Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare

Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that information Warfare embraces several related, but distinct sets of ideas which are not always clearly distinguished. For many defense analysts, it refers primarily the military application of' computers and other information technologies, and the organizational, operational and doctrinal changes this implies for the US and other military establishments. For other writers, however, Information Warfare is a much broader idea, relating to the emergence of ''Information Age'' civilization and the development of associated modes of political and social conflict which point toward the gradual erosion of nation-states and their monopoly of organized violence.

The Information Revolution

Viewed from latter perspective, Information Warfare raises basic questions not only about how wars will be waged but who will wage them and for what purposes. Such questions cannot, in turn, be separated from consideration of the larger changes that may flow from the ongoing ''Information Revolution.'' If futurists like the Tofflers and John Naisbitt are right the global diffusion of new and emerging information technologies will have economic, social, cultural and political consequences as profound as any in human history. It is, of course, impossible to be sure about the direction of these changes, but they could involve dramatic shifts in political power and attitudes toward authority. now (Note 2)

A comparison with the political effects of the "First Information Revolution" in Early Modern Europe may be instructive. As J.M. Roberts points out, the invention of movable type and the subsequent diffusion of printed books and literacy gave rise to a ''transformation of the European consciousness" after 1500 now (Note 3). Among its other consequences, this transformation abetted the rise of nation-states by providing their rulers with opportunities to mobilize national loyalties and develop centralized administrations. The long-term political "losers" were subnational and supranational entities such as the Papacy and feudal authorities who proved less efficient at exploiting the new medium.

The present Information Revolution may be having precisely the opposite effect inasmuch as the globalization and personalization of electronic communications system appear to be undermining the authority of nation-states and facilitating a devolution of power to subnational and transnational movements, especially those that tap ethnic, religious or cultural loyalties. Naisbitt, who regards such movements as manifestations of a "new tribalism" speculates that traditional institutions of central government and representative democracy may become increasingly anachronistic even in Western societies as demands there for "self rule" and decentralization gain momentum now (Note 4).

One should not, of course, exaggerate the "empowerment'' of the individual vis-a-vis the state. As David Ronfeldt notes, the Information Revolution "may give a state apparatus and its rulers powerful new means of control over their citizenry, with an official ideology determining what information is allowed now (Note 5).'' This may be less of a concern in the United States and other countries where democracy has deep roots, but it is a distinct possibility elsewhere, particularly in the Third World where it is easier for charismatic leaders to generate a public consensus in favor of tyranny. The Information Revolution may promote either democracy or totalitarianism depending on the socio-political context.

It is likewise premature to conclude that the presumed decline of nationstates will inhibit conflict and war. Indeed, the Information Revolution may actually stimulate conflict by accentuating economic, cultural and political differences among peoples while at the same time binding together groups previously separated by geographic or national barriers. Benjamin Barber, for example, sees a threatened "Lebanonization" of many nation-states, in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe -- a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality now (Note 6)."

While forecasts of a "coming anarchy'' or ''clash of civilizations" may be overdrawn now (Note 7), war in the Information Age could well spill outside of the CIausewitzian framework where it functions as a ''rational' instrument of state policy. John Keegan reminds us that, historically, different cultures have shaped war into bizarre and self-destructive forms whose warrior practitioners, unlike modern soldiers, often looked upon combat as a means of self-expression, recreation or religious sanctification now (Note 8). In some parts of the world, the weakening of state authority and the eruption of violent sociopolitical conflicts are enabling such warriors to make a comeback. ''as brutal as ever and distinctly better armed now (Note 9)."

In his chilling vision of war in a post-Clausewitzian world Martin van Creveld takes this line of reasoning a step further, speculating that modern high-tech armies are like to become obsolete. In his view, the relevance of these armies increasingly will be called into question because they will be unable to decisively defeat guerrillas and terrorists who operate beneath their "sophistication threshold" in low-intensity conflicts. Future wars, he suggests, will not be clean and short but ''protracted, bloody and horrible'' -- an affair of "listening devices and of car bombs, of men killing each other at close quarters, and of women using their purses to carry explosives and the drugs to pay for them now (Note 10). "

Van Creveld's work carries another interesting and, for professional soldiers, more disturbing implication: In order to wage low-intensity conflicts with any hope of success, conventional armies may have to adopt the organizational methods, and perhaps even the mentality of their opponents. Noting that war represents the most imitative activity known to man." van Creveld predicts that pervasive low-intensity conflict "will cause regular forces to degenerate into police forces or, in case the struggle lasts for very long, mere armed gangs now (Note 11)." Distinctions will thus erode between military and police forces, and ultimately between soldiers and the terrorists and criminals whom they are responsible for combating.

