

# Russia's Conventional Armed Forces, Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020

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Although Russian defense reform was already in its advanced planning stages prior to August 2008, the Russia-Georgia war served to facilitate launching the new effort to reform and modernize the conventional armed forces. This reform, repackaged as the “new look” was not only ambitious in its scope and aims, but would if implemented, fundamentally transform the Russian military. Formally announced in October 2008, rapidly carrying out the administrative or organizational elements throughout 2009, and progressing towards achieving key targets by 2012, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov's reforms have revealed contradictions, unforeseen challenges and the resulting corrective processes exposed a degree of reconceptualization.<sup>1</sup> The delicate balance achieved in avoiding the reform being undermined either through institutional inertia or until now largely ineffective or at times irrationally-inspired critics, will continue until these issues are resolved; most likely, not before 2012.<sup>2</sup>

## *Serdyukov's reform*

On October 14, 2008, after leaks about the reform agenda and a period of reflecting on the operational lessons of the campaign in Georgia, Serdyukov briefed the defense ministry collegium in closed session. Viktor Zavarzin, the Head of the Duma's Defense Committee and Viktor Ozerov, the Head of the Defense and Security Committee of the Federal Council were reportedly not permitted to attend.<sup>3</sup> As the agenda emerged, Viktor Ilyukhin, a member of the State Duma said its success would largely depend upon developing improved social conditions for servicemen, procuring modern weapons and enhancing the manageability and discipline of the troops. Aleksandr Vladimirov, the Vice-President of the College of Military Experts, advocated developing new programs and styles of teaching officers, aimed at producing a generation of officers with a deep understanding of geopolitics and global trends.<sup>4</sup> The trouble is that few precisely understood the agenda, which often resulted in criticism not really matching what was unfolding, or focusing upon one aspect at the expense of the broader picture.

Serdyukov secured the formal approval of the collegium, briefing them on, *Perspektivny oblik Vooruzhennykh Sil RF i pervoочerednye mery po ego formirovaniu na 2009-2020 gody* (The Future Outlook of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Priorities for its Creation in the period 2009-2020). At its heart, the reform concept promised to abandon

the mass mobilization principle that had served the interests of the state since the nineteenth century reforms conducted by Dmitry Milyutin, in so doing it would no longer make sense to argue that NATO posed any military threat to Russia that required mobilization. That controversy was well concealed beneath plans to downsize or more accurately “streamline” the officer corps.<sup>5</sup>

In Orenburg on September 26, 2008, Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, met with the commanders of military districts, and outlined the reasons for reforming the armed forces and referred to five decisive factors in military development.<sup>6</sup> These were:

1. Improving the organization and structure of the forces by converting all divisions and brigades to permanent readiness brigades, abolishing the mass mobilization principle and abandoning the division-based system.
2. Enhancing the overall efficiency of command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) (later interpreted as opting for a three tiered structure: operational command-military district-brigade).
3. Improving the personnel training system, including military education and military science.
4. Equipping the armed forces with the latest weapon systems and intelligence assets, primarily high-technology, in order to “achieve air superiority, deliver precision strikes on ground and maritime targets, and ensure operational force deployment.”
5. Improving the social status of military personnel, including pay and allowances, housing, and every day living conditions as well as a broad range of support packages.<sup>7</sup>

Careful analysis of the structure of foreign, including NATO militaries, had convinced the reformers to adopt an officer to enlisted personnel ratio of 1:15. The pre-reform 355,000 officer posts, would thus be pared back to only 150,000 as well as placing new demands on them.<sup>8</sup> As not all posts were filled, the planning envisaged shedding 205,000 officer posts by 2012 in order to optimize the system by addressing its “top heavy” features that resulted in having more colonels and lieutenant-colonels than junior officers.<sup>9</sup> The officer reductions were severe: serving generals was to move from 1,107 generals as of September 1, 2008 to 886 by 2012. Colonel posts were slashed from 25,665 to 9,114, majors from 99,550 to 25,000, and captains from 90,000 to 40,000. The only increase was to affect lieutenants moving from 50,000 to 60, 000. In an interview with *Rossiia TV* in March 2010, Serdyukov explained that another three years were required, and reported that 67,000 officers had been dismissed from service in 2009.<sup>10</sup> If that figure was reliable, they were approximately 50,000 away from the set target by the spring of 2010 (allowing for shedding the two-year officers), and on course to complete

the downsizing by 2012. However, some defense officials questioned whether 15 percent was the correct target and even suggested further paring back the officer corps to 9 percent of the overall manning structure.<sup>11</sup>

Upon completion, the “new look” would abandon the traditional division-based system and replace it with a brigade-based structure geared towards maneuverability, cadre units were to be jettisoned and in their place only “permanent readiness” formations would remain. The transformation impacted on the air force and navy, though mostly upon the ground forces, as 85 brigades were formed in 2009 and divisions disbanded, while their pre-reform total of 1,890 units was earmarked for reduction to only 172 units and formations. In the air force only 180 of the 340 units would remain converting to a squadron-based system, while the navy was scheduled to move from 240 units to 123. The Strategic Rocket Forces (*Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya* –RVSN) were to be streamlined from 12 to 8 divisions, while the airborne forces (*Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska*—VDV) from 6 to 5 and the latter faced a brigade-based restructuring in an indication that in the reform concept there were one size fits all approaches (this was later successfully resisted by the VDV, despite the fact the VDV had always deployed at sub-divisional level with a brigade HQ in its recent combat history).<sup>12</sup> The air force had to shed 50,000 posts,<sup>13</sup> or around 30 percent of existing air force officer positions. In January 2009, Colonel-General Alexander Zelin, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the *Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily*—VVS confirmed that the restructuring of the air force was underway: reforming 80 percent of units, among which 10 percent were to be disbanded, 22 percent redeployed and 68 percent would experience staff changes.<sup>14</sup> The overall driving force in the transition to the brigade-based structure was to enhance the ground forces with greater maneuverability.<sup>15</sup>

Serdyukov also targeted the navy, initially this centered on relocating its headquarters to St. Petersburg, though the costly move was postponed in response to concern over the recession and opposition from serving admirals.<sup>16</sup> In April, 2009, the transfer process was “suspended:” of the main command’s 800 staffers, only 20 favored the move.<sup>17</sup> Rear Services were downsized, losing 40 percent of all officers, including a number of generals: 12,500 posts including 5,600 officers and warrant officers. Between 23 to 40 percent of all civilian posts were eliminated,<sup>18</sup> leaving around 300 individuals in the Rear Services’ central apparatus.<sup>19</sup> Many of its functions were civilianized, ranging from catering services, using civilian enterprises to provide fuel to the provision of bathing and laundry services for the troops.<sup>20</sup>

### *Implementation*

The Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Army-General Nikolai Makarov, a critical supportive figure in the reform, noted in December 2008 that in order to oversee and monitor the implementation of the reform, the General Staff had sent its representatives

into line units, whose sole task was to report on any instances of individuals seeking to sabotage the reform.<sup>21</sup> During 2009, the structural reforms planned as part of Serdyukov's reforms were largely successful, in what by any standard represented a significant *organizational* achievement and in the process the mass mobilization system, cadres, divisions (apart from the VDV) all passed quietly into history. Officer downsizing proved more complex, with various figures cited at different times in terms of its progress, however, by late 2009, 85 permanent readiness brigades were formed as well as the new three-tiered command and control system. Medical staff lost 10,000 officer posts and 22 military hospitals were closed.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, 80 percent of all lawyers were dismissed, and only 20 officer posts in military media organizations remained –preserving those working for the official defense ministry publication *Krasnaya Zvezda*. Military educational institutions were also earmarked for reduction from 65 to 10; three military educational centers, six academies, and one military university (streamlining the General Staff Academy), as its structure needed to serve a new role based around filling the brigades with effective commanders and promoting efficiency and higher standards in these institutions. Deputy Defense Minister Army-General Nikolay Pankov, said these institutions were mostly only 60-70 percent full, and consequently they were combined.<sup>23</sup> The prestigious General Staff Academy had its 17 chairs reduced to two (the art of war and national security and defense) and instead of its usual 100-120 annual graduates, in 2009-2010 only 16 students at one star level were admitted, and were taught a revised curriculum (students no longer needed to study the division, for instance).<sup>24</sup>

It is also worth noting that just like President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are commonly referred to as the ruling “tandem,” so too in defense terms there is also an effective tandem: Serdyukov and Makarov. The latter had, by presidential decree, his service extended after reaching retirement age (60) in October 2009. This partnership between the first truly civilian Russian defense minister (Sergei Ivanov was a former Federal Security Service (*Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti*) FSB officer) and the CGS may well be instrumental in promoting and conducting the reform, but it would be misleading to characterize the reform as being the work of a small or maverick elite: it simply could not be enacted without the active participation of many other actors; particularly the *siloviki*.

### *Contradictions and challenges*

Almost two years into the reform, numerous contradictions and challenges have surfaced. How can such high levels of readiness be achieved if the manning of such brigades is mostly based upon 12 month serving conscripts? Is this enough time to train and achieve necessary standards? There is no consensus within the defense ministry and General Staff on the precise nature of the manning system: a widespread

recognition that the experiment with contract personnel has failed has not been followed by any obvious solution. Disagreement existed over the length of conscript service, or faced with a dwindling conscript pool whether to increase the maximum age for service from 27 years of age to 30.

