

## Nuclear Weapons in Russian Strategy and Doctrine

### Introduction

The Russian Federation (RF) remains in possession of the world's largest nuclear arsenal. Despite the elimination of some key foundations of superpower rivalry, most notably the intense ideological schism between Communism and Western-type democracies that sparked and fueled the Cold War, the RF Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) continue to target the United States and its allies. While the significant disequilibrium in economic, technological, military, power projection and other capabilities between the U.S. and the RF continues to expand, Russia remains the only global power presenting an existential threat to the U.S.

It is not the weapons but people possessing them who kill. Detailed information of the composition, combat readiness and procedures of RF SNF is important.<sup>1</sup> However, understanding the nature of the Russian political regime, the mentality of Russian leaders, and the underpinnings of Russian nuclear strategy as reflected in Russian doctrinal documents may help assess whether or not that country will ever resort to the ultimate weapon of destruction.

Soviet and Russian military and nuclear doctrines reflect the leadership's threat assessments; perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the military; national goals and tasks for the military organization of the state, etc. To the extent they are not used for propaganda or disinformation purposes, they may provide insights into disagreements and competitiveness within policymaking elites. Doctrines usually comprise classified components, and are accompanied by declaratory and interpretive statements that clarify or, for that matter, complicate the understanding of their intent and purpose.

The current presentation deals with the evolution of Russian thinking and policy on nuclear-related issues. It also seeks to understand motivations of the Russian leadership in its continued reliance on nuclear weapons and maintaining adversarial posture towards other nuclear powers, especially the United States. Past and current doctrinal documents are studied at the background of evolving nuclear weapons programs, military-political relations with the United States, perceived defense and security threats and requirements.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> On May 12, 2010, The RF Foreign Ministry announced it is "considering the possibility of publicizing data on its nuclear weapons" following similar moves by the U.S. and Great Britain and in the spirit of the new arms control treaty signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and RF President Dmitrii Medvedev in the Prague on May 8, 2010 (See: Russia "May Divulge Data on Its Nuclear Arsenal," *RIA Novosti*, May 12, 2010, (In Russian) available at: <http://army.lv/ru/yadernoe-oruzhie/901/24532>). It has not been indicated however whether Moscow intends to include the numbers and types of tactical nuclear weapons in its possession if and when this information is released.

<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed assessment of these issues see: Andrei Shoumikhin, "Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy: Implications for U.S. Security," *National Institute for Public Policy*, August 2008, available at:

Chronologically and substantively the main emphasis is made on the independence period of Russia, from December 1991 on. However, a reference to the Soviet period was deemed appropriate. After all, most of the strategic weapon systems Russia possesses today were created during the Soviet period. Moreover, while Russian leaders invariably underline substantive differences between the Soviet regime and the new socio-economic and political environment in contemporary Russia, there are still many similarities between current Russian and former Soviet thinking and behavior. To a large extent, the Russian Federation finds itself in a geopolitical situation resembling that of the Soviet Union. Despite considerable changes in the structure and composition of bureaucracies responsible for the development and implementation of the Russian military and foreign policy, many political appointees and professionals currently in charge of this policy have strong backgrounds in the Soviet system.<sup>3</sup>

### **1. Soviet Experience: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Pursuit of Parity**

Starting in the early-1950s, the Soviet leadership, driven by the need to buy time in bridging the technological gap in nuclear weapons and delivery systems with the United States, put a huge stake on disarmament negotiations and debates at the United Nations. They began to be regarded as a vital means of slowing down if not reversing the U.S. progress in developing advanced weapon systems while the USSR accelerated its own WMD programs. Nuclear disarmament or rather the politics of nuclear disarmament had also become a central component of the “peaceful competition of opposite social systems” promoted by the communist regime.

Fiery demagogue Nikita Khrushchev put his unique “stamp” on nuclear disarmament at the United Nations by proposing in 1959 a patently unrealistic however ideologically enticing plan of “general and complete disarmament” that would start with the nuclear-missile arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. From that time on, the Soviets often began negotiating processes by launching “initiatives” that had little or no chance

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<http://nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Russian%20Arms%20Control%20web.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> The Kremlin relies on various institutional mechanisms in defining the Russian military, including nuclear, and foreign policy. They include the Russian Security Council, the Presidential Administration; appropriate legislative and technical bodies of the Federal Assembly – the Russian two-chamber parliament consisting of the State Duma and the Council of Federation, e.g., committees and commissions on defense, national security, international affairs, etc.; as well as professional apparatuses of government ministries and other bodies, particularly the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Atomic Energy. Relatively speaking, there is currently a greater variety of sources for military and foreign policymaking than under the Soviet system. The ongoing, albeit slow process of the formation of civil society in Russia, greater freedom of speech, expression, etc., allowed various academic and educational institutions, public organizations, think-tanks, expert associations, individual specialists and representatives of mass media to speak freely on foreign and military matters, particularly arms control policy and negotiation; the military reform; civilian control of the armed forces, etc., e.g., the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (see: [www.svop.ru](http://www.svop.ru)); Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (see: [www.armscontrol.ru/](http://www.armscontrol.ru/)); The Russian Center for Policy Studies (see: [www.pircenter.org](http://www.pircenter.org)); Institute for Political and Military Analysis (see: [www.ipma.ru](http://www.ipma.ru)), etc.

of acceptance by the opposite side however could score big in the “war of ideas,” particularly among the “progressive world public opinion,” e.g., the antiwar and antinuclear groups in the West. Other added advantages of this methodology were to draw opponents into protracted bargaining and to eventually reach compromise by demonstrating “flexibility” while lowering the original excessive demands.<sup>4</sup>

Bold “peace initiatives” of the Khrushchev leadership were clearly predicated on the rapid progress of the Soviet nuclear and missile programs. As the result of intense efforts, already in October 1957, the Soviets put into orbit the first artificial satellite with a clear implication that Soviet missiles were now able to hit the U.S. territory flying through space.

Even during periods of relative relaxation of tensions in U.S.-USSR relations, Soviet perspectives on bilateral arms control were heavily tinted by ideological preconceptions. The Soviets invariably believed that the American side sought unilateral advantages for themselves. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko recalled in his memoirs:

For Carter, as all other American Presidents – his predecessors, the paramount goal had always consisted in limiting the Soviet nuclear potential, while keeping the main U.S. strike forces intact. Only with great effort, and under the influence of the irrefutable arguments and the constructive line of the USSR that enjoyed wide support in the world, he would deviate from his position aimed at achieving unilateral advantages for the United States.<sup>5</sup>

A real breakthrough for the Soviets in the pursuit of “equilibrium” in strategic relations with the United States began to emerge by the late-1960s when the U.S. took note of Soviet efforts to develop a strategic ABM system that eventually became the foundation for the Moscow ABM system.<sup>6</sup> The U.S. became apparently concerned with the prospect of arms race in ABM systems.<sup>7</sup>

In June 1967, President Lyndon Johnson raised the ABM issue in his meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glasborough, N.J. Johnson said he could delay a decision to deploy a U.S. defense system if he could announce that talks with the Soviet Union on the subject would start shortly. Kosygin repeated his personal view: “Defense is moral, attack is immoral,” and reiterated Politburo’s position that ABM systems could only be discussed together with setting limits for offensive weapons.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See: Andrei Shoumikhin, “Change and Continuity in Russian Arms Control,” *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 28, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 140 – 153.

<sup>5</sup> Andrei A. Gromyko, “To Be Remembered,” Vol. II, Moscow: *Politizdat*, 1990, p.221.

<sup>6</sup> The Russians pride themselves on being the first in the world to test a prototype ballistic missile interceptor on March 4, 1961 at the Sary-Shagan testing ground near Lake Balkhash. (See: “The Birth of System ‘A’,” *Voенно-Promyshlennyi Kurier*, No 33 (149), August 5, 2006, (In Russian), available at: [http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr\\_sign=archive.2006.149.articles.army\\_03](http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2006.149.articles.army_03)). The warhead used was a conventional one and intercepted a ballistic missile of the R-12 type that was moving at the speed of 3 kilometers per second. (See: Stanislav Menshikov, “Missile Defense: A Russian Perspective,” *ECAAR-Russia Paper*, July 21, 2002, available at: <http://www.fastcenter.ru/ecaar/UNdraft.PDF>).

<sup>7</sup> See: Anatolii Dobrynin, “Highly Confidential. Ambassador in Washington under Six U.S. Presidents, 1962-1986,” Moscow: 1997, *Avtor Publishers*, (In Russian), p. 133.

<sup>8</sup> Dobrynin, Op. cit, pp. 150-152.

However, Soviet progress in ABM systems and progress on both sides in testing MIRV's finally convinced the Politburo that it was time to start talks. In October 1969, President Richard Nixon was informed that Moscow was prepared to start official negotiations on the subject. Nixon agreed and talks opened on November 17, 1969, in Helsinki, Finland.

It took another two and a half years to prepare the relevant treaties for signature. The ABM Treaty was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, the same day as the SALT-1 Treaty on Strategic Arms Limitation. The Brezhnev leadership announced that the ABM and SALT talks and agreements signified that both superpowers had reached "parity" in their strategic capabilities, even though by the time both agreements were ready for signing (1971), the Soviet Union had 2,163 strategic warheads deployed, and the United States possessed 4,632 warheads.<sup>9</sup>

SALT-1 did not stop the nuclear arms race: by 1981, the Soviets increased their nuclear arsenals nearly fourfold to a total of 8,043 warheads, while the U.S. more than doubled its own numbers to 10,022.<sup>10</sup>

It should also be understood that the Soviet leadership at no time entertained plans to build a national ABM system. According to information that became available long after the initial bilateral debates, negotiations and agreements on the offensive-defensive linkage, feasibility studies ordered by the Soviets at the time resulted in a definite conclusion that such a system would not only be prohibitively expensive but would also be totally ineffective and could be easily penetrated in a massive nuclear attack.<sup>11</sup>

Therefore Moscow decided at an early stage that it would not be wasting resources on constructing such a system. To be absolutely certain that the U.S. would under no circumstances achieve a technological breakthrough in defensive systems where the Soviets anticipated failure, thereby gaining strategic superiority over the USSR, they agreed to conclude the ABMT. The complete reversal of the initial Kremlin's skeptical attitude towards regulating strategic defensive systems was based on pragmatic calculations. Establishing a "moratorium" on developing strategic defensive systems that lasted until the early 2000s may be considered a serious Soviet achievement in arms control.

With the conclusion in May 1972 of ABM Treaty and SALT-1, the paradigm of "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) became dominant in U.S.-Soviet strategic relations.<sup>12</sup> Negotiations on subsequent major arms limitation and arms reduction treaties (SALT-2,

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<sup>9</sup> Menshikov, Op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> See: "Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, A Status Report," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. Fact Sheet, June 2001, available at: [http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/Factsheet/Missile\\_defence.pdf](http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/Factsheet/Missile_defence.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> Pavel Podvig (ed.) "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," (With contributions from Oleg Bukharin, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene Miasnikov, Pavel Podvig, Igor Sutyagin, Maxim Tarasenko, and Boris Zhelezov,) *MIT Press*, 2001, pp. 620-622.