It might be objected that van Creveld and others who see non Clausewitzian war as the wave of the future underestimate the political dimension of the violence occurring in places like Bosnia. The systematic massacre or brutalization of non-combatants may affront "civilized" sensibilities and conceptions of warfare. If employed in the pursuit of political objectives such as the creation or defense nation-states, however, even "ethnic cleansing" can be seen as a continuation of politics. The problem, of course, is where to draw the line. Clausewitz himself recognized that war is at bottom an affair of "primordial violence" whose inherent tendency is to run to extremes of emotion and cruelty.

One can also question the strategic significance of many low-intensity conflicts, especially in the post-Cold War context. As appalling as their human costs may be, few of the small wars currently underway in the Third World and former Second World engage the vital interests of major powers or seem likely to bring about immediate changes in the international balance of power. The United States may choose to involve itself in military efforts to try to resolve or contain these struggles. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a global competitor however the geopolitical rationale for doing so has lost much of its former force, and the American interests at stake are often highly ambiguous.

"From a purely American point of view," as Eliot Cohen observes, ''the world is, and for some length of time promises to be, a more secure place than it was during the cold war now (Note 12).'' American statesmen now have, he notes ''no dragons to slay, or even to tame; partners may be competitors, but no state poses a direct challenge to our security or that of our allies.'' Even with the current downsizing of the U S. military establishment, its Cold War ''capital stock" of sophisticated military platforms, intelligence-gathering systems, military-technical infrastructure, and logistical assets, dwarfs that of any potential competitor and gives the United States unmatched global power-projection capabilities.

Although the external threats currently facing the United States are more diffuse and ill-defined than during the Cold War era, there is no lack of potential dangers and challenges. Clearly the most menacing contemporary development is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Only slightly less worrisome, however, is the diffusion of long-range missiles, advanced aircraft, and other high-tech weaponry Both trends are likely to enhance the military capabilities of state and non-state actors, thus increasing the escalatory potential of ethno-sectarian and inter-state conflicts. These trends may also make it possible for even relatively weak powers to strike directly at the United States.

The Military-Technical Revolution

The ongoing Information Revolution is having equally important, if less obvious effects on the post-Cold War security environment. There is, for example, broad agreement in the defense community that the 1991 Gulf War marked the early stages of a ''Military-Technical Revolution" (MTR) which promises to transform the character of war as radically as did the advent of nuclear weapons fifty years age. Driving this revolution are advances in surveillance, communications, and information-processing technologies, which create the possibility of imbuing the "information loop of warfare" with unprecedented accuracy and speed, thereby achieving "information dominance" over less capable adversaries now (Note 13).

Information dominance, combined with cruise missiles and other precision weaponry, is expected to confer the ability to overwhelm virtually any opponent quickly, decisively and relatively bloodlessly. The key problem in this mode of warfare will be protecting one's own "centers of gravity" or vulnerabilities while striking those of an enemy. As was foreshadowed in the Coalition air campaign in the Gulf War, the solution to the latter problem is likely to involve ''an improved ability to understand target systems and their relationship to operational and strategic objectives now (Note 14),'' since knowing which targets to strike will be critical to the effective employment of large numbers of precision weapons.

Full exploitation of information technologies will, it is argued, necessitate major changes in ''the ways militaries think about, organize themselves for, and wage combat now (Note 15)." Thus, reliance on sensors, computers and smart weapons points toward a reduced human role in decision cycles. Similarly, long-range strike capabilities will lessen the need for close-in combat and increase the importance of integrated air-land-sea-space operations. The extraordinary lethality of precision weapons and their ability to strike virtually anywhere will likewise require dispersed, independent combat units, and the replacement of present types of aircraft armored vehicles and surface ships by smaller and more stealthy platforms now (Note 16).

