Chapter Ten

Conclusion

Almost all observers forecast that China’s economy will continue to grow, a process that will require annual energy increases of 4 to 5 percent through 2020 (compared with growth of about 1 percent in the industrialized countries).²⁶³ China currently both consumes and produces about 10 percent of the world’s energy.²⁶⁴
China will increasingly be a net energy importer, although the nation will remain a net exporter of coal through the forecast period. Coal will remain China’s primary fuel for generating electricity; hydroelectricity, natural gas, and nuclear energy will become more important, while the oil sector will decline, losing at least half its share.
The natural gas share of total energy production is expected to double by 2020 as China begins to take greater advantage of its large domestic reserves. Beijing has vowed to cut pollution by “increasing the proportion of gas and electricity in energy consumption [by] 75 percent in 2005, and 83 percent in 2010.”²⁶⁵ The nuclear share of power generation may quadruple but will still form just 1.6 percent of production, while the hydroelectric share is expected to increase by a third, as the petroleum share falls.
China’s total energy production, 29.4 quads in 1990, had increased to 34.9 quads by 2000. By comparison, the United States produced approximately 70.9 quads of energy in 1990 and 99 quads in 2000. By 2015, China’s overall energy production is expected to exceed 70 quads, of which approximately three-fourths will come from coal.
On the other side of the ledger, China consumed 27 quads of energy in 1990, representing about 9 percent of world energy consumption. Of this amount, coal accounted for approximately 73 percent and petroleum another 20 percent. U.S. consumption in 1990 was more than 84 quads; by 2000, that number had risen to almost 99 quads.
The industrial sector typically consumes approximately 75 percent of China’s energy annually. Continuing increases in industrial energy efficiency are expected from such measures as installation of more efficient boilers, but industry is also likely to become more electricity-intensive as it phases out direct fuel burning. The transportation sector, by contrast, -accounts for only about 7 percent of China’s energy consumption. This amount will likely increase rapidly, however, as private automobile ownership increases.
China’s electricity demand more than doubled between 1986 and 1995 and is expected to triple between 1995 and 2020. Production of electricity is forecast to match this figure.²⁶⁶ Since only 80 percent of Chinese citizens are connected to an electrical grid (quite low compared to most industrialized nations), the residential/commercial sector should experience the most rapid growth in electricity demand, driven largely by enormous increases in appliance ownership and continued electrification of rural areas.
China will continue exploring for additional domestic oil and gas resources ashore, with the northwestern provinces the most likely source—despite relatively disappointing results to date.²⁶⁷ The goal to reduce the overwhelming reliance on coal for power generation has spurred a campaign to increase dramatically the use of natural gas. This goal also aims to lower reliance on imported oil, reduce the damaging environmental effects of burning coal, and increase the efficiency of the energy sector.
Tied to this aim is the fact that domestic oil production may not increase significantly in the immediate future. The Daqing oilfield, long China’s most productive, is suffering from decreasing supplies and inefficient reorganization; oil prices are low and no great new petroleum fields have emerged in China; the transportation infrastructure for energy products remains constrained; and the country is in the midst of economic reorganization that roils the energy sector picture. The Minister of Land and Natural Resources stated in April 2002 that the country’s “oil and gas reserves are in great shortage” and that “the oil fields in eastern China are unable to increase yield any more.”²⁶⁸ Furthermore, the Ministry of Land and Resources reported that “for the past ten years, China’s crude oil consumption has kept growing at an average rate of 5.77 percent, while the growth of domestic oil supplies was only 1.67 percent.”²⁶⁹
Energy is an increasingly significant factor in Beijing’s national security calculus and hence in the conduct of foreign relations. Future maritime exploration for energy resources is a significant aspect of this fact. China has for many years carried out an extensive program of maritime exploration and surveying. In many cases these surveys serve both national security and economic objectives; mapping the ocean bottom, for instance, yields data useful for future submarine and antisubmarine warfare applications, as well as for locating likely areas of petroleum reserves. To improve this program, Beijing has begun an effort to establish a system of navigation and surveillance satellites.²⁷⁰
These operations have caused diplomatic protests and influenced domestic political discourse in several Asian nations. Surveying missions in waters claimed by Japan have prompted frequent complaints by Tokyo. Similar operations in the South Pacific have evoked protests from Vanuatu.²⁷¹ In other words, although a signatory of the 1982 UNCLOS and quick to protest violations of that document’s parameters, Beijing does so based on its almost unique interpretation of maritime law and does not hesitate to exploit that interpretation for its own purposes.
The ocean-bed resources from which China currently draws petroleum products are located in territorial waters or those well within the nation’s exclusive economic zone, for the most part within 100 nm of the mainland. The only likely change to this situation would occur if significant oil or gas reserves are discovered in the middle or southern part of the South China Sea or well out in the East China Sea, which would extend Beijing’s proven energy interests out as far as 750 nm from China.
The most promising additional maritime energy deposits are likely to be either natural gas or methane hydrates. The latter is a gas found in solid form beneath the ocean bottom. Economic recovery of significant quantities remains beyond current technology, although since the early 1980s the United States, Russia, Japan, India and several other countries have experimented with its recovery.