<sup>12</sup> See: R.M. Dyachkov, "The History of the Conclusion of the Treaty on Limiting Antibalistic Missile Defense of 1972," *IX International Conference "Lomonosov-2002,"* available at: <http://www.hist.msu.ru/Science/LMNS2002/23.htm>.

START 1 and START II) were conducted at the background of continued reliance on mutual vulnerability to retaliation.

The Russians proclaimed the ABMT “the cornerstone of strategic stability” in bilateral relations and the foundation of geopolitical “parity” between the superpowers.<sup>13</sup>

Diplomatic experiences of the early-1970s had long-term effects on later Soviet and current Russian thinking. They suggested to the Kremlin that:

- Arms control is an extremely valuable means of “equalizing” capabilities of nuclear adversaries if one of them lags in levels of armaments and technological prowess.
- Success in negotiations is possible as the result of subtle and deceptive moves, like in the game of chess.
- The linkage between strategic offensive and defensive systems is quintessential in preventing unilateral advantages and creating “balance” in strategic relations.

Soviet nuclear strategy and doctrine were evolving together with the changing balance of strategic forces and progress in arms control negotiations:

Since the second half of the 1960ies, the leadership of the Armed Forces and the state experienced a transformation of views on the possible nature of the world war. The Soviet military doctrine began to take into account the possible initial stage of a military conflict with the sole use of conventional weapons. There began to emerge doubts in the possibility of gaining victory after a massive exchange of nuclear strikes. Since this time, the Soviet leadership began to seek the conclusion of treaties with the U.S. on banning or limiting strategic nuclear weapons... Beginning in the early-1970ies, the main concept of developing Soviet strategic weapons was the concept that could be described as ‘strategic sufficiency.’ It defined the quantitative and qualitative composition of carriers, their distribution among the Strategic Missile Troops, the Navy and the Air Force, with due account of potential use under different conditions. They established scientifically the optimal ratio of the number of carriers and warheads for them. It also took into account the process of strategic arms limitations that had already begun between the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>14</sup>

According to one Western view, by the late-1980ies, the Soviets had a fairly elaborate nuclear-use doctrine that included the following elements:

- Preemption (first strike).
- Quantitative superiority (a requisite for preemption and because the war may last for some time, even though the initial hours are decisive).
- Counterforce targeting.
- Combined-arms operations to supplement nuclear strikes.

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<sup>13</sup> See: “The Struggle of the USSR against Nuclear Danger, Arms Race and for Disarmament. Documents and Materials,” A.A. Gromyko, A.A. Bessmertnykh, P.A. Zhilin, G.M. Kornienko, and V.F. Petrovskii, Eds., Moscow: *Politizdat*, 1987, (In Russian).

<sup>14</sup> See: “Concepts of SNF Development of the USSR in 40ies-90ies,” *Arms.ru*, 9In Russian), available at: <http://www.arms.ru/nuclear/1.htm>.

- Defense, which has been almost totally neglected by the U. S. under its concept of mutual deterrence.<sup>15</sup>

However, publicly the Soviet leadership insisted it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The first official declaration to this effect was made by Leonid Brezhnev at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on June 15, 1982.<sup>16</sup>

## 2. Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking"

Soon after his advent to power in the early 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest General Secretary in the history of the USSR, announced his own vision and proposals on the in-depth curbing of nuclear armaments. In September 1985, he offered the United States to reduce strategic offensive weapons to 6,000 warheads on each side, while concurrently prohibiting the deployment of offensive weapons in outer space, including weapons aimed at satellites.<sup>17</sup> Clearly, despite his reformist rhetoric, on strategic nuclear matters Gorbachev continued to abide by the concept of MAD and the traditional Soviet position on the offensive-defensive linkage.

Gorbachev's proposals were specifically aimed against the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) announced by the Ronald Reagan Administration in January 1984. Together with American counter-proposals, they were discussed at the Geneva (November 1985) and Reykjavik (October 1986) bilateral summits. In negotiations, while Gorbachev agreed in principle with Reagan's proposal to reduce by half numbers of strategic offensive weapons, he also emphasized that this would not be possible if the U.S. went ahead with creating a strategic defense shield. He argued that in this case, the Soviet Union would have to concentrate on developing its strategic strike capacity in order to neutralize the "space shield."<sup>18</sup>

In effect, Gorbachev was the first to offer anti-BMD rationalization that is currently used by leaders of the Russian Federation. For example, he doubted the American suggestion to share ABM technology with the Soviet Union once it was ready for use. He told the American that "the creation of a shield... would allow a first strike without retaliation". He also said that the Soviet Union had already developed a response to SDI that would be "effective, far less expensive and ready for use in less time."<sup>19</sup>

In still another effort to reconfirm the rigid linkage of strategic offensive and defense weapons, Gorbachev declared that the SDI stood in the way of a 50-percent cut in

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<sup>15</sup> Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War/" Reprinted from the *Commentary*, 1977, available at: [http://www.etpv.org/bills\\_page/nuclear.html](http://www.etpv.org/bills_page/nuclear.html).

<sup>16</sup> "Address by the General Secretary of the CC of CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Second Special Session of the UN," June 15, 1982, (In Russian), available at: [http://www.nasledie.ru/politvne/18\\_6/oonb.htm](http://www.nasledie.ru/politvne/18_6/oonb.htm).

<sup>17</sup> Dobrynin, Op. cit., pp. 598-599.

<sup>18</sup> Dobrynin, Op. cit., pp. 623- 629.

<sup>19</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, "Memoirs," New York: Doubleday, 1996, pp. 406-408.

strategic arms, and insisted that the U.S. administration should do something about it if it wanted to reduce the nuclear stockpiles.<sup>20</sup>

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Andrei Kokoshin, who at the times of Reagan-Gorbachev summits worked as Deputy Director of the U.S. and Canada Studies Institute and was member of the Gorbachev-appointed inter-agency group to study Soviet asymmetrical responses to the U.S. SDI program confirmed years later that the Kremlin had indeed agreed on a variety of efficient and cost-effective counteractions to the U.S. strategic defenses if and when they would turn into reality.<sup>21</sup> This more or less rejects the argument of those Russian analysts who claim that the Soviets overreacted in a massive way to the U.S. SDI, and that it was enormous appropriations for fighting the “terrifying” American program that had finally broken the backbone of the Soviet economy.<sup>22</sup>

Gorbachev continued to press for spectacular new agreements with the United States. By December 1987 when the Soviet leader arrived in Washington for his new summit with Reagan, both sides were prepared to sign a treaty banning intermediate range missiles in Europe (the INF Treaty). However, during that summit again Gorbachev did not fail to refer to the U.S. SDI as a stumbling block, and reaffirmed the link between offensive and defense weapons.

Finally, a preliminary compromise was reached. Both sides would commit themselves to the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972. R&D and testing would not be contrary to the Treaty. The Soviet Union and the United States would not withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period of time yet to be determined.<sup>23</sup> During his May 1988 visit to Moscow Ronald Reagan confirmed that understanding. This cleared the way for further discussions on reducing strategic armaments. Eventually, they resulted in the signing of START I in Moscow on 31 July 1991.

However, in the course of START I preparation, that part of the 1987 understanding that dealt with the ABM Treaty “was somehow lost on the way.”<sup>24</sup> On June 13, 1991 the Soviet Union made a unilateral statement to the effect that a U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty could present a “*force majeure*” leading to the possible Soviet withdrawal from START I.<sup>25</sup>

Even more importantly, no mention was made in START I itself of its linkage with the 1972 Treaty. This omission was brought to Gorbachev’s attention and he promised to make an oral statement at the signing to the effect that if the ABM Treaty was abrogated the Soviet Union would not consider itself tied by START I. But for reasons unknown he failed to do so. Allegedly, as claimed by one of his aides, he did not want to spoil the

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<sup>20</sup> Gorbachev, Op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> See: Andrei Kokoshin, “The Competition of ‘Asymmetrical Responses’ Began in the 80s,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, July 7, 2007, (In Russian).

<sup>22</sup> Maksim Kalashnikov, “The Empire’s Broken Sword,” available at: <http://www.e-lib.info/book.php?id=1121022183&p=0>.

<sup>23</sup> Gorbachev, pp. 445, 451.

<sup>24</sup> Menshikov, Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Pavel Podvig (ed.), “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” *MIT Press*, 2001, p. 655.

“festive atmosphere.” Actually, in the Russian expert opinion, “this was another of those significant errors Gorbachev made in his last years in office.”<sup>26</sup>

Gorbachev’s critics in Russia widely accuse him of having consistently given in to American pressures in arms control negotiations. Allegedly, Gorbachev was so carried away by his “pet ideas” of *perestroika*, détente with the West, etc., and enamored by summitry with Western leaders that he was prepared to compromise on better Soviet interests, e.g., agreeing to stop construction of the large Soviet phased-array radar near the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, while keeping a blind eye at similar American installations in Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales, UK.<sup>27</sup>

Gorbachev’s handling of other issues, including conditions for the reunification of Germany, Soviet troop’s withdraws from Eastern Europe, elimination of shorter- and medium-range missiles under the INF Treaty, promises to get rid of tactical nuclear weapons, etc., -- all reverberate today in the Russian disappointments and attempts at revising former agreements and understandings.

### **3. The Boris Yeltsin Regime**

While Mikhail Gorbachev’s ouster from power and the disbandment of the 75-year-old communist regime was generally received in Russia without huge regrets, effects of the ensuing disintegration of the imperial Soviet state left a deep imprint on the lives of millions of Russian citizens. Without underrating the novelty and magnitude of the problems faced by the government of Boris Yeltsin – the first President of the new Russian state, and minimizing certain achievements in their resolution, it is clear that, by and large, throughout the Yeltsin rule, the Russian society continued to slide into moral degradation, structural disintegration and economic morass.

On top of the significantly diminished territory, population, economic, resource, military, power projection, etc., capabilities, the society continued to be plagued by traditional Russian woes: bureaucratic dictate, mismanagement and corruption, as well as public apathy and despondency epitomized by alcoholism and addiction. Uncontrolled “redistribution,” i.e., plunder of what was left of the unwieldy albeit bountiful Soviet inheritance was accompanied by rampant criminality. By late-1990s, Russia looked like a failed state on its way to disintegration and collapse.

Internationally, the RF earned a dubious nickname of “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons.”<sup>28</sup> Frequent claims at the early stages of the Yeltsin regime that Russia seeks adherence to the “club of civilized Western nations,” were not backed up by serious efforts at internal evolution to comply with international standards of democratic governance.

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<sup>26</sup> Dobrynin, Op. cit., p. 661.

<sup>27</sup> Menshikov, Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Aleksandr Golts, “Why Russia Has Let Its Nuclear Arsenal Go for Soap and Sausage,” *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, September 5, 1995, available at: <http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1995/sov95175.htm>.