Beginning with then Undersecretary Perry's announcement in the aftermath of Desert Storm that the U.S. had achieved a revolutionary advance in military capability now (Note 17)," many U.S. military leaders have enthusiastically embraced the MTR idea. The main doctrinal construct for implementing it at operational level is the strategy of ''Command and Control Warfare," which calls for "the integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities now (Note 18).''

Enthusiasm within the U.S. military for the MTR is tempered by concerns about over-reliance on technology and the possible loss of traditional combat skills 19. But skepticism about the MTR in professional military circles has deeper roots. As C. Kenneth Allard points out, the integration and information sharing required by emerging command and control technologies threatens to upset the "delicate balance" of service autonomy and, ultimately, the very notion of military hierarchy itself now (Note 20). Despite universal acceptance of the twin imperatives of "jointness and interoperability," service cultures and perspectives are therefore likely to act as a brake on institutional change.

For many MTR proponents, the U.S. military has barely begun the "intellectual revolution" necessary to realize the quantum leap in combat effectiveness potentially offered by information technologies. Dan Goure, for example, compares the present level of institutional adaptation to the U.S. Navy's initial efforts to develop carrier aviation in the 1920's. Absent a constituency for more radical doctrinal and organizational reforms, he predicts that U.S. military planners will "fall prey to the old tendency to look to technology as the solution to strategic and operational problems" and settle for the "fleeting advantage" conferred by "mere technological superiority now (Note 21)."

According to Goure and others, this piecemeal approach may create opportunities for more innovative competitors to vault ahead of the United States. Based on his study of previous military revolutions, Andrew Krepinevich warns that it is a "dangerous delusion" to assume that the United States will be able to control the direction of the current revolution now (Note 22). "Even when countries will not be able to compete in the full spectrum of military capabilities," he argues, ''some of them, by specializing, will become formidable niche competitors." Moreover, they may find it easy to do so since the Information Revolution is lowering the cost of information technologies and increasing their availability.

In a similar vein Paul Bracken urges U S military planners to devote more attention to what he sees as the likely emergence 15 or 20 years hence of ''Eurasian peer competitors.'' According to bracken, the rapid economic growth of countries like China will give them the means to field modern military forces based on advanced technologies and innovative operational concepts. Unless the United States begins now to think seriously about how to counter such challenges, it risks becoming ''locked into" current force structures, concepts technologies and doctrines which -- although sufficient to deal with near-term contingencies -- may be inadequate to sustain the long-term U.S. competitive advantage now (Note 23).

A basic problem with these scenarios is that they rest on assumptions about the future shape of the international order, the nature of war, and the direction of technological change, none of which can be taken for granted. As Goure notes, military planners during the Cold War and interwar periods faced the task of bringing "known pieces of potential capability together in a fashion suited to an expected form of warfare against anticipated adversaries now (Note 24). Under current conditions of rapid technological change and the emergence of new subnational and transnational players, however, such certainties are denied planners who cannot be sure about the form or participants that will characterize future wars.

Since the MTR is seen as a long-term process and presupposes threats which have not yet materialized, its relevance to current defense needs is open to question. The basic rationale for reshaping the U.S. military now comes down to providing a hedge against the possible rise of future high-tech challengers. In addition, pushing ahead with the MTR is espoused as a way of increasing the effectiveness of U.S. forces in dealing with near-term, regional contingencies and conducting military operations short of war. Domestic, political, and budgetary constraints, which require the U.S. military to "do more the less" and minimize casualties on all sides, are also cited to justify this course now (Note 25).

The adequacy of current U S. military plans and programs to accomplish these objectives is a subject of controversy. The 1993 "Bottom-Up Review." DOD's blueprint for meeting the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment. emphasizes the need to maintain military capabilities sufficient to defeat regional aggressors in two "nearly simultaneous" conflicts. The areas of particular concern are the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, and the most likely aggressors are deemed to be North Korea, Iran or a resurgent Iraq. The kind of attack foreseen (an armor-heavy, combined arms offensive") and the forces considered necessary to defeat it are modeled on the 1990-91 Gulf conflict now (Note 26).

