Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy

By Richard Weitz

At a February 5, 2010, session of the Russian Security Council, President Dmitry Medvedev finally approved Russia's long-discussed comprehensive Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which was published on the president's Kremlin website the following day.[1] Despite all the developments of the past decade, including the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Georgia, this latest version generally supports the same policies as the previous Military Doctrine adopted in 2000. The Doctrine depicts Russia as the target of increasing military threats emanating from NATO collectively and its members individually. It also expresses unease at the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies; the advent of conventional high-precision weapons whose capabilities allow them to achieve results previously requiring nuclear weapons; the militarization of outer space; territorial claims against Russia and its allies as well as interference in their internal affairs; and the spread of global terrorism, interethnic tensions, religious extremism, separatism, and other sources of international tensions.

Russia's 2010 Military Doctrine expresses particular dissatisfaction with NATO, complaining about the growth of NATO military infrastructure close to Russia's border as well as the alliance's alleged efforts to acquire "global functions in contravention of international law." Attending this year's Munich Security Conference, NATO Secretary-General Fogh Rasmussen professed to be taken aback by the alliance's depiction as the prime security threat to Russia, insisting that "this new doctrine does not reflect the real world" because "NATO is not an enemy of Russia."[2] In operational terms, this latest Military Doctrine, Russia's third, does not radically differ from the previous one adopted in 2000. It too stresses the need to avert threats and justifies the use of military force only for defensive purposes. Most importantly, despite expectations based on earlier Russian government statements, the 2010 doctrine does not expand the range of permissible uses of nuclear weapons to include preventive or preemptive nuclear strikes.

Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine states that, "The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation."[3] Similarly, the 2010 Military Doctrine affirms Russia's readiness to employ nuclear weapons only in retaliation for the use of nuclear

[1] http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461
[2] http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE61503G20100206
[3] http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00003/index.htm

or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies. It also allows Russia to use nuclear weapons first when a conventional attack by an aggressor proves so effective that it endangers the Russian state (a provision not in the first 1993 doctrine). In both documents, the declared purpose of Russian nuclear weapons is to deter other countries from engaging in a military conflict with Russia. Like the United States and the other nuclear weapons states (with the exception of China), however, the Russian government refuses to adopt an unqualified no nuclear-first-use doctrine. In principle, Russian officials are prepared to start a nuclear war in an emergency. These declaratory statements still appear operationally relevant since Russian military forces continue to conduct large-scale exercises with scenarios involving possible nuclear use.[4] In February 2004, for example, the Russian government conducted "Bezopasnost 2004" ("Security 2004"), the largest strategic military exercise in the Russian Federation's history. It involved all elements of Russia's strategic forces.[5] More recently, in September 2006, the Russian Air Force simulated a massive cruise missile strike involving 70 strategic bombers against potential targets in the vicinity of Japan and Alaska. At the same time, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces conducted a major command post exercise that practiced mobilizing forces from a peacetime to a wartime posture.[6]

The current Military Doctrine, like the 2000 version, identifies four types of military conflicts: small-scale armed conflicts; local wars such as that between Russia and Georgia in 2008; regional wars that can potentially involve many countries; and large-scale conflicts such as World Wars I and II. The doctrine's authors state that nuclear weapons will continue to help avert the last two types of wars. In peacetime, the doctrine assigns Russia's armed forces such tasks as fighting terrorism and maritime piracy, maintaining public order, managing emergencies, protecting Russian citizens and interests abroad (including from maritime pirates), and contributing to internationally authorized peacekeeping missions, such as those undertaken by the United Nations or the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. The 2010 doctrine also stresses the need to improve Russia's capabilities to wage high-precision conventional warfare using sophisticated communications, command, and control networks. U.S. forces have demonstrated these capabilities in several recent conventional wars, while Chinese and European militaries have also been developing such assets. The authors expect that contemporary military

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[4] Mark Schneider, *The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation* (Washington, DC: United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, 2006), pp. 8-9, at http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Russian%20nuclear%20doctrine%20--%20NSF%20for%20print.pdf.

[5] For a description of the units involved see "Russian Defense Ministry to Conduct First Big Military Exercise in 25 years," February 4, 2004, at http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/351/11962_military.html. See also "Russia Cites U.S. Action for War Exercises," *International Herald Tribune*, February 11, 2004. On the continued preoccupation of Russian military planners with a potential war with the West see Victor Myasnikov, "The Red Army: Still the Scariest of them All," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, February 27, 2006.

[6] "Russian Strategic Bombers Penetrate Buffer Zone Near Alaska Coast," September 30, 2006, at http://www.tldm.org/News9/RussianBombersBuzzAlaska.htm.

actions "will be characterized by the growing significance of high-precision, electromagnetic, laser, and infrasound weapons, information control systems, unmanned aerial and autonomous sea vehicles, and autonomous robotic weapons and military technologies."

In addition to advocating improvements in Russia's high-tech conventional capabilities, the 2010 Military Doctrine also provides support for other elements of Russia's current defense reform program. The doctrine instructs the Russian military to use its financial, physical, and other resources more efficiently, including by improving military education and training, defense research & development, and the repair and maintenance of existing military equipment. It also calls on the Russian defense and intelligence communities to better anticipate the outbreak of wars and the characteristics of future military conflict. The 2010 version affirms the need to improve the quality of life of the Russian defense community, including its civilian and retired military personnel as well as soldiers on active duty and their families. And it stresses the need for Russia to have a world-class high-technology defense industrial sector capable of meeting the demands of the Russian military as well as foreign customers.

Although U.S. defense officials briefed their Russian colleagues in advance about the content of the recently released U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), neither the U.S. nor the Russian doctrinal writers appear to have taken the other's declaratory doctrine into account when composing their own text. Whereas the current Russian Military Doctrine basically describes U.S. actions as threatening Russia, the QDR characterizes Russia as a potential partner with the United States against WMD proliferation, terrorism, and ballistic missile threats. We thus have a conceptual asymmetry in which Russian defense planers are preoccupied with hypothetical U.S. and NATO threats while American strategists are seeking Russia's help in winning the war in Afghanistan as well as countering international terrorists and states of proliferation concern like Iran.

INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding the recurring reticence in Russia's public military doctrine on nuclear issues, maintaining a strong nuclear force has long been—and will likely remain--Russia's defense priority. In a January 12, 2006, article entitled, "Military Doctrine: Russia Must Be Strong" published in the Russian *Vedomosti* newspaper, then Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said Russia's first task for the 2006-2010 period is "to sustain and develop strategic deterrent forces at the minimum level needed to guarantee that present and future military threats are deterred."[7] On of the architects of Russia's new military doctrine, Army General Makhmut Gareyev, justified the text's continuing support for the country's nuclear deterrent by arguing that, "The nuclear weapons of all major nuclear powers are ultimately designed to be

[7] See also his rankings of the MOD's "priority tasks" in his responses during interviews published in *Izvestia* on February 21, 2006 and March 28, 2006.

used against Russia, whether we want to admit it or not. In this context, the task of curbing a potential aggressor by means of a strategic nuclear deterrent is becoming more important than in the past."[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly told Ivanov that Russia's nuclear forces account for 90% of the country's security.[9]

Despite the recent emphasis on how Russia's oil and gas have replaced the Army and Navy as Russia's two most influential strategic tools, the most important fact about Russia is that it possess the world's second most powerful nuclear arsenal, with sizeable forces in all categories of the traditional offensive nuclear triad.[*NDU papers will all need to use the same database—perhaps the most recent data exchange conducted through the START process, whose treaty-governed counting rules assume that each platform carries the maximum number of warheads tested with that system, along with the differing SORT numbers, or perhaps one of the think-tank databases, such as http://russianforces.org/blog* ?} Russia and the United States declare they no longer constantly target each other with their strategic systems, but the most plausible target for their still large nuclear forces remains the other country's military, industrial, and other assets. Russian government representatives openly acknowledge that they take U.S. capabilities into account when structuring their own forces. As Ivanov put it, "Moscow is attentively tracking the developments in the U.S. strategic nuclear forces."[10] In particular, Russian government representatives insist they will retain sufficient—if not necessarily equal—nuclear weapons capacity to overcome any U.S. attack.

Decision-Making Processes

The Russian president plays the most important role in decisions affecting the development of Russia's nuclear forces, including those concerning their funding and deployment. The other members of the Russian Security Council—the Russian prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister, and director of the Federal Security Services (*Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti*, FSB)—also influence Russian strategic policies. Despite various proposals to combine all strategic systems into a single organization (comparable to the U.S. Strategic Command, USSTRATCOM), most recently by Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev in 1998, the Air Force and Navy still maintain control of the maritime and air-based components of the nuclear triad. Russia's senior military officers and the leading civilian weapon

[8] Viktor Litovkin, "General Gareyev: Russia Changing its Military Doctrine," part 2, January 18, 2007, at http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070118/59307373.html.
[9] Viktor Myasnikov, "Starie osnovi novoy doktriny," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 19, 2006.
[10] Lentu.ru, "Sergey Ivanov raskryl britantsam tseli I zadachi rossiyskikh yadernykh sil," Сергей Иванов раскрыл британцам цели и задачи российских ядерных сил = "Sergei Ivanov Explains to Britons the Goals and Missions of the Russia Nuclear Forces," July 14, 2004, at http://www.rol.ru/news/misc/news/04/07/14_010.htm.

scientists, technicians, and designers can affect decisions in their areas.[11] As in other countries, the country's leading design bureaus and defense companies can provide guidance on what systems are technically feasible. In cooperation with Russia's Federal Space Agency (RosKosmos), they are responsible for developing and supplying rocket boosters for Russia's strategic missiles. The Russian government's Military Industrial Commission (VPK) serves as a high-level body to integrate the Ministry of Defense's requirements with the Russian defense industry's capabilities. Although members of the Russian legislature can pose questions, and several members of the Duma have acquired considerable expertise in strategic issues, they appear to have little impact on executive decisions in this area. Similarly, despite the existence of several independent media representatives and public policy think tanks interested in strategic affairs, their limited access to information (reinforced by the periodic arrest of overzealous researchers and journalists for espionage) severely constrains their influence. Since the USSR's collapse, various social groups have organized to lobby for military reform, especially ending conscription and curbing hazing and other abuses of Russian soldiers.[12] Of these, however, only the environmental movement has sought to influence Russia's nuclear policies. Thus far, its impact has been felt almost exclusively on restoring sites contaminated with radiological pollution through military activities, rather than on shaping the evolution of Russian military strategy and doctrine.

Nuclear vs. Conventional

During the 1990s, Russian strategists vigorously debated the importance of maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent.[13] A minority argued that, in the post-Cold War world, nuclear weapons had lost much of their military utility and hence Russia should concentrate on developing its conventional forces. The majority, however, continued to view Russia's nuclear arsenal as an essential instrument for preserving its status as a great power, especially since the other nuclear powers showed little inclination to relinquish their own arsenals. Such considerations still weigh heavily on Russian strategic thinking. When asked why Russia deserved to be in the G-8, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a January 31, 2006, press conference that, "the G-8 is a club which addresses global problems and, first and foremost, security problems. Can someone in this hall imagine resolving, shall we say, problems concerning global nuclear

[11] Alyson J. K. Bailes, ed., *SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 230.
[12] Larisa Deriglazova, "To Fear or to Respect?: Two Approaches to Military Reform in Russia," *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, no. 4/5 (2006), at http://www.pipss.org/document415.html..
[13] This debate is reviewed in Nikolai Sokov, "Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia: The Emerging New Posture" (May 1998), at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/modern.htm; and Frank Umbach, *Future Military Reform: Russia's Nuclear & Conventional Forces* (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2002), pp. 11-14.

security without the participation of the largest nuclear power in the world, the Russian Federation? Of course not." [14]

Besides these considerations of prestige and status, many Russians argued that the unprecedented effectiveness of U.S. conventional precision strikes in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrated Russia's need to retain a strong nuclear arsenal to balance its conventional weaknesses. Moreover, they observed that upgrading Russia's conventional forces to American standards would entail considerably greater expenditures than maintaining even a large nuclear force. In April 2006 General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, head of the Russian General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, told a press conference: "Strategic parity in a sense of an equal number of missiles, aircraft and ships—this meaning is going and has already gone into non-existence. We are not going to tighten our belts or take off our last pair of trousers to achieve parity in the number of aircraft and missiles with the United States or all of NATO. . . . [Russia] has and will have nuclear deterrent forces sufficient to bring to reason anyone who could try to test the strength of our borders or tap our natural resources."[15]

In his May 2006 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin stressed that Russia could not afford to wage a quantitative arms race with the United States, but instead had to rely on less costly, asymmetric means in designing Russia's strategic deterrent.[16] Yet, Russian leaders are caught in a vicious circle. They hesitate to shift funds away from their nuclear arsenal at a time when Russia's conventional forces lack sufficient strength to counter a NATO conventional military offensive. But by refusing to transfer substantial financial or other resources to the country's conventional forces, Russian decision makers cannot wean themselves away from their dependence on nuclear deterrence. Russian force planners could resolve this dilemma if they abandoned the need to defend against implausible threats such as an American nuclear attack or a NATO conventional invasion, and instead focused on managing small-scale wars, insurgencies, and terrorist threats within Russia and neighboring states. Adopting a new force-sizing standard, however, would require a top-level decision by the Russian leadership that the West no longer presented a mortal threat. Until now, they have merely added the new challenge of resisting insurgents and terrorists to the traditional requirement of deterring and defeating a U.S.-NATO attack. In his May 2006 address, Putin himself reaffirmed the ambitious force planning goal that Russia's armed forces must be "able to simultaneously fight in global, regional and—if necessary—also in several local

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[14] "Transcript of the Press Conference for the Russian and Foreign Media," January 31, 2001, at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/01/31/0953_type82915type82917_100901.shtml.
In an interview with NBC News, Putin likewise observed: "How can we talk about ensuring global security and address the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament if we do not include Russia, which is one of the biggest nuclear powers?" July 12, 2006, at http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/07/12/1443_type82916_108525.shtml.
[15] Nabi Abdullaev, "Russia Won't Seek Nuclear Parity with West," *Defense News* (April 10, 2006), p. 12.
[16] Vladimir Putin, "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation," May 10, 2006, at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml.

conflicts."[17] Only a large conventional military backstopped by strategic and tactical nuclear weapons can meet such demanding criteria.