Much has been made of extensive planning to introduce a new professional non-commissioned officer (NCO), with the first of these being trained in a new NCO training center at the elite Ryazan airborne school: the Commander of the VDV, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov was specifically tasked with inculcating the “spirit” of the VDV among these new NCO’s —all required to make parachute jumps, and meticulously trained in a course lasting two years and ten months. Yet, despite the shortage of entrants to the center (it opened in December 2009 with under 260) there are also contradictory statements concerning the underlying NCO concept: will these NCO’s in future take on the burden of commanding their unit, and will their commanding officer come to terms with delegating authority? Addressing the defense ministry collegium on March 5, 2010, President Medvedev said such NCO’s in future may take on command roles, which does not help to clarify their actual role. Medvedev stated that: “NCO’s should be capable, *if required*, to substitute for officers of the primary level.”<sup>25</sup>

Another critical factor in measuring the success of Serdyukov’s reform will be the transformation of the officer corps. Yet, there is also no clear consensus on what model officer Russian defense planners have in mind, let alone planning how to achieve this; instead there are loosely framed aspirations calling for better types of officer. Reportedly, corruption persists within the officer corps, and if there is a concerted effort to minimize or eliminate this scourge, how will the defense ministry conduct such a policy? Will an officer known for his competence and command abilities be sacked if he is found guilty of corruption? Indeed, the challenges facing the new look may be more rooted in manning issues such as these than in overcoming the problems associated with equipment and weapons modernization. Of course, these demands are emerging from the drive to modernize the inventory, as well as upgrading command and control and in general terms beginning to adopt network-centric warfare capabilities. Such a technological and information-based military environment will necessitate a significantly higher level of education, equipping officers to meet such demanding challenges.

Surprisingly, in this context, the defense ministry expended substantial energy and time on paper chasing. Serdyukov commissioned the drafting of a written code of honor. In November 2010, the 3rd All-Army Conference of army and navy officers was scheduled in Moscow, to discuss formulating the principles of corporate ethics among Russian

officers in the longer-term look of the armed forces. That debate was being encouraged within units, and this is an important step, as Colonel (retired) Vitaliy Shlykov believes that a code of corporate ethics will result in a fundamentally “new level” of professionalism within the Russian military. Nonetheless, an ethos, and a code of ethics among officers, takes time to develop. It is a positive initiative to introduce a clear code for officers, however, as American officers say, they need to “walk the walk:” or not simply be aware of a codified approach to their important role, but also live and serve as an inspirational example to their men. Higher standards of justice and moral character are demanded from officers compared with society and those whom they lead, and the formulation of codified document in Russia will no doubt set a benchmark against which officer standards can be outlined and measured, though the longer term task is to encourage a constant striving for excellence among officers through a variety of mechanisms including incentives.<sup>26</sup> As these issues are examined among Russian officers, all too often they regard society simply as a source of problems for the military, failing to appreciate just how much Russian society has changed over the past twenty years. This institutional myopia will likely persist until an effort is made to adapt any agreed officer model to reflect societal realities.

An analysis of the reform in the period 2009-2010 highlights numerous obstacles and ongoing challenges:

- The downsizing of the Russian officer corps, planned well in advance of the current reforms, is being ruthlessly implemented. Its unintended consequence has been to reduce officer morale and place additional burdens on those serving.
- Senior defense and military officials have avoided offering precise detail on how the downsizing is being conducted, and consequently official statements and figures are often misleading and contradictory.
- Senior level officer rotations, dismissals or retirements since the reform began reveal a systematic campaign to avoid the emergence of any coherent and organized anti-reform movement.
- The officer cuts were driven by the need to enhance C<sup>2</sup>, improve the efficiency of the manning system and were rooted in a Russian analysis of the structure of western militaries.
- The General Staff wants to develop a new type of officer, more akin to their western counterparts, but presently lack any clearly defined model for officer development.
- Corruption and ill-discipline has increased since the reform began.
- The General Staff has identified that the mentality of serving officers is the main stumbling block in the path of officer reform.

- Russian operational-strategic exercises conducted since the reform was launched confirm that an unstated aim of the “new look” is the adoption of network-centric warfare capabilities.
- Elements of testing network-centric command, control and communications (C<sup>3</sup>) systems established the need to adjust officer training and exposed design flaws in the new technology.
- Exercises, however, remained mostly focused on contact warfare, including both offensive and defensive operations.
- Officers are now being rapidly taught the principles and practical skills needed in order to transition towards network-centric warfare.
- Weaknesses in tactical level capabilities were also revealed and resulted in shifting the training focus in 2010 towards improving individual skills.
- The independence and capability of the “new look” brigades are likely to be impaired for many years by the slow rate of modernization, further efforts to improve the manning system and reform the officer corps.<sup>27</sup>

Many of these challenges are unlikely to be overcome rapidly and certainly in the case of officer reform, rather than achieving their objectives (if clearly defined) by 2020, it is more realistic to expect officer reform if pursued consistently to take a generation to affect. Perhaps one of the central challenges facing the reform relates to its undeclared aim, which is evident in military exercises and several aspects of officer training and procurement: the adoption of network-centric warfare principles.

While Russian military theorists have long written extensively or advocated network-centric warfare, this has intensified in two stages, with the first following an analysis of the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003, and more recently, after the announcement of the “new look.” Although there is clearly theoretical understanding, even sophistication within this “debate,” it is equally accurate to designate the Russian military as currently being at the beginning of a very long road towards fully adopting such concepts and applying them within their structures. This is not, as some commentators or government officials appear inclined to believe, merely a question of technology, procuring the necessary high-technology assets including having enough *GLObal'naya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema* (GLONASS) satellites in orbit, but it also places demands on the culture of the armed forces extending into thought processes and attitudes.<sup>28</sup>

However, it is necessary to stress that although only in the early stages of adopting network-centric warfare, which will transition from the current contact-based capabilities towards being able to conduct non-contact operations, there are reasons to suggest this will not happen as rapidly as the Russian state might like. This is not only

linked to the slow rate of procurement, where estimates within the Russian defense industry suggest that there is capacity to transfer five brigades per annum to automated C<sup>3</sup> systems, it also raises important defense planning issues.<sup>29</sup> If network-centric warfare capabilities are the central aim of the reform, has this been adequately factored in to current procurement plans? In other words is the state prioritizing the correct equipment and weapons systems? Officers receiving additional training during 2010 on how to issue orders using such automated technology reported that the software is overly complicated, and the icons etc, need to be simplified. If officers are experiencing such user issues it raises fundamental questions about the end-user being a 12 month conscript. This seems to be more than mere teething issues.<sup>30</sup>

An additional, deeper and more complex problem or rather set of problems, relates to the division, disagreement and misunderstanding that currently exists on how simple or complex these challenges really are and what it means for force structure and training. Reading Russian writers on network-centric warfare, it is quite striking how advanced and sophisticated their knowledge can be, revealing deep understanding of these developments in the US and Chinese armed forces in particular. However, there are gaps and a lack of fully agreed approaches to overcoming such issues which may well serve to complicate planning decisions. Here the risk is to paraphrase the former Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, “we wanted the best, and ended up with what usually happens.” In a recent article in *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* assessing the contours of this debate, Major-General, Vasiliy Burenok, the Director of the Defense Ministry’s 46th Research and Development Institute, examined some of these inconsistencies. Noting that the model of network-centric warfare is formed of three grids (sensor, information and combat) he then demonstrated the way that many theorists over-simplify the issues.<sup>31</sup>

He noted that some Russian military scientists attempt to prove that adopting network-centric warfare requires no changes to the plans to develop the armed forces and their weapons systems or combat manuals and instructions. Others, argue precisely the opposite, and recommend procuring next generation armaments as well as mass-produced network-centric robotic technologies that are not even available in western armies. Burenok succinctly encapsulated the sheer complexity in forming armed forces oriented towards network-centric operations, since it entails seeking a synergy between human and technologically advanced factors. Yet, some theorists persist, in his view, in claiming that progress can be achieved by making a massive and sudden “jump” to introduce such new concepts and technology. He concludes that if there is no real understanding of how this type of war should be fought, then it is impossible to verbalize and formulate algorithms of conducting network-centric wars. The scientific understanding must *precede* software development and procurement decisions.<sup>32</sup>

After the transition to the new model of the armed forces, we have found ourselves at the beginning of the journey, because both the structure and the composition of the military formations have changed considerably (*and continue to change*).<sup>33</sup> And what about information compatibility? It begins with the unified information space (standard classifications, vocabularies and databases of models, their tactical and technical performance characteristics and so on), whose creation in Russia progresses at a pace which requires considerable acceleration. And the situation with information transferability is far from the ideal altogether, given our mind-boggling diversity of automated systems and means of data transfer which were designed using different fundamental, design, and software principles.<sup>34</sup>

Resolving such issues, making appropriate refinements where needed, also, as Burenok stressed, has implications for force structure and development. Thus, while the “new look” is marked by its switch from the system it displaced, it is not yet in its final form: it will continue to change, in response to the demands of network-centric warfare models and how this is achieved practically in a way that suits Russian requirements.

