security situation in HOA, billet assignments, and interagency relationships.

Discordant Threads Exercise

From December 12 to 15, the Center for Applied Strategic Learning (CASL) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) co-sponsored ICAF's end of semester "Discordant Threads" capstone exercise. "Discordant Threads" challenged students to evaluate complex national security challenges and opportunities that the U.S. faces in the strategic environment of the 21st century. Participants reacted

to an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula coordinated terror attack on Dulles International Airport using suicide tactics and a radiological dispersion device, and leveraged scenario information and panel presentations that outlined domestic, economic, media, and other contextual issues. Acting as a National Security Council Principals Committee, participants gained an appreciation for the dynamics of the inter-agency policy formulation process as they developed an array of policy options and national strategic guidance in response to the scenario events. Participants later assumed the role of a combatant command staff and developed military courses of action and a concept of operation that allowed them to experience key aspects of joint operational planning.