Deterring a Direct Attack

At a minimum, Russian nuclear forces and strategy aim to prevent the United States or any other country from launching a major attack against Russian territory. This requirememt is likely to persist for at least the next decade. In late 2006, Putin told Russian military leaders that the country's "deterrent forces should be able to guarantee the neutralization of any potential aggressor, no matter what modern weapons systems he possesses."[18] Russian nuclear planners most likely concentrate their planning and resources on surviving a war with the United States since such a capability should provide the assets that Russia would need to defeat weaker nuclear adversaries (e.g., Britain, China, or France). Russian strategists most fear an American attempt to decapitate the Russian leadership through a surprise attack involving U.S. nuclear and conventional attacks against Russian nuclear forces at their peacetime alert status. They worry that American leaders might anticipate crippling the Russian military response by incapacitating Russia's political and military decision makers before they could organize a coherent retaliatory strike. Such a hypothetical attack could employ submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with depressed trajectories from Trident submarines on patrol near Russia, or stealthy conventional weapons that would exploit weaknesses in Russia's early warning systems. U.S. ballistic missile and air defense systems would then attempt to intercept any Russian nuclear delivery platform that had survived an American first strike and been launched in reprisal.[19]

Russian military commanders have taken several steps to guard against a potential U.S. disarming attack. First, they continue to invest in mobile platforms such as nuclear submarines and special off-road vehicles capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Such platforms can be less vulnerable to attack because a moveable target is much more difficult to destroy than a stationary object, given the need to estimate its position at the time when the attacking warhead will arrive at its location. Second, the Russian government has retained a sizeable arsenal of nuclear warheads to increase the likelihood that a force of sufficient strength for retaliation would survive an American attack. Third,

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[17] Vladimir Putin, "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation," May 10, 2006, at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml.

[18] Cited in RIA Novosti, "Russia to Buy 17 ICBMs in 2007—Minister," at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061116/55705839.html.

[19] For a probably exaggerated assessment of the U.S. capacity to launch an effective first strike against Russia and China see Kier A. Leiber and Daryl G. Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March-April 2006), pp. 42-54; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44. Russian responses to their assessment are surveyed in Arthur Blinov and Igor Plugatarev, "Guaranteed Unilateral Destruction," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 23, 2006; and Pavel K. Baev, "Moscow Puts PR Spin on its Shrinking Nuclear Arsenal," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, April 17, 2006. Other critiques appeared in the September-October 2006 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

Russian officials continue to improve Russia's early warning systems and, to a much lesser degree, the country's ballistic missile defenses (BMD).

Should they lose confidence in these measures, the Russian government might adopt certain risky operational procedures designed to increase the chance that at least some of their strategic forces might respond before or after an American first strike. For example, they might adopt "hair-trigger" alert tactics—such as a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack (*otvetno-vstrechnyy udar*) posture—that authorize the immediate use of Russia's nuclear weapons if intelligence data had convinced Russian leaders that the American government might soon order a strike or already had done so.[20] Alternately, Russia's civilian decision makers might pre-delegate second-strike launch authority to certain senior military commanders, permitting them to retaliate if they determined that an American attack had rendered Russia's political leadership incapable of organizing a second-strike. A few commentators fear that Russian officials have equipped at least one of their secure underground leadership command posts with a "Dead Hand" doomsday communications rocket that could launch Russia's nuclear missiles automatically even if an attack decapitated Russia's nuclear chain of command.[21]

In considering these options, Russian officials confront the problem that, while such techniques might bolster their deterrence capacity by making a Russian nuclear counterattack more likely, they increase the prospects that a failure of deterrence, leading to a major conflict between Russia and the United States, would more easily escalate to a large-scale nuclear exchange between the combatants. In addition, measures that facilitate the authorized employment of nuclear weapons by Russian military forces in a crisis would also assist their unauthorized use by rogue Russian commanders or terrorist groups. Terrorist actors might even seek to trigger a catalytic war by attacking NATO forces with a Russian nuclear weapon in the expectation that the conflict would escalate to widespread nuclear use.[22]

Sustainment Challenges

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[20] Historically, Soviet and Russian planners have never had sufficient confidence in their technical early-warning systems to rely on such hair-trigger tactics; see Pavel Podvig, "Reducing the Risk of Accidental Launch: Time for a New Approach?," PONARS Policy Memo 328 (November 2004), at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0328.pdf. Podvig fears that any effort to improve the system's perceived effectiveness could be destabilizing by leading Russian authorities to become overly confident in its accuracy. The complex sequence of steps Russia's political and military leaders would need to take to launch a rapid retaliatory strike before their forces are destroyed by incoming U.S. warheads are itemized in Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of MAD?: The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 21-22.

[21] Bruce G. Blair, "The New Nuclear Threat: Hair-Trigger Missiles Risk Catastrophic Terrorism," *Counterpunch*, May 3, 2003, at http://www.counterpunch.org/blair05032003.html. Pavel Podvig argues that such a system was developed but never deployed; see his "Dr. Strangelove Meets Reality," April 14, 2006, at http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/04/dr_strangelove_meets_reality.shtml.

[22] Bruce G. Blair, "Primed and Ready," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 2007), pp. 33-37.

Like other nuclear weapons states, Russia has encountered challenges in maintaining robust nuclear forces in a post-Cold War environment characterized predominately by conventional and sub-conventional military threats. The Russian government currently pursues a multi-pronged approach toward sustaining its nuclear forces. It has been retiring older systems, extending the service life of existing systems, actively test launching delivery platforms in current operational status, and developing new nuclear weapons systems with advanced technologies. Despite progress in some areas, thus far the Russian military industrial complex has proven inadequate to this task. Most Russian defense firms have yet to adapt successfully to the transition from a command to a market-based economy. For this reason, Putin's unexpected decision on February 15, 2007, to appoint Anatoly Serdyukov, the Director of the Federal Tax Service since 2004, as Russia's new Defense Minister makes eminent sense. Serdyukov has a substantial background in the private sector, both as an entrepreneur (in the furniture business) and as a tax official (at the local as well as national level) who spent years investigating Russian business practices. It is doubtful, however, that a single individual, no matter how skilled, can make considerable progress in solving this long-standing problem.

The Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom), headed by former Russian Prime Minister Sergey Kirienko since November 2005, develops and manufactures Russia's nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996, and ratified the treaty on June 30, 2000. Russian officials have endorsed the CTBT as an important element of the global nonproliferation architecture and have urged the United States and other non-participating countries to ratify the treaty as soon as possible. Russia has adhered to the global moratorium against nuclear weapons testing since October 1992, but has conducted about a half dozen sub-critical explosions annually at the military's Central Testing Ground at the Novaya Zemlya range, which is located on a large Arctic island.[23] (The Russian military ceased using the former Soviet test site of Semipalitinsk in Kazakhstan after the Soviet Union's disintegration in 1991). When the Executive Secretary of the CTBO Preparatory Commission, Wolfgang Hoffmann, visited Novaya Zemlya in March 2003, he praised the Russians for their transparency. Hoffmann said his Russian interlocutors advocated adopting additional verification measures for nuclear test ranges after the CTBO entered into force.[24] In addition to conducting the experiments at Novaya Zemlya, the Ministry of Defense uses advanced

[23] For a description of these tests see Dmitriy Litovkin, "Arkhipelag gotov k yadernym ispytaniyam," *Izvestia*, July 20, 2006; Viktor Litovkin, "Sergei Ivanov Visits Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Testing Site," July 26, 2006, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20060726/51869240.html. See also Thomas Nilsen and Igor Kudrik, "Russia Performed Three Subcritical Nuclear Tests," Bellona Foundation, September 8, 2000, http://www.bellona.no/imaker?id=17814&sub=1.

[24] Christine Kucia, "CTBTO Head Visits Russian Nuclear test Site" *Arms Control Today* (May 2003), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/ctbto_may03.

computational techniques to simulate nuclear explosions.[25] In public, Russian officials express confidence in the capacity of the country's nuclear establishment to produce high-quality warheads.[26]

Some Russian experts worry, however, about their ability to certify warhead reliability without full-scale nuclear detonations. When then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov visited the site in July 2006, he stressed that Russia kept it in a state of "permanent readiness for nuclear tests."[27] When he visited the same facility with Ivanov in June 2002, Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev said Russia's national security required being able to resume nuclear testing in response to future political developments elsewhere in the world.[28] At the end of March 2006, then Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a special meeting of about a dozen senior officials in charge of Russia's nuclear weapons infrastructure to assess how to sustain its health without weapons testing as Russia transforms its civilian nuclear energy industry. For the first time in Soviet or Russian history, Moscow has begun separating the civilian and military components of its nuclear complex.[29] Russian nuclear weapons designers also face successor-generation problems resulting from inadequate funding, attractive job opportunities in commercial high-technology industries, and other challenges. These difficulties have discouraged Russia's best scientists and technicians from pursuing employment in the nuclear weapons sector. According to one source, since Russia conducted its last nuclear tests in October 1992, it has lost over half its nuclear weapons designers.[30]

Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency has sought to compensate for these problems by continuing to use warhead designs and materials certified by pre-moratorium testing. Since the mid-1980s, Russia has reduced its stock of intact warheads from approximately 35,000 to some 15,000 (of which some 9,300 are in reserve or awaiting dismantlement).[31] Nevertheless, the much shorter life of Russian warheads (estimated at 10-20 years, considerably less than U.S. warheads) means Russia remanufactures hundreds of warheads annually. Decommissioned warheads are shipped under guard to one of the two remaining large warhead assembly and disassembly facilities. Technicians there take them

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[25] Andrei Frolov, "Putin Meets with Nuclear Industry Chiefs," *Moscow Defense Brief*, no. 2 (2006), p. 12.
[26] See for example the interview with Sergey Kirienko, the head of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, in Aleksandr Emel'yanenkov, "Sergey Kirienko o tom, kak budet razvivat'sya yadernaya energetika Rossii," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, July 1, 2006.
[27] "Russian Nuclear Testing Ground Remains Ready—Ivanov," Interfax, July 19, 2006, http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id=11556790.
[28] Dmitriy Safonov, "Materik osvobozhdayut ot yadernykh otkhodov," Izvestiya online edition, http://www.izvestia.ru, 27 June 2002, cited in Rumyantsev: Nuclear Tests May Resume In Future," June 30, 2002, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weafacl/othernuc/novayaze.htm.
[29] Nikolai Sokov, "Moscow Rejects U.S. Authors' Claims of U.S. First-Strike Capability, as Putin Protects Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure," *WMD Insights*, no. 5 (May 2006), pp. 19-20.
[30] Nikita Petrov, "Robert Gates shows nuclear impatience," RIA, October 1, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081101/118086970.html.
[31] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2007," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March/April 2007), p. 61, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/d41x498467712117/fulltext.pdf.

apart and replace components with limited service lives (e.g., plutonium pits). Surplus fissile material is stored for recycling or elimination.[32] Russian experts indicate that this frequent dismantling and remanufacturing process allows them to detect warhead problems without having to operate a U.S.-style scientific-based stockpile stewardship program—which they could not afford, and might not trust, in any case.[33] To further ensure warhead sustainability, Ivanov announced in late April 2006 that all land and sea-based ballistic missiles entering service from the end of 2006 will be equipped with the same type of new warhead. Each missile will have either a single warhead or a MIRV cluster.[34] Russian designers hope to complete testing of such a common warhead in 2008. The Russian military intends to deploy these warheads, which supposedly have enhanced BMD penetrability, aboard both the new Topol-M ICBM (RT-2UTTH; designated by NATO as the SS-27) and the Bulava SLBM (R-30 SS-NX-30), currently undergoing operational testing—though perhaps not for much longer in the absence of an improved testing record.[35]