#### *Reconceptualization*

Considering the overall conceptual basis of Serdyukov’s reform, revolving around restructuring and focusing on permanent readiness brigades with enhanced combat capability and combat readiness, it is worth tracing the formative intellectual influences that led to adopting and planning the “new look.” Of course, brigades were not “new” as such in the Russian military experience, since they were after all actively utilized in mechanized formations during the Great Patriotic War, and more recently, Soviet and Russian defense ministers had certainly toyed with the idea of either enhancing the number of brigades or even transitioning more fully to a brigade-based system. In October 1990, Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov signed a draft reform program envisaging such a transition, Pavel Grachev later planned to increase the number of brigades in the table of organization and equipment (TOE) and the latter, as well as Igor Sergeyev and Sergei Ivanov considered forming operational-strategic commands. Nonetheless, the most striking feature of Serdyukov’s reforms is the extent to which it draws upon an analysis of foreign military experience.

In April 2004 the Foreign and Defense Policy Council (SVOP) in Moscow, published an important 70 page study: Colonel (retired) Vitaliy Shlykov headed the team of writers, including Alexei Arbatov, Alexander Belkin, Major-General (retired) Vladimir Dvorkin, Sergei Karaganov, Mikhail Khodorenok and Andrei Kokoshin.<sup>35</sup> The report, *Voyennoye stroitelstvo i moderinzatsiya Vooruzhennykh sil russiy* (The Development and Modernization of the Russian Armed Forces), identified 15 traits present in the World’s

leading militaries, though absent from the Russian armed forces, and recommended dramatically reducing the officer corps, abolishing warrant officers, training professional non-commissioned offers, introducing military police and a number of other measures (later featuring in Serdyukov's reform).<sup>36</sup>

This was referred to in a letter from Serdyukov to Sergei Karaganov, the Chairman of SVOP, on September 30, 2009:

The issues which are raised in the report are important during the period of profound reforms in the Russian Federation armed forces. In the process of the transition to the new model of the Russian Federation armed forces, the Russian defense ministry is *currently implementing the most important measures which are proposed in the report, including the transition to the new TOE and establishment of the military formations, optimization of the command and control bodies, comprehensive technological rearmament of the troops (forces), improvement of the system of staffing, optimization of the system of military education, improvement of the system of mobilization planning and other measures.*<sup>37</sup>

Serdyukov's letter also promised that the defense ministry planned to involve SVOP experts in future development and modernization of the Russian military in the broader, "consultative interaction within the framework of the activities of the Public Council of the Russian Federation defense ministry."<sup>38</sup> In April 2010, while attempting to explain why the defense ministry had suspended its plans to introduce a military police structure, Serdyukov interestingly said that additional time was required to "study foreign experience."<sup>39</sup>

It is important to emphasize, however, that there was and is no Russian effort to "copy" western experience, but this analysis is playing a formative role in the current reform. It is highly unlikely that the Russian armed forces will ever simply become a copy of any western model. Although the report cannot be seen as representing sole justification for aspects of the reform concept, it is nevertheless possible to discern many of its features and identify both the strength and weakness of the "new look." For many western observers, the conceptual approach involved in Serdyukov's reform makes sense, and this is precisely because it does draw upon western experience. As the reform concept was applied, the defense ministry and General Staff discovered weaknesses or unforeseen problems requiring correction or revision to the original concept. Absent from the original declaratory concept, for instance, was the intention recently outlined by the General Staff, to replace the existing six military districts with four enlarged operational-strategic commands (by December 1, 2010).

The performance of the brigades, for instance, during operational-strategic exercises in 2009 (Kavkaz, Lagoda and Zapad 2009) revealed that they were “heavy” “cumbersome,” consequently taking longer than anticipated to move over large distances. Such brigades, retaining the firepower of a division and in many cases as much heavy artillery, seemed more like small divisions: a “one size fits all” approach was unsustainable. Senior commanders publicly admitted that recalculation was required, notably the CINC of the Russian Ground Forces, Colonel-General Aleksandr Postnikov, appointed in January 2010, who stated that further refinements were needed in order to make the forces more flexible and mobile. He particularly recommended that instead of maintaining such heavy brigades, three types were required: heavy, multirole and light.<sup>40</sup> Postnikov was effectively saying that a key feature of the reform, rapidly conducted throughout 2009, now required “refinement,” or additional reform. For its critics, this appeared to admit inadequate planning. Yet, the opposite is probably more accurate: it showed that the planners were implementing, assessing, re-evaluating, discussing and where necessary making corrections, even if that involved altering key concepts. In other words, paradoxically, it confirms that a real and systemic reform is in progress with mistakes being made, adjustments demanded and new challenges encountered. Postnikov, in fact, described the brigades as “less than perfect,” and said that the defense ministry was actively working to correct “mistakes.” He said the brigades were badly equipped (after all at the start of the reform there was only 10 percent modern weapons and equipment in the TOE) and characterized readiness levels on the part of their commanders as “low.”<sup>41</sup> Postnikov was not isolated in holding such views, as an interview by the Deputy Defense Minister for Armament, Vladimir Popovkin, confirmed. On February 20, 2010, Popovkin told *Ekho Moskvy*, that the new brigade structure had turned out to be “cumbersome, they are all heavy.” He added that “light brigades with light equipment” were needed in order to correct this imbalance. In turn, this would demand a diverse approach toward training, adopting new combat training models, and might also add to the procurement needs of the brigades.<sup>42</sup>

Such calls to further fine tune the brigade structure was also present in work by highly respected military theorists such as Major-General (retired) Ivan Vorobyev, co-writing in *Voyennaya Mysl*, (along with Colonel Valeriy Kiselev) in the spring of 2010, advocating three brigade types based on enhancing their maneuverability. The co-authored article began with a brief overview of brigade development in the US armed forces, and then turned to the history of Soviet brigades during the Great Patriotic War. It highlighted the fact that deficiencies within the TOE can result in military defeat, and noted in passing the five TOE reorganizations during the first six months of the Great Patriotic War. The article then recommended adopting three types of brigade (heavy, medium and light) depending on the operational axis.<sup>43</sup> They also stressed that the

restructuring of the TOE was no panacea, and the effectiveness of these brigades would depend on several factors:

“Much will depend on technical outfitting, the quality and combat effectiveness of arms and military *equipment*, brigade *manning*, the personnel's proficiency and moral-psychological and combat qualities, materiel support, and above all the *officers' professional training*, which cannot be improved overnight. Brigade employment will be effective when they are trained to preempt the enemy, deliver surprise attacks, and execute swift maneuvers, and when they have high protection and survivability.”<sup>44</sup>

It is also worth highlighting in passing, the way in which the authors utilized the legacy of World War II as a basis to advocate changing the TOE rather than to retain the pre-existing structures. The experience gained during the war, in their view, had exposed the inadequacies of the TOE and compelled its displacement in order to meet new requirements. Thus, Vorobyev and Kiselev presented their argument around the often unifying legacy of the Great Patriotic War and simultaneously advocated restructuring the TOE.<sup>45</sup>

CGS Makarov has already lamented the low quality of brigade commanders, saying that many have been sacked that were appointed in 2009, as they were simply not up to the task. If Vorobyev and Kiselev's model were adopted, which would certainly contribute to mobility and maneuverability it would actually result in the basic building block of the “new look” becoming the *battalion* rather than the brigade, and consequently the training burden would expose deeper problems; since clearly finding suitable brigade commanders is proving difficult.

As the reform concept is reconceptualized, moving from a uniform brigade size towards perhaps three basic types, and determining their mission type and operational utility, it is equally possible that the claim in relation to “permanent readiness” brigades may also require “adjustment.” The likelihood being that in future there will be a stratified approach to readiness levels on differing strategic axis. Equally, these structures need to be optimized to suit the development and adoption of network centric warfare capabilities, and as this is introduced and experience is gained, it may well elicit further adjustments. In short, having successfully abandoned the mass mobilization principle, jettisoning cadre units and forming the new brigade-based structure, the reform concept itself is under review, in order to correct weaknesses discovered after assessing these new structures. The timescale to complete this process is likely to be between 2012 to 2016, while more significant challenges lie ahead in relation to developing the officer corps, educating and training brigade commanders,

forming professional NCO's, as well as modernizing the TOE. Despite the officially declared target of reaching a 70:30 ratio of modern equipment and weapons by 2020, to date this has proved much slower than expected; rather than the 9-11 percent modernization per annum, it appears to be closer to 2 percent. How will this mismatch be corrected? Will the defense ministry opt for more upgrades? Will there be a greater appetite for foreign procurement? Can the problems facing the Russian defense industry be overcome?

Analyzing and assessing foreign military experience, calibrating these features into reform planning, however, will only take Russian defense reform so far. They may understand, often quite thoroughly the principles involved, but without practical experience they will not appreciate why it works or exactly how: such processes could be cut short or facilitated by asking for foreign defense reform assistance: though potentially controversial, especially if that assistance were provided by NATO or Alliance members, it is nonetheless possible at least in theory, and could form part of intensified trust building measures.