As an example of its potential, possible methane hydrate resources in U.S. waters are estimated (at 50 percent probability) at 9,000 tcm, which is almost 300 times larger than the estimated total remaining conventional natural gas resources in the United States.²⁷² Should this resource be found in Chinese waters, the implications for a net energy importer like Beijing would be significant. Some Chinese engineers have estimated that huge amounts of methane hydrate reserves lie on the Tibetan Plateau, as well as in the Bo, East China, and South China Seas, but the theoretical rather than proven nature of these reserves is described by Dr. Jin Xianglong, a researcher with China’s State Laboratory of Ocean Floor Science under the State Bureau of Oceanography.²⁷³
The efficient transfer of natural gas to market (on mainland China) requires liquefaction, given the current limits for piping natural gas. That in turn means that Beijing would require the cooperation of the nations closest to the gas deposits to build liquefaction plants. Hence, even the discovery of large, economically recoverable energy resources in the mid- to southern South China Sea is not likely to evoke military action by Beijing.
There is no doubt about the government’s deliberate, well-funded global effort to locate and secure energy supplies. This search is spurred by the lack of success locating additional domestic petroleum resources and the probability that offshore sources will never satisfy more than approximately 10 percent of China’s petroleum requirements. Hence, Beijing will remain forced to seek international energy supplies.
During 2002, CNPC engaged in exploration and production in Russia, Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Tunisia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Burma, “and other Southeast Asian countries.”²⁷⁴ China is also actively seeking oil imports from other nations in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East. As discussed above, Beijing has petroleum products purchase agreements with several countries in these regions.²⁷⁵ Another aspect of this policy is China’s reported attempt to purchase outright one of Russia’s state oil firms.²⁷⁶
China faces two serious difficulties in Latin America, one immediate and one more general. The first is the political uncertainty in Venezuela, the Latin American nation with which Beijing has signed its most significant energy acquisition agreement. The turmoil of President Hugo Chavez Frias’ regime highlighted severe economic, political, and social problems common to all too many Latin American nations, to which are offered few solutions other than to blame the United States. His agreements with Beijing resulted more from a desire to tweak Washington than to form a lasting relationship with China.
This leads directly to the more general problem China faces in acquiring Latin American energy resources: the United States remains the dominant economic and political presence in the hemisphere, with European interests in second place. It is difficult to imagine circumstances that would permit China to acquire significant energy resources from Latin America.
Beijing faces a similar problem in sub-Saharan Africa. The oil-rich nations of this region are already heavily tied to Western oil countries, including the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Brazil. This does not mean Beijing could not make inroads on the continent, but it does mean that such efforts may incur a significant cost in relations with the nations with whom China would be competing. Mozambique is a case in point: Chinese efforts to take part of this state’s oil production by supplanting the Brazilian companies already present would affect Chinese efforts to expand its economic presence in South America.
A great many articles have appeared in the open press during the past decade about Russia’s Far East serving as the source of large energy supplies for China. The Russian company Yukos has been supplying oil to China by rail since 2001 and recently signed an agreement with CNPC to increase these shipments through 2005.²⁷⁷
After at least 2 years of discussion, in July 2001 President Jiang Zemin signed an agreement in Moscow for a feasibility study of a 400,000-bbl-per-day pipeline from Angarsk in eastern Siberia to Daqing, in northeastern China.²⁷⁸ This project remained in the planning stage as of June 2003, with fall 2003 the most optimistic start date.²⁷⁹ Available -details describe a 1,400-mile-long pipeline capable of providing 147 million bbl of crude oil a year to China when completed in 2005, and 221 million bbl by 2010.²⁸⁰ This proposed pipeline, which would cost approximately $2 billion, would have the capacity to convey 30 million tons of petroleum—a very significant proportion of China’s total demand—from Russia to China annually by 2010. The lead companies for the project would be CNPC and PetroChina for China, and Yukos and Transneft for Russia.²⁸¹ The two governments have also discussed the sale of Russian surplus electricity to China.²⁸²
Despite all the talk—and the almost certain presence—of large natural gas and oil deposits in Siberia, very little production from this area has shipped to China. One reason for this is that Russia’s energy exporting infrastructure is oriented toward Western Europe. Redirecting that infrastructure to supply China would be a large undertaking based on political as well as economic evaluations.
This situation evokes the decades of desultory reports of Japanese plans to provide the investment necessary to recover the mineral wealth of Russia’s Far East. The wealth is there, but in China’s case, the necessary technological and financial resources, not to mention the political will, so far have been lacking. Furthermore, Moscow’s desire for the financial return from selling these resources to Beijing is shadowed by historic Russian doubts about Chinese reliability.
As of March 2003, the discussions between Moscow and Beijing remain essentially stalled, with Russia negotiating with Japan about an alternative: instead of building a pipeline from Angarsk in Siberia to Daqing in northeastern China, Moscow would run the pipeline from Angarsk to Nakhodka, a seaport that would facilitate the shipment of Russian oil both to Japan and to other Pacific nations. Moscow may originally have aired this idea to pressure Beijing into an agreement about exploiting Siberian reserves, which are plentiful but expensive to recover, but Tokyo’s proposal to share the $5 billion cost of the pipeline strongly appeals to Moscow. The most likely result of the two pipeline proposals, which have engaged Beijing’s testy attention, is that a pipeline from eastern Siberia will be built with branches both to China and to Nakhodka. Moscow has yet to announce its decision.²⁸³