Numerous external factors could affect the evolution of Russia's nuclear forces, especially their nuclear modernization plans. First, despite many improvements, managers of the nuclear weapons complex must still address a number of problems with its basic infrastructure. The complex remains vulnerable to both safety hazards (e.g., accidents from aging equipment) and security breaches (e.g., terrorism or unauthorized thefts and diversions). Moreover, Russian defense managers have inherited a host of expensive environmental problems from their Soviet predecessors. Cleaning up this mess could drain resources from military modernization. Second, the Russian decision to reduce the variety of nuclear delivery platforms in service has already created crises whenever one type has experienced production (e.g., the Topol-M) or development (e.g., the Bulava) problems. The concomitant reduction in the types of nuclear warheads creates comparable risks from a failure of a particular warhead design. In particular, proposals to use a single warhead type on all future Russian ground-launched and submarine-launched ballistic missiles could prove disastrous should that design experience an irreparable technical fault—a development that could call into question the viability of Russia's entire strategic deterrent given the weakness of the country's strategic bomber fleet. Third, the Russian government might decide to allocate a greater share of defense spending to its conventional forces. Most military reform proposals envisage increasing the number of better-compensated professionals serving in the Russian armed forces,

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[32] John B. Wolfsthal and Tom Z. Collina, "Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia," *Survival*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Summer 2002), p. 74.
[33] The structure and standard procedures of Russia's nuclear weapons complex are described in Oleg Bukharin, "Downsizing Russia's Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure," *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 116-130.
[34] RIA Novosti, "Russian Ballistic Missiles to be Equipped with New Warhead," April 24, 2006, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060424/46839202.html.
[35] Ivan Safronov, "Rossiya skreshchivaet boegolovki," *Kommersant*, April 24, 2006.

which remains largely an army of low-paid conscripts. The planned increase in the use of contract soldiers and other non-conscripts could entail substantially higher spending on human resources since attracting and keeping more volunteers will require providing them with better pay, housing, and food. Russian military commanders want to purchase many more advanced conventional weapons such as expensive precision-guided munitions. Any fall in the government's energy exports, in combination with the competing demands of Russia's conventional forces, could further curtail spending on the country's nuclear forces.

RUSSIAN TNW: CURRENT POLICIES AND FUTURE TRENDS

Russian and American negotiators decided not to address "non-strategic" nuclear weapons or the nuclear forces of other countries in their recently completed negotiations on the New START treaty. When asked about the issue at the April 6, 2009, session of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace conference on nuclear nonproliferation, chief U.S. New START negotiator Rose Gottemoeller said that, while President Obama was concerned about non-strategic warheads, "My own view is that the immediate START follow-on negotiations will not be the area where that issue is immediately pursued." Instead, she simply advocated that "we should begin exploring the issues with the Russian Federation and decide how to fit that into the agenda." the same session, Sergey I. Kislyak, currently the Russian Ambassador to the United States and an influential figure in determining Russia's strategic arms control policies, argued that, while non-strategic nuclear weapons would need to be eliminated "if you decide to move to the world free of nuclear weapons," for the moment Russia and the United States "have enough work to do now to focus on things that are doable," adding that, "when you go to substrategic, there will be a lot of other things that needs to be entered into the play." Among these issues, Kislyak cited "the imbalances in conventional weapons [and the] appearance of new systems that maybe are non-nuclear, but designed to do the same job."[36]

During the Cold War, Soviet negotiators would initially insist that any nuclear arms control agreement also limit British and French nuclear systems, citing the close security ties between these two countries and the United States. At some point in these talks, however, the Soviet government would concede their exclusion in return for other American concessions. In recent years, Russian officials have again periodically raised the issue of extending Russian-American arms control measures to encompass other countries, especially Britain and France. In April 2009, however, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said that it would be "counterproductive" to complicate the immediate START replacement talks by attempting to include other national governments in the negotiations. Like other Russian and

[36] "Whither U.S.-Russia Relations?," Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1305&prog=zgp&proj=zted.

American government representatives, Ryablov argued that addressing the nuclear forces of third parties would only become necessary after Russia and the United States decreased their offensive nuclear weapons to much lower levels, which would increase the strategic significance of other countries' smaller nuclear holdings."[37]

Definitions and Controls

There is not an agreed definition of what constitutes a "non-strategic" nuclear system. Terms such as "sub-strategic," "tactical" or "theater" nuclear weapons (TNWs) are also used. In general, these systems are those nuclear weapons not deployed on "strategic" nuclear delivery vehicles such as land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range heavy bombers. All three systems are capable of attacking targets at great distances (over 5,500 kilometers). The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty prohibits Russia and the United States from developing, manufacturing, or deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 kilometers. Russia and the United States still retain many nuclear weapons having ranges under 500 kilometers. These shorter-range tactical systems can be launched by short-range missiles, dropped from the air as gravity bombs, loaded onto torpedoes or other tactical naval weapons, or otherwise delivered by non-strategic systems (though neither country appears to have the fabled "nuclear hand grenades). Another possible criterion for identifying a non-strategic nuclear weapon, their small yields, offers a less helpful indicator since the constantly improving accuracy of strategic delivery vehicles has meant that their warheads can also have low yields but still destroy their distant targets.
No bilateral treaty limits the number of short-range nuclear weapons in the American and Russian arsenals. The most important measure constraining these weapons occurred in 1991. That fall, U.S. President George Bush became alarmed that the ongoing disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had been accelerated by the failed August 1991 coup by communist hardliners, was endangering Moscow's control over thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads. Bush therefore announced in late September major reductions in the number of deployed American TNWs, including the elimination of all U.S. ground-launched systems and the removal of all nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships and attack submarines, and invited Soviet President Gorbachev to reciprocate. Gorbachev made a similar announcement on October 5, pledging to eliminate many TNWs and transfer others from deployment with operational units to central storage facilities. The following January, Boris Yeltsin, president of the new Russian

[37] Interview with Sergey Ryabkov, "My ne budem vprygivat' na podnozhku amerikanskogo poezda, sleguyushchego v neizvestnom napravlenii," Interfax, April 21, 2009, http://www.interfax.ru/txt.asp?id=75683&sec=1483.

Federation, committed his government to implement Gorbachev's original offer as well as some other reductions that Yeltsin subsequently added.[38]

Although these 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) consisted only of parallel and reciprocal measures, they have eliminated more nuclear weapons than any other arms control treaty. Under their terms, Russia and the United States have destroyed thousands of their non-strategic nuclear weapons and removed other non-strategic nuclear systems from operational deployment, transferring their warheads to secure storage. Yet, the PNIs are not a formal arms control agreement and they do not entail provisions for verify compliance. Neither Russia nor the United States has allowed monitors from the other country to conduct technical inspections at its TNW storage sites. The two governments also do not exchange data about their remaining non-strategic weapons, though at some NATO-Russia meetings they have simply reported the percentage of PNI-applicable warheads, though not their absolute numbers, that they have eliminated.[39] In 2005 and 2006, however, American officials complained that the Russian government was not providing sufficient information to substantiate its claims to have made further reductions in its non-strategic nuclear systems.[40] Some multilateral nuclear arms control agreements do cover TNW, but their provisions also not well enforced. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) anticipates the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Proposals to reduce and better control Russian and American non-strategic weapons regularly arise at NPT-related meetings. For example, several delegates to the May 2010 NPT Review Conference advocated making greater efforts to eliminate non-strategic weapons regardless of their range. Yet, nuclear abolition is seen by the Russian and American governments as a long-term goal—the horizon appears to be longer in Moscow—requiring stringent conditions. Other arms control agreements—such as those establishing nuclear-free zones or requiring that nuclear weapons states guarantee never to use their nuclear weapons against states not possessing them—restrict the legally permissible use of nuclear weapons, but they lack means to ensure compliance.

In addition to those promoting general nuclear disarmament, some analysts favor eliminating TNW on the grounds that their small size, scattered location, relative mobility, and weaker security and safety features (the older Russian systems are thought to lack advanced electronic locks) render them more at risk for terrorist seizure than the nuclear warheads that are deployed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which are generally some of the most well-guarded military assets in the Russian and American

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[38] Nikolai Sokov, "Issue Brief: Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)," Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2002, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_10a.html.
[39] Nikolai Sokov, "Issue Brief: Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)," Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2002, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_10a.html.
[40] Wade Boese, "Deeper Nuclear Cuts Unlikely for Now," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 35, no. 6, July/August 2005, p. 36; and "Press Conference with Stephen Rademaker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Security and Nonproliferation Issues," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, April 12, 2006, www.sgpproject.org/Personal%20Use%20Only/G8Rademaker4.12.06.htm.

defense communities.[41] They also fear that Russia or the United States are more likely to employ a TNW than a strategic nuclear warhead. In addition to their generally lower yield, their battlefield missions encourage commanders to see them as weapons for warfighting rather than deterrence. In turn, this status might place them under the tactical control of field commanders in certain conditions. A RAND study concluded that some Russian operational commanders can launch ground-based TNW without further central government approval after Russia's civilian national security leaders have authorized their deployment to front-line troops.[42] Pending their elimination, other arms control analysts would seek to bring non-strategic weapons under a more formal and transparent arms control regime than the existing PNIs, which lack a legal basis and do not entail obligatory data exchanges and other verification procedures.[43]

The number, status, and other characteristics of the non-strategic nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States are state secrets. Information about the possible non-strategic nuclear weapons of other countries is also minimal, though all the nuclear weapons of India, Pakistan, India, and North Korea appear to have ranges below 5,500 kilometers. Although China appears to have some twenty intercontinental-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets in North America, the Chinese military has hundreds of non-strategic nuclear weapons designed for potential use around China's periphery as well as possibly on Chinese territory against an invading land army (a very unlikely contingency at present). Most estimates place the number of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in the thousands, from 2,000 to 8,000. Although the United States had thousands of non-strategic nuclear systems during the Cold War, analysts believe that the U.S. military now only has a few hundred short-range nuclear weapons in the form of gravity bombs for airplanes (some at U.S. air bases in Europe) and nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles (deployed at secure land facilities in the United States).[44]

The U.S. armed forces have been dramatically reducing their holdings of non-strategic weapons because the advent of precision-guided conventional weapons has reduced the number of missions that might require a nuclear munition. In addition, an important role for theater nuclear weapons—defending NATO allies in Europe from the large conventional militaries of the Soviet bloc—vanished with the end

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[41] See, for example, Robin Cook and Robert McNamara, "Is it Time to Dismantle the Cold War's Nuclear Legacy?" *Financial Times*, June 23, 2005; and Daryl G. Kimball, "Small, Portable, Deadly, and Absurd: Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *International Herald Tribune*, May 3, 2005.

[42] Olga Oliker and Tanya Charlick-Paley, *Assessing Russia's Decline: Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S. Air Force*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, pp. 81-83.

[43] Pierre Claude Nolin, *The Security of WMD Related Material in Russia*, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 2005, p. 7, www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=695; and John Edwards and Jack Kemp, eds., *Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, pp. 48-49

[44] Norris and Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2009," p. 61. They estimate the number of inactive non-strategic warheads at 600 (p. 65).

of the Cold War. Furthermore, many American commanders and civilian strategists doubt that the U.S. President or other senior civilian and military leaders would authorize the use of a nuclear weapon except under the most extreme circumstances. The U.S. military has preferred to redirect monetary and other resources to researching and developing conventional weapons whose use is more likely. At present, the main factor sustaining the U.S. non-strategic nuclear arsenal is to meet NATO's formal requirements for such weapons as well as to make U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees appear more credible to countries such as Germany, Japan, or Turkey that might otherwise decide to pursue their own nuclear weapons.

TNW Trends and Functions

The Soviet and Russian armed forces have decreased their non-strategic nuclear forces since the mid-1980s too. The INF Treaty required the Soviet Union to eliminate several important medium-range missile systems, while the PNI led to the destruction of many shorter-range systems. During the early 1990s, the withdrawal of the Russian Army from central Europe and the Russian Navy from combat patrols also decreased Russian military interest in non-strategic nuclear weapons. The severe problems experienced by the Russian defense industry during this period also led the Russian government to concentrate Russia's limited production resources on higher-priority weapons.

Toward the end of the decade, Russian interest in strengthening Russia's nuclear forces, including those having short ranges, began to increase. Russian policy makers decided to retain many non-strategic nuclear weapons because they perceived them as valuable as a vital instrument for preventing NATO, which was then expanding its membership and engaging large and unprecedented military operations in the former Yugoslavia, from exploiting its conventional military superiority in a possible war with Russia. The Russian defense industry has found it difficult to match the large number of sophisticated precision conventional weapons produced by NATO countries. To make up for this deficit, the Russian military has continued to deploy hundreds of nuclear warheads on short-range missiles and other systems intended for missile and air defense as well as anti-ship and air-to-ground strikes. The greater destructive power of their nuclear warheads compensates for the higher targeting inaccuracies compared with NATO precision weapons. Some Russian military leaders might also have viewed Russia's TNWs as helping Russian troops compensate for China's much larger ground forces in the event of a Russia-China war.