Many critics contend that the Bottom-Up Review falls into the familiar trap of "preparing to fight the last war" instead of the next one now (Note 27). They argue, for example, that regional aggressors are unlikely to repeat Saddam Hussein's blunders and will instead employ a range of strategies to deter U.S. military intervention, including "ambiguous aggression," guerrilla warfare, and threats to use weapons of mass destruction. It is also suggested that the kind of forces appropriate to counter threats from North Korea or Iraq are not suitable for meeting future challenges from more formidable peer competitors who may succeed in combining information technologies with innovative military doctrines.

Another focus of criticism is the force mix recommended by the Bottom-Up Review to maintain U.S. power-projection capabilities. Edward Luttwak is typical of those who see this mix as reflecting the success of the services in preserving their Cold War force structures rather than shifting to "low-casualty or noncasually forms of aerial and robotic military strength" more suited to the post-Cold War security environment now (Note 28). Luttwak and others are also concerned that the costs of supporting carrier battlegroups and heavy army divisions will consume an undue share of DOD's shrinking budget, allowing fewer resources for R&D and modernization programs necessary to sustain the U.S. comparative military advantage.

Some critics are also skeptical that it will be possible to reconcile the Bottom-Up Review's regional conflict strategy with the growing demands imposed on the U.S. military by peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other "operations other than war now (Note 29)." Since these operations tend to be manpower-intensive, expensive, and protracted, they drain resources needed to assure the readiness and modernization of forces which might be required to respond to major regional contingencies. Moreover, irregular operations, by their nature, offer fewer opportunities than conventional warfare to employ U.S. surveillance, command and control, and precision strike capabilities to achieve decisive military results.

The prescriptions for these problems offered by MTR advocates range from more rapid structural reform of the U.S. military to recasting American defense strategy. Krepinovich, for example, urges that higher priority be accorded to "preserving the long-term military potential of U.S. forces, as opposed to near-term capabilities now (Note 30)." This implies accepting a smaller force structure and devoting more resources to modernization. Such an approach also entails greater use of multinational coalitions to deal with regional contingencies, increased reliance on stand-off precision strikes to punish or deter troublemakers and more selective engagement of U.S. forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian ventures.

The emphasis put by Krepinovich and others on preparing for future high-tech conventional wars has not gone unchallenged. A.J. Bacevichi, for example, charges that the MTR idea is at bottom an exercise in "wishful thinking'' designed to relieve U.S. military leaders of the burden of coming to grips with the realities of nuclear and unconventional war for which "they never devised an adequate response now (Note 31)." In a similar vein, Daniel Bolger, himself an infantryman, cautions that the "sanguinary shade" of Vietnam may rise again unless the US. Army "forsakes the seductive urge to keep refighting World War II" and devotes more attention to basic infantry skills needed to combat irregular opponents now (Note 32).

MTR theorists do not entirely ignore unconventional warfare but it is not central to their concerns. A recent study of the subject concludes that advanced surveillance and precision-strike systems can at present make only "limited contributions" to irregular operations, owing to the complexity of the human and natural environments in which such operations often must be conducted. While holding out the prospect that emerging sensor and non-lethal weapons technologies may change this situation in the near future, its authors recommend that priority should be given to "traditional combined-arms operations" which "pose the most serious risk to U.S. interests" over the next 10-15 years now (Note 33).

Several factors may, however, increase the relative importance of irregular warfare in the post-Cold War setting. As noted above U.S. dominance of the conventional battlefield is likely to encourage aggressive regional powers to eschew blatant adventurism in favor of indirect strategies, including sponsorship of low-intensify conflicts. Furthermore, cheap commercial information technologies such as satellite-based personal communications devices, encrypted fax machine, and global positioning systems will provide "force multipliers" for irregular forces. The availability of sophisticated weapons from the former Soviet bloc and other suppliers will also enhance the their capabilities.

The growing dependence of modern societies on computer-controlled information infrastructures is opening up new areas for unconventional warfare. Recent intrusions into the U.S. civilian and military computer networks by hackers and criminals only hint at far more serious disruption that could be wrought by systematic electronic sabotage of national telecommunications systems power grids and financial institutions. As information security specialist Winn Schwartau suggests, such sabotage is a 'low risk/high reward endeavor" inasmuch as it can be conducted by "remote control" and offers the prospect of inflicting "indiscriminate damage on millions of people with a single keystroke now (Note 34)."