The Yeltsin government was unable to define coherently and explain to the public the goals and orientation of Russian foreign, military and nuclear policies. Despite a flurry of international exchanges between Russian officials and foreign dignitaries, the Russians remained ultimately confused whether the RF was “with” or “against” the United States and NATO on most global and regional issues. It appears that Yeltsin himself thought that the Russian nuclear potential was an “automatic guarantee” of Russian security and a barrier to other’s alleged anti-Russian policies.<sup>29</sup>

While the Yeltsin government supported denuclearization of other former Soviet Republics and actually helped in this process, e.g., under the “Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,”<sup>30</sup> it continued to rely heavily on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence strategies. Moreover, it was under the Yeltsin regime that Russia started a movement away from the non-first use of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. The process was typical for Yeltsin’s erratic style of policymaking when lots of people in his immediate entourage competed for the right to define and represent Russian interests to the outside world.

On December 21, 1991, at a meeting in Alma-Aty, Kazakhstan, where leaders of former Soviet republics joint the declaration on the creation of the “Community of Independent States” (CIS), heads of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan – states with the still deployed Soviet nuclear weapons – signed an “Agreement on Joint Measures Regarding Nuclear Weapons.” Article 2 of the Agreement stated that its member-states “reconfirm the obligation on the non-first use of nuclear weapons.”<sup>31</sup> Supreme Soviets of Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan (that actually never signed the Agreement) ratified it on December 25, 1991, June 10, 1993 and March 6, 1992, respectively. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, Russia was supposed to abide by this Agreement, unless it reconsidered the decision on its ratification.

However, the Yeltsin government soon started drifting away from the non-first use obligation. Yeltsin’s decree No 1833 on “Main Clauses of the RF Military Doctrine” of November 2, 1993 was never published officially. However, according to the publicly available sources familiar with the document,<sup>32</sup> it failed to make any reference to the non-first use obligation.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> “Yeltsin Rattles Nuclear Sabre after Criticism over Chechnya,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 42, December 1999, available at: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/textonly/dd/dd42/42sabre.htm>.

<sup>30</sup> See: Ashton B. Carter, “U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in Dismantling Their Weapons of Mass Destruction, Congressional Hearings, “Special Weapons: Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Missile,” *House Foreign Affairs Committee*, September 21, 1993, available at: [http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1993\\_h/930921-ash.htm](http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1993_h/930921-ash.htm).

<sup>31</sup> The First-Strike Doctrine, *Scilla.ru*, June, 13, 2010, available at: <http://www.scilla.ru/content/view/3533/2/>.

<sup>32</sup> See: There Will Be No RAKs without MAKs,” *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, March 11, 1999, available at: <http://www.buran.ru/hm/11-3-99.htm>.

<sup>33</sup> Decree No 1833 was submitted for the consideration of the RF Federal Assembly (parliament) elected on December 12, 1993, however the latter refused to consider it for reasons of continued confrontation between the executive and legislative branches in Russia.

In February 1997, then-Secretary of the RF Security Council Ivan Rybkin declared in an interview to the government *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* that the Soviet obligation not to use nuclear weapons first was a mistake and that Russia was prepared “in case of a direct challenge” to use these weapons.<sup>34</sup> At the time, the President’s Office tried to distance itself from Rybkin’s “personal opinion.” However, a short while later, Rybkin’s “personal opinion” became part and parcel of the official Russian military doctrine.

Despite this and other policy vacillations and inconsistencies, throughout his rule, Boris Yeltsin tried to appear accommodating and “progressive” on military-political relations with West and eager to compromise on arms control. However, internal political bickering between Yeltsin and the leaders of the State Duma prevented the government from assuring ratification of the key arms control agreement negotiated with the U.S. – the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II).<sup>35</sup>

By the time of his voluntary resignation on December 31, 1999, Russian foreign and internal policies appeared to be heading into an impasse. In effect, the RF was standing on the brink of chaos and imminent national disintegration.

#### 4. The Vladimir Putin Presidency

In sharp contrast, Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, originally a little-known apparatchik Vladimir V. Putin<sup>36</sup> could become not only a widely popular Russian leader, but actually a symbol of Russian economic and political revival.<sup>37</sup>

Putin worked consistently to create a new nation-wide ruling elite based strongly on personal devotions and vassal-type dependencies. The construction of a rigid “vertical of power”<sup>38</sup> and the use of blunt force in subduing regional secessionism while criticized as “overly authoritarian”<sup>39</sup> strengthened the central authority and eliminated much of the

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<sup>34</sup> See: “Rybkin Reasserts Moscow’s Right To Use Nuclear Weapons,” *Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy*, May 13, 1997, *GlobalSecurity.org*, available at:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/1997/drsov05131997000591.htm>.

<sup>35</sup> The Treaty was signed on January 3, 1993 by President George Bush Sr. and President Boris Yeltsin. It codified the “Joint Understanding” arrived at by the two Presidents at the Washington summit on June 17, 1992. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of START II on January 26, 1996. Ratification of the Treaty in the Russian Duma proved illusive for Yeltsin in view of the strong opposition of the Russian legislature. (See: Eugene Myasnikov, “Problems of START-2 Treaty Ratification in Russia. Is START-3 Possible?” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, September 12, 1996, (In Russian)).

<sup>36</sup> See: Andre de Nesnera, “Who Is Putin?” *GlobalSecurity.org*, available at:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2000/000128-rus1.htm>.

<sup>37</sup> See: “The Insider’s Guide to Vladimir Putin,” October 26, 2006, *CNN International*, available at:

<http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/10/25/insider.putin/>.

<sup>38</sup> See: “Vladimir Putin Lines Up the Parties Under the Vertical of Power,” *Newsru.com*, April 15, 2005, (In Russian), available at: <http://www.moscow2000.ru/news/view2.asp?Id=13767&IdType=2>; “The Russian Opposition Is Unhappy with the Power ‘Vertical’ Built by Putin,” *Information-Analytic Portal of the Union State*, July 9, 2006, (In Russian), available at:

<http://www.soyuz.by/second.aspx?document=21540&uid=4&page=4&type=Qualifier>.

<sup>39</sup> “The Russian Opposition Is Unhappy with the Power ‘Vertical’ Built by Putin,” *Information-Analytic Portal of the Union State*, July 9, 2006, (In Russian), available at:

<http://www.soyuz.by/second.aspx?document=21540&uid=4&page=4&type=Qualifier>

centrifugal tendencies in Russian regions. Confining Islamic radicalism and terrorist activities predominantly to southern Russia created a sense of relative security in populous hinterland regions.

Under Mr. Putin, a considerable effort was devoted to filling in the “ideological void” created by the disappearance of communist ideology and the Soviet propaganda apparatus.<sup>40</sup> In the search for the new “national idea,”<sup>41</sup> wide use was made of traditional tools of social mobilization in Russia – nationalism, religion and patriotism.<sup>42</sup> While there is no single distinct, let alone dominant ideology in Russia so far, it is not exactly true that “Russian strategic policymakers have no ideology.”<sup>43</sup> The Russian ruling elite is driven by strong “Great Russian” instincts and mentality. Another important component of the emerging system of prevailing values and concepts in Russia is the rejection of the geopolitical model that has at its center the conglomerate of advanced Western powers headed by the United States. In the current Russian political vernacular this aspect of the emerging official ideology and strategy is usually identified as opposition to “unipolarity” and American global dictate.

Putin’s grand strategy called for mobilizing all available internal resources to restore Russia’s political, economic and military grandeur. Nuclear weapons and arms control diplomacy were called upon to play crucial roles in the program of national revival.

By late-2002, Putin reversed all plans promoted by the government of his predecessor to reorganize and downsize the Strategic Missile Troops (SMT). Expanding U.S. BMD programs were the strongest argument in favor of preserving the status of the SMT and extending the service lives of aging heavy ICBMs, expressly to counter the alleged U.S. BMD threat to the Russian deterrence potential. Any doubts the Russian military-political leadership could have had previously about the value and importance of the Russian offensive missile-nuclear capability vanished completely.

Ultimately, Vladimir Putin argued that stopping the decay of the Russian military power was among the main achievements of his 8-year presidency. In 2006, Vladimir Putin reported to the Russian legislature:

The situation in the armed forces today has changed dramatically. We have created a modern structure for the armed forces and the different units are now receiving modern, new arms and equipment, arms and equipment that will form the basis of our defense through to 2020... Naval shipbuilding has got underway again and we are now building new vessels of practically all types. The Russian

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<sup>40</sup> See: “Sergei Kortunov, “On the Quality of the National Elite,” *Intelligent*, January 23, 2006, (In Russian), available at: <http://www.c-society.ru/wind.php?ID=244495&soch=1>.

<sup>41</sup> See: V.S. Elistratov, “The National Language and National Idea,” *Gramota.ru*, (In Russian), available at: [http://www.gramota.ru/mag\\_rub.html?id=54](http://www.gramota.ru/mag_rub.html?id=54); “The Russian National Idea,” *Vostok14.ru*. (In Russian), available at: <http://www.vostok14.ru/?page=idea>;

<sup>42</sup> See: Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the Benediction Ceremony of the Cross-and-Banner Procession,” *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, (In Russian), available at: [http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2003/07/31/1518\\_type63374\\_49692.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2003/07/31/1518_type63374_49692.shtml)

<sup>43</sup> Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” In “Russian Security Strategy under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, November 2007, p.35.

Navy will soon commission two new nuclear submarines carrying strategic weapons. They will be equipped with the new “Bulava” missile system, which together with the “Topol-M” system will form the backbone of our strategic deterrent force. I emphasize that these are the first nuclear submarines to be completed in modern Russia. We had not built a single vessel of this type since 1990.<sup>44</sup>

In effect, it was under Vladimir Putin that the Russian missile-nuclear potential became the symbol of Russia’s survival as a nation-state and the absolute guarantee of its security. In the Russian President’s words,

When looking at today’s international situation and the prospects for its development, Russia is compelled to realize that nuclear deterrence is a key element in guaranteeing the country’s security.”<sup>45</sup>

During his presidency, he consistently alluded to the Russian nuclear potential as the foundation of Russia’s special role in geopolitics. Above all, in the eyes of the Russian leadership, a robust nuclear potential created preconditions for “strategic parity” with the U.S. The Russian logic was simple:

Russia and the United States are the biggest nuclear powers. Our economy might be smaller, but Russia’s nuclear potential is still comparable to that of the United States... Also important is that we have the years of experience, the technology and the production potential, the technological chains and the specialists. Russia is a great nuclear power. No one disputes or doubts this. And the United States and Russia definitely have a shared interest in ensuring security on this planet.<sup>46</sup>

The Putin government offered full support to the Strategic Nuclear Forces and parts of the military-industrial complex (MIC) responsible for the development, maintenance and modernization of the country’s missile-nuclear shield. In a typical statement dated June 9, 2006, at an important meeting with heads of enterprises belonging to MIC, the second Russian President declared:

Our country’s nuclear potential is of vital importance for our national security interests. The reliability of our ‘nuclear shield’ and the state of our nuclear weapons complex are a crucial component of Russia’s world power status. I do stress that our work to develop our nuclear arsenal must go hand in hand with the most stringent demands on reliability and security of operation and, of course,

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<sup>44</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, May 10, 2006, available at: [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823\\_type70029type82912\\_105566.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml)

<sup>45</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Opening Address at Meeting on Developing Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Complex,” *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, March 30, 2006, available at: [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/03/30/2300\\_type82913\\_104010.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/03/30/2300_type82913_104010.shtml)

<sup>46</sup> Vladimir Putin, *Interview with Al Jazeera Television Channel, October*, *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, 16, 2003, available at: [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2003/10/16/1648\\_54238.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2003/10/16/1648_54238.shtml)

with strict compliance with all non-proliferation regimes. In this respect Russia's position is firm and unchanging.<sup>47</sup>

The idea of using nuclear weapons in limited war was also gaining momentum under the Vladimir Putin's presidency. Senior Russian generals started talking about using them in exercises and in limited war already in the late-1990ies.<sup>48</sup> The new version of the RF Military Doctrine of April 21, 2000, elaborated under Boris Yeltsin however signed by Vladimir Putin in his capacity of Interim President, elaborated the provisions pertaining to the limited use of nuclear weapons that were set out four months earlier in the "National Security Concept" and in this regard marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of Russian nuclear doctrine.<sup>49</sup> In particular, it stated:

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to a large-scale aggression involving the use of conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states-members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do not possess nuclear weapons, except in case of an aggression against the Russian Federation, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or other troops, its allies or against a state with which it has agreements in the area of security, committed or supported by such a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, jointly or in the presence of allied obligations with a state-possessor of nuclear weapons.<sup>50</sup>

Besides the "RF Military Doctrine," the Putin government approved other doctrinal and strategy documents that reserved a special place for the strategic weapons in assuring Russian security, including the Federal Law "On Defense,"<sup>51</sup> the "National Security Doctrine,"<sup>52</sup> the "Foreign Policy Doctrine,"<sup>53</sup> as well as policy statements by high government officials, e.g., annual "Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly," etc.

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<sup>47</sup> "Opening Remarks at Meeting with Heads of the Russian Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy Complexes," Novo-Ogaryovo, June 9, 2006, President of Russia Official Web Portal, available at: [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/06/09/1952\\_type82912type82913\\_106757.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/06/09/1952_type82912type82913_106757.shtml).

<sup>48</sup> Vladimir Sokirko, "Top-ol, Top-ol!!" *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, December 23, 1999, OSC Doc. FTS19991222001392; "CINC Yakovlev Interviewed on 40th Anniversary of RVSN," *Nezavisimoe Voennoye Obozrenie*, December 17, 1999, OSC Doc. CEP19991229000022.

<sup>49</sup> Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine," October 1999 (revised July 2004), *NTI.org*, available at: <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/doctrine.htm>.

<sup>50</sup> See: "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," Adopted by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 706 of April 21, 2000, (In Russian), available at: [http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/ykazi/doc\\_war.htm](http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/ykazi/doc_war.htm).

<sup>51</sup> See: "The Law of the Russian Federation on Defense," Adopted by the State Duma on April 24, 1996, and Approved by the Federation Council on May 15, 1996, (In Russian), available at: <http://www.hro.org/docs/rlex/defence/index.htm>.

<sup>52</sup> See: "The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," Adopted by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 1300 of December 17, 1997, in the "Edited Version of the Presidential Decree № 24 of January 10, 2000," (in Russian), available at: <http://www.iss.niit.ru/doktrins/doktr01.htm>

<sup>53</sup> See: Robert Legvold, "Russia's Unformed Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2001, available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faessay5570/robert-legvold/russia-s-unformed-foreign-policy.html>.

While these documents did not identify the “potential adversaries” of Russia by name, it was obvious that the United States and NATO powers were at the top of the list of the “threat factors” for Russia.<sup>54</sup>

Bellicose statements on Russian readiness to use nuclear weapons continued throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency. In February 2007 then-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told the Duma that, “As regards the use of nuclear weapons in case of aggression, of course [we will use them in this case]. What else were they built for?”<sup>55</sup> He did not mention any of the caveats associated with official Russian nuclear use doctrine.

A few days later Colonel-General Nikolay Solovtsov, Commander of the Strategic Missile Troops, made nuclear threats against Poland and the Czech Republic if they allow U.S. missile deployment.<sup>56</sup> Despite U.S. protests against such inflammatory tactics, then-Commander of the RF General Staff Army General Yurii Baluyevskii in April 2007 once again threatened to target U.S. missile defense facilities in Europe:

If we see that these facilities pose a threat to Russia, these targets will be included in the lists of our planners - strategic, nuclear or others. The latter is a technicality.<sup>57</sup>

The Putin government’s decision to put nuclear weapons and arms control in the center of its military and foreign policy agenda was apparently taken with several important goals in mind. Firstly, by associating arms control failures with the weakness of Russia’s global power and stature, Moscow was creating justifications for intensified efforts at internal militarization in general and modernization of the Russian strategic forces in particular.

Secondly, by playing the arms control “card,” Vladimir Putin was subtly distancing himself from the predecessor Boris Yeltsin administration associated in the Russian mind with many troubles of their country in the 1990s. Thirdly, emphasis on nuclear-related issues was Vladimir Putin’s way of signaling to the U.S. and other nuclear powers that Moscow would not sit idle while others augment their own capabilities.<sup>58</sup> In a way, the Russians were offering a choice between a new race in advanced weapon systems, and return to binding restraints and limitations in developing and introducing these systems.<sup>59</sup> In the latter case, they expected opponents, the U.S. in particular, to recognize that Russia

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<sup>54</sup> Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (Eds.), “Nuclear Deterrence and Non-Proliferation,” (Members of Working Group: Pavel Kamennov, Elina Kirichenko and Vladimir Pyryev,) *Carnegie Moscow Center*, Moscow, 2006, p.4, available at: [http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/books/9735arbatov\\_eng\\_blok.pdf](http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/books/9735arbatov_eng_blok.pdf).

<sup>55</sup> “Russia Reserves the Right to Preemptive Strikes,” *Moscow Agentstvo Voennykh Nosostei*, February 7, 2007. Open Source Center (OSC) Doc.CEP200707950213.

<sup>56</sup> “General Says Russia May Target Missile Defense Sites in Eastern Europe,” *Channel One Television*, February 19, 2007, OSC Doc. CEP20070219950390.

<sup>57</sup> “Baluyevskii Says U.S. European Missile Defense Poses Threat to Russia,” *WebDigest.ru*, May 3, 2007, OSC Doc. CEP2007054358001.

<sup>58</sup> See: Andrei Yashlavskii and Inga Kumskova, “Moscow Flexes Its Muscles,” *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, March 1, 2007, OSC Doc. CEP20070301021003.

<sup>59</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 2007, *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, available at: [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138\\_type82914type84779\\_118135.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82914type84779_118135.shtml)

deserves a “special place” in geopolitics by virtue of its military and economic potential, size, history, culture, etc.<sup>60</sup>

In an obvious demonstration of his readiness to deflate tensions and fulfill Russia’s arms control obligations, shortly after his formal election to the presidential post, Vladimir Putin moved to expedite ratification of the START II Treaty. On April 14, 2000, Putin could master the majority of votes in the State Duma in support of the Treaty. In assuring the ratification that eluded his predecessor for many years, the new Russian President was motivated as much by the desire to bring the Russian legislature under his control as by the need to avoid the image of a “weakling” in the eyes of Washington.

However, Vladimir Putin and people around him were evidently well aware of the serious misgivings of the Russian military about START II. Almost from the moment it was signed by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, many in the Russian political elite and the expert community argued against its ratification because allegedly it worked against better Russian interests and represented a “huge concession” to the U.S.

Moscow was also well aware that parallel to efforts at making START II effective, the United States was considering changes to or abrogation of the ABM Treaty in order to implement its BMD programs. Clearly, it was with Putin’s acquiescence, that the State Duma added a provision to its START II ratification document stating that Russia would not be tied by this or other arms control agreements if the ABM Treaty was violated by the U.S. According to Russian experts, “Thus, the link that Gorbachev failed to insist upon in 1991 was re-established nine years later by Russia” under Vladimir Putin.<sup>61</sup>

The START II Treaty had never entered into force. Besides linking the fate of the Treaty to U.S. adherence to the ABMT, the Russian legislative decision on ratification made its implementation contingent on U.S. Senate ratifying a September 1997 Addendum to Treaty which included “Agreed Statements on ABM-TMD Demarcation.”<sup>62</sup> Neither of these occurred because of U.S. Senate opposition, where a faction objected to any action supportive of the ABM Treaty. On June 14, 2002, one day after the U.S. formally withdrew from the ABMT, Russia announced its withdrawal from START II.

However, Russian “firmness” was of dubious political and practical value. In effect, failure to prevent the demise of the ABMT was apparently a good lesson for the Putin government. It demonstrated that no amount of rhetoric and verbal threats can affect actions of a stronger and determined opponent. The Russians realized that dragging their feet with START II ratification, refusal to accept earlier compromise proposals on BMD modification to accommodate particular U.S. interests in developing limited ABM

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<sup>60</sup> See: Nikolai Zyatkov, “Where Is the Smell of Gunpowder Coming From?” *Argumenty i Fakty*, February 19, 2007, OSC Doc. CEP20070224950135.

<sup>61</sup> Menshikov, Op. cit.

<sup>62</sup> See: Amy F. Woolf, “Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues,” *CRS Report to Congress*, April 27, 2000, available at <http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/international/inter-68.cfm>,

capabilities, and, generally speaking, lack of flexibility, failure to use windows of opportunity in fluid diplomatic exchanges, etc., had resulted in the ultimate loss for the weaker side.

To the credit of the Putin government and Vladimir Putin personally, they refused the temptation to react hysterically and stir up still another massive accusatory campaign against the U.S. in response to the actual U.S. moves to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (the U.S. announcement on the withdrawal was issued on December 13, 2001, and the Treaty ceased to exist on June 13, 2002.)<sup>63</sup>

As seen by a Russian expert,

In mid-2001 Putin suddenly softened the linkage [between strategic offensive and defensive weapons]... eventually permitting George W. Bush to scrap the ABM Treaty without worrying about an adequate Russian response. By doing so, Putin also undermined the arguments of the opposition in the U.S. to Bush's decision that claimed that scrapping the Treaty would lead to a new armaments race.<sup>64</sup>

Similar *realpolitik* calculations apparently played a mitigating role in defining Russia's reaction to the initial NATO enlargement.<sup>65</sup> Obviously, Vladimir Putin was personally responsible for preventing outbursts of indignation and promises of counteractions that could not be supported by actual demonstrations of Russian power and could do more harm than good to the Russian reputation in Europe and beyond.

