Conclusions

• Forming an effective coalition force from several different nations, each with different capabilities and equipment and lacking prior experience in military cooperation is a major challenge. The United States has demonstrated its capability to perform this task. The United Nations is learning. However, having the UN Secretary General and Security Council as the command authorities for a large, complex multinational military-civilian operation still poses potential complications.

• The transfer of control of the multinational security force in Haiti (UNMIH) from the United States to the United Nations on March 31, 1995 reflects substantial improvements over the transfer which occurred in Somalia two years earlier. Most, although not all, of the serious problems encountered in Somalia were either eliminated or reduced in Haiti. The transition to date has been smooth.

• The operational improvement in UNMIH over the earlier UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) does not guarantee strategic success in Haiti. The political, economic, and social realities of Haiti itself pose the most serious obstacles, e.g., overpopulation, severe underdevelopment, weak institutions, subsurface struggles for power, and the near total absence of a functioning rule of law. As was the case with Somalia, Haiti's chances of meeting United States and UN expectations will require a substantial, extended, difficult commitment by the latter, although without any comparable degree of armed opposition. This commitment will be required for several years, well beyond the present UNMIH end date of March 31, 1996.