Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare

In July 1878, by order of President Rutherford B. Hayes, three distinguished U.S. Army officers were summoned to West Point, New York. The senior was Major General John M. Schofield, who had been one of Sherman's subordinate commanders during the Georgia campaign.(Note 1) Next was Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry, veteran of campaigns in the Carolinas and Petersburg and a key figure in the 1876 campaign against the Dakota Sioux. (Note 2) The third was Colonel George W. Getty, a thirty-eight year veteran who had participated in all of the Army of the Potomac's campaigns from Yorktown to Appomattox. (Note 3) These officers were directed to preside over one of the most remarkable hearings in the history of American military jurisprudence, the investigation of the "facts of the case of Fitz John Porter, late Major General of Volunteers." (Note 4)

Fifteen years earlier, a court martial had convicted Porter for his actions during the second battle of Manassas, August 1862, when he commanded the Army of the Potomac's V Corps, attached to Major General John Pope's Army of Virginia. Porter was accused of not moving his corps in accordance to orders and of failing to attack Confederate General Jackson's forces when an attack could have prevented defeat. (Note 5) At the trial, Porter's defense argued that Pope's orders were impossible to execute because they were based upon an inaccurate picture of road conditions and the enemy's disposition. Porter could not have attacked Jackson without fighting Confederate General Longstreet's forces, which were concentrated in front of him when he received Pope's order. As evidence, Porter's side produced a dispatch from the commander of Union cavalry, Brigadier General John Buford, which reported Longstreet's troops pouring toward Porter almost eight hours prior to the dispatch of Pope's order. (Note 6)

Shoring up the case against Porter was a body of testimony that can only be described as incompetent and immaterial. The most outlandish was the statement of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. H. Smith, who testified that, after meeting Porter, he had reported to Pope: "General, he [Porter] will fail you." (Note 7) When pressed in cross examination for an explanation, Smith claimed that:

I had one of those clear convictions that a man has a few times perhaps in his life as to the character and purposes of a person when he sees him for the first time. (Note 8)

Thereafter, Porter's supporters would refer to Smith as "the mind reader."

Despite the flimsy case against him, Porter was convicted and sentenced to "be cashiered and forever disqualified from holding office of trust or profit under the government of the United States." (Note 9) Porter appealed the verdict, but it took fifteen years for the government to act on his appeal.

The President had authorized the Schofield board to review the alleged irregularities of the 1863 court martial and to consider new evidence. Accordingly, to their great credit, exConfederate officers who were at the Second Battle of Manassas came forward to clarify the tactical questions on which Porter's claims rested. Most notable was General Longstreet, who revealed that at the time that Porter received orders from Pope, his Confederate troops were present in strength, and that had Porter attempted to attack "we could have broken up" the Union force and "thrown everything we had in pursuit." (Note 10) Longstreet testified that Porter, by maintaining his position, had prevented him from joining forces with Jackson," thereby averting a greater catastrophe on the twenty ninth of August than actually occurred on the thirtieth. Rather than censure, Porter's actions merited his commander's thanks. The board then called Thomas C. H. Smith, the "mind reader." Smith stuck to the version of the facts he had recounted fifteen years earlier. (Note 12) He also told the board that he was working on a history of the Second Manassas Campaign. When Porter's counsel expressed his regrets that he would have to rewrite the portion of his history on Porter, Smith quietly said, "That chapter is not written yet." (Note 13) The recommendations of the Schofield board were unambiguous:

In our opinion, justice requires such action as may be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case of General Fitz John Porter and to restore him to the position of which that sentence deprived him. (Note 14)

Unfortunately, however, the board did not have the authority to grant a reversal. The case had become a political issue, and was hotly debated in Congress. Again, some of the most powerful voices in Porter's defense came from Confederate veterans. Alabama Congressman Joseph Wheeler, a former leader of Confederate cavalry, expressed the prevailing sentiment when he declared that "the honor of an American soldier was as dear to the people in the South as in any other section of the land." (Note 15) Finally, in August 1886, twenty three years after the original verdict, Fitz John Porter's conviction was set aside and his rank and good name were restored. The modern reader might be tempted to think that the disaster at the Second Battle of Manassas and the unjust conviction of General Porter were the results of poor communications and information management inefficiencies that have been remedied by modern technology. We might be tempted to imagine that with such innovations as space-based position locating systems, overhead imagery, near real-time battlefield information, and instantaneous communications, such a calamity could never happen again. Perhaps we had better think again.