Moscow saw a relative "compensation" for ceding ground on the ABMT and taking an accommodating stand on global issues in the U.S. agreement to negotiate and conclude the "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" (SORT), also referred to as the "Moscow Treaty."<sup>66</sup> The Kremlin presented the signing of the Treaty on May 24, 2002 as its "big

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<sup>63</sup> Putin's short statement in response to the American withdrawal announcement made the following points: "The U.S. has the legitimate right to abandon the Treaty in accordance with its provisions; Though an American "mistake", the withdrawal decision does not create immediate threats to Russian security; Abandonment of the ABM Treaty leads to the emergence of a legal vacuum in the elaborate system of agreements in the sphere of disarmament and the nonproliferation; That "vacuum" should be filled up by rapid elaboration of a "new framework" of strategic mutual relations; Under that "framework" considerable reductions of offensive weapons should take place (preferably to the level of 1,500-2,200 warheads for each side)." (See: Vadim Markushin, "Bad News for the World Community," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, December 15, 2001, (In Russian).)

<sup>64</sup> Menshikov, Op. cit.

<sup>65</sup> "Russian Reaction to NATO's Enlargement," *Analitik*, March 4, 2004, (In Russian), available at: [http://analitik.org.ua/ukr/current-comment/ext/407412da4f691/pagedoc1095\\_25/](http://analitik.org.ua/ukr/current-comment/ext/407412da4f691/pagedoc1095_25/).

<sup>66</sup> "The SOR Treaty calls for the reduction of the strategic nuclear warheads of both Russia and the USA by the end of 2012 to 1,700-2,200, i.e., approximately by three times compared to the level provided by the START 1 Treaty. START 1 itself is to remain in force until December 5, 2009, and may then be extended. The SOR Treaty ensures continuity in disarmament and arms control in the conditions when the ABM Treaty has ceased to be operative, the question of the entry of the START 2 Treaty into force has fallen away, and other disarmament agreements are undergoing serious trials. The new Treaty was called upon to assist substantially the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime as well." (See: "Statement by Alexander Konuzin, Deputy Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations, at the Session of the UN Commission on Disarmament Held on April 1, 2003.") SORT was ratified by the Duma on May 14, 2003 by votes of 294 deputies with 134 voting against and none abstaining.

success” despite the Treaty’s alleged deficiencies, e.g., lack of explicit elaborate verification and other implementing arrangements, on the analogy with START, the possibility of “uploading” warheads removed from their carriers for storage and not elimination at some point in the future, etc.<sup>67</sup>

As the Soviets before them, the Russians saw arms control negotiations and agreements creating a quintessential paradigm for “equalizing” Russian and U.S. roles in such key areas of international diplomacy as WMD nonproliferation, global and regional security systems, etc.<sup>68</sup>. Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Yevgenii Kozhokhin described Russian “self-interest” in arms control in connection with the signing of SORT and other bilateral agreements in Moscow in May 2002:

Russia does not conceal its vested interest in the agreements that have been signed. It looks like Moscow is primarily motivated by the desire to enshrine in the agreement equality in the relations with the U.S. and, if possible, to maintain at least a seeming parity in strategic arms. A factor of no less importance is Russia’s hope that it will be able to put an emphasis on the principle of interdependence between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. These must be the reasons why Moscow insisted on a legally binding character of the future agreement. From Russia’s point of view, no other document could help it achieve these goals.<sup>69</sup>

SORT was particularly welcome for Moscow especially since it came at a time when the structure of traditional arms control was shattered by the disappearance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 long considered by the Russians to represent the cornerstone of the entire bilateral strategic arms control.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> See: Nikolai Sokov, “The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT,” *Arms Control Today*, April 2003, available at: [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003\\_04/sokov\\_apr03.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/sokov_apr03.asp)

<sup>68</sup> While keeping a competitive posture on strategic weapons, Russia is prepared to play a partnership role with the U.S. in curbing WMD proliferation and other areas where both nations face similar challenges and threats. For example, in July 2006, Presidents of both countries launched the joint Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism aimed “to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities.” “Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin announcing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” St. Petersburg, July 15, 2006, *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2006/07/108727.shtml>.

<sup>69</sup> Yevgenii Kozhokhin, “U.S.-Russian Relations: Facts and Mutual Expectations,” *IAIR Publication*, December 2002, (In Russian), available at: [http://www.ipmi.ru/html\\_en/publication\\_en/m\\_en/06\\_%20\\_1\\_december\\_2002\\_en.htm](http://www.ipmi.ru/html_en/publication_en/m_en/06_%20_1_december_2002_en.htm).

<sup>70</sup> According to Nikolai Sokov: “Coupled with the end of the ABM Treaty and START 2, SORT marks the end of traditional arms control. Further reductions are unlikely in the near future because, after SORT is implemented, the United States and Russia will have reached what they feel is the optimal (or close to the optimal) level of strategic arsenals that they need: 2,200 deployed warheads for the United States and 1,500 for Russia. One possible additional step is codification of the ongoing reduction of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, but its chances are remote. More importantly, managing first-strike capability, which was the key motive of traditional arms control, is no longer urgent following the end of the Cold War.” (See: Nikolai Sokov, “The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT,” *Arms Control Today*, April, 2003.)

By consenting to a significantly less structured arms control and the abandonment of the direct qualitative and quantitative parity in offensive and defensive capabilities, the Kremlin appeared to have not only accepted the unavoidable, but also untied its own hands in pursuing modernization of nuclear forces in line with internal economic and political exigencies.

The Russians took advantage of the relatively improved strategic relations with the U.S. to facilitate the elimination of weapon systems that were either too old, or too costly to maintain for purposes of “sufficient” deterrence while concentrating on the development and production of modern and more effective systems. They also sought to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the West in areas where Moscow lacked resources and/or advanced technologies, e.g. the Ballistic Missile Defense.

A key Russian diplomatic initiative, intended as an alternative to the U.S. global BMD system, was the offer to create a “European ABM system.” The Euro-ABM was supposed to be built with the help of Russian tactical ABM technologies that could allegedly protect the European continent, including the European part of the RF, against non-strategic ballistic missiles<sup>71</sup> Moreover, the Russian government proposed to participate in developing “strategic” ABM systems in cooperation with the U.S. on the basis of “equality of rights” and under an “appropriate legal framework.”<sup>72</sup>

## **5. The Medvedev-Putin Duumvirate**

The elevation of Dmitrii Medvedev to the pinnacle of the Russian political hierarchy did not and apparently could not make any major changes to the Russian nuclear strategy, especially the reliance on nuclear weapons. Medvedev was hand-picked by Vladimir Putin as his successor. Both share power in a duumvirate arrangement. Disagreements between the two are limited to secondary matters.

As a symbolic gesture addressed to the Russian people and the rest of the world, on May 15, 2008, hardly a week after his formal inauguration as the RF President (May 7, 2008), Dmitrii Medvedev visited the field positions of the 54th missile division of the Strategic Missile Troops at the Teikovo Missile Complex (Ivanovo Region). On the occasion, the presidential press service announced proudly:

The 54th missile division is the first formation in charge of the new, refitted mobile land-based missile system Topol-M. In 2006 the first missile battalion armed with such weapons came into active service. In December of last year a second Topol-M missile battalion with three launchers was put into service at the Teikovo Missile Complex. The Topol-M missile complex represents the latest achievements of science and technology. The take-off weight of the missiles is 47

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<sup>71</sup> “Sergei Ivanov: Russia is for the Creation of Europe’s Non-Strategic Anti-Missile Defense System,” *Itar-Tass*, August 30, 2005 (In Russian).

<sup>72</sup> *Itar-Tass*, August 6, 2005, (In Russian).

tons, their military payload is 1200 kilograms, and their flight range 10,000 kilometers.<sup>73</sup>

Medvedev's first year in power was marked by the worst crises in Russia's relations with Georgia. The August 2008, war between the two former Soviet republics was ostensibly handled primarily by Medvedev as the new Russian Commander-in-Chief even though it is evident that Mr. Putin participated fully in war planning and eventual resolution of the conflict.<sup>74</sup>

While criticizing the U.S. for "unilateralism" and foreign "adventurism" the Russian leaders sought cooperation with the U.S. on many evolving negative global phenomena – from fluctuating market conditions to the rise of radicalism, international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, etc. In effect, despite its displeasure with the Republican Administration, the Medvedev government demonstrated eagerness to involve Russia in global cooperative ventures led by the U.S., e.g., the Group of 8 (G-8) and the Group of Twenty (G-20).

With the coming to power in the U.S. of the Democratic Administration, both Medvedev and Putin saw added opportunities for promoting Russian strategic interests and, in particular, the Russian arms control agenda. Moscow took advantage of Washington's intention (many think idealistic and eventually detrimental to better U.S. interests)<sup>75</sup> to significantly reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, in order to expedite negotiations on the new bilateral strategic arms reduction treaty (START III).

The Kremlin praised signing of the treaty on April 8, 2010 to replace both SORT and START I (that had actually expired in December 2009) as a symbol of "continued strategic parity."<sup>76</sup> Pro-government experts hailed the new treaty as extremely beneficial for the RF. As stated by the Director of the U.S. and Canada Institute of the RF Academy of Sciences Sergei Rogov,

We will not have to reduce anything prematurely. In effect, the ceilings established by the new START Treaty do not force us to reduce currently available strategic offensive forces, in contrast to previous treaties that banned or

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<sup>73</sup> "Visit to Ivanovo, Kostroma and Yaroslavl Regions." Teikovo (Ivanovo Region), Kostroma, Yaroslavl, *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, May 15, 2008, available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2008/05/200822.shtml>

<sup>74</sup> According to Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev, "The United States of America actively helped Georgia to erect its military machine, pumped money and weapons into it. Unfortunately, at some stage they gave Mr. Saakashvili a carte blanche for any actions, including military ones. All this materialized in the aggression that was launched on the night of 7-8 August." (See: "Russian President Attacks Georgian Leader, USA in TV Interview," *Vesti TV*, September 2, 2008, OSC Doc. CEP20080902950547.)

<sup>75</sup> See: Andrei Shoumikhin, and Baker Spring, Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for the Protect and Defend Strategy, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/1997/drssov05131997000591.htm> *Heritage Foundation*, May 4, 2009, available at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/strategic-nuclear-arms-control-for-the-protect-and-defend-strategy>.