Beijing apparently is making an extensive effort to include the energy sector in any strategic partnership with Moscow, and a similar effort is being made with Russia’s former republics in Central Asia, with the SCO as vehicle. Extensive programs have been launched in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with whom Beijing has signed agreements and contracts and from whom it has purchased a small amount of oil. China’s energy policy in Central Asia is shadowed by competition from Russian and Western oil companies seeking to recover the area’s potentially rich petroleum deposits, and increasingly by the extensive post-September 11 American presence on China’s western border.
China’s rulers historically have viewed Central Asia as the source of threats to national security. Beijing no doubt looks favorably at the suppression of the transnational Islamic movements in Central Asia that have affected its rule in Xinjiang, but it also must have a good deal of concern about both the renewed Russian interest in its former republics and the U.S. indications of maintaining a strong presence in the region for the foreseeable future.
The proposals for various trans-Asian pipelines would require international cooperation and, probably, sharing of energy resources on a scale demanding Beijing’s agreement to a dramatically new degree of economic cooperation and opening. These proposals include an ASEAN Gas Center; a pipeline that would serve Russia, China, Japan, and Korea; and a visionary complex of pipelines that would stretch from Kazakhstan to Shanghai and from Australia to Russia’s Far East.²⁸⁴
This project assumes a 58.8 percent growth in Southeast Asia’s energy needs by 2010 and would require an investment of an estimated $180 billion over the next 10 years.²⁸⁵ As a participant in ASEAN Plus Three discussions, China may be part of cooperative ASEAN efforts and has held talks on energy security in Asia with Japan and South Korea.²⁸⁶ The Asian energy equation is clouded by estimates that two of the region’s largest producers, Indonesia and Malaysia, will exhaust exportable resources by about 2012 and 2016, respectively.²⁸⁷ Over 60 nations met in September 2002 in Osaka to address uncertainties in Asia’s energy supply. China agreed with Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN nations to establish an information-sharing network as part of preparing a set of emergency response measures.²⁸⁸
China’s leadership recognizes the importance of energy resources in their nation’s economic, social, and political future. In October 2001, the SETC called for the “rectification and standardization of the [oil] market.” Standardization was to be enforced at all levels of government, from national to municipal, and at all levels of the economy, from wholesale importation and storage to individual gas stations.²⁸⁹
Beijing is focusing on the nation’s energy requirements, supplies, infrastructure, environmental concerns, and international ties, but it is still struggling with the question of how much state control to exert over the nominally private energy sector. Numerous government statements, organizational moves, and actions by state-sponsored “private” energy conglomerates all dance around this issue: how freely will “socialism with Chinese characteristics” allow the energy system to function?
This issue can be difficult to resolve, as evidenced in the widespread labor unrest that has accompanied recent privatization efforts. The maximization of foreign investment of capital, technology, and developmental skills is also recognized as a requirement, as is expanded access and even outright acquisition of a variety of energy resources, literally on a global basis. One enlightening report describes the Liaohe River Petroleum Exploration Bureau, a state-owned oil company in troubled Liaoning Province. In the process of privatizing, the company significantly reduced employment, cutting well-drilling and production teams “in accordance with market demand.” It is also “targeting the international market,” with projects in North Africa, South America, and Russia. This report claims success in economic terms but does not explore the resulting unemployment problems.²⁹⁰
Another aspect of China’s energy sector that probably troubles Beijing is the reliance on foreign companies for exploration, exploitation, and marketing. Foreign investment in China’s energy sector is concentrated in the hands of American and Western European companies, which raises interesting possibilities for non-national influences on Beijing’s future national security decisions.
China’s ability to control its rapidly changing energy situation is marked not only by dependence on foreign technology and investment, but also by the mining industry’s terrible safety record, the societal unrest resulting from corruption and from the privatization of SOEs, the lack of an adequate transportation and pipeline infrastructure, the weakness of the domestic governmental system to coordinate among national and provincial governments, and the ideological manacles of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
As evidenced in the past decade’s new willingness to engage in multilateral forums, conduct land and maritime border negotiations, and modernize the military, China’s long-term campaign to secure energy will continue to affect the pursuit of national security and foreign relations. If China’s energy requirements continue to grow as forecast and significant new domestic sources are not found, then reliance on foreign energy resources will increasingly be a factor in Beijing’s policy options.
Dependence on foreign energy supplies may result in a studied departure from the five “peaceful coexistence” principles so long adumbrated by Beijing, if foreign energy resources face political or economic threats. As long as the CCP governs China and believes continued economic growth essential for regime survival, then Beijing will use all instruments of statecraft, military as well as economic and political, to ensure adequate energy supplies are available.
This does not mean that severe domestic unrest or international conflict is inevitable or even likely. Rather, it means that as China becomes more integrated into the international economy through the vehicle of the WTO, the energy sector will play a more significant role in both its domestic and foreign policy priorities. Hence, other nations dealing with China will find themselves focusing increasingly on this part of their relationship, while the Chinese government will have to react to greater pressure to liberalize its political rule over a liberalized economy.