### **Russian Military Doctrine 2010: "Strategic Disconnect"**

The long awaited new Russian military doctrine, to replace its previous version in 2000, first mooted by the then President, Vladimir Putin, in the spring of 2005 was finally signed by President Medvedev on February 5, 2010.<sup>46</sup> Despite western and Russian analysts mainly speculating on the nuclear elements of the doctrine, there was no explicit move toward lowering the nuclear threshold, though as many noted there can be no certainty on the issue since further detail on the nuclear posture was contained a classified addendum (The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020). The military doctrine, tactically released during the ongoing START negotiations and sandwiched between the publication of the US Quadrennial Defense Review and just prior to the 46<sup>th</sup> Munich Security Conference appeared balanced, encapsulating a compromise between hawks and doves and really offering something in its text for everyone, avoiding being either too provocative or controversial. Little in its content fitted with the image of a "resurgent Russia."<sup>47</sup>

Nonetheless, as many Russian analysts and commentators noted, the doctrine is remarkable for a number of less positive reasons. First, and perhaps most striking, it bears no resemblance to the "new look" armed forces, in fact quite the opposite since it is almost entirely divergent from the actual ongoing military reform.<sup>48</sup> The gap between official theory and practice is therefore staggering by any rational measurement. Moreover, the doctrine in places contradicts the National Security Strategy (NSS, May 2009), even contains self-contradictory statements, offering little clarity on the nature of warfare or threats that the armed forces should be prepared to meet as well as parts of

its content simply making no sense whatsoever. One example of this confused approach, which exposes the dichotomy between the doctrine and Serdyukov's military reform, can be demonstrated by the latter having abolished the mass mobilization principle as a result of the organizational transformation in the armed forces in 2009, while the former mentions "mobilize" or "mobilization" more than fifty times in the document. The 2000 doctrine specified the role of the General Staff in terms of command and control, also referring to the function of the defense ministry and the military districts: all this has been jettisoned in the new doctrine and its place a vacuum exists. The new doctrine notes the potential hazard posed by information warfare and the need for the state to possess the means to conduct such operations, yet it remains largely ignored in the doctrine, while its only counterpart (The Information Security doctrine, 2000) now appears somewhat dated. The "balance" if this was what was intended on the part of those drafting the doctrine is in reality a sea of confusion, in which the military are tossed to and fro and any sense of strategy is left helplessly sinking. Long term trends, clear guidance or nuanced interpretation in this context must be treated cautiously and often with multiple caveats.

The sense of strategic disconnect contained in the new military doctrine is perhaps better understood by examining certain features of its content coupled with how the document was formulated, which actors were involved and finally linking the doctrine to the actual condition of the conventional armed forces.

*The search for the "new:" defining "dangers" and "threats"*

The military doctrine "takes account" of its previous version in 2000 as well as other strategic planning documents (Concept for the Long-Term Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation for the Period through 2020, National Security Strategy through 2020, and relevant provisions in the 2008 Russian Foreign Policy Concept and the Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine for the Period through 2020). In general terms the doctrine appeared as too loosely constructed, lacking specificity. This prompted Colonel-General (Ret.) Leonid Ivashov to observe: "This doctrine can be used in military academies for seminars on the subject of how to compile such documents, but this doctrine has little to do with Russian reality."<sup>49</sup> However, the doctrine contained little that was fundamentally "new," though there were shifts, text left unchanged since the 2000 version, and aspects that failed to connect with changes in the strategic environment since 2000.<sup>50</sup> Unlike the 2000 doctrine, the new military doctrine makes a crucial distinction between *opasnosti* (dangers) and *ugrozy* (threats) facing Russia. This allows Moscow to continue to designate NATO enlargement, as opposed to the existence of the Alliance *per se*, as a danger, rather than an imminent threat. In so doing, however, and by placing this as the primary "danger" Moscow has signaled that the previously anti-western paradigm evolving within its doctrinal thinking persists,

albeit in a slightly more muted manner.<sup>51</sup> Allowing for the innovation in terms of distinguishing the difference between dangers and threats, as well as noting that general less specific framing of language on the latter, it is worth noting the perception of the Russian security elite that the dangers facing the state have grown.

To begin with, the doctrine defines how these terms are used: a military danger is “a state of interstate or intrastate relations characterized by an aggregate of factors that can, under certain conditions, lead to the emergence of a military threat.” Whereas a military threat is “a state of interstate or intrastate relations, characterized by the real possibility of the emergence of a military conflict between opposing sides, a high degree of readiness of some state (group of states) or separatist (terrorist) organizations for the use of military forces (violence with the use of weaponry).” In other words, in certain situations the former may evolve into the latter more serious scenario.

#### *Dangers and threats*

These dangers are delineated into eleven points. Pole position, as already noted, is given to NATO (in the 2000 doctrine not specified, only referred to as a “bloc”), especially the aim of assigning global functions to the Alliance both violating international law and moving relentlessly towards Russia’s borders by its expansion; attempts to destabilize individual states or regions, or undermine strategic stability; deployment or build-up of foreign troops on the territories or waters of states contiguous with Russia and its allies; creating and planning to deploy strategic missile defense systems to undermine global stability and nuclear parity, militarizing outer-space and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems; territorial claims on Russia or its allies and interference in their internal affairs; proliferation of WMD, missiles and related technology, and the increase in nuclear weapon states; individual states violating international accords and noncompliance with existing treaties; the use of military force close to Russia in violation of the UN Charter or other norms of international law; the emergence of armed conflict and possible escalation of such conflicts on the territories of states close to Russia and its allies; the spread of international terrorism; and the emergence interfaith tension, international armed radical groups in areas adjacent to Russian borders and those of its allies and the growth of separatism and religious extremism in various parts of the world. Internal dangers stem from efforts to compel change to the constitution; undermine the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the state; and disrupting the functioning of the organs of state power, state and military facilities and the information infrastructure of Russia (Section II.8.a-k; 9.a-c).<sup>52</sup> The proliferation of WMD and the increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons as well as international terrorism, according to the military doctrine, pale in comparison with NATO.

As noted, the reference to NATO is not new, just how it is presented more exactly as a “danger,” and probably also reflects dissatisfaction with the lack of western interest to date in Medvedev’s European security architecture initiative. The second seems to be an insertion that fails to make clear to what it might refer, while the next appears a more nebulous variant on a similar statement in the previous doctrine. An additional new danger appears to relate not only to Ballistic missile Defense (BMD) but also obliquely to US “global strike” planning. Reference to “territorial claims” against Russia, has been condensed in the new doctrine, since the old formula had an additional element concerning a multipolar world. The next two dangers on were absent in the old doctrine: WMD proliferation and related technology and the violation of international treaties, etc. The first of these could be explained by reference North Korea and possibly Iran, while the latter seems linked to the abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the collapse of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The danger posed by the use of military force near Russia in violation of the UN Charter, follows a similar formula used in the old doctrine. And, finally, the references to interfaith tension and international armed radical groups must surely have Afghanistan in mind. Internal dangers relate to separatism and terrorism in the mainly in the North Caucasus, as well as possible attempts to penetrate information security.

The main military threats stem from a drastic deterioration in the military-political situation (interstate) resulting in escalation to use of military force; impeding the functioning of command and control systems in the country, disrupting the functioning of the strategic rocket forces, missile early warning systems, spaced based monitoring systems, nuclear weapons storage facilities and other potentially hazardous facilities; forming and training illegal armed formations on Russian territory, or on the territory of its allies or contiguous state; demonstrations of military force during military exercises on the territories of states contiguous with Russia; and finally increased activity on the part of armed forces of individual states or group of states involving partial or complete mobilization and the transitioning of the states’ organs of state and command and control to wartime conditions (Section II.10.a-e).<sup>53</sup>

The first of these threats does not appear in the 2000 doctrine, while the second almost verbatim follows the earlier formula. The third threat, though present in the old doctrine, allowing for the adjustment seems to signal concern that an enemy may try to establish and train illegal armed formations on Russian territory. However, the fourth and fifth threats are new: and in terms of the latter while the doctrine does not explicitly mention China, which is taboo in Russian security documents, it might reflect growing concern in Moscow over military exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), that appear to have rehearsed future Chinese military intervention in Russia and Central Asia.<sup>54</sup> Thus, as the military doctrine outlines the dangers and threats facing the

Russian state, these are often contradictory, give rise to questions concerning their order of importance, countermand other strategic planning documents such as the Foreign Policy Concept 2008 or the NSS 2009, and can equally be so loosely framed as to appear nebulous. NATO is represented as a danger, and its global functions decried, while the same doctrine advocates a much firmer version of Article 5 in relation to the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in its list of multilateral organizations with which to pursue cooperation mentions NATO (albeit after the CSTO, CIS, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the EU), though in last place (Section III.19.e).<sup>55</sup>

*Lengthy gestation period: infighting, military reform and other factors*

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11), followed by the global war on terrorism, intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with the “progress” of the second Chechen war, instances of domestic terrorism in Russia such as the Nord Ost theater attack in Moscow in October 2002 or the Beslan school siege in September 2004 appeared to necessitate revision of the military doctrine passed in 2000. Adjusting to the post 9/11 security environment, with for a time enhanced international counter-terrorist cooperation which Moscow was willing to pursue, finally resulted in June 2005 in the then President Vladimir Putin ordering a new military doctrine. That the gestation period for this new doctrine was so long, almost five years, requires some explanation. And in seeking that bureaucratic insight, it is necessary to scrutinize, as far as possible, features of the drafting process in order to understand how the “balance” represented in the new doctrine was achieved, and where the sensitivities were located.