<sup>76</sup> See: "Russian-US Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Has Been Signed. Joint News Conference with US President Barack Obama," April 8, 2010, Prague, *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, available at: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/271>.

limited our heavy missiles as well as our mobile MIRVed ICBMs. These limitations have disappeared, and the Treaty allows us to conduct the modernization of our strategic forces since the old Soviet weapons have long exhausted their life-terms. From now on, each side defines the composition and structure of its strategic forces independently. Russia now has the capability – previously denied to us – to deploy new MIRVed ICBMs as well as new sea-based systems. In effect, only budgetary allocations and the potential of our industry will define how many Topol-M and RS-24 missiles – that would apparently, together with the Bulava, form the foundation of Russia’s strategic offensive weapons – we would be able to build. It may not be excluded that before the Treaty expires and unless Russia and the U.S. conclude new agreements on further reductions, as championed by Obama, there will appear a new type of Russian heavy ICBMs. Only the United States will have to conduct reductions, albeit not very dramatic ones.<sup>77</sup>

However a less enthusiastic perspective was offered by analysts without links to the Russian officialdom. For example, Major General (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin warned that numerical reductions of nuclear weapons between the two leading nuclear powers do not solve numerous global security problems – from nuclear terrorism to regional nuclear conflagrations. In case of Russia, diminished nuclear deterrence potential raises uneasy questions about the weakness of Russian conventional forces, vulnerability to the attack with the of precision weapons; medium- and shorter-range missiles no longer possessed by Russia and the U.S.; the need to take into account the nuclear arsenals of U.S. allies, China and other existing and emerging possessors of nuclear weapons.<sup>78</sup>

Some government critics came to regard new START as a “conspiracy” to eventually deprive Russia of its nuclear deterrence entirely. The signing of the treaty gave rise to numerous publications in Russia on the “fallacy” of unilateral nuclear disarmament.<sup>79</sup>

Parallel to the arms control activity, Medvedev who prides himself on legal expertise and adherence to “international legality,” engaged in preparation of numerous internal Russian doctrinal documents, including an update of the RF Military Doctrine, the RF Foreign Policy Concept, etc.

In effect, the work on the revision of the 2000 RF Military Doctrine started long before Medvedev’s coming to power. For years, Moscow periodically and apparently purposefully circulated rumors on the imminence of the document and its forthcoming major novelty, particularly related to the expanded uses of nuclear weapons. As early as

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<sup>77</sup> Sergei Rogov, “Attempt Number 6: the Balance of Achievements and Concessions. Only the United States Will Have to Reduce Its Strategic Forces,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, April 9, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-09/1\\_snv.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-09/1_snv.html).

<sup>78</sup> Vladimir Dvorkin, “START on the Balance of Strategic Stability. The Time Has Come to Rethink Notions Such As Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, April 16, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-16/1\\_snv.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-16/1_snv.html).

<sup>79</sup> See: Sergei Brezkun (Kremlev), “The World That Ran Away from the Bomb and Was Exploded Afterwards,” February 2, 2010, (In Russian), *Foundation of Strategic Culture*, available at: <http://www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2746>.

October 2003 the military top brass, President Vladimir Putin, administration officials, ministers, security chiefs, Duma deputies and journalists gathered in the Defense Ministry to hear Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov present a document titled the “Public Part of the Military Doctrine.”<sup>80</sup>

News on the preparation of a new version of the Russian Military Doctrine that was supposed to “concretize” Russian threat perceptions and strategy began to circulate with particular intensity around mid-2006, at the moment the U.S.-Russia relations were at their lowest ebb in years.<sup>81</sup> According to media reports, the new document was intended not only to directly identify the U.S. and NATO as Russia’s key “potential adversaries,” but also equate threats from Western sources to the threat of terrorism.<sup>82</sup>

On January 20, 2007, at the “Military-and-Scientific Conference” of the Academy of Military Sciences, the leadership of the RF Armed Forces formally reviewed the structure and the content of the new version of the Doctrine. According to the report of the conference proceedings by the Academy’s President, Army General Makhmud Gareev, nuclear issues occupied a special place in the discussions.<sup>83</sup>

The Doctrine was reported to stress the reemergence of the “existential nuclear threat” to the RF. As emphasized by General Gareev, “nuclear weapons of all states that possess them are ultimately aimed at Russia.” In particular, as seen by the Russian military, “NATO is engaged in creation of powerful groupings of armed forces that are dramatically changing the military balance” in Europe and globally.<sup>84</sup> Not surprisingly, in light of such dyer assessments, the proposed new military doctrinal document was expected to call for “augmenting the [Russian] nuclear potential” in the future.<sup>85</sup>

Justifications for modernization of the Russian strategic triad were sought and found in American declarations of intentions, statements and announced programs, e.g., the decision to resume the production of plutonium parts for nuclear bombs,<sup>86</sup> and develop new types of efficient low-yield warheads.<sup>87</sup> Alarmist Russian media reports accompanied the appearance of practically any official U.S. policy statement dealing with the issue of nuclear weapons.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> See: “Russian Military Doctrine,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/doctrine.htm>.

<sup>81</sup> See: Yuri Kirshin, “Generals Blueprint New Military Doctrine,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 28, 2006, (In Russian).

<sup>82</sup> See: “The Draft New RF Military Doctrine: U.S. Equated to Terrorists,” *Agentura.ru*, September 19, 2006, (In Russian), available at: <http://www.agentura.ru/?p=14&col=1&id=1158642000>.

<sup>83</sup> See: Makhmut Gareev, “New Conditions – New Military Doctrine,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, February 2, 2007 (In Russian).

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Yevgenia Borisova, “U.S. Restarts Its Nuclear Machine,” *Moscow Times*, April 24, 2003.

<sup>87</sup> “The U.S. Develops a Super Bomb,” *Utro.ru*, May 19, 2003, (In Russian); Vasilii Sergeev, “Nuclear Bombs Become Smaller,” *Gazeta.Ru*, May 21, 2003, (In Russian).

<sup>88</sup> Alla Yaroshinskaya, “Is the World Moving Towards the Nuclear War?” *Rosbalt.ru*, March 23, 2006, (In Russian).

For many years leading to the emergence of a new version of the RF Military Doctrine, Moscow was trying to fight off politically and diplomatically the expanding U.S. BMD program and, in particular, U.S. plans to deploy a third BMD site to deal with the growing threat of Iranian missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Medvedev government picked up the task of opposing the third-site idea with enthusiasm. In his first Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in November 2008, he threatened to move *Iskander* missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads into the Kaliningrad area and provide other responses if and when the U.S. deploys third site elements in Eastern Europe.<sup>89</sup> Other asymmetrical countermeasures were also mentioned with a clear intention to forewarn the U.S. and threaten U.S. European allies. For example, former RF Air Force Commander Petr Deikin suggested adding nuclear X-55 cruise missile and its most recent non-nuclear version X-555 (both may be carried on Tu-95M and Tu-160 strategic bombers) to augment the political impact of *Iskander* deployments.<sup>90</sup>

Expediting work on a “tougher” version of the RF Military Doctrine that would emphasize wider potential use of nuclear weapons became an additional measure in the Russian arsenal of “asymmetric measures” to the U.S. BMD and other perceived American technological advances. In early August 2008, Russian media sources commented briefly on a document allegedly prepared by the RF Defense Ministry titled “Draft Concept of the Development of RF Armed Forces Until 2030.” The official status of the document was unclear. In all probability, it represented a trial balloon by the Russian military establishment intended to check expert and public reactions in Russia and abroad to potential changes to the existing RF Military Doctrine.<sup>91</sup>

In December 2008, Russian media sources carried a brief official statement attributed to Army General Yurii Baluevskii, then-deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council (formerly head of the Russian General Staff), announcing that the “Security Council, together with the Defense Ministry, other interested bodies of state power, and both chambers of the parliament commenced the preparation of the new military doctrine of Russia.”<sup>92</sup> Baluevskii was quoted saying:

I was charged to head the working groups of the RF Security Council to prepare the draft of a new wording of the country’s military doctrine that would respond to contemporary challenges and threats, and the existing changes in the geopolitical and military-political situation in the world, including the growing role of military power in politics... The new version of the military doctrine should become the response to the most topical problems of assuring Russian

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<sup>89</sup> See: “Medvedev Sent a Revolutionary Message: He Responded to the U.S. BMD and Increased the Term of Presidency to 6 Years,” *NEWS.ru*, November 5, 2008, available at: <http://www.newsru.com/russia/05nov2008/poslanie1.html>

<sup>90</sup> Vladimir Ivanov, “Iskanders Alone Are Not Enough. It Is Proposed to Use Strategic Aviation to Act against the American BMD in Europe,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, November 21, 2008, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2008-11-21/8\\_iskander.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2008-11-21/8_iskander.html).

<sup>91</sup> See: “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Adopted by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 706 of April 21, 2000, (In Russian), available at: [http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/ykazi/doc\\_war.htm](http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/ykazi/doc_war.htm).

<sup>92</sup> “They Prepare a New Military Doctrine in Russia – “Response to Problems,” *Russianews.ru*, December 12, 2008, (In Russian), available at: <http://russianews.ru/news/20211/>.

military security, including the legal foundations for the legitimate use (“*pravoprimemenie*”) of nuclear weapons as an instrument of strategic deterrence.<sup>93</sup>

Along with Medvedev’s threats of forward missile deployments, reviving the idea of a “tougher” revision of the Military Doctrine was obviously intended to coincide with the U.S. election campaign. This was Moscow’s way of sending a message to the future U.S. Administration on prospects of bilateral strategic relations.

Russian observers also linked the flurry of statements on the imminent appearance of the new RF Military Doctrine to the new effort at reforming RF Armed Forces undertaken under Dmitrii Medvedev by Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov. From the very beginning, the reform met with considerable skepticism and critique by various military and civilian authorities.<sup>94</sup> It clearly affected the interests of powerful groups in the military-political establishment besides thousands in the Officer and General Corps.

Announcing the resumption of work on the RF Military Doctrine, and especially the appointment of Yurii Baluevskii to chair the Editorial Commission to define the Doctrine’s basic parameters and substance, may have represented a concession to the conservatives who began to regard the Serdyukov reform as an attempt to undermine Russia’s ability to engage actively in geopolitics and, especially, to use the military might in the promotion of Russian interests abroad.<sup>95</sup>

Long before his forced transfer to the RF Security Council from the post of the General Staff Commander, Baluevskii campaigned for turning the original 2000 RF Military Doctrine into an aggressive tool justifying the use of nuclear weapons not only for retaliation purposes but as a practical tool of defeating an aggression with the use of superior conventional forces against Russia, and even for preemption and suppression of activities inimical to Russia’s interests outside its borders, for example those by terrorists and radicals.<sup>96</sup> Baluevskii also consistently spoke in favor of offering an “adequate asymmetrical response to American and NATO provocations.” In particular, he argued in support of targeting the proposed elements of the U.S. third BMD site in Eastern Europe by Russian tactical and strategic means including nuclear.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> See: Aleksandr Khranchikhin, “The Institute of Political and Military Analysis Raises Alarm. The Reformed Russian Army Will Be Able to Fight against Only One Adversary,” December 12, 2008, *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-12-26/5\\_analiz.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2008-12-26/5_analiz.html); Mikhail Rastopshin, “‘Military Thought’ against the General Staff. It Is Impossible to Achieve Permanent Readiness for All New-Look Troops,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, March 12, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-03-12/1\\_genshtab.html?mthree=3](http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-03-12/1_genshtab.html?mthree=3).

<sup>95</sup> Olga Bozhieva, “Russia Prepares an Anti-Military Doctrine,” *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, December 11, 2008, (In Russian), available at: <http://www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2008/12/11/russia/385672/>.