Endnotes

²⁶³For a dissenting view, see Gordon G.G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). [BACK]

²⁶⁴The data used as the basis for this survey should be periodically updated if China’s economy continues to expand, as expected. The following section draws on the excellent EIA report, “China’s Energy Production and Consumption,” in “China: An Energy Sector Overview, 1997” (December 1997), accessed at <www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china/part2.html#ENERGY>; and EIA, “International Energy Outlook 2002, accessed at <www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/tbl_bl.html>. [BACK]

²⁶⁵“China’s Modernization May be Slowed Down by Oil Shortage,” People’s Daily,in Alexander’s 6, no. 15 (August 14, 2001). [BACK]

²⁶⁶This estimate is from “World Energy Outlook 2000,” International Energy Agency, accessed at <www.cna.ca/english/Articles/Electricity%20in%20China.pdf>, 2. Actual numbers offered by various Department of Energy, Chinese government, and commercial sources differ, but all agree on the magnitude of the expected increases in electrical production and consumption. [BACK]

²⁶⁷“China Petrochemical Speeds Up Exploration in Northwest China,” Reuters, in Alexander’s7, no. 3 (February 6, 2002). [BACK]

²⁶⁸Tian Fengshan, cited in “China Spells Out New Strategy for Oil Exploration,” Xinhua,April 18, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020418000199, and “Land Minister on China’s Potential in Oil, Gas Exploration,” Xinhua, April 18, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020418000157, also claimed that only 25 percent of China’s onshore oil deposits and 20 percent of offshore deposits had been explored. A different opinion is given by Yao Guanming of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, who stated that the country has plentiful domestic reserves, with enough crude oil to be Acontinuously exploited” to 2063, and natural gas to the 22d century (“Will China’s Oil and Gas Resources Be Depleted,” Keji Ribao, July 11, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020729000142). [BACK]