On January 20, 2007, a consultative conference was held in Moscow examining the issue of formulating a new military doctrine. Those attending the conference were representative of the bodies with vested interests in the military doctrine: the presidential staff, government, Duma, Federation Council, Security Council, Ministry of Defense, Interior Ministry, Emergencies Ministry, the Federal Security Service, Federal Protection Service, Academy of Sciences and Academy of Military Sciences. In January 2008, an additional conference was held by the Academy of Military Sciences and also paid close attention to such issues. In December 2008 more formal plans for a new military doctrine were announced and during a meeting of the Russian Security Council a working group was formed consisting of delegates from state bodies and civilian and military academic experts, led by the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Army-General Yuri Baluyevskiy (former Chief of the General Staff) and Colonel-General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn headed the defense ministry working group. Army-General Makhmut Gareev, President of the Academy of Military Sciences and one of the country’s foremost military theorists also played a key role in drafting the doctrine.

Thus, the most significant players leading the process shared a military background, and probably brought military interests to the fore. What is remarkable is that the reporting on the drafting in 2007-2008 bears a striking resemblance to the final content of the 2010 military doctrine.<sup>56</sup>

A key paper in the January 2007 conference was entitled “Doctrinal Views of NATO on the Nature of Wars and on Security,” which was presented by an unnamed GRU officer, reportedly stressed the issue of NATO expansion. Another paper “The Role and Place of Strategic Nuclear Arms in Russia's Military Doctrine” asserted that the security of the Russian state is *90 percent* dependent upon nuclear deterrence. Colonel-General Aleksandr Rukshin, the then Chief of the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate, covered the organizational development and use of Russia's armed forces. Papers were given in order of importance, with air and space defense placed above naval aspects of doctrine. Papers on international terrorism were therefore given less priority, in part since the armed forces saw this as a function of the interior ministry and intelligence services, while a paper on military education failed to reach the top ten. Yet, Baluyevskiy emphasized that the main threat was hidden in the fact that the “conduct of hostile information activity against Russia has incommensurately grown,” the initiator of such activity appeared clear to all military chiefs assembled in the hall. Critically, following the conference, Major-General (Ret.) Vladimir Belous, Professor in the Academy of Military Sciences said that he saw few differences between the military doctrine in 2000 and that being worked out: “There was no military doctrine in Soviet times, but there was a powerful army. The organizational work of the top was aimed at increasing the professional capabilities of the armed forces. Now in the post-Soviet period the Chief of the General Staff is motivated by the assessments of the Americans on the highest state of the Russian armed forces. Apparently he does not realize that this is said to a great extent in order to increase the Pentagon's budget. And meanwhile the organizational work of the highest military circle degenerates into primitive paperwork, as if the paper itself will solve the problems of the armed forces.”<sup>57</sup>

The dye was largely cast then during 2007-2008, and there were intermittent rumors that the new doctrine would be signed in the latter part of each year. The question arises why was it delayed? Some analysts suggested that evaluating BMD, or the presidential transition from Putin to Medvedev, or indeed waiting to assess the outcome of the US presidential election may have played some part in shelving the doctrine. However, the necessity for the new doctrine emerged more sharply after the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 and the launching of Serdyukov's “new look” reforms in October 2008. For instance, the affirmation of the right to deploy troops abroad “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security,” included in the doctrine directly follows Medvedev's

change to the law on defense permitting this type of intervention, which he passed in December 2008 (Section III.26).<sup>58</sup>

### *Nuclear posture and redrafting*

Despite the “reset” in US-Russian relations, largely proceeding in the fall of 2009 around the ongoing START talks, senior Russian security officials not only implied that consideration was being given to lowering the nuclear threshold, but also to nuclear deterrence extending to involve local conflicts. Although he was not intending to promote an image of continued conventional military weakness, the Secretary of the Security Council and former Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, revealed details of changes to the draft military doctrine in relation to the country’s nuclear posture. In an interview with journalists in Novosibirsk on October 8, 2009, Patrushev signaled that the doctrine was being “fine-tuned,” and may include the right to use a “preventative nuclear strike.”<sup>59</sup> He also stated that Moscow’s greatest priority was to “keep its nuclear state status” and that “conditions of the deployment of nuclear weapons” were corrected to allow their use “not only in global but also regional and even local conflicts.” He also said: “The conditions for the use of nuclear weapons to repel aggression with the use of conventional weaponry in large-scale, but also in regional and even in a local war have been corrected. Moreover, in situations critical for national security, the inflicting of a preventive nuclear strike upon an aggressor is not excluded.” However, his meaning was clear, since during his interview he left little scope for doubt using several times the word *preventivnyy* (preventive), and only once the term *uprezhdayuschiy* (preemptive).<sup>60</sup> It is also important to note that General Baluyevskiy provided tacit support for these comments, confirming on October 15, 2009 that such revisions were being made to the draft doctrine.<sup>61</sup> Such comments aroused trepidation even on the part of Russia’s closest allies.<sup>62</sup>

Russian commentators were also uneasy about Patrushev’s comments, though largely in agreement that despite Serdyukov’s reform agenda, it implied continued conventional weakness. Konstantin Sivkov, the Vice-President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, said that, due to the serious problems in the armed forces, “Russia can ensure its national security and ward off military threats on the scale of local wars and above [regional and large-scale] only by recourse to the threat or direct use of nuclear weapons.”<sup>63</sup> Aleksandr Pikayev, a government critic and a high-ranking member of the Russian Academy of Science, said that the planned shift in new doctrine reflected conventional weakness and an admission that the armed forces simply were unable to carry out their “assigned missions.” Igor Korotchenko, a member of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council and the then editor of *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer*, said that the new doctrine had to “compensate for the degradation of the Russian armed forces,” adding that to preserve its great power status Russia “is ready to use

nuclear weapons.”<sup>64</sup> Some even suggested that the lack of progress in military reform had increased reliance upon nuclear weapons as the only possible way to deter aggression against Russia.<sup>65</sup>

Other officials and experts were more guarded in their assessments, linking any possible inclusion of Patrushev’s “leaks” in the new doctrine, once finalized, to progress in the START talks. An unnamed source in the presidential administration, for instance told *Vedomosti* that the new doctrine was “still being worked out,” and the final decision would be left to Medvedev.<sup>66</sup> Although much of the doctrine had already been drafted, it appears on closer examination, that some redrafting occurred following the meeting between Obama and Medvedev in Moscow on July 7, 2009 and that these revisions were further affected by the ongoing START negotiations. In February 2009, Serdyukov claimed the new doctrine would be ready for signing in September 2009, while later in the same month CGS Makarov explained that doctrine had been “worked out” and “will remain in its current form.”<sup>67</sup> By May 2009, Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladimir Karabushin, the Vice-President of the Academy of Military Sciences, said the new doctrine would receive Medvedev’s signature in early August.<sup>68</sup> Nonetheless, in early August Patrushev, far from implying imminent signature, said that in fact “substantial revisions” were made, and claimed that the latest draft bore little resemblance to the earlier one. It is likely that the point of neuralgia and disagreement related to the nuclear issue.<sup>69</sup>

The abandonment of the mass mobilization system and transition from the division-based structure in the ground forces to the brigade-based replacement, implemented rapidly throughout 2009 meant the doctrine could only realistically be signed at the end of that year.<sup>70</sup> As that organizational transition occurred and the new brigades were tested in operational-strategic exercises in 2009 (*Kavkaz*, *Lagoda*, *Zapad 2009*) the General Staff had to contend with convincing skeptics that the “new look” may result in lowering readiness levels. That in turn led to the hawks pushing the nuclear threshold and pre-emptive strike issues on to the agenda, while the General Staff leadership attempted to portray the new brigades as more combat capable and combat ready.<sup>71</sup> Despite the public claims that the conventional transformation had resulted in achieving the capability to deploy brigades within “one hour,” it seems that a tenuous consensus was reached amounting to recognition that the reforms had not damaged readiness levels (which were very low prior to launching Serdyukov’s reform).<sup>72</sup> An additional factor of widespread disagreement related to abandoning Russia’s traditional self-reliance on its defense industry for its procurement needs. The admission in September 2009 that talks were underway between Moscow and Paris on the possible procurement of the *Mistral* class amphibious assault ship brought the controversy over seeking foreign armaments and equipment to the fore, and most likely this internal

tussle carried over into the issue of finalizing the military doctrine.<sup>73</sup> The reformers also knew the draft paid scant regard to the “new look” and had to brace themselves to press ahead with the reform despite the impending publication of a doctrine that seems at odds with the agenda.