In addition to compensating for Russian weaknesses in conventional military power, Russian military thinkers perceive their non-strategic weapons as helping accomplish missions that otherwise might require the use of Russia's more limited supply of strategic nuclear weapons. Russia's large number of nuclear weapons also strengthens the credibility of the implicit Russian nuclear security guarantees offered to some of the former Soviet republics through the Collective Security Treaty (CST),

which was signed in Tashkent in 1992 by the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Under CST Article 4, members pledge to render each other "all necessary assistance, including military assistance" in case of external aggression. Following a joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise in June 2006, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said that he could not exclude the use of Russia's TNW in his country's defense.[45] The CST underpins the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as well as Russia and Belarus.

Russian strategists have long considered using limited nuclear strikes to alter the course of a conventional conflict that Russia risked losing. The January 2000 National Security Concept, for example, implied that Russia could use non-strategic nuclear forces to resist a conventional attack without engendering a full-scale nuclear exchange. Russian strategists have also indicated they might detonate a limited number of nuclear weapons—perhaps just one—to induce an adversary to end ("de-escalate" in Russian terminology) a conventional military conflict with Russia.[46] The selective strike would seek to exploit the inevitable "shock and awe" effect associated with nuclear use to cause the targeted decision makers to weigh the risks of nuclear devastation more heavily. This strategy exploits the fear that, after one nuclear explosion, the prospects of further detonations increase substantially. Initiating nuclear use would underscore the seriousness with which the Russian government viewed the situation and might encourage the other side to de-escalate the conflict and pressure its allies into making concessions.

A related function of Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces would be to prevent other countries from escalating a conventional conflict to a nuclear war. In such a scenario, Russia could threaten to retaliate disproportionately should an adversary employ nuclear weapons to try to alter a conventional battle in its favor. Even after one party has initiated a limited nuclear exchange, Russian commanders might attempt to control further escalation by issuing nuclear threats, showing restraint, or pursuing other "nuclear signaling." The most commonly discussed contingency for a "de-escalation" mission is a NATO decision to intervene against a Russian military ally (e.g., Belarus) or on behalf of a non-member country (e.g., Georgia) in a conflict with Russia. In 1993, the Russian government abandoned its declared pledge not to employ nuclear weapons first in a conflict, effectively establishing a justification in Russian doctrine for initiating nuclear use. The statement brought the declared strategic posture of Russia into line

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[45] Viktor Myasnikov, Vladimir Ivanov, and Anton Khodasevich, "Novaya strategicheskaya initsiativa," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 26, 2006.

[46] According to one authoritative source, "De-escalation of aggression" is defined as "forcing the enemy to halt military action by threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons" (Sergey Ivanov, *Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation*, Moscow: Russian Ministry of Defense, October 2, 2003, p. 70) at http://www.pircenter.org/index.php?id=184.

with that of the United States, Britain, and France (but not China). These NATO countries have never renounced the right to resort to nuclear weapons first in an emergency.

Actually exploding a nuclear device in a conflict would prove problematic. On the one hand, it could terminate the conflict in Russia's favor. On the other, it could lead to potentially, even large-scale, nuclear use if the other side considered the detonation a prelude to additional nuclear strikes and decided to escalate first. Russian officials would probably attempt to underscore the strike's limited nature to minimize the risks of further escalation. In conducting a nuclear strike for a "de-escalation" mission, for instance, Russian commanders could seek to minimize its opponent's civilian and perhaps even military casualties to discourage further nuclear use. For example, they could employ a low-yield tactical nuclear warhead against an adversary's military base, warship, or armored formation operating in a scarcely populated area. Alternately, Russian forces could detonate a high-altitude burst near an adversary's warships with the expectation that the explosion would not produce casualties or nuclear fallout, but would still devastate the fleet's sensors and communications due to its electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) and other effects.

Lack of Interest in TNW Arms Control

The important and diverse roles that Russia's non-strategic weapons contribute to Russia's security have led Russian officials to resist applying additional arms control agreements to their TNW since the early 1990s. Concerns about deterring a potential pre-emptive attack against Russia by NATO forces leads Russian military strategists to value precisely those characteristics of their TNW—their mobility and ease of concealment—that most worry arms control advocates concerned about the diversion of TNW to terrorists. In the view of Russian military commanders, uncertainty regarding the number and location of Russia's non-strategic weapons limits the confidence of Western militaries that they can destroy them in a first strike.[47] Such considerations weigh against proposals to consolidate Russia's TNW in a few highly secure locations, even if dispersal makes them more vulnerable to terrorists.[48] Russian analysts also note that TNW represent one of the few areas where Russia enjoys military superiority over

[47] For a review of the debate in Russia over how best to use tactical nuclear weapons in a confrontation with NATO see Yuri Fedorov, "Russia's Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons," Pugwash paper no. 279 (London, November 15-17, 2002), at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/federov.htm.

[48] Timothy D. Miller and Jeffrey A. Larsen proposed negotiating substantial reductions in Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces through direct purchase by Western governments; see their "Dealing with Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Cash for Kilotons," *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 2 (Spring 2004) pp. 64-86. Other proposed U.S.-Russian arms control measures relating to their non-strategic forces are reviewed in Amy F. Woolf, *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, September 9, 2004), pp. 24-26.

the United States and NATO.[49] The Russian military has developed but apparently not implemented a program to upgrade thousands of Russia's existing TNW with a smaller number of next-generation systems.[50]

On September 3, 2007, Russian Colonel General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, head of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, which is responsible for Russia's nuclear weapons, told reporters that Russia would consider negotiating additional restrictions on non-strategic nuclear weapons, "but it must take place with the participation in the process of other countries, above all Britain and France."[51] Since France and Britain characterize their nuclear-armed ballistic missiles as strategic, the significance of Verkhovtsev's remark, which in any case was not followed by a formal Russian proposal to London or Paris, must be called into question. Russian officials have also been pressing for other countries to join the 1987 INF Treaty, whose limitations currently only apply to Russia and the United States. Thus far, both efforts have met with little interest on the part of other countries possessing nuclear weapons or intermediate-range missiles.

The George W. Bush administration, like the current national security team, also concluded that it would prove too difficult to address non-strategic nuclear weapons within the context of the Russian-American strategic nuclear arms control talks. The May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, like previous Soviet-American and Russian-American arms control agreements, does not address the TNW issue. In subsequently explaining this exclusion before the U.S. Senate, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained that the parties decided it would prove too difficult to resolve the many arms control complexities associated with these non-strategic weapons: "We might have argued that Russia's proximity to rogue nations allows them to deter these regimes with tactical systems; because they are many thousands of miles away from us, the United States distance from them requires more intercontinental systems possibly than theater systems. This could have resulted in a mind-numbing debate over how many non-strategic systems . . . should equal an intercontinental system, or open the door to a discussion of whether an agreement should include all nuclear warheads regardless of whether they're strategic or tactical."[52] In early June 2005, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker said

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[49] See for example the remarks of Colonel General Leonid Ivashov cited in "Psledniy Sekret," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, June 10, 2005.

[50] Nikolay Poroskov, "Vzrivnie Eksperimenti" ["Explosive Experiments"] *Vremya Novostey*, August 10, 2004, http://www.vremya.ru/2004/141/4/104791.html; and Ivan Safronov, "Sergey Ivanov Otvetit za Poluraspad" ["Sergey Ivanov Will Be Held Responsible for the Semi-Disintegration"] *Kommersant*, August 10, 2004, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=496518.

[51] http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/archives/news/world/20070903-Russia-France-Britain-nuclear-power-reduce-weapons.php
September 3, 2007 "Britain, France must be included in weapons talks: Russian General," AFP

[52] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense, "Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Moscow Treaty as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld," July 17, 2002,

Russian officials continued to evince "very little interest in talking to us" on further Russian-American non-strategic arms control.[53]

NATO's New Initiative

At a April 22-23 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn, Estonia, both NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and U.S. Secretary State Hillary Clinton endorsed the recommendation of the expert group helping to revise NATO's Strategic Concept that NATO retain its TNW arsenal until Russia also agrees to reduce its much larger holdings of these weapons.[54] As long as nuclear threats exist, Rasmussen argued that, "NATO needs a credible, effective and safely managed deterrent. Nevertheless, the Alliance must also do what it can to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation."[55] Rasmussen thought that "the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential part of a credible deterrent."[56] Similarly, Clinton maintained that, "as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance." Given that even the Obama administration does not anticipate the elimination of nuclear weapons for generations, this condition effectively would keep NATO' in the nuclear weapons business for decades. "As a nuclear alliance," Clinton continued, "sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental," in this case implying that some allies not possessing nuclear their own nuclear weapons will allow those that do to store nuclear forces on their territory. [57]

NATO spokesman James Appathurai observed that this session was "the first discussion that I can remember at ministerial level in over a decade" on the NATO TNW issue.[58] Appathurai stated that the foreign ministers, while not empowered to make any conclusive decisions, had nevertheless agreed on "some clear themes" to geode their approach to the issue:

- NATO would maintain nuclear weapons as long as they existed in the world
- Member states will not make "unilateral moves" on nuclear weapons issues
- Members would share the burdens of maintaining a safe and credible nuclear deterrent

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http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020717-secdef1.html.

[53] Cited in Wade Boese, "Deeper Nuclear Cuts Unlikely for Now," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 35, No. 6, July/August 2005, p. 36.

[54] Julian Borger "NATO Experts Group Say US Nukes Should Stay in Europe," The Guardian, March29, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/mar/29/nato-tactical-nuclear

[55] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-14F7094C-2369EAA1/natolive/news_62852.htm? ; Apr. 23, 2010

[56] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html?src=mv
April 22, 2010 "U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts" MARK LANDLER

[57] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html?src=mv
April 22, 2010 "U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts" MARK LANDLER

[58] "Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai at the Informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers - Tallinn, Estonia," April 22, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E0A8F737-39D940A7/natolive/opinions_62906.htm.

- The alliance would balance maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the need to contribute to general arms control and disarmament[59]

Apparthurai, Clinton and others did indicate one way in which NATO could reduce its TNWs—if Russia agreed to eliminate some of its much larger stockpile of these weapons, as well as relocate any TNW its does keep away from neighboring NATO countries and make these holdings more transparent. Clinton told the foreign ministers that, "In [seeking] any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, relocate those weapons away from the territory of NATO members, and include non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms control discussions."[60] Apparthurai observed that, while NATO might take actions affecting its nuclear weapons policies without a direct Russian input, "Russia had to be taken into account when looking at the broader issue of reducing the total holdings of nuclear weapons in Europe."[61] Nonetheless, he acknowledged that the Russians have not shown interest in negotiating formal limits on their TNWs, and that the allies have yet to propose initiating formal negotiations with the Russians.

A related issue is the future of NATO's missile defense architecture. Both Clinton and Rasmussen have advocated making missile defense a core NATO mission because they argue that missile defense and TNW complement one another. In their view, tactical nuclear weapons would serve as a means of deterrence, while missile defenses would protect allies if deterrence fails.[62] At a press conference in Tallin, Rasmussen observed that, "Missile defence is no replacement for an effective deterrent. But it can complement it. Because there are states, or other actors, who might not be rational enough to be deterred by our nuclear weapons. But they might be deterred by the realisation that their few missiles might not get through our defences."[63] The Lisbon summit will decide whether NATO should make protecting the territory and populations of all European nations an Alliance mission.[64] The U.S.-

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[59] "Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai at the Informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers - Tallinn, Estonia," April 22, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E0A8F737-39D940A7/natolive/opinions_62906.htm.

[60] "U.S. signals its nuclear arms stay in Europe for now" Arshad Mohammed and David Brunnstrom Reuters, April 22, 2010; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/22/AR2010042202712.html

[61] "Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai at the Informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers - Tallinn, Estonia," April 22, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E0A8F737-39D940A7/natolive/opinions_62906.htm.

[62] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html?src=mv April 22, 2010 "U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts" MARK LANDLER

[63] "Nuclear Weapons And Interceptor Missiles: Twin Pillars Of U.S.-NATO Military Strategy In Europe," 24 April 2010 Rick Rozoff, http://australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2378:nuclear-weapons-and-interceptor-missiles-twin-pillars-of-us-nato-military-strategy-in-europe&catid=94:breaking-news

[64] "Nuclear Weapons And Interceptor Missiles: Twin Pillars Of U.S.-NATO Military Strategy In Europe," 24 April 2010 Rick Rozoff, http://australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2378:nuclear-weapons-and-interceptor-missiles-twin-pillars-of-us-nato-military-strategy-in-europe&catid=94:breaking-news

funded missile defense deployments around Iran will protect some European countries from attack, but not every NATO country. "The United States already has a missile defence system," Rasmussen explained, while "Some European Allies have a capacity to protect deployed forces against missile attacks." If the alliance could "connect national systems into a NATO wide missile shield to protect all our Allies," he argued "that would be a very powerful demonstration of NATO solidarity in the 21st Century."