²⁶⁹People’s Daily, February 12, 2003, in Alexander’s 8, no. 5 (March 6, 2003), reported the ministry figures and repeated that 2002 oil imports were 15 percent above those for 2001. [BACK]

²⁷⁰Yu Fei, “State Oceanic Administration: China to Launch Marine Satellite in 2001,” Xinhua (Hong Kong), October 26, 2000, in FBIS-CPP20001026000072. [BACK]

²⁷¹See, for instance, Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Speculation Regarding the Appearance of Chinese Ships in Japanese Waters—Petroleum Resources Surveys or Military Strategy?” Ekonomisuto (Tokyo), March 19, 2002, in FBIS-JPP20020312000076. For a brief report of Beijing’s diplomatic and economic activities in the South Pacific, see “Special Report: An Analysis of Chinese Activity in Oceania,” VIC (November 5, 2002); Chinese aid to the region (approximately $300 million) has quadrupled since 1998. In the past few years, China has begun military contacts with Papua New Guinea, established a satellite tracking station in Kiribati, broken New Zealand’s trade monopoly with the Cook Islands, and conducted numerous high-level political visits and exchanges in the region. Beijing has also secured observer (non-voting) status in the region’s major economic organization, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Former Vanuatu leader Barak Sope was directly responsible for securing China’s position in the PIF. [BACK]

²⁷²A good explanation of this promising resource is at <www.woodshole.er.usgs.gov/project-pages/hydrates/>. Also see “Broad Perspective of Gas Hydrates in Offshore Goa,” accessed at <http://www.dod.nic.in/pro/chapter-16.doc>. [BACK]

²⁷³“Gas Hydrates to be New Energy in 21st Century,” People’s Daily, December 15, 1999. Jin is also quoted in “Search for New Energy Resources has Become Imperative,” China Daily, April 29, 2003, in Alexander’s 7, no. 10 (May 16, 2003). [BACK]

²⁷⁴“Jiang Zemin, Qadhafi Ink Deal to Open Libyan Oil Sector to PRC Firms,” AFP, April 14, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020414000057; Cao Xiaoxi, quoted in Xie Ye and Huo Yongzhe, “Oil Giants Map Out Overseas Takeovers,” China Daily (Business Weekly Supplement), February 5, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020205000060. Also see “CNPC Raises 2002 Production Forecast,” Reuters, in Alexander’s 7, no. 3 (February 6, 2002); “Sinopec Group and Sinochem to Buy Middle East Oil Assets,” Reuters, in Alexander’s 7, no. 8 (April 18, 2002), also reported that Sinopec has requested permission from Kuwaiti authorities to join in a $7 billion “Northern Fields” project. Also see “Oman and China Sign Oil Cooperation Agreements,” Asia Pulse, in Alexander’s 7, no. 8 (April 18, 2002). Sinopec’s plan to invest $525 million in Algeria is reported in “Chinese Company Wins Contract,” Radio Algiers, October 1, 2002, in FBIS-GMP20021001000257. [BACK]

²⁷⁵One recent agreement with Venezuela is reported in “Foreign Minister Reports on Four Agreements Signed with PRC,” Globovision Television (Caracas), December 28, 2001, in FBIS-LAP20011228000013. [BACK]

²⁷⁶“CNPC Wants to Bid for Russia Slavneft,” Reuters, December 4, 2002. [BACK]

²⁷⁷“Yukos to Boost Oil Supply to China by Rail,” Commersant, July 26, 2002, in Alexander’s 7, no. 16 (August 23, 2002), reported these amounts as 11 million bbl in 2001, increasing incrementally to 22.1 million bbl in 2005. [BACK]

²⁷⁸Cited in Ann Myers Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis, “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy,” Survival 4, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 125. [BACK]

²⁷⁹Huang Yan, president of PetroChina, quoted in “PetroChina May Invest in Russian Pipeline,” Bloomberg.com, August 30, 2002, in Alexander’s 7, no. 18 (September 19, 2002). [BACK]