While the nuclear pre-emption and lowering the threshold was clearly on the agenda, an event in early December 2009 in Moscow may well have proven to be an opportunity to move a voice of reason center stage. On December 8, 2009, an assembly of the Academy of Military Sciences held in Moscow examined urgent problems in the development of military science and improving the country’s defense. In the presence of many of the military top brass, the keynote speech was given by the President of the Academy, Army-General (Ret.) Makhmut Gareev. His wide-ranging speech covered the situation in Afghanistan, the expansion of NATO, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, transnational threats, changes in the strategic environment, and Gareev said that insufficient attention was given to identifying the intentions and forecasting the practical actions of numerous international and transnational forces, particularly on the work of western think tanks producing closed work for government, “This is why many important processes end up outside our field of view,” he asserted. However, he noted forms of opposition, economic, information-based, psychological, etc, having a substantial impact on the nature of warfare and the development and training of armed forces. Stressing that nuclear weapons remain the most important and reliable means to ensure the security of the Russian state, he said that with the nature of new threats nuclear weapons could not be regarded in absolute terms. Gareev noted:

“Having a mindset that Russia’s security is guaranteed as long as there are nuclear weapons do not conform fully to the new realities. We know the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, but nuclear weapons remain and there is no union state.”<sup>74</sup>

Moreover, he emphasized that such weapons cannot be general-purpose, stressing their use is futile in local situations such as Chechnya or to neutralize economic and information threats or all types of subversive activity. Drawing on the experience of Great Patriotic War, Gareev said it was time to assess the merits of the decisive importance not only of the initial period of war, but above all the first strategic strike. Reminding his audience of the difficulties the Red Army faced in the first few months following the German invasion in 1941, then referring to more recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia (1991 and 1999 respectively) he said in modern conditions it is impossible to withstand a massive first strike. “Therefore, as in the fight against terrorism, more aggressive actions are needed and preemptive actions as well, if necessary,” he concluded.<sup>75</sup> His appeal seemed less nuclear than it did conventional. An

aspect later taken up in April 2010 by Andrei Kokoshin, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and former member of the Security Council: "The new Russian-US treaty on strategic offensive armaments lays the basis for strategic stability for the foreseeable future. However, this is not an automatically achievable objective, it can only be achieved if Russia continues to carry out a whole range of improvements to its strategic forces," he explained. Russia should keep its strategic forces secure against attacks and increase their capacity to penetrate any potential missile defense, adding: "Strategic stability will largely depend on precision weapons with conventional warheads, to which a great deal of attention should also be paid, providing Russia with a potential for non-nuclear or *pre-nuclear deterrence*."<sup>76</sup> The latter, by the way, is prescribed by the new Russian military doctrine," he said.<sup>77</sup> His reference to *pre-nuclear deterrence*, drew upon Gareev's thinking, but is still a long way off as the conventional modernization of the Russian armed forces faces technological and defense industry-related challenges. In any case, Gareev's was a voice of reason: nuclear weapons cannot be considered as "general-purpose" options.

Patrushev's "leaks," were ultimately absent from the new military doctrine, which if anything assumes a more cautious stance on the nuclear issue than did its previous version in 2000. There is no commitment to preventive or pre-emptive strikes, or reference to local conflict. Its comment on the issue, briefer than in 2000, describes nuclear use "when the very existence of the state is under threat," instead of the earlier: "in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation." (Section III.22).<sup>78</sup>

The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat. (Section III.22).<sup>79</sup>

As if to stress still further, the level of extreme caution involved, the doctrine also adds: "The decision to utilize nuclear weapons is made by the Russian Federation president." Its inclusion seems calibrated to remind the military that the decision rests with the supreme political leadership. Despite the controversy in the fall of 2009, the doctrine did not adopt a more aggressive nuclear posture, suggesting that a struggle occurred in the hiatus resulting in the victory of more moderate forces in the Russian security elite.<sup>80</sup> While there was a fudge on the issue of the "new look," on the nuclear issue and foreign procurement the hawks were plucked, and there hopes for rapid feather growth lay in questioning whether the "new look" will prove successful in future and clinging dogmatically to nuclear deterrence. Paradoxically, the new doctrine subsequently

allowed slightly more scope to those advocating reform to openly discuss the “teething” problems of the new look armed forces.

### **Pandora’s Box and growing international strategic confusion**

This uneasy consensus reflected in the new military doctrine, which appears weighed in favor of old approaches manifests itself in a curious way in the country’s nuclear posture. Military justification for such reluctance to reduce or eliminate Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) is less rooted in strategic deterrence capabilities than either Russian politicians or experts admit. The Defense Ministry’s 12th Main Directorate (*Glavnoye Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony* –GUMO) tasked with responsibility for nuclear weapons, maintains that such weapons are needed in the Kola Peninsula at naval facilities. Equally, it is fair to say that within the Russian armed forces, the navy is the main advocate of maintaining these capabilities, since they are considered as a necessary part of confronting the US navy in any conflict. In August 2009, the naval main staff indicated that the role of TNW was set to expand on attack nuclear submarines for that very reason.<sup>81</sup> GUMO and the uniformed armed forces, however, would place much greater currency upon long-range systems, rather than tactical weapons when attempting to relate nuclear strategy to actual military planning. As the Russian state seeks to update and modernize its strategic nuclear forces by 2020, with many expressing skepticism that this will be fully implemented not least owing to budgetary setbacks but also due to the ongoing design problems experienced in connection with the Bulava Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). Nevertheless, the political inertia and sensitivity surrounding the issue of non-strategic weapons, has long resonance, after previous futile efforts to make progress on the issue.

While many have questioned the military value of TNW, in the Russian strategic context such military value most certainly persists, but primarily in relation to China. This is due to several factors all linked to Russian conventional weakness vis-à-vis the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In the first instance, in any military conflict the Russian VVS cannot guarantee air superiority against the Chinese. Moreover, they do not possess sensor-fused cluster munitions, though in theory their surface to surface missiles (SSM’s) could deliver cluster munitions depending on whether the missile troops remained intact long enough. Faced with an advancing PLA division or divisions early use of TNW would present a viable option.

In February 2010, Aleksey Arbatov, the Head of the Moscow-based World Economics and International Relations Institute Center for International Security, explained that such weapons are for Moscow “the chief guarantee for maintaining a balance of forces with the United States,” adding: “Considering the colossal US superiority in conventional weapons and the growing lag above all in delivery vehicles of the strategic

forces, the role of TNW only grows as an instrument of foreign policy,” Arbatov asserted. Yet, the military significance of the tactical weapons is far eclipsed by the issue of how to verify and monitor any binding joint reductions, since as he admits, this is in order of magnitude much more complex than in relation to any reduction in strategic nuclear forces. “Technically it is practically impossible to verify a reduction,” he suggested. “While intercontinental missiles simply can be destroyed, you cannot do it so simply with dual-purpose delivery systems,” Arbatov believes, pointing out that frontal aviation artillery and the navy can be equipped with such capabilities, but monitoring their storage facilities would be “unprecedented.”<sup>82</sup>

Colonel-General (Ret.) Viktor Yesin, a former Chief of the Main Staff of the RVSNI, linking recent assurances over US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) plans with the possible future participation of Russia, expressed the need for caution on the part of Moscow: “When the issue is national security, attention must be given to the capabilities of the arms system being developed and not to assurances, which can change in one hour. Moscow should not fall into the same trap that it fell into in the past when the West promised that, after the unification of Germany, NATO would not advance to the East.”<sup>83</sup> Such skepticism, distrust and outright opposition to cooperation with the US or NATO in the areas traditionally featuring in Russian anti-western foreign policy rhetoric is more pronounced in the discussion on TNW. Any sense that such discussions may serve to benefit Russian security is at best a minority view. While its US and European advocates appear to suggest that the reduction of US TNW based in Europe would result in strong pressure on Moscow to reciprocate, Russian experts adopt a more nuanced stance, partly based on attacking western thinking or in pointing out the contradictions in the strategic thinking at play. Major-General (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, a senior researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences,<sup>84</sup> recently encapsulated that approach, by noting that Russia need not respond to any future withdrawal of such weapons from Europe, since, as he suggested this would take the form of a unilateral action, and Russia has no such weapons deployed beyond its territory. Only after a unilateral withdrawal of US TNW from Europe, could bilateral talks commence between Moscow and Washington aimed at a “balanced” reduction of these weapons. As Dvorkin stated, “This does not mean that we must achieve the same ceilings (that is, the same levels of TNW), since, in comparison with the United States, Russia is in a different regional situation,” in what could only have been a passing reference to the China factor. Yesin also supports such a position, arguing that Moscow must set as a pre-condition to any talks, that all strategic and TNW must be located exclusively on the national territories of those states possessing them.<sup>85</sup> Dvorkin implied that any policy designed to “place the onus on Russia” would be doomed from the outset.