THE CASE OF GENERAL FREDERICK FRANKS

The four days of DESERT STORM's ground operations in February 1991 seemed to most Americans to be a remarkable military achievement and a satisfactory ending to what could have been a long and bloody war. Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono captured the public's mood when he said:

For as long as Americans honor their history, these 100 hours of Operation Desert Storm will be remembered as one of the most powerful applications of military might and one of the most flawlessly executed campaigns in the annals of warfare. (Note 16)

It came as something of a shock, then, when one year after the event Army Times writer Tom Donnelly revealed that the theater command structure was "riven by disputes"(Note 17) over how the ground battle should be waged. Donnelly related that the theater commander and chief, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, was often at odds with his subordinate land force commanders, Lieutenant Generals John Yeosock, Commander THIRD Army, Gary Luck, Commander XVIII Airborne Corps, and Frederick Franks, Commander VII Corps. The principal target of Schwarzkopf's frustration, Donnelly reported, was Franks, who was "not aggressive enough in attacking Iraq's Republican Guard." (Note 18)

Schwarzkopf later added to the controversy in his October 1992 autobiography. Schwarzkopf described Franks' plan as "plodding and overly cautious." (Note 19) Schwarzkopf told of his frustration in finding that, on the morning after the beginning of the ground attack [G+1], VII Corps had not advanced at a rate commensurate with other units in the attack, most notably the 24th Infantry Division in the adjacent XVIII Airborne Corps. (Note 20) In the end, Schwarzkopf toned down his criticism, saying that he had been "too hard" on VII Corps' "slow progress during the battle" and conceding that Franks had been "faced with the challenge of accomplishing [the] mission while sparing the lives of as many of his troops as possible." (Note 22) Schwarzkopf closed with the thought:

We will probably never know whether attacking the Republican Guard one or two days sooner would have made much difference in the outcome. What I did know was that we had inflicted a crushing defeat on Saddam's forces and accomplished every one of our military objectives. That was good enough for me. (Note 23)

The fact that Schwarzkopf stopped short of indicting Franks did not deter others from building a case against him. In June 1993, retired Air Force Colonel James G. Burton, a fourteen year veteran of the Pentagon and noted critic of Army testing and acquisition, published an article in which, like the "mind reader" in the Porter case, he claimed to have had a premonitory insight into Franks' failings. Burton charged that Franks' unhurried maneuver was the result of rigid adherence to a doctrine not suited to the demands of modern maneuver warfare. (Note 24) He argued that Franks could not keep pace with the demands of the ground war because of his overriding concern that the formations under his command remain "synchronized." The result was a linear, ponderous maneuver which permitted the Iraqi Republican Guard, Franks' objective, to escape. Burton declared that the events of the ground war proceeded at a rate "much quicker than Franks could handle," (Note 25) suggesting that "dinosaur blood runs freely through his veins.''(Note 26)

In a June 1994 article, retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor described Franks as "well respected in the Army," but "known to be slow and deliberate in all that he did ... not what Schwarzkopf was looking for as leader of the main attack against the Iraqis." (Note 27) Trainor concluded that Franks "could have been more aggressive," (Note 28) but traced the root of the problem to "a complex combination" of factors, including "different war fighting cultures" and "leadership styles." (Note 29)

Both of these cases illustrate that different war fighting cultures can produce incompatible leadership styles. The case of Fitz John Porter suggests that this dilemma has been with us at least since the Civil War. The case of Frederick Franks warns us that even in the information age, it is a problem we ignore at our peril.

THE ENDURING PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION

A comparative survey of the details of the Porter and Franks cases illustrates that an organization's warfighting culture will shape a subordinate commander's evaluation of information and interpretation of direction. Moreover, when a unit is detached from one organization and placed under the operational control of another, it will carry with it the warfighting culture of its parent command. This phenomenon affects mission analysis, appraisal of enemy capabilities, appreciation for ambient conditions, and promulgation of subsequent guidance.