Neither the Russian government nor many Russian nuclear commentators have expressed much interest in entering into negotiations with NATO over the issue. In return for accepting reductions or other limitations on Russia's non-strategic arsenal, Russian officials likely would try to extract compensating concessions from Western governments, such as imposing restrictions on the deployment of NATO missile defenses, attack aircraft, or other military forces near the Russian border. Moscow might also revive the 2007 proposal to limit British and French nuclear systems, which was a recurring objective of Soviet nuclear arms control negotiators. Perhaps the most likely Russian goal would be similarly constraining U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe. Russian leaders have long complained about the continued deployment of these U.S. systems, noting that all Russian TNW now lie exclusively in their own territory. In late 2003, the head of the Russian General Staff, General Yuri Baluyevskiy, observed that the hundreds of U.S. air-deliverable TNW in Europe "are for Russia acquiring a strategic nature since theoretically they could be used on our command centers and strategic nuclear centers."[65] In early June 2005, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that Russia was "prepared to start talks about tactical nuclear weapons only when all countries possessing them keep these weapons on their own territory."[66]

American officials counter that U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons play an essential role in sustaining NATO's nuclear deterrence and discouraging efforts by additional NATO members to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Even an American offer to redeploy all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to the United States might prove insufficient to convince the Russia government to agree to additional TNW arms control measures. The United States could return its short-range nuclear weapons to Europe in a few hours unless their storage sites and related infrastructure had also been destroyed. In addition, it would prove difficult to verify any agreement since attack aircraft, the main NATO delivery system for U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons, are typically dual-use systems that can also launch conventional strikes. Given these considerations, as well as Russia's numerical superiority in TNW, Russian negotiators have also not pressed to include NATO's non-strategic nuclear weapons in the current round of post-START

[65] Cited in Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2004," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 60, no. 3 (May/June 2004), p. 69.
[66] Cited in Associated Press, "Russia Issues Warning on Space-Based Weapons," *Baltimore Sun*, June 3, 2005.

negotiations. Some Russian analysts might anticipate that European government might at some point decide to request their removal in any case given a lack of widespread popular support for NATO's nuclear mission.

In this context, it is unclear how NATO might best engage in TNW elimination negotiations with Russia. These could be discussed in bilateral Russia-U.S. talks devoted solely to that issue, though Russia has always resisted that approach and Washington's NATO allies would not welcome their exclusion. They could also be dealt with as part of the NATO-Russia dialogue regarding a new European security architecture, which Moscow would also see draw up a new European Security Treaty along the lines of the draft text proposed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. These could occur within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, but Appathurai said during his April 22 Tallinn news conference that "I don't think that that is on the immediate agenda. That's not the forum in which that kind of discussion, I think, would be held, and certainly not now." [67] Furthermore, the TNW issues could be negotiated as part of a follow-on negotiations to the New START Treaty, which would cover other issues set aside in the rush to negotiate the recently signed treaty (non-deployed nuclear warheads, strategic defense systems, and the use of conventional warheads on traditionally strategic delivery vehicles such as long-range ballistic missiles). Finally, they might be considered as part of the discussions aiming to strengthening the NPT against further nuclear proliferation (many NPT parties consider NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangement a violation of the first two articles of the treaty).

The debate over the appropriate negotiating forum also relates to how one defines a tactical nuclear weapon, which are also variously referred to as "theater," "sub-strategic," "short-range,". And "battlefield" nuclear weapons. The yield of the weapon's explosive power may not be a good indicator now that many countries are developing low-yield nuclear weapons. Range is therefore more often used as a classifying category, but many nuclear warheads can simply be moved from a short-range launcher to a longer-range one. Yet, relying on non-physical properties—such the weapons intended use—is difficult when some countries, such as Russia, intend to use TNW for both tactical battlefield purposes and strategic ones.

Seeking to avoid becoming bogged down in the debate in the appropriate reduction for a, a December 2009 report argues that the United States and Russia should exchange data about their European TNW holdings as a means to "jump-start serious negotiations" toward their eventual complete elimination. The proposed "transparency package" would include declarations about their stockpiles and possibly their storage facilities. They propose considering ways in which NATO might accept limits on

[67] "Press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai at the Informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers - Tallinn, Estonia," April 22, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E0A8F737-39D940A7/natolive/opinions_62906.htm.

its conventional superiority through an enhanced Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as part of a Grand package" to persuade Russia to accept greater reductions in its larger TNW arsenal.[68] Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren also advocate addressing TNW issues within "a restored and renewed CFE Treaty framework" or similar arrangement that provided for total transparency, verification, and monitoring of changes in TNW arsenals through extensive data exchanges and on-site inspections. They also favour extending the provisions of the bilateral INF Treaty to encompass both shorter-range missiles and additional countries.[69] Another proposal is for both sides to eliminate some weapons while removing others away from their frontline forces, perhaps concentrated in a specified number of distinct storage sites accessible to arms inspectors.[70] A senior advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested removing some or all U.S. TNW from NATO Europe in return for encouraging Russia simply to concentrate its large TNW in more secure locations.[71]

Any proposals for increased transparency or TNW consolidation would need to overcome Russian fears about NATO pre-emption, since placing the weapons in a few designated places would make them easies to attack, creating opportunities (and incentives) for a preemptive first strike that would destroy the weapons before they could be dispersed to their launch sites. Any proposals for less than total reductions would need to address U.S. congressional concerns about the imbalance in the Russian-U.S. TNWs, which would become especially salient were both countries to negotiate further reductions in the size of their strategic nuclear arsenals. The warhead and launcher limits in the New START Treaty may already be lower than the size of Russia's residual TNW, though he latter are by definition less threatening to the U.S. homeland and compensated for by NATO's superior conventional forces.

Even if the parties are unable to secure the elimination of all NATO and Russian TNW, or if some weapons were exempt from the transparency arrangements to enhance deterrence through the increased uncertainty, mutual TNW reductions could provide several advantages, including reducing the number of possible terrorist targets, saving money spent on having to modernize a larger number of weapons, allowing NATO to remove the TNWs from countries no longer eager to host them (which for NATO might leave only Turkey and perhaps Italy as TNW hosts), and demonstrating NATO and Russian commitment to making progress toward nuclear non-proliferation.

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[68] Miles Pomper, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, *Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe* (Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December 2009), p. . http: .

[69] Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, "Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Arms Control Today (October 2009), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher.

[70] Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, "Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Arms Control Today (October 2009), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher.

[71] Martin Matishak, "U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based Nukes, State Department Official Says," Global Security Newswire, August 5, 2009, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090805_4929.php.

FUTURE RELATIONS

Russia's contemporary leaders have offered a vision of their preferred world order that sharply differs from that commonly sought in the West. Above all, they insist that other governments recognize Russia's status as a global power with legitimate interests in setting the rules and norms of the 21st-century international system. These claims extend from nuclear arms control to proposals to restructure the global financial system. One of the most prominent refrains of Putin's notorious speech at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy was that Washington was threatening world instability through its "greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law." Since assuming office, Medvedev has pushed forward plans to establish Russia as "a global financial center" and make the Russian ruble one of the world's reserve currencies, especially for transactions involving Russian oil and gas, framing these steps as recognition of Russia's important role as a core pillar of the new multipolar international system.

Even before the August 2008 Georgian War, Russian leaders had been making a series of bellicose statements and actions trumpeting Russia's revised military strength and, reinforced by the heightened value of its energy assets, diplomatic influence. After the Russian military overwhelmed the outnumbered Western-trained Georgian military and seized control of the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Medvedev boasted that Russia's victory had demonstrated that Moscow was no longer a great power to be trifled with. He told the State Council in early September that, "The events in South Ossetia showed that Russia will not allow anyone to infringe upon the lives and dignity of its citizens, that Russia is a state to be, from now on, reckoned with."[72] Since then, Russian military units have conducted an unprecedented range of operations, from massive live-fire exercises at home to naval and air deployments throughout much of the globe. The Russian defense leadership has also announced plans to modernize all components of the Russian military—the air force, navy, ground forces, and nuclear arsenal.

Russian leaders have also challenged other elements of the existing international system that they believe bestows excessive power on the United States while depriving Russia and other rising world powers of sufficient influence. In his first State of the Nation address on November 2008 Medvedev said that the Georgian and global financial crises underscored the inability of the world's existing security and economic institutions to contain local crises or manage their subsequent escalation: "A barbaric aggression against South Ossetia and the global financial crisis—two very different problems which nevertheless have common traits and a common origin," Medvedev argued. "The lessons of mistakes and crises of 2008 proved to all the responsible nations that it is the time to act, and it is necessary to radically

[72] "S. Ossetia Events Show Russia Will be Reckoned With—Medvedev," RIA Novosti, September 6, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080906/116593944.html.

reform the political and economic system."[73] Like other Russian leaders, in his speech Medvedev denounced the "double standards" of the West in recognizing Kosovo's independence but not that of South Ossetia and Abkhazia—while also implying that the Kosovo decision set a precedent for Russian actions. Although he insisted that Russians were not intrinsically anti-American and that there was no reason why the Russian-American relationship had to be confrontational, Medvedev blamed the United States for largely causing the world financial crisis and the war in Georgia.

The precise reasons for Moscow's newly confrontational policies remain unclear. The decisions to enlarge NATO further, recognize Kosovo's independence, and deploy missile defenses in regions that many in Moscow consider falling within their sphere of influence has led many Russians to believe that the West routinely fails to take into account Russia's legitimate security interests on major policy issues. Furthermore, the astonishing resurrection of the Russian economy over the past decade has reduced Russia's dependence on foreign economic assistance, allowing Russian leaders to resist Western policies more vigorously they might have accepted earlier. In the decade since the 1998 financial collapse, Russia's GDP has increased from less than $200 billion in 1999 to more than $1.7 trillion in 2008.[74] Yet, suspicions linger that Putin also adopted a more nationalist posture in order to enhance his power at home by exploiting Russian patriotism to rally support behind his quasi-authoritarian domestic policies.

Russia-US: Contrasting Visions

Soon after he assumed office, Russian President Dmitry A. Medvedev came stated five succinct theses to define his country's foreign policy, which came to be known as the Medvedev Doctrine.[75] First of all, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the frame for the relations between civilized peoples. Accordingly, Russia will build its relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law. Second, Russia thinks that the world should be multipolar. Russia cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America, because such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict. Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself, and will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible. Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they are, is an unquestionable priority and duty of the Russian government.

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[73] Dmitry Medvedev, "Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation," November 5, 2008, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029type82917type127286_208836.shtml.
[74] Central Intelligence Agency, "Russia," *World Factbook*, April 23, 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
[75] George Friedman, « The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy », *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 09/02/08 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/medvedev_doctrine_and_american_strategy

Russian officials will also protect the interests of the Russian business community abroad. Finally, like other countries, Russia has privileged interests in certain regions, in Moscow's case countries that share with Russia special historical relations that bind them together as friends. In determining its foreign policies, Russia will pay particular attention to its work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries. Medvedev concluded that "These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice." To sum it up, Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. While Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this will be entirely based on their behavior toward Russia, including efforts by these external powers to challenge Russia's "special interests" in certain regions

The Kremlin's vision of its relationship with Washington is based on the assumption that U.S. global hegemony is unsustainable and the decline of American power irreversible. Russians tend to view the current crisis of American global power as analogous to the crisis of the Soviet power in the 1980s—in other words, they project their own experience onto that of the United States. The Russian media present the U.S. debacle in the Middle East and especially in Iraq as "America's Afghanistan." And the U.S. financial crisis demonstrates the fundamental weakness of the American economy, analogous to Russia's post- imperial financial collapse. All those elements are useful in perpetuating the view that Russia did not lose the Cold War; rather, its end marked major global systemic changes that are now buffeting the Americans, as well, a decade and a half later. Moscow's key strategic calculation is, as Sergei Karaganov puts it, that "the West is losing its monopoly on the globalization processes", rendering the next decade a window of opportunity for restoring Russia's regional hegemony and global influence. If Russia fails to seize this opportunity, it will fall behind even China. In geopolitical terms, when seeking to create a multi-polar word, Russia needs Europe mainly as a balancing weight to U.S. hegemony in the international system.

Obama's election appears to have surprised the Russian leadership. The Russian leadership did not embrace Obama until well after the election result was announced. Medvedev gave a State of the Union address hours after the result of the U.S. ballot had become known, giving a very negative appraisal of U.S.-Russian relations, perhaps reflecting a fear that the new Democratic administration would return to an ideologically motivated policy. After it became clear that Obama's foreign policy would be markedly different from the policies of the preceding Bush and Clinton administrations, the Russian government adhered to a modestly unhelpful principle when it came to Iraq and Afghanistan: "you break it, you fix it; it's your responsibility." During the past year, there has been some improvement, with the Russian government willing to adjust its policies regarding Iran after the Obama administration adopted an approach toward European missile defense and NATO expansion that Moscow found somewhat better

than the Bush approach. Still, Russia's new national security strategy still identifies the possible U.S. acquisition of a first-strike capability against Russia through global ballistic missile defenses as a major threat to Russian security. And a pair of dueling speeches at the beginning of this year suggests the continuing gap in Russian and U.S. officials visions of Europe's desirable future security order. Whereas last year Vice President Joseph Biden used his appearance at the Munich Security Conference to call for a "reset" in relations between Russia and the United States, this February's presentation by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, contrasted with a speech by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton two weeks earlier, shows the sharp differences regarding Eurasian security that remain between the two countries.