The advent of satellite-based global television broadcasting has created yet another arena for unconventional warfare. As was demonstrated in the Gulf War and the 1993 skirmishing in Somalia between UN forces and the clan warriors of General Aidid, live television coverage provides participants in armed conflicts with unprecedented opportunities to conduct military deception and shape the way distant audiences perceive events on the battlefield. Such "CNN Wars'' are likely to become more common and to have disproportionately large political repercussions, especially in societies like the United Slates where policymaking is sometimes driven transitory public reactions to media images.

The foregoing trends point to changes not only in the environment in which wars are fought but in the nature of warfare itself. Information technologies are enlarging the venue of conflict from the traditional "battlefield" to computer networks, electronic databases, television screens, and other unconventional settings. They are also expanding opportunities for waging war through sabotage, terrorism, propaganda and similar clandestine means. One possible consequence is that it may be increasingly difficult to draw a clear line between war and other forms of conflict. Another is that distinctions between military and civilian practitioners of war may become progressively blurred.

Information Warfare

What are the implications of these trends for the MTR concept and the future of professional military establishments? Following van Creveld, one might conclude that, since modern high-tech armies are ill-suited to waging unconventional wars, they will either wither away or be transformed into paramilitary security forces. If, on the other hand, one accepts the premise that technology-based information superiority confers the ability to dominate any opponent, a military with this advantage should be able to prevail in unconventional wars. What is needed, however, is a conceptual framework that identifies strategies and requirements for achieving such dominance across the full spectrum of conflict.

DOD has begun to move in this direction by expanding its doctrine of Command and Control Warfare into the broader concept of Information Warfare (IW). According to a provisional DOD definition, IW consists of "actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our own information and information systems now (Note 35)." This formulation is intended to encompass military and non-military actions as well as defensive and offensive aspects. It also covers all levels of war from the tactical to strategic, and applies to troth peacetime and wartime conditions.

According to writers like Donald Ryan, IW is based on the assumption that information technologies have developed to the point where they can now be employed as a weapon in their own right rather than as a "handmaiden" of armed combat now (Note 36). It thus becomes possible to envision wars being "won'' or "lost" without, a shot being fired. In contrast to Command and Control Warfare, which aims at victory on the battlefield, IW seeks to avoid the need to resort to lethal force by putting ''enemies in positions where their information resources are useless or, worse, unreliable." In this respect, IW aspires to realizing Sun Tzu's famous dictum that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.''

Employed offensively, IW emphasizes the manipulation of electronic information systems to influence an adversary's perceptions and behavior. This might, for example, involve disabling military and civilian telecommunication systems through computer viruses or electromagnetic pulse devices. Infiltration is, however, the "maneuver of choice" since an enemy, unaware that his information sources have been compromised, will continue to trust them, creating opportunities for deception now (Note 37). Offensive IW also emphasizes the use of direct broadcast satellites, the commercial media, and "visual stimulus and illusion" technologies such as holography to conduct propaganda and subversion.

Defensively, IW requires an ability to detect and thwart attempts to tamper with one's own sources of information. In the military sphere, this entails assuring the integrity of command and control, communications, and intelligence systems. Critical elements of the civilian infrastructure such as power grids, financial networks, and telecommunications systems must also be protected. In addition, IW posits an ability to counter enemy propaganda and disinformation. According to the Tofflers, this can best be accomplished in an Information Age context by "precision-targeting" audience segments, disguising propaganda as news and entertainment, and employing computer-generated special effects now (Note 38).

IW theorists like John Arguilla set great store by the techniques of systems analysis to identify enemy and friendly centers of gravity now (Note 39). This approach, which is modeled on the air campaign plan against Iraq, visualizes a state or society as a set of systems and subsystems linked by numerous "nodes." Given sufficient knowledge of such systems, one can isolate the 'critical nodes ' which when destroyed or disabled will cause a systemic collapse. In most cases, the political leadership will be the critical node of the entire state structure, but if it cannot he reached with hard or "soft kill'' weapons, belief systems, economic infrastructures, and military forces may have to be attacked.

Applied in an IW context, the systems approach presupposes not only comprehensive knowledge about an adversary, but an ability to continually update that knowledge so that one is in a position to react more swiftly to a changing situation. Such "situational awareness" depends, in turn, on the use of artificial intelligence and other advanced data processing technologies to "fuse" large quantities of human and technical intelligence into an accurate, real-time picture of events. While most IW theorists acknowledge that anything resembling omniscience is unattainable, they do claim that these technologies confer a potentially decisive advantage over opponents lacking comparable capabilities now (Note 40).