Mission Analysis: The missions of both the Army of Virginia and Central Command included geographic and enemy-oriented objectives. The mission of the Army of Virginia was to protect "Western Virginia and the National Capital" and to "attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell." (Note 30) Similarly, Central Command's mission required it to "eject Iraqi Armed Forces from Kuwait" and "destroy the Republican Guard." (Note 31) Strictly speaking, in neither mission was one component more important than the other, but both Pope and Schwarzkopf chose to concentrate on the enemy-oriented aspects of their missions. Pope's orders of 27 August included the optimistic prediction that "We shall bag the whole crowd [i.e., Jackson's force]." (Note 32) Likewise, Schwarzkopf told his subordinates "we need to destroy not attack, not damage, not surround - I want you to destroy [emphasis in the original] the Republican Guard." (Note 33)

Appraisals of Enemy Capabilities: In both the Porter and Franks cases, the corps level appraisal of enemy capabilities was inconsistent with the theater commander 's. On the eve of the second battle of Manassas, Pope was under the impression that Jackson was fleeing for his life. (Note 34) Pope's information was based on an intercepted message(Note 35) and his own underestimation of enemy capabilities. (Note 36) Earlier, Pope's 14 July 1862 order, calling for his command to "discard such ideas" as "taking strong positions and holding them, of lines of retreat, and of bases of supplies"(Note 37) was a bombastic appeal to discard a cautious style of operations in favor of bolder action. (Note 38) Porter, on the other hand, formed his judgments based on Buford's report, which indicated that on the morning of 29 August over 14,000 Confederates had passed through the Thoroughfare Gap and were massed in the vicinity of Union forces. (Note 39) Pope denied seeing this crucial piece of battlefield intelligence until 1900 hours that evening. (Note 40) Thus, the two commanders made decisions based on two distinct images of the enemy situation.

Similarly, Schwarzkopf viewed the enemy's collapse on G-Day as prelude to a general rout. (Note 41) Schwarzkopf was contemptuous of the enemy facing VII Corps. He said: "The enemy is not worth shit [sic]. Go after them with audacity, shock action, and surprise." (Note 42) To Franks, however, the indicators that suggested to Schwarzkopf that Iraqi forces were in flight painted a different picture, that they were concentrating, possibly for offensive action. Franks expected to fight five heavy Republican Guard Forces Command [RGFC] divisions, (Note 43) four of which were estimated to be 75-100% effective on the eve of the ground attack, the fifth 50-75% effective. (Note 44) Intelligence had warned that "[t]he RGFC is the best equipped and best trained force in the Iraqi ground forces(Note 45) ... untainted by years of defensive warfare ... a highly motivated and trained offensive force ..." (Note 46) During the Iran-Iraq war, the RGFC "assumed a tactically offensive role: the counterattack." (Note 47) Like Pope, Schwarzkopf based his judgments on data provided by remote sources: intercepted messages and technical surveillance. In contrast, Franks made decisions based on battlefield data, which he believed to portray the situation with greater fidelity. Non-contextual electronic data tracking vehicular movement presented no coherent, persuasive grounds to expect that the anticipated meeting engagement would be anything less than originally anticipated.

Supervision of Operations: The manner of issuing direction in the two cases also bears comparison. Pope's orders were vague and difficult to interpret. Porter can not be blamed for failing to deduce that he was to attack from this order:

	move forward ... towards Gainesville. ... as soon as communication is 				established ... the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back 			behind Bull Run ... tonight. (Note 48) 

Appreciation of Ambient Conditions: Common to the specifications charged against Porter and the deficiencies alleged against Franks were the difficulties of night operations. In Porter's case, Pope had directed Porter to conduct a night march on 27 August, commencing at 0100 to arrive at Bristoe Station by daybreak. (Note 52) Porter could not obey the letter of this order because of factors Pope could not appreciate: the road was narrow, Confederate forces had destroyed the bridges, and two to three thousand Union Army wagons blocked the way. (Note 53) Porter did not start his march until 0300 and could not reach his destination until 1000, a delay which Pope maintained had prevented him from "bagging" Jackson's forces. (Note 54)

In Franks' case, Schwarzkopf's anger at what he perceived to be VII Corps' failure to "make good progress during the night"(Note 55) of G-Day suggests that, like Pope, he could not visualize his subordinate's predicament. Because of his wide span of control over U.S. and coalition forces, Schwarzkopf's staff relied on computer graphic displays of information, which were necessarily abridged. (Note 56) These displays precluded him from absorbing the details of any specific component of the operation, even in the area of the main attack. Since his map showed only movement, he was inclined to think that a lack of movement equated to a lack of progress. In his own words, "They seem to be sitting around." (Note 57) He could not appreciate the difficulties of the 1st Infantry Division's consolidating a breachhead, the passage of 7000 vehicles of the British 1st Armored Division, and then the 1st Division's redeployment to join 1st and 3d Armored Divisions. (Note 58) For all the advantages of twentieth century technology, Schwarzkopf had no better picture of Franks' situation than Pope had of Porter 's.