<sup>96</sup> See for example: “Head of the General Staff: the RF Develops a New Military Doctrine and Plans Military Measures against the U.S. BMD,” *Newsru.com*, May 7, 2007, (In Russian), available at: <http://www.newsru.com/russia/07may2007/baluevskij.html>.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

In 2009, the current Secretary of the Security Council and former Director of the Federal Security Service Nikolai Patrushev sent still another apparent trial balloon dealing expanded uses nuclear weapon for preemption and prevention in the RF Military Doctrine revision. While asserting that Moscow's main goal was to preserve its nuclear power status, he claimed the Doctrine will change conditions for the deployment of nuclear weapons to allow their use "not only in global but also regional and even local conflicts." According to Patrushev,

The conditions for the use of nuclear weapons to repel aggression with the use of conventional weaponry in large-scale, but also in regional and even in a local war have been corrected. Moreover, in situations critical for national security, the inflicting of a preventive nuclear strike upon an aggressor is not excluded.<sup>98</sup>

The new RF Military Doctrine was finally approved by President Dmitrii Medvedev by virtue of his Decree No 146 of February 5, 2010. At the same time, Medvedev signed "The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020," which was not made public. Opinions differed on the significance of this version of the Doctrine, particularly on the meaning of clauses related to nuclear weapons use. In the opinion of some Russian experts, "it made one more step away from Russia's obligation not to be first in the use of nuclear weapons."<sup>99</sup> A Western observer notes in this connection:

There are reasons to assert that the Doctrine sanctions the use by Russia of nuclear weapons in preventive (preemptive) strikes. In its time, this clause stirred a lot of hullabaloo and criticism in the West. Currently, this clause has been removed from the text of the Doctrine. However, was it removed as such? I do not think so. It is probable that the "Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020" comprise stipulations on preventive (preemptive) strikes."<sup>100</sup>

Other experts maintained that "the new Military Doctrine appears to reduce, at least somewhat, the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's national security policy."<sup>101</sup> In effect, the 2010 RF Military Doctrine states: "The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and (or) its allies of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of an aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is placed under threat."

Doctrine-writing under Medvedev was marked by major contradictions. A characteristic example is the RF "Foreign Policy Concept" adopted by Dmitrii Medvedev on June 12,

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<sup>98</sup> "Patrushev Interview," *Interfax*, October 13, 2009; "Security Council's Patrushev Interviewed on Military Doctrine," *Izvestiya*, October 14, 2009.

<sup>99</sup> "The First-Strike Doctrine," *Scilla.ru*, June, 13, 2010, available at: <http://www.scilla.ru/content/view/3533/2/>.

<sup>100</sup> Marcel de Haas, "Doctrinal Stipulations and Political Realities. What Should Be the Western Response to the New Doctrine?" *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, February 2, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [www.ng.ru/realty/2010-02-26/1\\_doktrina.html](http://www.ng.ru/realty/2010-02-26/1_doktrina.html).

<sup>101</sup> Nikolai Sokov, "The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle," *CNS Feature Stories*, February 5, 2010, available at: [http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205\\_russian\\_nuclear\\_doctrine.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm).

2008. The Concept was promoted by the Kremlin as a demonstration of Russia's resolve "to position itself on the international arena as a civilized, rule-of-law state." It professed Russia's trust in "international law as the most stable foundation in relations among states," and the reliance on the UN to ensure international peace.<sup>102</sup>

Events of the Russian-Georgian war that took place shortly after the publication of the Concept apparently forced Medvedev and the Russian political elite to reconsider its key postulates. Already on September 6, 2008, at the meeting of the RF State Council the Russian President announced "the discussion of Russia's new foreign policy strategy," i.e., the renewed work on revising the Concept, to proceed together with activities aimed at "national security consolidation."<sup>103</sup>

On May 12, 2009, in his decree No 537, Dmitrii Medvedev approved still another Russian doctrinal document – "The Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020" (NSS). In a sense, it replaced the ill-fated Foreign Policy Concept signed into law less than a year before.<sup>104</sup> The document reiterated that the U.S. and NATO present threats to Russian military security:

Threats to (Russian) military security include: policies of a number of leading foreign countries aimed at attainment of overwhelming dominance in the military sphere, primarily in strategic nuclear forces, by means of developing precision, information and other high-tech means of military warfare; strategic weapon systems with non-nuclear warheads; formation, in a unilateral fashion, of the global system of anti-missile defense and militarization of the outer space, which may lead to a new loop in the arms race, as well as proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological technologies, production of mass destruction weapons or their components and means of delivery. The state of the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies is being further negatively affected by the departure from international agreements in the area of the limitation and reduction of weapons, as well as by actions aimed at the disruption of the stability of the systems of state and military command, missile early warning, space control, the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, installations of nuclear warhead storage, nuclear energy, nuclear and chemical industries, and other potentially hazardous installations.<sup>105</sup>

Measures to deal with the above "threats" were however rather cautious and ambiguous. Besides pursuing the reform of the RF Armed Forces to give it "a totally new image," NSS called for improving strategic deterrence and national defense. "Strategic deterrence" was defined as implying "the development and systemic implementation of a complex of interrelated political, diplomatic, military, economic, information and other

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<sup>102</sup> Olga Mefodyeva, "Policy Without Double Standards. Russian Foreign Policy Concept Seen in Context of Medvedev Speech to Ambassadors," *Politcom.ru*, July 17, 2008, OSC Doc. CEP20080718379002.

<sup>103</sup> "State Council to Discuss New Foreign Policy Strategy," *Itar-Tass*, September 6, 2008, OSC Doc. CEP20080906950051.

<sup>104</sup> "The Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020." (In Russian), available at: [http://www.nsnbr.ru/strategiya\\_nb\\_rf.html](http://www.nsnbr.ru/strategiya_nb_rf.html).

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

measures aimed at forestalling or reducing the threat of destructive actions by the aggressor state (coalition of states).”<sup>106</sup> It was further clarified:

Strategic deterrence is conducted with the use of the economic capabilities of the state, including the resource support of the national security forces by means of developing the system of military-patriotic education of RF citizens, as well as the military infrastructure and the system of managing the military organization of the state.”<sup>107</sup>

As far as “national defense” is concerned, NSS stipulated:

The RF assures national defense on the basis of the principles of rational sufficiency and effectiveness, including by methods and means of non-military reaction, mechanisms of public diplomacy, peacekeeping and international military cooperation. Military security is assured by means of developing and improving the military organization of the state and the defense potential, as well as by earmarking for these purposes of sufficient financial, material and other resources.<sup>108</sup>

The “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020” struck many observers in Russia as a fairly eclectic, poorly organized and poorly edited document.<sup>109</sup>

### **Conclusion: Perceptions and Realities Defining Russian Doctrines**

Barring unpredictable major changes at the top of the Russian ruling elite or dramatic transformations in internal Russian situation and/or Russia’s international environment, Russian doctrinal thinking will continue to be affected by the following circumstances, considerations and perceptions that contributed to the emergence recent Russian strategic documents.

#### ***Paranoiac Threat Assessments***

Despite repeated calls for strategic partnership between Russia and the West, and limited progress in select areas, such as arms control, as well as some cooperation in areas where Russian and U.S. interests and policies converge, the ruling political elite in Moscow remains deeply suspicious of American intentions and policies. The Russians usually see American advances, especially in the geopolitical and military-technological areas, as intrinsically inimical to Russian interests. In a typical alarmist assessment by Colonel General Andrei Nikolaev, Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee:

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> See: Andrei Konurov, “The Strategy of National Security: the Word and the Deed,” *Foundation of Strategi Culture*, May 18, 2009, available at: <http://www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2152>; Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia's Defense Modernization Without a Doctrine,” *Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor*, March 26, 2009, available at: [http://search.yahoo.com/search?p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocnus.net%2Fartman2%2Fpublish%2FDefence\\_Arms\\_13%2FRussia\\_s\\_Defense\\_Modernization\\_Without\\_a\\_Doctrine.shtm&ei=utf-8&fr=b1ie7](http://search.yahoo.com/search?p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ocnus.net%2Fartman2%2Fpublish%2FDefence_Arms_13%2FRussia_s_Defense_Modernization_Without_a_Doctrine.shtm&ei=utf-8&fr=b1ie7)

The gap between good intentions on establishing world peace and the real policy on the use of force is not diminishing but expanding. Tendency to militarizing the international life is becoming more and more awesome... In recent years some progress was achieved in the sphere of reducing and limiting weapons. However, that process mostly involved qualitative parameters of the “man-killing industry”, while quantitative transformations in the area of the creation of new weapon systems and particularly new methods of conducting contemporary warfare remain without attention and critical analysis. High precision weapons, arms based on new physical principles, new methods of using space for the conduct of war... have no legal or moral limits. It is difficult to talk about international legal limitations for the new race in super new weapons when the international law is subjected to the revision by states (the U.S., Britain) that should be guarantors of international stability... Today, the U.S. and NATO have occupied such strategic boundaries in Europe and the Central Asian region that they could not even dream about before. Military structures, created for purposes of the Cold War are not only being preserved but are also expanding... Indeed, today, there exists perhaps no clear threat for Russia. But what will happen tomorrow when the balance of forces changes dramatically? In case of need, NATO may create any military scenario that suits its interests... like in the Balkans.”<sup>110</sup>

The prevailing Russian opinion is that the U.S. seeks to establish its dominance in both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Current U.S. championship of total nuclear abolition is also generally suspect despite Moscow’s eagerness to pay lip service to the abstract ideal of the non-nuclear world. “Nuclear zero” proposals are often seen as a thinly veiled attempt to disarm Russia by neutralizing its nuclear potential. A widely held view among Russian experts is that their country would not be able to compete with the U.S. and other Western powers and probably even China in advanced non-nuclear systems, and may eventually become victim of pressures and blackmail if left without nuclear weapons:

Today, nuclear weapons are a factor of deterrence. However, take a closer look: the Americans are already developing the theory of strategic non-nuclear deterrence... Actual use of nuclear weapons... puts an end to any deterrence because it results in irreversible processes. In contrast, strategic high-precision non-nuclear weapons may be used both for deterrence and punishment. This is why in America... they are now seriously looking at strategic non-nuclear deterrence that offers significantly more flexible capabilities for use and punishment of any aggressor specifically for purposes of deterrence.<sup>111</sup>

Importantly, since the collapse of the bipolar world, Russian policymakers base their military and foreign policy decisions not only on the analysis of the state of relations with the United States and NATO. Currently, Russian leaders recognize the existence and growth of multiple sources of threats and challenges to their country in proximity to Russian borders and across the world. It is highly doubtful that even if bilateral U.S.-

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<sup>110</sup> Andrei Nikolaev, “Old Strategy Refurbished,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 12, 2003, (In Russian).

<sup>111</sup> Vladimir Slipchenko, “What Kind of War Should Russia Be Prepared to Wage,” *Polit.ru*, November 23, 2004, available at: <http://www.flb.ru/info/32983.html>.

Russian relations miraculously evolved into strategic partnership in the near future, Moscow would be prepared to give up nuclear weapons as an ultimate guarantee of Russian security.