The United States faces both opportunities and challenges in waging Information Warfare. On the one hand, it enjoys a wide lead over potential competitors in adapting information technologies to military purposes, and its private sector is at the cutting edge of the global Information Revolution. At the same time, however, the American information infrastructure, on which U.S. defense communications depend, is highly vulnerable to infiltration and sabotage. A recent Joint Security Commission Report describes this vulnerability as "the major security challenge of this decade and possibly the next century" and warns that there is "insufficient awareness of the grave risks we face in this area now (Note 41)."

"Hardening'' the U.S. national information infrastructure, however, will not be easy. From a purely technical standpoint, it would be a ''lengthy and extremely costly" undertaking which might not ensure protection for all types of sensitive date. Moreover, neither DOD nor any other Federal agency currently has the legal authority to enforce information security standards in the private sector, and the imposition of such standards probably would be controversial, especially in the absence of a clear external threat to national security. Despite public concern over privacy and computer crime, reaping the benefits of the ''information superhighway" is widely believed to require openness and accessibility now (Note 42).

It will also not be easy for the U.S. to wage Information Warfare at the political level. It is unclear, for example, whether DOD or some other Federal entity would have primary responsibility. Since IW involves issues which affect numerous government agencies and cut across the public and private sectors, a case could be made for the establishment of a separate agency, or coordinating body. However, such organizational problems pale in significance compared to the controversy likely to be generated by the official adoption of a strategy which sanctions, or appears to sanction, systematic "perception management" activities aimed at the American people in the name of national security.

Whatever the means employed, it is questionable whether American public opinion can be induced to support risky foreign policy ventures absent a clear threat to U.S. interests. As Richard Haas points out, building consensus around such ventures is extremely difficult in a political environment characterized by a focus on domestic priorities, an assertive Congress, and heightened media scrutiny now (Note 43). The unraveling of U.S. policy in Somalia after the October 1993 firefight with Aidid's followers illustrates the problems that can arise in this kind environment, especially when the executive branch neglects to build a reservoir of public support by explaining the costs and risks of its policies.

Information Warfare also poses potential foreign policy and international legal complications. Eliot Cohen, for example, worries that ''a military fighting the shadowy battles of "information warfare" may find itself engaging the country in foreign policy tangles of a particularly messy kind now (Note 44)." IW operations undertaken in peacetime by the United States for purposes of deterrence or compellence, such as electronically sabotaging the power grid of a rogue state, might well be considered "terrorism," exposing the U.S. to international criticism and possible retaliation in kind. Operations of this type could also stiffen the resolve of the leaders and populace of a hostile state rather than coerce them.

The possibility should be considered that Information Warfare may be more effective against some kinds of adversaries than others. In general, the "critical nodes" of nation-states are easier to identify than those of nonstate entities, especially ones organized as networks and camouflaged within civilian populations. Given "precision intelligence," the vulnerabilities of any group can, in theory, be targeted, and the Information Revolution is enhancing the prospects of acquiring such intelligence through improved surveillance and data processing techniques. As is demonstrated by the growth of computer crime, however, the Information Revolution is also enlarging opportunities for concealment.

According to Robert Steele, the U.S. intelligence community as presently constituted is ''virtually worthless" in assuring information dominance over terrorists, criminals, guerrillas and other non-state actors who are able to operate beyond the reach of its technical collection capabilities now (Note 45). To, deal with the threats posed by such groups, Steele argues that radically new approaches to intelligence gathering and analysis are needed, including greater reliance on human as opposed to technical collection methods: closer cooperation among military, law enforcement and private-sector organizations; and a concerted effort to tap "open source" data available from the media, academia and business.

The inconclusive U.S. "war" against foreign drug traffickers suggests, however, that better intelligence by itself may not be enough to ''defeat" some non-state actors. Drug trafficking is rooted in intractable political, social and economic conditions -- including endemic poverty and corruption in producer countries and the demand for illicit drugs in the United States -which can be addressed only at the margins through interdiction. Thus, while improved intelligence and surveillance methods may enable military and law enforcement authorities to break up some trafficker organizations and raise the cost of doing business for others, trafficking itself is unlikely to be stamped out by such methods now (Note 46).