Lavrov began by lamenting the lost opportunity resulting from the failure of NATO to follow the Warsaw Pact's example and dissolve after the Cold War, thereby allowing the OSCE to become Europe's single comprehensive security organization "providing equal security for all states of the Euro-Atlantic area." Instead, Western governments chose to expand NATO, "which meant not only preserving the lines that separated Europe during the Cold War into zones with different levels of security, but also moving those lines eastward." In the process, the OSCE was sidelined into "servicing this policy by means of supervising humanitarian issues in the post-Soviet space." Lavrov particularly faulted Western governments for discarding "the lofty and noble principle enunciated in the 90s at the highest level, the principle of indivisibility of security across the entire Euro-Atlantic space, according to which no single state can be secured at the expense of another's security." The Foreign Minister argued that NATO only applied the principle of the indivisibility of security to its own members and excluded it from the realm of the OSCE or even the NATO-Russia Council, where the principle was "limited to a genre of political declarations, without any legal or practical embodiment." He cited the wars in Kosovo and South Ossetia as examples when some OSCE members ignored the institution's prohibition against the use of force and allegedly committed aggression as "manifestations of the OSCE's systemic weakness." Lavrov argued that only by "having solved the issue of the indivisibility of security fully once and for all, can we concentrate on a positive agenda and urgent matters based on our coinciding interests and create a solid foundation for joint action by the US, the EU, and Russia in international affairs." This was why, he continued, it was important to adopt the proposal of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev for a new European Security Treaty. He argued against limiting discussion of this proposal exclusively to the OSCE, because the organization "does not reflect the comprehensive approach and is devoted to the humanitarian sphere to the detriment of the other 'baskets'." He also denied that Russia sought to divide Europe into "spheres-of-influence" and accused NATO governments as contributing to such a development by retaining an exclusive political-military bloc "in which different standards are applied in terms of military and political security, humanitarian obligations, access to markets and modern technology and so on." Nonetheless, he claimed that "Russia wants to see the OSCE a strong and

effective organization, based on international law" and a comprehensive approach to security. Moscow, he claimed, supported endowing the OSCE with a legal foundation and other reforms. He also related the Russian writers of the draft European security treaty had excluded concrete political-military initiatives from the proposal, such as those dealing with arms control and confidence-building, and sought to address them within the OSCE's Corfu Process. "And in the Draft Treaty we have left no practical things, but only one principle – the principle of the indivisibility of security." He described this gambit as a test of the sincerity of Russia's partners, to see whether they were willing to make the principle legally binding: "let's take this decision and confirm that we were all sincere when in the 90s we said that none of our countries would guarantee their security at the expense of others' security."

Lavrov's speech can be read as a refutation of the speech made by Secretary Clinton on January 29 in Paris. Clinton identified several core values as guiding the Obama administration's approach toward European security. First, the administration would insist on respecting "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states," including their right "to pursue their own foreign policies, choose their own allies, and provide for their own self-defense." Here Clinton attacked Russia for failing to honor the provisions of its ceasefire agreement with Georgia and for recognizing the independence claims of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. She also denounced the concept, attributed to Russia, of seeking to establish "spheres of influence … in which one country seeks to control another's future." Clinton dismissed complaints that NATO and EU enlargement were threatening Russia's security, arguing that their enlargement "has increased security, stability, and prosperity across the continent, and that this, in turn, has actually increased Russia's security and prosperity." She insisted that any country had the right to join NATO if it met the alliance's membership requirements. Whereas Clinton joined Lavrov in endorsing the principle of the indivisibility of European security, she asserted that Europe's existing security institutions "provide the full range of tools to meet common challenges" and that negotiating new security treaties would be "a very long and cumbersome process." Other NATO leaders have also denigrated the value of Russia's proposed European Security Treaty given the continent's already rich network of institutions. Clinton instead affirmed the administration's intent to revitalize the NATO-Russia Council to deepen concrete cooperation on Afghanistan, missile defense, in other areas. The Secretary reaffirmed the administration's "unwavering commitment" to Article 5 of the NATO charter, which defined an attack on one member as an attack on them all. She further confirmed that the U.S. would "continue to station American troops in Europe, both to deter attacks and respond quickly if any occur." In addition, she acknowledged that, "We are working with our allies to ensure that NATO has the plans it needs for responding to new and evolving contingencies." According to media reports, at least one of these contingency plans—covering the Baltic states—concerns a possible war with Russia. Clinton reiterated the administration's decision to proceed with establishing a robust missile defense architecture

for NATO territory, while adding that Washington still hoped to collaborate with Moscow in this endeavor. Clinton called for urgent measures to restore the military transparency and confidence-building provisions embodied in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. According to Clinton, Russia's decision to stop implementing the accord in late 2007 had meant that "this valuable regime is in danger of crumbling." She called for renewed talks on restoring the treaty regime within "a modern security framework that takes into account developments in Europe since the original treaty was drafted, limits military deployments, and strengthens the principles of territorial integrity, non-first use of force, the right of host countries to consent to stationing foreign troops in their territory." Alluding to fears of further Russian military actions in Europe, the Secretary stated that many East Central Europeans fear "that something may be happening they're not aware of, that some action may be taken that is directed at them." Finally, Clinton insisted that enduring security would only result when countries upheld democracy and human rights. "Development, democracy, and human rights comprise a mutually reinforcing cycle that is critical to security everywhere. When that cycle is broken, a nation is not secure." Citing the achievements of the Central European nations in discarding communism and becoming liberal democracies, Clinton affirmed that "now the United States works with NATO, the EU, and the OSCE to extend this kind of comprehensive human security to other places," which would include the countries of the Balkans and the former Soviet republics despite Moscow's complaints about Western efforts to incite color revolutions in neighboring countries.

Nuclear Possibilities and Illusions

The provisions of the New START Treaty—the term encompasses the main treaty text, a protocol specifying some additional rights and obligations of the parties, and the technical annexes—will not affect the TNW issue directly but will help define Russian military planning for future nuclear scenarios. Many provisions legally confirm reductions that have already taken place or are in the process of occurring as Russia and the United States continue their decades' long practice of fielding fewer but more capable and versatile nuclear systems. The new 1,550 limit for deployed nuclear warheads on no more than 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is lower than any previous treaty, but each side possesses thousands of additional warheads in storage, undergoing maintenance, or in the form of shorter-range nuclear systems. The seven-year implementation timeline gives Russia and the United States ample time to continue gradually reducing their totals while modernizing their remaining arsenals. Furthermore, the provisions give Russia and the United States considerable flexibility to determine how to structure their nuclear arsenals within these aggregate limits. Both sides can continue to keep a strategic triad of land-based intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers, distributing the warheads among these three legs as they prefer. The United States

and Russia are even allowed to keep an additional 100 non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, a provision designed to deal with the problem of the U.S. "phantom" systems—those missile launchers and strategic bombers that are no longer usable but still counted under the original START because they had not been eliminated according to its procedures. The treaty's proposed verification regime would be less intrusive and costly than the elaborate requirements of the 1991 START Treaty, yet it still includes on-site inspections of nuclear weapons facilities, mandated exhibitions of delivery vehicles, obligatory exchanges of data, and advanced notifications of some activities related to Russian and American nuclear weapons policies. Other provisions would facilitate treaty monitoring by prohibiting acts that could disrupt national technical means of verification and by mandating the continued exchange of some missile testing telemetry.

Ratification in the Russian legislature is likely given the Russia government's influence over that body. Securing the consent of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate will prove more difficult but seems probable. At least some Republicans will likely need to vote to approve the treaty. The Democrats hold only 59 Senate seats at present. Since the Senate took 287 days to ratify the three-page 2002 Moscow Treaty and 429 days to ratify the original 1991 START treaty, a vote on START 1 might not occur until after the November 2010 U.S. congressional elections, when the Democrats look likely to lose some Senate seats. At the same time, Russian officials have warned that they reserve the right to withdrawal from the new START treaty if the continued U.S. missile defense buildup in Europe begins to present a serious threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile, nuclear security experts in both countries warn that it will be difficult to ignore the nuclear forces of Britain, China, and France if Russian and United States aim to reduce their nuclear holdings considerably below the levels contained in the new START accord.

In recent years, a number of American and international security experts, including several who held prominent U.S. government positions during the Cold War, have supported various proposals leading toward general nuclear disarmament.[76] In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama declared his ultimate objective to be the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Russian officials have publicly offered general support for eliminating nuclear weapons at some point. At his September 2008 meeting in Sochi with foreign experts of Russia who were members of the Valdai Discussion Club, Prime Minister Putin gave conditional support for abolishing nuclear weapons. Although Putin acknowledged that, until a few years ago, he would have considered achieving the practical elimination of nuclear weapons "absolutely impossible," he now professed that, "Today I consider it almost realistic"

[76] George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby, eds., *Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008). See also George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2252&issue_id=54; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html.

given that the conventional weapons capabilities of nuclear weapons states, like Russia, had improved sufficiently to deter any aggressor.[77] Medvedev and Obama reaffirmed in their April 1 joint statement the ultimate goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons. And Putin responded affirmatively to a question at a joint news conference with visiting German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier when asked whether he could imagine a Russia without nuclear weapons, though Putin indicated he would expect for the United States to also eliminate its own nuclear forces.[78]

Nonetheless, many foreign observers of the Russian defense community doubt that the Russian government would want to relinquish one of the last remaining props of Russia's great power status, and create a situation in which American and NATO conventional military superiority would be unchecked by Russian nuclear weapons.[79] Influential Russians have also expressed unease at transitioning to a nuclear free world. In April 2009, Sergey Rogov, the director of the USA and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, published a commentary in the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* explicitly warning that, the lower the level of Russia and American nuclear forces, the more significant the conventional imbalance of forces will become.[80] On April 20, Medvedev directly addressed Obama's April 5 Prague speech, which called for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Medvedev said that a number of "conditions" must be achieved for universal nuclear disarmament. These prerequisites included banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, ensuring that nuclear weapons removed from operational deployment were destroyed rather than simply stockpiled, and preventing a compensating buildup in conventional arms following a reduction in nuclear forces. Medvedev also warned that the unilateral deployment of missile defense systems also "complicates nuclear disarmament.[81]

The Membership Mirage

The demise of the Cold War confrontation between Moscow and NATO simultaneously created an environment favorable for improved Russian-Western relations and established conditions that made conflict likely. On the one hand, the July 1991 dissolution of the integrated Warsaw Pact, based on the power of the Soviet military machine that formally vanished later that year, in the heart of Europe

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[77] Andrei Zolotov Jr., "Three Hours with Vladimir Putin," Russia Profile, September 12, 2008, http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Politics&articleid=a1221223275.
[78] "Putin could imagine a Russia with no nuclear weapons," Deutche Welle, June 10, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4315776,00.html.
[79] Pavel Felgenhauer, "Russia Will Retain as Many Nuclear Weapons as Possible," Eurasia Daily Monitor, ; Brian Whitmore, "Arms Control Redux: Let The Games Begin," RFE/RL, April 24, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Arms_Control_Redux_Let_The_Games_Begin/1615455.html; and Michael Bohm, "Finished From the START," *Moscow Times*, June 11, 2009, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1016/42/378486.htm.
[80] Sergey Rogov, *Kommersant*, April 15, 2009--FIND
[81] Brett Young and Denis Dyomkin, "Russia gives cautious response to Obama nuclear plan," Reuters, Apr 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSLK21213720090420.--FIND ORIGINAL RUSSIAN TEXT

removed the threat from the east that for decades had generated distrust and hostility toward Russia in NATO countries. The end of Soviet communism also eliminated the sources of the ideological conflict between the Russian government and the Western democracies. Americans and Europeans saw a once-in-a-generation opportunity to transform a former adversary into a stable, liberal democracy that would help maintain international security and stability. On the other hand, Russia has always appeared too unstable, too big, and too different from the existing alliance members to warrant NATO membership on its own. Russia's lack of influence on alliance decision making and the resulting imbalance of power in the West's favor was bound to unnerve Russian leaders, especially as the alliance took advantage of its political-military preeminence in central Europe to incorporate new members and employ military force to address perceived threats to European stability, such as Russia's Serb nationalist allies in the former Yugoslavia. Relations during the past two decades have sometimes warmed, sometimes cooled, but never moved sufficiently in any direction to induce Russian policy makers to anticipate major future changes in the relationship or the scenarios that might require Russia to use, or threaten to use, all the military forces at its disposal.

Formal ties between Russia and NATO developed soon after the Cold War. The Russian government joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the concurrent Partnership for Peace program, which provided mechanisms through which NATO countries and their former Soviet bloc adversaries could pursue cooperative defense and security projects. This initial stage in their relationship culminated in the successful joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, the May 1997 signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, and the concurrent creation of the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC). During the late 1990s, however, the alliance's decisions to offer membership to several East European countries and to intervene militarily in Kosovo without Russian approval set back relations for several years. The Clinton administration wanted to continue a good Russia-American relationship, but this objective conflicted with the goal of promoting democracy and stability in central and eastern Europe. The administration decided that this latter objective required offering Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and eventually other European countries full membership in NATO, despite Moscow's strenuous objections. Ties improved somewhat under the Bush administration after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, when the Russian government supported the United States and other NATO members against the mutual threat of Islamist terrorism. Divisions over the American decision to invade Iraq were mitigated by the opposition of Germany, France, and several other important NATO governments to the intervention. Further waves of NATO enlargement, disputes over Russian policies towards Georgia and the other former Soviet republics, and the decision of the U.S. government to deploy ballistic missile defenses in east European countries close

to Russian borders then led to a sharp downfall in relations, with the nadir reached following Russia's war with Georgia.