In view of the persistently negative Russian threat assessments, it is highly questionable that the Russian military-political leadership would make drastic changes to their country's doctrines and strategies in the foreseeable future, let alone relinquish instruments of power painstakingly restored in recent years, particularly the Strategic Nuclear Forces. A more probable development would be the inclusion into Russian doctrinal documents of certain abstract statements on benign Russian intentions that would be attractive to the general public but totally unbinding for policymakers. In effect, this is exactly the way Soviet policies were presented to the outside world as compendiums of grand declarations that often had no link to real intentions and actions of the political elite.

### *Reliance on MAD*

Russian politicians and experts remain nostalgic of the strategic balance paradigm based on Mutual Assured Destruction, and would like to go back to similar arrangements in current U.S.-RF strategic relations. Many of them would actually like the bilateral strategic balance to remain the foundation of global stability. Explained Major General (Ret.) Vladimir Belous:

During the Cold War there emerged an approximate balance between both sides in strategic offensive weapons that contributed naturally to strategic stability and the concept of nuclear deterrence based on the central model of mutual assured destruction (MAD) that has never lost its topicality... The process of globalization and 'restructuring' of the world order creates strong premonitions since neither a unipolar, nor a multi-polar system would be able to assure the desired global stability. The unipolar model cannot do that because of the extreme egocentrism of the single state at its center, and the multi-polar one because of the interaction of the mostly antagonistic conglomerate of vectors of geopolitical and geo-strategic interests of many countries. Under these conditions, the role of the nuclear policies, especially of the U.S. and Russia that inherited huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and traditional views on their military uses from the time of the Cold War, is clearly growing.<sup>112</sup>

Under both Presidents Putin and Medvedev, the concept of MAD continued to form the de-facto basis of Russian views on bilateral relations with the U.S. in the nuclear sphere despite the formal termination of the Cold War and the disappearance of the main document that used to codify MAD-type relationship – the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). In the view of many Russian experts:

Despite the changes in the world, in U.S.-Russian relations and the policies of both countries, in their doctrines and operational plans for the use of strategic

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<sup>112</sup> V.S. Belous, "Deterrence and the Concept of First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Personal Web Page*, available at: <http://www.c-society.ru/wind.php?ID=240498&soch=1>.

nuclear forces, both Russia and the U.S.A. continue to proceed from the concept of mutual nuclear deterrence<sup>113</sup>.

Russia will most probably continue sticking to its opposition to BMD and the need to restore formal linkages between strategic offensive and defensive systems in line with the “classical” model of MAD.<sup>114</sup> However, expert demands in favor of developing Russia’s own BM defenses<sup>115</sup> as well as other hi-tech systems, e.g., non-nuclear strategic missiles, are growing.<sup>116</sup> It may not be excluded that the military-political leadership will sooner or later recognize the validity of these demands. Russia’s interest in cooperation with the U.S. and other technological powers in developing such systems may grow in the future and lead to changes in adamant Russian views on offensive-defensive linkages.

### *Search for Strategic Parity*

The Russian psyche was traumatized by the collapse of the Soviet Union. By and large, the new Russian policymaking elite that progressively acquired a distinct nationalistic orientation, refuses to abide by the global status-quo that reserves only secondary roles for Russia in world affairs. The nuclear area is virtually the only area where Russia had retained approximate equality of capabilities with the United States.

It is with this quasi-parity in nuclear potentials in mind, and emboldened by the progress in reconstructing Russia’s economic and military potential as the result of favorably changing global prices for energy raw materials, that in the early 2007 the Kremlin stepped up efforts to reclaim greater political equality with Washington in global and regional affairs. In a landmark presentation at the “Munich Conference on Security Policy” (February 10, 2007), President Vladimir Putin declared Russian rejection of American unilateralism in international affairs<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> See: V.V.Prozorov, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Theory of Application of Strategic Missile Forces.” Part I, “Theoretical Aspects of the Activity of SMF Groups in Implementing Nuclear Deterrence.” Moscow: 1999.

<sup>114</sup> Vladimir Ivanov, “The American Anti-Missile Circle – the Pentagon Presented the Plan on Developing BMD Systems,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, February 26, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-02-26/1\\_anti-usa.html?mthree=2](http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-02-26/1_anti-usa.html?mthree=2).

<sup>115</sup> Yulii Estenko, “The Capital’s Hole-Ridden Umbrella. The Country Lacks Newest AD/ABM Systems,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, February 26, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-02-26/1\\_pro.html?mthree=1](http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-02-26/1_pro.html?mthree=1).

<sup>116</sup> See: Leonid Orlenko, “National Security and Modernization of the Army. To Increase Russia’s Security We Need Accelerated Rearmament of the Army with Newest Non-Nuclear Weapons,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, June 11, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-06-11/1\\_safety.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-06-11/1_safety.html); Vasilii Burenok, “The Basis for Net -Centric Wars – Acceleration, Intellect, Innovations,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, April 2, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-02/1\\_bazis.html?mthree=4](http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-02/1_bazis.html?mthree=4); Mikhail Rastopshin, “Military Thought’ against the General Staff. It Is Impossible to Achieve Permanent Readiness for All New-Look Troops,” *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, March 12, 2010, (In Russian), available at: [http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-03-12/1\\_genshtab.html?mthree=3](http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-03-12/1_genshtab.html?mthree=3).

<sup>117</sup> Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 2007, *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, available at: [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138\\_type82914type84779\\_118135.shtml](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82914type84779_118135.shtml)

The RF President accused the United States of “overstepping its national borders in every way,” and essentially declared Moscow’s determination to oppose Washington’s “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions.”<sup>118</sup> Mr. Putin reiterated Russia’s intensely negative reactions to NATO’s advancement towards its borders, U.S. BMD-related deployments in Eastern Europe, “space militarization,” etc., and reasserted that his government is prepared to provide “asymmetric responses” to these perceived “threats to Russian security.”<sup>119</sup>

Importantly, Dmitrii Medvedev, while slightly toning down the anti-American rhetoric of his predecessor in his public statements, essentially continued the critique of American global policies after becoming the RF President.<sup>120</sup>

Liberal Russian politicians and experts were thrilled to hear from the new U.S. Administration that it plans “to stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; and seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material.”<sup>121</sup> In line with these goals and the promise “to extend a hand if others are willing to unclench their fist,”<sup>122</sup> both sides rushed to renew strategic arms control negotiations on a follow-on agreement to START I,<sup>123</sup> and broader areas of cooperation to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and prevent further proliferation in accordance with joint statements issued by President Obama and Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev in London on April 1, 2009.<sup>124</sup>

The signing of the new START agreement brought many in Moscow to near-euphoria. In Russian eyes, it vindicated Russian adherence to MAD and the linkage between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, and carried a promise of limiting the U.S. global BMD effort, especially as far as deployments close to Russian borders are concerned.

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Tatyana Stanovaya, “Medvev Set the Tone of Russian-American Relations,” *Politcom.ru*, June 9, 2008, OSC Doc. CEP20080610015002.

<sup>121</sup> The White House, “The Agenda: Foreign Policy,” available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign\\_policy/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/) (March 19, 2009).

<sup>122</sup> President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, January 21, 2009, *The White House Blog*, available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/>.

<sup>123</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Treaties in Force* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2007), “Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding,” p. 5, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83043.pdf> (March 19, 2009).

<sup>124</sup> The White House, “Joint Statement by Dmitrii A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm , April 1, 2009, at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama) (April 7, 2009) and “Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America, April 1, 2009, at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America) (April 7, 2009).

The Kremlin will most probably be able to assure the treaty's ratification in the State Duma where it enjoys comfortable majority (both countries need to proceed to the ratification simultaneously). The situation in the U.S. where many question the basic MAD-oriented premise of the treaty, the ultimate value it may have for U.S. security, the direction it gives to U.S. nuclear strategy, etc., may be very different.<sup>125</sup> In case START ratification stalls or the treaty fails to enter into force altogether, the Russian Federation may experience an upsurge in anti-Americanism. This is bound to be reflected at some stage in Russia rewriting its military and foreign policy guidelines.

Even if the treaty is ratified, Russia may change its attitude towards it depending on the on-going U.S. BMD programs in Europe and other regions in accordance with Moscow's clarifying statement on missile defense at the signing of START.<sup>126</sup>

### *Internal Russian Evolution*

Russia's military and foreign policies depend on internal political, economic, and security stability. At this point, the Medvedev-Putin duumvirate appears to be in control of the situation in the country. However, it faces mounting challenges:

- Russia failed to evolve into an open democracy-based society. An authoritarian regime may hold the country together for a relatively long time, especially if it indulges in populism and has resources to maintain a reasonably reliable repressive apparatus, docile legislature and mass media. However, as the Soviet and other similar experiences demonstrate, collapse of this type of a regime usually comes precipitously and acquires devastating proportions. Regime changes that took place in some former Soviet republics serve as pertinent examples.
- The global and internal Russian economic crises forced the government to make adjustments to ambitious plans of expansion and growth in many areas, including defense modernization. Resources previously available from such sources as exports of oil and gas and were in part used to maintain stability, are dwindling. The gap between the haves and the have-nots in Russia is expanding rapidly fueling public discontent.
- The authorities are largely incapable of eradicating massive corruption and criminality, as well as the flight of capital from Russia that could otherwise be used for development.<sup>127</sup>
- Frenetic attempts to streamline, restructure and improve the performance of the government apparatus have been ineffective.

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<sup>125</sup> See: Keith B. Payne, "Disarmament Danger," *National Review*, April 7, 2010, available at: <http://article.nationalreview.com/430551/disarmament-danger/keith-b-payne>; Kim R. Holmes, "New START Negotiations: Show Us the Records!" *Heritage Foundation*, May 26, 2010, available at: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/05/New-START-negotiations-Show-us-the-records>.

<sup>126</sup> See: "Statement by the Russian Federation on Missile Defense," April 8, 2010, *President of Russia Official Web Portal*, available at: [http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/4](http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/4).

<sup>127</sup> Anti-government opposition provides scathing critical data on the internal situation in Russia. One of the latest publications of the opposition "Solidarity" movement is a brochure by Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov titled "Putin. Results. 10 Years" (available at: <http://www.putin-itogi.ru/>).

- Reforms of the army, law-enforcement and judicial systems that traditionally provide stability and security for the regime are failing,
- According to some worst-case predictions, Russia may soon be unable not effectively defend itself with conventional forces. Under this scenario, the emphasis on nuclear weapons' use will undoubtedly grow.
- Serious deterioration or eventual collapse of law-and-order in the country may again raise the vital question of security and safety of nuclear and other sensitive materials and installations, and potential WMD proliferation from Russian sources.
- The seemingly amicable relationship between two top Russian leaders may deteriorate or break down especially if the duumvirate comes under serious pressures from opponents, rivals, unhappy and irate public, including the military and other people in uniform.

These and many other so far unforeseen developments may change the Russian scene. Any major transformations in Russia are bound to modify that country's policies, stated strategic goals and doctrines.