It might be objected that ''raising the cost of doing business" is a viable objective in many conflict situations, and Information Warfare offers the U.S. a means of achieving it at a lower human and material cost than reliance on military force alone. It is not difficult. for example, to envision U.S. forces successfully using IW techniques in "peace operations" to calm civil disturbances or induce the participants to settle their differences by nonviolence means. Even when armed conflicts cannot be averted or resolved, moreover, these techniques might be helpful in weakening the aggressive capabilities of a target group by sowing distrust among its members or undermining its base of popular support.

By the same token, however, the United States itself presents an inviting target for Information Warfare since its "centers of gravity" are highly visible and difficult to defend. As noted above, these include the vulnerability of the civilian information infrastructure to electronic attack and the tenuous nature of domestic support for foreign military interventions. The sensitivity of American public opinion to military casualties, collateral damage, and the taking of hostages, is another obvious pressure point which foreign adversaries -- aided by media coverage of such events -- have sometimes manipulated to coerce U.S. policymakers and will no doubt continue to try to exploit.

In sum, the United States faces significant constraints and handicaps in waging Information Warfare despite its undoubted military and technological process. Most of those who advocate the adoption of an IW strategy by the U.S. deal with this subject within a military frame of reference, ignoring or glossing over its broader political, legal, foreign policy, ethical and cultural implications. Critical questions therefore tend not to be addressed. Perhaps the most fundamental of these is whether the American people are willing, in the absence of a clearly defined external threat, to accept the increased government intervention and regulation that would be required to implement such a strategy.

If waging Information Warfare is problematic for United States, it also poses difficulties for other states, including totalitarian regimes. Such regimes are less inhibited by legal, political and moral constraints than democratic governments. But even a garrison state like North Korea cannot completely protect its infrastructure against electronic manipulation and disruption. Moreover, the tight bureaucratic controls needed to sustain totalitarian system exact a heavy price in economic efficiency, national competitiveness and, ultimately, living standards. The 1989-1991 collapse of most communist states indicates that discontents bred by these systems contains the seeds of their own demise.

As John Patrick suggests, Information Warfare may be best suited to non-state entities like guerrilla movements, drug cartels, and terrorist networks now (Note 47). Such groups have several advantages over formal military organizations, including a decentralized organization and an ability to blend in with their surroundings. They are also adept at manipulating ideas and information to defeat opponents politically. Furthermore, the Information Revolution is enhancing their capabilities by making them more competitive in terms of firepower, increasing their ability to conduct "pyschological operations" through the media, and enabling them to inflict ''electronic Pearl Harbors" on vulnerable nation-states.

Conclusions

One is thus led back to the issue posed at the outset of this essay -whether the advent of the Information Age marks the beginning of the end of the monopoly of war by nation-states and their professional military establishments. This issue is largely ignored in discussions of the Military Technical Revolution, which assume that information technologies are merely the latest in a series of innovations which have revolutionized the character of armed conflict among nation-states. The possibility raised by van Creveld that larger changes may be underway in the nature of war itself with which nation-state armies are ill-prepared to cope is thrust into the background or even dismissed as "elegant irrelevance now (Note 48)."

Information Warfare theorists, on the other hand, do address the broader societal impact of the Information Revolution and the challenges this poses for conventional militaries. As suggested above, however, they tend to frame these challenges in narrowly technological and military terms, with the result that they often fail to take into account the political, cultural and legal dimensions of the subject. As long as Information Warfare continues to be viewed chiefly as a problem of military modernization, rather than as part of a larger global transformation affecting every facet of society, it will be difficult to transcend the limitations of this approach and to formulate more persuasive recommendations for coping with it.

A precondition for addressing the challenge of Information Warfare is recognizing that there is a problem. This requires moving beyond the horizons of the MTR concept in which dealing with today's low-intensity conflicts is seen as a "small but irksome" task "compared to potentially more critical but totally unknown tasks that may face the nation two decades from now (Note 49)." A second requirement is acknowledgment that the ability of the U.S. government and military to "solve" the problem may be limited. Technology is unlikely to provide all the answers and the American political environment is not conducive to peacetime mobilization for "total war" against still largely hypothetical threats.

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Last Update:  October 1, 2002