The post-9/11 resurgence in NATO-Russian cooperation lasted for several years, but had faded by the late 2000s. Russian security experts have long held diverse and often ambivalent views regarding NATO—simultaneously seeking to cooperate with the alliance on concrete security issues while questioning why it still exists after the Cold War. In recent years, the predominant opinion has become distinctly negative.[82] At the February 2007 session of the Munich Security Conference, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov said that Russia was prepared to continue cooperating with NATO, but he acknowledged that, "after two years of euphoria when Russia and NATO were staging joint military exercises and exchanging intelligence data", the two parties "do not see many prospects in this area now."[83] At the same conference, Ivanov warned that Russia would not support international decisions made without its participation, especially those that were "imposed on Russia."[84]

Putin laid out many Russian objections to NATO expansion at his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. He told the audience that, "I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?" Putin also repeated the Russian claim that NATO leaders promised they would never establish military bases in former Soviet bloc countries in return for the Russian decision to allow Germany's unification within NATO and to dissolve the Warsaw Pact. He also expressed unease at the American decision to deploy troops in the former Soviet Bloc countries of Bulgaria and Romania, where he claimed the United States was establishing "so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each." These two countries have agreed to host as many as 5,000 American military personnel serving on rotational deployments. Although every country has the right to decide its military and political affiliations, Putin raised the issue of "why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders during this expansion?"[85]

Conventional Uncertainties

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[82] For a comprehensive survey of Russians' "zebra-like" (p. 43) views of NATO see Stephen J. Blank, The NATO-Russia Partnership: A Marriage of Convenience or a Troubled Relationship? (Carlyle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2006).
[83] "Russia Speaks Its Mind, Ivanov Says," Kommersant, February 12, 2007, at [http://www.kommersant.com/p-10081/r_500/Munich_Security_Ivanov/]
[84] Cited in Thom Shanker, "Gates Counters Putin's Words on U.S. Power," New York Times, February 12, 2007.
[85] http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/11/0138_type82914type84779_118135.shtml

Aside from all the obstacles and uncertainties Russian military planners face in developing their own conventional forces, the major uncertainties they must consider when looking outward is the state of the Conventional Forces Treaty, which Medvedev's has linked with his proposed European Security Treaty, and the extent of further NATO enlargement. For the moment, the latter process is stalled, but it could conceivable resume within the next decade. Among other issues, the extent of NATO membership's roster will shape the missile defense architecture near Russia's borders as well as the conventional force deployments in its vicinity.

On November 19, 1999, 30 countries (8 new parties had acceded to the original treaty by then) signed a CFE Adaptation Agreement at a heads of state summit in Istanbul, held under the auspices of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). The amended version replaced the obsolete bloc ceilings and zones with a system of national limits for each treaty party.[86] Although it retains the systems of flank zones, which were of particular importance for Turkey and Norway, the Adapted Treaty applied them to smaller areas.[87] In subsequent years, however, only four of the signatories—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia—fully ratified the 1999 Adaptation Agreement. The other parties have refused to do so until the Russian government fulfills the commitments it made at the Istanbul summit to withdraw all its military bases from the other former Soviet republics. The new European countries that emerged in Europe after December 1990—including the three Baltic states adjoining Russia—cannot join the CFE Treaty until it is ratified by all current members.

A major source of contention between Russia and the West regarding the CFE Treaty is their differing interpretations of the relationship between two important decisions adopted at the Istanbul summit. First, NATO governments agreed to modify the CFE Treaty to account for the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, de-linking the force levels of Russia from the other former members of the Soviet bloc, some of which were joining NATO. Second, in accord with the principle that foreign troops can only remain in a host country with its consent, the Yeltsin government indicated in several Annexes to the 1999 CFE Final Act adopted at the OSCE Istanbul summit (known as the "Istanbul Commitments") that they would withdraw their military forces from the former Soviet military bases in Georgia and Moldova. While Western governments consider these two steps interdependent, Russian officials rejected NATO's insistence that a formal link exists between the CFE's implementation and their military withdrawal from Georgia's autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as Moldova's Russian-speaking separatist region of Trandsniester.

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[86] "Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," November 19, 1999, *http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/cfe/osce_cfefinalact.pdf.*

[87] Michael Scollon, "Russia: Analyst Says CFE Pullout Harms 'Trust And Transparency'," July 16, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/07/51482c54-9d3d-48d0-9e22-1ebdaa228763.html.

At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet armed forces occupied four military bases in Georgia. In 2001, Russia transferred the Vaziani military airfield outside Tbilisi to the Georgian government. It was not until May 31, 2005, however, that the Russian and Georgian governments signed bilateral agreements in Sochi regarding two remaining bases. Under their terms, the Russia pledged to remove its military personnel and equipment from the bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi by the end of 2007 and 2008, respectively. But controversy persisted regarding the fourth facility. According to Moscow, the Russian military ceased using the base at Gudauta in Abkhazia for combat operations in October 2001. The Russian government reported that only some 400 Russian military personnel remain there, and that half of these were retirees and dependents. Moscow acknowledged that several combat and transport helicopters as well as other military vehicles and facilities also existed at the base, but affirmed that their function was strictly to support the Russian troops assigned to the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. The Georgian government, along with other CFE members, called for establishing a multinational inspection mission (including some Georgian nationals) at the base to evaluate the Russian claims and monitor military activities there. The separatist authorities in Abkhazia, backed by Moscow, denied the Georgian government access to the Gudauta base. Russian representatives denied that the CFE Treaty or Yeltsin's Istanbul commitments required them to authorize the creation of such an observation mission. At most, they indicated interest in arranging for a one-time visit by foreign observers to certify the base's closure. Although they have participated in trilateral talks on the issue with German and Georgian representatives, Russian officials advocated bilateral talks between Russia and Georgia to resolve the remaining disputes.

In justifying their continued deployment of Russia's 14th Army in the self-proclaimed republic of Trandsniester, Russian officials cited the need to prevent criminals and terrorists from acquiring the estimated 20,000 tons of ammunition and equipment left behind from the Soviet military occupation. Transnational criminal networks have sold many of these small arms to the parties in conflict in the northern Caucasus, central Africa, and other regions of conflict.[88] In addition, Russian policy makers argued they needed to retain large troop concentrations in the northern Caucasus and northern Georgia in order to counter Islamist-inspired terrorism in southern Russia. Russian government officials also argue they needed to maintain large "peacekeeping" forces in Abkhazia, Trandsniester, and the other so-called "frozen" conflict regions of the former Soviet Union pending their resolution. The CFE Treaty does not directly limit the size or activities of peacekeeping units, many of which consist of former Soviet military personnel. The elaborate CFE inspection regime also does not encompass the "unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment" possessed by separatist forces in these conflict regions. Much of this equipment is

[88] Steven Lee Myers, "Ukraine Battles Smugglers As Europe Keeps Close Eye," New York Times, May 28. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/world/europe/28ukraine.html.

suspected to be of Russian origin and has become a source for small arms traffickers throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa.

In addition, Russian policy makers insisted their country needs more flexibility to deploy larger troop concentrations in southern Russian to counter Islamist-inspired terrorism in Chechnya and other areas. The CFE Treaty contains certain special "flank restrictions" to prevent the concentration of conventional heavy equipment in northeastern and southeastern Russia (primarily near Norway and Turkey, respectively). Russian officials also expressed concern that the treaty's provisions do not apply to U.S. military deployments in Bulgaria and Romania. They have called for more constraints on NATO military activities in southeastern Europe as well as the three Baltic states. NATO representatives insisted that their military activities in the Baltic region comply with existing CFE provisions. The Baltic governments, which gained their independence after the drafting of the original CFE Treaty, have agreed to sign the Adapted CFE Treaty upon its coming into force. U.S. officials deny plans to establish large military bases in Bulgaria and Romania, describing them as "joint training facilities" that would only host U.S. forces on short-term rotations.

Despite these arguments, NATO members have refused to ratify the updated CFE treaty until Russia completely removes all its troops, military equipment, and ammunition stockpiles from the two countries' internationally recognized boundaries.[89] The United States and other NATO governments have indicated that they would consider further revisions in the treaty to meet Russia's concerns regarding its flank deployments, but only after Moscow fulfilled its commitments to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said NATO members would ratify the adapted CFE treaty in "a matter of days" after Russia fulfilled its Istanbul commitments[90] Western governments have also suggested replacing Russian soldiers with international peacekeepers, but Russian representatives contend that these contingents can only be safely removed after a solution to the underlying conflicts that have necessitated their continued presence.[91]

In February 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that the CFE treaty had become "meaningless" as a result of NATO's decision to extend its membership throughout most of Europe as well as the refusal of its old and new members to ratify the amended version of the treaty. He stated that the alliance's position, along with the expansion of NATO military structures toward Russia's borders, have created "extreme imbalances" in force levels between Russia and NATO. Lavrov called the

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[89] David McKeeby, "Russian Action on "Frozen Conflicts" Can Save Key Security Pact," USINFO, November 7, 2007, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=November&x=20071107154931idybeekcm0.3379633&chanlid=washfile.

[90] Nicholas Fiorenza, "Putin Declares Moratorium on CFE Arms Treaty Compliance," Jane's International Defence Review (June 2007), p. 5.

[91] Alexei Arbatov, "Russia wants to bring the CFE Treaty back to life," December 5, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071205/90993105.html.

attempt to link the CFE ratification issue with that of the Russian peacekeeping deployments in Georgia and Moldova an illegitimate attempt to conceal NATO members' loss of interest in a treaty they no longer supported.[92] In his February 2007 presentation before the Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin likewise lamented the "pitiable condition" of the CFE treaty. He insisted that Russian troops were leaving Georgia on an accelerated schedule and that only 1,500 Russian troops remained in Moldova to secure the Soviet-era ammunition warehouses and prevent renewed fighting between the Moldovan authorities and Transdnestrian separatists. He then noted that the United States would soon establish large-scale military bases in Romania and Bulgaria.[93] In his annual state of the nation address on April 26, 2007, President Putin told the Federal Assembly that, since NATO has refused to implement the treaty, "all that this treaty means is that we face restrictions on deploying conventional forces on our own territory." Putin called this uniquely discriminatory burden intolerable and warned, to the applause of the legislators in the audience, that his administration might impose a moratorium on CFE participation unless the other parties ratified the adaptation agreement and stopped seeking to "gain unilateral advantages" at Russia's expense by, for example, "to build up their own system of military bases along our borders."[94]

Russia pressed for and secured an extraordinary emergency meeting on the CFE Treaty, the first in CFE history, in June at Vienna. The head of the Russian delegation, Foreign Ministry official Anatoly Antonov, told the session that his government remained committed to conventional arms control in Europe, but that "Europe has changed, and this circumstance necessitates a modernization of the set of tools used to achieve these goals."[95] Another member of the Russian delegation, Mikhail Ulyanov, explained that such "modernization" would require taking into account NATO's post-1999 expansion—10 East European countries joined the alliance between 1999 and 2004—as well as the expanding U.S. military presence in southeast Europe, which unlike Russian military deployments in the northern Caucasus was unconstrained by the CFE Treaty.[96] The emergency meeting failed to resolve the CFE disputes.

On 14 July, President Putin signed a decree suspending Russia's participation in the Treaty due to "extraordinary circumstances ... which affect the security of the Russian Federation and require

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[92] Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press "Lavrov: CFE Treaty No Longer Relevant," Moscow Times, February 19, 2007.
[93] Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," February 10, 2007, at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118135.shtml.
[94] http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029_125494.shtml.
[95] Cited in "Russia Urges CFE Modernization—Foreign Ministry," RIA Novosti, June 12, 2007, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070612/67103380.html.
[96] Judy Dempsey, "Russia Calls for Major Changes in European Arms Control Treaty," International Herald Tribune, June 12, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/12/news/treaty.php.

immediate measures." In justifying its July 2007 suspension decision, the Russian government accused NATO countries of violating the treaty's limits by deploying excessive forces in Eastern Europe. Russian representatives had long complained that NATO's expansion into former Soviet bloc states violated a purported pledge Western leaders had made at the time of Germany's reunification not to establish military bases in such countries. NATO governments denied that they were exceeding permissible deployment levels in Eastern Europe. Some Western experts also questioned the legality of the Russian decision. The CFE treaty has no formal provision for "suspension." A signatory can "withdraw" from the accord by giving the other signatories 150 days advance notice, but Russian representatives insisted they only want to strengthen the treaty, not violate it. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained that Moscow could no longer accept a situation in which Russia complied with the Treaty but other signatories did not. He said the Kremlin hoped that Russia's move would induce Western nations to commit to the updated treaty. According to the copy of the president's decree posted on a Kremlin Web site, Russia's suspension will take effect 150 days after the 14 July, allowing for the possibility of its reversal should the West offer suitable concessions. In early October, Germany hosted a special meeting of all CFE signatories to resolve differences between Russia and western governments.[97] At the conference, NATO representatives unsuccessfully offered to help finance Russia's withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova and host expanded consultations in the NRC on ways to facilitate the accession of Slovenia and the Baltic states to the CFE Treaty.[98]

On December 12, 2007, Moscow technically violated the treaty by failing to provide NATO countries with information about the size, location, and activities of its military forces in the region west of the Ural Mountains, the Russian territory covered by the CFE Treaty. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted a detailed statement on its web site justifying the CFE suspension decision, which formally went into effect on December 12 at midnight, as due to "exceptional circumstances" that jeopardized Russia's "national interests in the sphere of military security."[99] The text blamed NATO countries for refusing to ratify the Adopted CFE Treaty until Moscow fulfilled "farfetched requirements having nothing to do with the CFE Treaty." It also accused them of taking "a number of steps incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Treaty and undermining the balances that lie at its core." This charge refers to NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe and the deployment of NATO military forces from Western Europe and the United States on these new members' territory.