THE PHENOMENON OF CONCEPTUAL DIVERGENCE

Although separated by over a century, both of these cases illustrate a common problem: diverging concepts of ongoing operations leading to dysfunctional misunderstandings at different levels in the chain of command. This divergence is a natural consequence of on-the-spot decision making when conditions preclude consultation and coordination. A model might useful in understanding the phenomenon.

Prior to the initiation of active operations, deliberate planning should produce a common vision between senior and subordinate commanders. The record shows that Pope and Porter agreed on the plan to concentrate the Army in the vicinity of Alexandria to confront Lee's threatened move north.59 Similarly, Schwarzkopf and Franks appear to have been in general agreement about the concept of the "great wheel" to defeat the Iraqis. (Note 60)

After the senior and subordinate reach consensus, each begins a process of subsequent decision making independent of the other. Once combat operations commence, decisions must be made at a rate that does not permit the formal, fully-staffed process, especially when the demands of supervision compete with the demands of decision making. Accordingly, commanders involve a smaller number of staff officers and make decisions using on abbreviated procedures. These procedures will vary according to the commanders' personalities, but will include the following analytical processes:

	

- detailed planning, to ensure that each of the mission's component tasks

  is assigned to the most capable element.

- fine tuning, to provide refined guidance to subordinate units based upon

  the most detailed data available.

- contingency analysis, so that the organization is prepared to respond 

  effectively to possible changes in the enemy or friendly situation or to

  unpredictable variations in terrain or weather.

- disaster avoidance, to avoid catastrophic defeat in the event of the worst

  case.

- updating, to ensure that actions underway or contemplated are still

  appropriate to the current situation.

THE CRITICAL RELEVANCE OF CONTEXT

The transmission of data without the associated context further diminishes the clarity of a message, especially when the receiver is in a different contextual environment than the sender. The more impersonal the means of transmission, the greater the lack of context will produce misinterpretation. Any alternative to face-to-face consultation reduces the ability of senior and subordinate commanders to communicate clearly. The use of non-specific or metaphoric language carries with it the greater risk that the image the sender intends to communicate will not match with the image invoked in the mind of the receiver.

As more powerful technological tools intrude into the process of command, they bring with them the risk that a generation of officers will be more inclined by instinct to turn to a computer screen than to survey the battlefield, and that the use of precise operational terms will be displaced by computertalk. If that happens, we may have lost more than we have gained. To use Clausewitz' terms, a commander's ability to perceive "some glimmering of the inner light which leads to the truth,''(Note 61) may be enhanced by technology, but the "courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead"(Note 62) is still a function of character.

THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIATE COMMANDERS

Significantly, in both cases there was a level of intermediate command between the corps and theater commanders.

In Porter's case, Major General Irwin McDowell, who was senior to Porter, assumed command of his own and Porter's corps, in accordance with the custom of the day. (Note 63) McDowell had been with Pope since the Army of Virginia was created, and enjoyed his confidence. (Note 64) As McDowell positioned the two corps, Porter looked to him for clarification of Pope's intent. "What do you want me to do?" Porter asked McDowell at a critical point. McDowell only waved his hand and rode off, leaving Porter to rely on his own judgment. (Note 65) McDowell's absence was a subject of testimony at Porter's court martial. Porter stated that: From about 10 A.M. ... till after 6 P.M., I received no instructions from him [i.e., Pope] or General McDowell, though I had sent many messages to both of them. (Note 66)

In Franks' case, the intermediate commander was Yeosock, Commander of the THIRD Army. In accordance with modern U.S. military doctrine, Army command in a theater of operations involves three distinct responsibilities: to provide Army forces to the joint force, to perform assigned combat support and service support functions in the theater, and to provide command and control over Army elements engaged in operations. (Note 67) In the case of THIRD Army, plans and exercises leading up to the deployment into Saudi Arabia emphasized the first two responsibilities, but the command and control of operational Army elements was performed primarily by XVIII Airborne Corps. (Note 68) Thus, when the President decided to reinforce CENTCOM with VII Corps, THIRD Army was forced to assume a function for which it had not prepared. Both McDowell and Yeosock occupied posts which required either that they advocate their subordinates' views to the superior or that they compel their subordinates to alter operations in accordance with the superiors' guidance. Neither intermediate commander performed effectively, because both chose to be distant from and incommunicative with their subordinates. For both Porter and Franks, this remote style of command may have been the most difficult aspect of their new environment because it represented a major cultural change. Porter had been a protege of McClellan, a general who made a practice of "long days in the saddle and nights in the office - a very fatiguing life, but one that made my power felt everywhere and by everyone." (Note 69) Similarly, the command style in U.S. Army Europe during Franks service in it was summarized by its commander, General Crosbie E. Saint:

	When you personally talk to commanders, things come out that 

	you cannot get from a telephone conversation. I have no doubt 

	about the need for that kind of personal coordination. That is

	the reason why a corps or army group commander**  needs a

	mobile command post. The commander can send it out ahead 

	of time to someplace convenient and then bring commanders 

	together to get everything synchronized. (Note 70)

Significantly, neither McClellan nor Saint felt the criticism leveled against their subordinates was justified. McClellan called Porter "probably the best officer general officer I had under me." (Note 75) Likewise, Saint lauded Franks' "incredible success." (Note 76)

THE MORALE FACTOR

Another factor that Schwarzkopf might have considered before publishing his memoirs is the impact of his criticism on the morale of the rest of the officer corps. He might have found an insight in the papers of Major General George Gordon Meade. Meade made a number of references to the Porter court martial. In March 1863, Meade related that he had been called to Washington to appear before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," (Note 77) to comment on the conduct of Major General William Buell Franklin, who, like Porter, was investigated for the defeat at Fredericksburg. Meade thought that Franklin was being done a "great injustice(Note 78) ... to be made responsible for the failure at Fredericksburg ..." (Note 79)

This practice of blaming scapegoats caused much bad feeling among the officers of the Army of the Potomac. Meade himself was affected. In a 29 June 1863 letter to his wife] he revealed that when the War Department messenger arrived at his tent to inform him that he was to command the Army, his first thought was that he was about to be arrested, (Note 80) likely to take the blame for Chancellorsville.

The practice of blaming failure on subordinates was one of the least appealing characteristics of the Army during the Civil War, but while we may not condone it, we can at least appreciate that it was a result of repetitive defeats. It seems much more unseemly in the wake of victory, regardless of how far short that victory fell of the commander's claims. Although the Gulf War ended before the decline of morale that characterized the Army of the Potomac could become a factor, the question nonetheless remains: what will be the impact of Schwarzkopf's criticism of Franks on the officer corps as a whole?

CONCLUSION

The Porter - Franks comparison cannot as yet be neatly concluded. Porter fought for over twenty years to have his conviction reversed, but in the end was exonerated. Franks was never indicted, so his reproof takes the form of faint praise in Schwarzkopf's memoir and pettifoggery from the likes of Burton. Since the Iraqi generals are never likely to be as gracious in defeat as the Confederates were, we will never know whether more rash maneuver on the part of VII Corps would have resulted in an American unit falling into a carefully laid Iraqi ambush. As long ago as the fourth century, the military commentator Vegetius warned that:

A rash and inconsiderate pursuit exposes an army to the greatest danger possible, that of falling into ambuscades and the hands of troops ready for their reception. (Note 81)

And while the evidence suggests that many RGFC formations escaped destruction, their escape now appears to be a result of the decision to end the war after four days of ground combat, inefficient employment of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and less than optimal terms of the cease fire - factors that were not the result of anything that Franks did or failed to do.

The amalgamation of information technology with the proven techniques of effective operational command is a chapter not yet written in the literature of information-age warfare. Franks himself has taken the first steps as commanding general of the Training and Doctrine Command. The concept of "battle command"(Note 82) in the latest Army operations manual, written under Franks' direct supervision, is a product of his reflection on the subject. More than any of the other major figures in the war against Iraq, Franks has refused to rest on his laurels and has endeavored to provide the army the benefit of his experience.

Franks' actions are reminiscent of another corps commander in another war, Major General Hunter Liggett, commander of the American Expeditionary Force's I Corps in the Argonne Forest, in World War I. On 12 November, 1918, twenty four hours after the Armistice, General Pershing visited the I Corps headquarters, and found the corps commander pouring over his maps. "Don't you know the war's over?" asked a bemused Pershing. Liggett replied, "I'm trying to see where we might have done better." (Note 83)

* A "press" in basketball is a term used to describe a defense which takes the initiative away from an offensive team by coordinated action all across the court.

** Author's note: An army group is a NATO command echelon, analogous to a field army commander is the CENTCOM example.

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Last Update:  October 1, 2002