²⁸⁰“Russia and China May Ink Oil Pipe Deal Next Month,” Reuters, November 20, 2002; “Government to Approve a China-Russia Oil Pipeline Project Soon,” Wenweipo News, in VIC, “Asia-Pacific Daily News Summary” (November 25, 2002). [BACK]

²⁸¹Huo Yongzhe, “Pipe Dream to Come True for Oil/Gas Transfer,” China Daily (Business Weekly Supplement), September 10, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020910000086. [BACK]

²⁸²An optimistic account of these negotiations is in Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Russian-Chinese Strategic Rapprochement: Lessons of History and Outlook for the New Millennium,” Washington Journal of Modern China 7, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2001/2002), 29. The $2 billion figure is in Alexandre Zyuzin, “Russia-China Oil Pipeline Construction to Boost Bilateral Trade,” ITAR–TASS, December 1, 2002, in FBIS-CEP20021201000008, which reports that pipeline construction will start in 2003 and be completed in 2005, but also notes that the project’s “feasibility study” remains uncompleted. “Assessing China-Russia Oil Pipeline Project,” Takungpao News, December 5, 2002 in VIC, “Asia-Pacific Daily News Summary,” reports that the pipeline feasibility study had just begun. [BACK]

²⁸³A good summary of this imbroglio is in “Russia’s Potential Far East Pipelines,” VIC, “Special Report: Potential Russian Far East Oil Pipelines” (February 20, 2003), accessed at <www.oilandgasinternational.com/departments/development_production/jan03_russia>, but dozens of reports in Russian, Chinese, and Japanese newspapers have appeared on these pipeline negotiations. See, for instance, “Russian Minister Views Political Aspect of Oil Pipeline Projects,” ITAR–TASS, February 28, 2003, in FBIS-CEP20030228000017; Wang Ling, “China May Approve Adding Japan to Sino-Russian Oil Pipeline,” China Daily, March 3, 2003, in FBIS-CPP20030303000025; and “Russian President Favors Japan Pipeline Plan Over China’s,” Kyodo News, January 30, 2003, accessed at <www.asia.news.hahoo.com/030130/kyodo/d7oseeqo2.html>. Also see “Russia-China Oil Pipeline Project Stalled Because of Internal Politics,” Neftegaz.RU, December 24, 2002, in Alexander’s 8, no. 2 (January 24, 2003), for the probably accurate report that “the major obstacles for the crucial project...have become Russia’s high prices and China’s demands for a share in Siberian oilfields.” The dual-line solution is described in “Russian Oil Pipeline Confirmed to Lead Directly to China,” People’s Daily, March 18, 2003, despite this article’s misleading title. [BACK]

²⁸⁴See, for instance, “Creation of ASEAN Gas Centre Expected to Take Off in 2002,” Manila Bulletin, in Alexander’s 6, no. 24 (December 19, 2001); Manning, 113. [BACK]

²⁸⁵“Southeast Asia Needs $180 Billion Investments to Develop its Energy Sector,” The Daily Star, in Alexander’s 6, no. 5 (March 8, 2001). [BACK]

²⁸⁶“Japan, China, and South Korea Hold High-Level Energy Talks,” Kyodo News, in Alexander’s 7, no. 6 (March 21, 2002). [BACK]

²⁸⁷“Asia Will Need $200 billion in Next 10–15 Years to Build Gas Infrastructure,” Gulf News Online, May 22, 2002, in Alexander’s 7, no. 12 (June 13, 2002). [BACK]

²⁸⁸“Asian Countries Agree on Coordinated Response to Oil Supply Emergency,” Xinhua, September 22, 2002, in Alexander’s 7, no. 20 (October 15, 2002). The meeting was attended by 65 nations, plus 10 international organizations; 13 states agreed to form the information-sharing network. This meeting is also described in “Japan, 12 Other Asian Nations Agree on Oil Supply Info Framework,” Jiji Press (Tokyo), September 22, 2002, in FBIS-JPP20020922000059. [BACK]

²⁸⁹General Office of the State Council, “The Suggestions on Further Rectifying and Standardizing the Market Order of Finished Oil,” Xinhua (Hong Kong), October 25, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20011025000151. Also see “Refined Oil Prices Drop Again Today,” Xinhua, December 31, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20011231000160. [BACK]

²⁹⁰Xia Qiuju, “State-Owned Oil Company in Liaoning Makes Progress in Restructuring SOEs,” China Daily, June 10, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020610000014. [BACK]