On April 21, 2010, prior to traveling to Washington for talks on a range of security issues, CGS General Makarov indicated that this represents official policy, stating that any future negotiation must be preceded by withdrawing US weapons from Europe. He also argued that given the conventional imbalance in Europe between NATO and Russian forces, including precision weapons, that TNW play an important role for Russia.<sup>86</sup>

Due to the lack of official transparency on these weapons, estimates as to the precise numbers in the Russian inventory widely vary from 2,000 to 6,000, with the lower figure concentrated more on deployed weapons, while others are stored. One estimate claimed the ground forces still have access to more than 1,100 tactical warheads, and more than 2,200 available for naval deployment. By 2007, GUMO reported that all tactical weapons reductions among those assigned to the ground forces had been completed.<sup>87</sup> In late 2003 senior Russian military officials suggested that such weapons were needed in order to counter possible development of new types of US weapons, and in late 2008, CGS Makarov said these required as long as the European continent was unstable and so heavily armed. Sergei Karaganov, on the basis of available reports commented: "According to unofficial information (we usually do not provide official information), Russia has 5,400 of these warheads, 2,000 are in a combat-ready state, and the majority of them are in Europe."<sup>88</sup>

Hawkish members of the Russian security elite, tend to unite around the idea that it is "too early" to begin to discuss the tactical nuclear issue. Addressing a non-proliferation conference in Moscow on March 5, 2010 dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), Army-General Yuri Baluyevskiy, Deputy-Secretary of the Russian Security Council and former CGS, said that such talks could begin, but only after the US withdrew such weapons from Europe, stressing the US is unique in being only country that has TNW on the territories of other states. Baluyevskiy stressed Russia these as strategic, since "American tactical nuclear armaments in Europe are strategic for Russia because their delivery vehicles have a small distance to cover."<sup>89</sup> Baluyevskiy also reacted negatively to the shift in US nuclear doctrine, saying that it was rooted on the growing capability of its high-precision strike systems, and echoed concern of other Russian military officials about placing conventional warheads on strategic delivery systems.<sup>90</sup> Lieutenant-General Andrei Shvaichenko, Commander of the RVSN, in October 2009, expressed deep concern that international security might be damaged by the formation of the US Global Strike Command. He said that as conceived, strikes could be launched carrying a nuclear or conventional payload, and he noted that no detection system was capable of distinguishing the type of warhead after its launch. The state targeted by such a strike, would need to evaluate the degree of threat and appropriate retaliatory measures to be

taken, he said. "In the short time span involved, the response will be quite predictable, which could push mankind to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe," the general explained.<sup>91</sup>

Other aspects of Moscow's attitude towards the issue of reducing TNW at face value appear entirely unrealistic. In early April 2010, Lieutenant-General Yevgeny Buzhinsky, the former Head of the Defense Ministry's International Legal Department, said that Russia could begin such discussions only after first achieving conventional parity with the US, including in relation to high-precision weapons. "We should not start negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear armaments as long as we have disparity in conventional armaments, especially, high-precision ones. Under these circumstances, tactical nuclear armaments are means of deterrence and any reductions will inevitably damage Russian security," he affirmed. Clearly, given the ongoing problems facing the Russian defense industry combined with the technology lag between its research and development compared to the US, as well as the woefully inadequate level of modern equipment and weapons in the Russian TOE, such parity will prove impossible to achieve. But, his assertion underscores a far deeper anxiety relating to long-term Russian conventional forces weaknesses that will prove to be a significant barrier among the security elites in placing the tactical nuclear reduction issue on the table. Buzhinsky went further than many experts, referring to the precondition that the US unilaterally withdraws its TNW from Europe prior to entering US-Russian talks, he added that all related infrastructure in Europe must be dismantled in order to rule out redeployment later.<sup>92</sup>

Following the signing of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Sergey Rogov, the Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, was interviewed in the defense ministry publication *Krasnaya Zvezda* on April 7, 2010. Like other Russian experts, Rogov broadly welcomed the new START and outlined a number of its features that suited Russian policy concerns. However, he went on to realistically assess the START breakthrough by highlighting a number of its weaknesses. His starting point was to explain that a "balance of forces" is not restricted to strategic nuclear arms, and that the new treaty continues to preserve US and NATO superiority over Russia in nuclear and conventional terms. Then, he noted the treaty fails to address Moscow's concern that precision weapons, being developed by the US, are not limited by the new START, which he highlighted as anomalous since such weapons systems as part of the global strike program, might pose a threat to Russian strategic facilities. Moreover, since the number of Russian missiles capable of carrying a large quantity of warheads will be stood down in the future owing to aging, Rogov argued that the US will maintain its superiority in return potential, though not at the same level as under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Continued work

on BMD, while not representing an immediate issue for Moscow, will pose a potential problem in 15-20 years, which Rogov suggested demands the development of Russian countermeasures. Finally, he said that bilateral nuclear treaties must give way to a wider multilateral framework that takes account of the growth in the number nuclear states.<sup>93</sup>

*Tactical nuclear reduction talks as a risk to Russian military reform*

Sergey Karaganov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, in an article published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, on April 23, 2010, argued strongly against Russia entering such negotiations on the basis that it would serve to undermine Serdyukov's military reform. Placing TNW on the agenda, in his view, would strengthen the hand of those opposed to the radical conventional reform underway in Russia, which he said was geared toward shifting these forces away from their traditional fixation on NATO toward enhancing their capabilities to deal with "more plausible threats and challenges." Karaganov continued: "Withdrawal of American TNW (token arsenals as they are) from Europe will weaken the United States-Europe link. A good deal of Europeans – and particularly in the so-called New European countries – will start clamoring for better defense from the mythical Russian leviathan."<sup>94</sup> While noting that he also assumed a unilateral American withdrawal as a precursor to joining this process, he emphatically characterized it as a highly dangerous step leading to strategic confusion, and what Karaganov viewed as opening Pandora's Box: "Euphoric over the Prague treaty signing, so called experts insist on tactical nuclear arms reduction talks. Left to their own devices, they will open this Pandora's Box in no time at all."<sup>95</sup> This was not the first time he used the Pandora's Box argument, but here he was clearly signaling that the delicate balance that exists within the Russian defense and security elite over the current military would be upset by playing the tactical nuclear card, a balance reflected in the compromise that led to the new military doctrine in February 2010 and one that appeared vulnerable as discussions continued in Moscow on the future shape of the manning system in the armed forces. Should this unpredictable process be unleashed, the likely key indicator that the opponents of military reform have gained the upper hand would be signaled by an increase in the term of conscript service from one back to two years, representing the political and psychological defeat for Serdyukov's reform.

The bedrock of Karaganov's argument, however, is rooted in the traditionally sacrosanct position of nuclear weapons in Russian security strategy, which underlies his utter opposition to what he sees as the senseless and idealistic call for global zero in nuclear arms reduction advocated by the Obama administration. His assessment of Russia's geopolitical position is bleak, with its modernization impaired by corruption. Russian security is guaranteed by its nuclear capability, which is also the main source of

its political economic weight in the world. In this context, Karaganov believes that any move toward abandoning these weapons prove suicidal for the Russian state. The *only* purpose arms control talks serve for Moscow, he claimed, is to build trust and transparency between the world powers, "This is all Russia needs arms control talks for."<sup>96</sup>

Karaganov's influential work in this area cannot be separated from wider strategic issues and areas of divergence within the complex and evolving US-Russian bilateral relationship. These include the precise nature and trajectory of the reset, and how this is interpreted both in Washington and Moscow as well as among Alliance members, future BMD plans, Medvedev's European security treaty initiative and how the global zero concept is viewed by the Russian security elite. Karaganov has expressed skepticism over the meaning and objective content in the "reset" policy, openly question the administration's plans to deploy BMD components in Bulgaria and Romania by 2015, and has fiercely criticized global zero both in terms of the centrality of nuclear deterrence in Russian security policy and the contradictory posture adopted by its architects.<sup>97</sup>

Karaganov's critique of global zero stemmed from his overview of how the concept was first outlined in January 2007 by the former US Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and former Secretary of Defense, William Perry. Despite initially supporting what he regarded more as an aspiration than a policy, Karaganov soon revised his stance, saying that mankind continued to need the nuclear "Sword of Damocles."<sup>98</sup> The "movement" had in effect been launched, and the aspiration was announced by US President, Barack Obama, in Prague in April 2009, which was also broadly welcomed by Medvedev and Putin. However, he then objected that the four same authors, in an article in January 2010 called for increased spending to increase the reliability and effectiveness of the US nuclear arsenal. In his view, this shift reflected an acknowledgement that the US nuclear capability had been under-financed in recent years, as well as an admission that the nuclear proliferation genie had appeared. In typically Russian style, he delighted in the semblance of hypocrisy, suggested US power faced a strategic crisis following its experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and made clear that if anyone expected the Kremlin to pursue global zero, they must be thinking centuries ahead.<sup>99</sup> Washington's strategic thinking was, in his assessment, becoming increasingly confused, ignoring that India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel had all joined the nuclear club, and rather than considering how to deal with the new geostrategic situation preferred to philosophize such weapons out of existence, while noting the massive imbalance in favor of the US which global zero would achieve based on American technological advances in the use high-precision conventional weapons. NATO's intervention in the Balkans in 1999, US

intervention in Iraq combined with the various attempts to site components of BMD in Central and Eastern Europe all featured in his assertion that a new European security treaty is required, perhaps more than one, and eventually a political-military alliance between Moscow and Washington or Russian membership of NATO.<sup>100</sup> Finally, on the issue of TNW and their possible reduction he highlighted the glaring blunder in the appeal made by the Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministers, Radek Sikorski and Carl Bildt respectively, in their article in February 2010 which called on Russia to remove TNW from the Kola Peninsula and Kaliningrad Oblast, since are none stationed in the latter. He ridiculed the whole concept, pointing out that withdrawing these weapons from European Russia would hardly help Moscow in its relations with Beijing.<sup>101</sup>

### *Europeanizing the debate*

Within a short period a response to the call for tactical nuclear reduction in Europe made by Sikorski and Bildt was the subject of a scathing demolition in *Krasnaya Zvezda*. Their proposal that Russia should withdraw its TNW from Kaliningrad was highlighted as not only politically incorrect, since a similar appeal was not directed towards the US, but entirely flawed in as much as these weapons are not based there. The Kola Peninsula was treated differently, and here the author argued that such an appeal could only be considered if the US eliminated its naval bases in San Diego or Norfolk. It further asserted that the US by basing these weapons on the territories of European allies had violated the first and second articles of the NPT, and stressed that such articles such be followed without exception. The list of flaws in the Sikorski and Bildt hypotheses was extensive, and placed high value on the sovereign right of any state to freely deploy its armed forces in any way, place or time on its territory. The proposal was described as ill-conceived and unfounded, as the author then proceeded to outline a plausible compromise:

“Before the beginning of official discussions on this theme, Washington and Moscow must take the same starting position in the negotiations. [The United States must agree] to withdraw all of its TNW from the European continent and bring them back to its own territory. That is, it must do what Russia did 15 years ago.”<sup>102</sup>

During the 46th International Security Policy Conference in Munich in February 2010, Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, who led a 30 strong Russian delegation said that it was it likely that Washington and Moscow, following the signing of the follow-on START would come under pressure to negotiate joint reduction of their tactical nuclear stockpiles. Ivanov, expressed a similar position to that adopted in the *Krasnaya Zvezda* article: “But it should not be forgotten that our country has been dealing with this problem since the 1990’s. We voluntarily reduced this arsenal,

concentrated it on our own territory, removed it from the field, and warehoused it in special storage facilities.” In other words, Moscow has already assumed the moral high ground.<sup>103</sup>

Such themes were revisited in an article by Viktor Ruchkin in *Krasnaya Zvezda* in March 2010, and laying emphasis on how Russia had withdrawn nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The onus, in this thesis, was on the US to reciprocate and follow this Russian model. “It is perfectly clear that the United States must unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw its TNW from Europe. That would realize the aspirations of the Europeans, who view those TNW as a threat to their security, and it would also correspond to the declared intentions of Washington to free the planet of nuclear weapons,” Ruchkin asserted. Nothing could be simpler: Washington must learn from the virtuous conduct of Russian nuclear policy.<sup>104</sup> The same author claimed that far from intending to withdraw these weapons from Europe that Washington instead planned to extend their service lives and modernize them. He provided various figures on the numbers of combat ready US TNW based in Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy and Turkey which appeared incongruous in the context of the withdrawal of Russian weapons from former Soviet Republics.

Consequently, for a range of reasons, Moscow views the tactical nuclear issue as mostly a process it would like, at least initially, to observe as unfolding between the US and its European allies, fearing that unless handled sensitively it may exacerbate East European and Baltic clamor for greater defense against Russia, or provide an opportunity to further divide the US and its allies in Europe. Dragged, reluctantly into bilateral talks aimed at joint reduction of these weapons, Moscow would seek to prolong such discussions, at least until the organizational phase of its conventional reform is complete (2012 at the earliest), and thereafter would attempt to form linkage to other issues ranging from BMD, CFE and to its advocating new European security treaty.

Indeed, some Russian commentators portrayed the domestic German political dimension at play in pushing for the elimination of US nuclear weapons on German territory. Originally proposed in the fall of 2009, by the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, the leader of the Free Democratic Party in the ruling coalition demanded such withdrawal in a separate paragraph in the coalition treaty Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats. Addressing the Munich Security Conference in February 2010, Westerwelle confirmed his intention to pursue the elimination of the US nuclear arsenal in Germany by 2013 (the end of the ruling coalition’s period in office). It was also noted that the Free Democratic Party are ideologically opposed to nuclear energy in any form

and advocate withdrawing German troops from Afghanistan, and that Merkel most likely agreed to compromise on the issue of nuclear weapons in order to preserve the German presence in Afghanistan.<sup>105</sup>

While Russian analysts recognized that the START III represented a key element within the “reset” policy and more importantly the only forum within which Moscow can hold discussions with Washington on an equal footing, this neither translated into confidence in extending such discussions to include TNW nor an appetite to hold such talks in perpetuity. Fyodor Lukyankov, for instance rightly characterized the April 8, 2010 signing of START III as a political-military compromise allowing both sides to claim success without undermining the claims by either side, though he also placed the treaty in the category of the last of the Cold War model agreements, pursued by Washington as an instrument rather than for its intrinsic value or merit. That process, underway since the 1960’s, had drawn to a close. A similar approach was unworkable in the realm of TNW, since it could “bring about the absurd remilitarization of the political debate in Europe, but will do nothing to create a stable security system there.”<sup>106</sup>

#### *Policy implications*

As the obsessional phrase in the Russian security lexicon has evolved from “star-wars,” to “missile defense” so it is likely that we are already witnessing that progression to include over the course of the next decade “US global strike,” and if compromise is reached on BMD or Russian concerns are allayed, the more pronounced the “global strike” phrase will become. This reflects sensitivity within the Russian security elite about future strategic parity, the potential for conventional capabilities in the hands of the US Global Strike Command to strike anywhere globally, coupled with an acute awareness of the crisis in the domestic defense industry and possible downward spiral for the Russian economy.

A “straight” horse trading over TNW would most likely fail. Its potential appears more rooted in the policy being linked to a range of other issues as part of “strategic engagement” with Russia, but this would need to include an offer of assistance with conventional defense reform, and assuage concerns on the part of some NATO members.

Thus far, Serdyukov’s reform agenda has been implemented rapidly and with significant achievements. These are mostly administrative achievements, such as the transition to the permanent readiness brigades. Yet, the challenges ahead are far deeper, and are more connected with the value of the Russian state: its people. More than the introduction of any new weapons or equipment, the future of the Russian armed forces

will center on whether the state can harness and develop a new generation of Russian officers, and for each individual that will entail serving as an example, delegating authority, bringing the best out of his subordinates, encouraging a culture of initiative and problem solving: in short *leadership*.

Russia is only in the early stages of conventional defense reform, a process likely to endure for many years, not least in terms of the transition towards network-centric warfare capabilities. It is clear that many critical issues are still in the melting pot, and are unlikely to witness any speedy resolution. Consequently, this domestic defense reform coupled with the “China factor” makes it unlikely that TNW reduction currently presents a realistic option. Serdyukov and Makarov, probably in an effort to shore up support for the reform, have undoubtedly exaggerated its success to date and perhaps there will be need, at some point deemed as politically “safe” to admit that major tasks still lie ahead demanding more time. In this sensitive context, any attempt to place TNW reduction on the agenda risks unraveling that reform, possibly damaging the “reset” in US-Russian relations and missing potential defense cooperation opportunities based on the collateral damage to the current conventional defense reform: from a Russian perspective it may represent the correct policy but at the wrong time.

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<sup>1</sup> Aspects of the following analysis of the long term challenges facing Russian defense reform is based on the author’s presentation: “Russian Defense Reform: Contradictions, Challenges and Reconceptualization,” Institute of International Relations, Prague, 27 May, 2010.

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<sup>3</sup> Daniyal Ayzenshtadt, Yelizaveta Surnacheva, “The Abkhaz-Israeli Reform of the Russian Armed Forces,” [www.gazeta.ru](http://www.gazeta.ru), November 19, 2008.

<sup>4</sup> Viktor Baranets, “The Army Will Be Getting the Latest Weapons and Lodgings and Will Be Rid of Hazing: Dmitry Medvedev Has Formulated Five Principles of Development of the Armed Forces,” *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, October 1, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Yuriy Gavrilov, “General’s Reduction: They Will Reduce the Armed Forces and Change Their Look,” *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, October 15, 2008; Mikhail Barabanov, “Reform of the Combat Spirit,” *Kommersant-Vlast*, October 20, 2008; “The Army Needs to be Protected from Dilettantes,” [www.utro.ru](http://www.utro.ru), October 22, 2008. (Юрий Трифонов, “В рамках реформирования Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Генералов станет меньше, лейтенантов – больше,” *Военно-промышленный курьер*, № 42 (258), октября 22-28, 2008 года.[http://www.archive.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr\\_sign=archive.2008.258.articles.army\\_02](http://www.archive.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2008.258.articles.army_02)) Yuri Trifonov, “V ramkah reformirovaniya Vooruzhennih Sil Rossiiskoi Federacii. Generalov stanet men’she, leitenantov – bol’she,” *Voенно Promyshlennyy Kuryer*, 42 (258), October 22-28, 2008.

<sup>6</sup> Baranets, “The Army Will Be Getting the Latest Weapons,” *Op. Cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Nikolay Poroskov, “Military Arrangements,” *Vremya Novostey*, October 8, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Gavrilov, “General’s Reduction,” *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

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- <sup>10</sup> Interview with Serdyukov, *Rossiia* 24, March 6, 2010.
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- <sup>13</sup> (Вадим Соловьев, «Военная реформа 2009–2012 годов», *Независимое Военное Обозрение*, декабря 12, 2008 года. [http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-12-12/1\\_reform.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-12-12/1_reform.html)) Vadim Solov'ev, "Voennaya reforma 2009 – 2012 godov," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, December 12, 2008.
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<sup>33</sup> Author’s emphasis.

<sup>34</sup> Burenok, “Basis for Network-Centric Wars,” Op.Cit.

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<sup>41</sup> “Will Have to Serve Without Contract,” *Izvestiya*, February 26, 2010.

<sup>42</sup> “Military Board,” *Ekho Moskvy*, February 20, 2010.

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> *Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii* (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html>.

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<sup>48</sup> Mikhail Tsypkin, “What’s New in Russia’s New Military Doctrine?” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, February 27, 2010.

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