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[97] Jane Sharp, "Missile Madness," The World Today, (December 2007), p. 15.
[98] Ibid., p. 15.
[99] http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/10da6dd509e4d164c32573af004cc4be?OpenDocument

The Ministry insisted that Moscow intended the moratorium to restore rather than kill the treaty. The declaration noted that by "suspending" Russia's participation in the treaty rather than formally withdrawing altogether, the Russian President could quickly resume implementing its provisions, providing NATO members met the following conditions:

> "- agree on how to compensate for the additional potential acquired by NATO as a result of its expansion;
> - arrange the parameters for restraint in the stationing of forces on foreign territories;
> - resolve on the abolition of so called flank restrictions for the territory of Russia (they hinder our common struggle against terrorism);
> - ensure the participation in the Treaty of the new NATO members Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia;
> - enact the adapted version of the CFE Treaty as soon as possible and without artificial conditions and embark on its further modernization."

The suspension decision also plays well in Russian domestic politics. Putin signed into law the bill authorizing the CFE suspension several days before Russia's Duma elections, burnishing his credentials as a leader of a team that could stand up to the West.

In a news conference held after the moratorium went into effect, the head of the Russian General Staff disclaimed any plans for a major near-term increase in the size of Russia's military contingents in the CFE-governed regions around Russia's borders: "We woke up on December 12 in the same situation. It doesn't mean there will be a massive arms build-up to the north, to the south and to the west." Nevertheless, General Yury Baluyevsky acknowledged that, "at least I, as head of the armed forces, can exercise complete freedom in movement of the armed forces on Russian territory. I didn't have that right prior to December 12." He also warned that, "This is not a bluff, but an objective necessity," due to American and NATO efforts to use the CFE issue "as a lever to exert pressure on Russia."[100] President Putin likewise stated that if NATO governments ratified and complied with the Amended Treaty, Russia "could" resume its participation. Nevertheless he warned: "I would like to emphasize that we cannot wait forever."[101]

The Russian moratorium decision suggests that Russian officials aimed to inflict sufficient shock to dismantle the old CFE structure while still allowing for the emergence of a superior European conventional arms control regime in its place. Whether they have correctly calculated this precise balance remains to be seen. Although the Russian government declined to participate in the CFE's mandatory year-end data exchange, which the States Parties use to establish their inspection quotas for the following

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[100] http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKL1521180120071215?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews
[101] http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0322133020071203]

year, it did submit a separate, if less detailed, report to the OSCE about its conventional military forces in Europe.[102] In announcing its suspension decision, the Russian Foreign Ministry called on NATO to "enact the adapted version of the CFE Treaty as soon as possible and without artificial conditions and embark on its further modernization." [103] Lieutenant General Yevgeny Buzhinsky, a senior Defense Ministry official, identified two paths for realizing these twin objectives. NATO governments could first ratify the adapted treaty. After it came into force, they could proceed to modify it further. Alternatively, NATO members could "make a political decision and draw up a new agreement" directly, effectively setting aside the 1999 draft [104]

According to Russian international security expert Alexei Arbatov, Russian policy makers do not consider the 1999 Adapted CFE Agreement as fully meeting their country's security needs because "it is merely a step toward the formation of a more stable and equitable system of confidence and security in Europe. . . . If NATO countries ratified the adapted treaty as it is, these conditions could be discussed later." Russian officials have already called on NATO to eliminate the flank limitations, commit not to establish permanent military bases outside NATO territory, and accept lower quotas to compensate for the additional military capacity NATO has acquired through its membership expansion.[105] Ambassador Rogozin said that the provisions of a revised CFE Treaty should extend to encompass navies because "naval forces in many NATO countries have considerable advantages over Russia's navy." He told the NRC that, "Its adapted version should counterbalance these advantages."[106]

After the Russian CFE moratorium went into effect, NATO issued a statement calling the Russian decision "particularly disappointing" because Allied governments "have worked intensively with other Treaty partners over the past months to try to resolve the Russian Federation's concerns constructively." Yet, the alliance still insists that any compromise had to respect "the integrity of the Treaty regime with all its elements," as well as to "fulfill remaining commitments reflected in the 1999 CFE Final Act with its Annexes, including those related to the Republic of Moldova and Georgia." NATO governments said that, while they would not retaliate "in kind at this stage" to Russia's suspension, they "will carefully monitor the Russian Federation's compliance with its Treaty obligations" given that the "Allies'

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[102] Wade Boese, "Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Implementation," Arms Control Today (January/February 2008), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_01-02/cfe.asp.

[103] "Statement by Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Suspension by Russian Federation of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)," December 12, 2006, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/10da6dd509e4d164c32573af004cc4be?OpenDocument.

[104] "Russia Proposes Drafting Simpler START Arms Treaty," RIA Novosti, July 18, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/world/20070718/69186261.html.

[105] "Putin Says Russia Ready to Return to CFE if the West Ratifies It," RIA Novosti, December 3, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071203/90760551.html.

[106] Cited in "Russia's NATO Envoy Says New CFE Treaty Should Include Navies," RIA Novosti, January 24, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080124/97671139.html.

proposals for parallel actions on outstanding issues are constructive, reasonable, and forward looking."[107] U.S. officials did not stop supporting NATO's further enlargement or the planned ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployments in Eastern Europe.[108] Under Medvedev, Russian proposals regarding the CFE Treaty have been closely tied to the President's call for a new, comprehensive European security treaty to address the continent's major security issues as an integrated passage.

Medvedev's New European Security Treaty

Russia's growing alienation from NATO was evident when President Medvedev visited Berlin in early June 2008. There, he delivered a major speech that proposed a comprehensive restructuring of Europe's security architecture.[109] Medvedev argued that "NATO has also failed so far to give new purpose to its existence" by its efforts to expand its members and "globalising its missions, including to the detriment of the UN's prerogatives." In place of what he called "a bloc politics approach that continues by inertia," the Russian President raised the idea of convening a summit of European governments to draft a new legally binding European security treaty. "Our predecessors during the Cold War years managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act (which, as the legal foundation for the European system, has withstood the test of time despite all the difficulties encountered), and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organisations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties." Although NATO and other European security institutions would have a role, "all European countries should take part in this summit…as individual countries, leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups."

[Putin said that all the main decisions – whether on the invasion of Iraq or the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) in Europe – are made singlehandedly in Washington, and then the rest of NATO members are pushed to endorse them. The European Union, too, is "to a large extent an instrument of U.S. foreign policy," except that there are many in Europe, who, like Putin's "friend" and former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, think differently. "That is why we cooperate with Europe in the Caucasus," he said. "We would very much want to see European observers there." Presenting Russia as a threat to Europe is a method of consolidating the Western alliance, Putin said. "Why horde [nations] with

[107] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Alliance's statement on the Russian Federation's "suspension" of its CFE obligations," December 13, 2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-139e.html.
[108] R. Nicholas Burns, "Press Conference at OSCE Ministerial Meeting," November 30, 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/96054.htm.
[109] June 5, 2008, Berlin Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders Dmitry Medvedev

a whip into the 'West' and enforce discipline, while decisions are made singlehandedly [in Washington]?" Putin said.[110]]

After the Georgia War in August 2008, Russian government representatives cited the conflict as another reason for reconsidering Europe's post-Cold War security architecture.[111] They claimed, for instance, that the war—as well as other developments—showed that NATO was incapable of managing the European security architecture by itself: "We see the accumulation of problems in the area of European security which NATO is not in a position to solve alone," Lavrov later said. "Among those problems are, for example, abiding by the principles that were agreed upon, but are not being complied with. Those problems also include the crisis in conventional arms control and many other things."[112]

Russian government representatives subsequently presented their proposal for a new European security treaty to the United Nations, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the European Union.[113] Lavrov made it a major point in his address to the UN General Assembly in late September, stressing that the proposed European security treaty would conform to the principles of the UN Charter: "it is a process involving all participants who would reaffirm their commitment to fundamental principles of the international law, such as non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs, and inadmissibility of strengthening one's own security by infringing upon the security of others."[114] In a later press conference, Lavrov stressed that the core principle underpinning the Russian proposal was "indivisibility of security and… the need to avoid any means to strengthen your own security at the expense of the security of others," which he claimed NATO had been doing through its policy of eastward expansion.[115] Medvedev also offered his ideas on how to restructure the European security system during his presentation at the first World Policy Conference at the French town of Evian in October..[116]

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[110] Andrei Zolotov Jr., "Three Hours with Vladimir Putin," Russia Profile, September 12, 2008 http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Politics&articleid=a1221223275.

[111] "criticizes NATO for 'freezing' Russia-NATO Council work," RIA Novosti, September 24, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080924/117069271.html.

[112] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference with Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski, Warsaw, September 11, 2008," http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/cd9a026910cb657bc32574c3003c69a2?OpenDocument.]

[113] "Lavrov says 'Russia-NATO relations are not frozen'," RIA Novosti, September 27, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080927/117172470.html.

[114] http://voanews.com/english/2008-09-28-voa3.cfm
"Russia Proposes New European Security Pact," Margaret Besheer United Nations, 28 September 2008

[115] http://www.spacewar.com/reports/New_European_system_must_ensure_security_for_all_Russian_FM_999.html; "New European system must ensure security for all: Russian FM,"AFP, Sept 29, 2008.

[116] Find on President's website or Evian website, October 8?

Russian officials called for a meeting of the NRC to consider the concept on September 24, but NATO's decision after the Georgia War to suspend meetings of the council have prevented NATO and Russia from considering the idea in a common framework.[117] Even before the Georgian War, NATO governments had dismissed Medvedev's proposal as overly vague and, with its emphasis on eliminating existing "blocs" and creating a new pan-European structure involving all European countries on an equal basis, aiming at diminishing the role of NATO and the United States in continental defense questions. At the time of the April 2009 NATO summit in Paris, an alliance official complained that, "After asking Moscow for two months, we got back two and a half pages of old language."[118]

Russian officials have indicated that the United States, Canada, and existing security institutions would participate in the drafting of the new treaty and have a role in the new security architecture.[119] To make it more attractive to Europeans, Russian government representatives have also indicated a willingness to address human rights issues within the new continental security framework.[120] The European Commission has urged EU members to develop a unified position on the proposed European security pact.[121] Some analysts associated with the new Obama administration have advocated exploring the proposal, but mainly to underscore to Russian decision makers their need to improve their human rights policies and foreign policy principles if they wish to remain a major player in the international security order.[122]

Russia-France Relations

France's Russia policy under President Nicolas Sarkozy was initially projected to deviate from the typically cozy relationship Russia enjoyed with France during the Presidency of Jacques Chirac. Like Chirac, many of President Sarkozy's other predecessors conspicuously spurned France's NATO membership, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Sarkozy, in contrast, was perceived to actually be an "Atlanticist" who would pursue policies favorable for NATO, as well as British and American interests. These perceptions were derived from much of the rhetoric of Sarkozy's Presidential campaign

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[117] " criticizes NATO for 'freezing' Russia-NATO Council work," RIA Novosti, September 24, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080924/117069271.html.

[118] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/world/europe/10nato.html; April 10, 2009, "NATO Struggles With Conflicting Views on Russia," STEVEN ERLANGER

[119] http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080922/117027444.html
Russia expects U.S., Canada to join new European security talks ; RIA Novosti, 22/ 09/ 2008.

[120] Ahto Lobjakas, "EU Appears Ready to Return to Talks with Russia, If Not To 'Business As Usual," RFE/RL, November 1, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Appears_Ready_To_Return_To_Talks_With_Russia_If_Not_To_Business_As_Usual/1337214.html

[121] http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/21892

[122] Stephen Sestanovitch, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001faessay87602/stephen-sestanovich/what-has-moscow-done.html?mode=print

which, for many, suggested that Sarkozy's presidential policies would veer sharply from the amicable positions taken by former French Presidents, including predecessor Jacques Chirac. While campaigning, Sarkozy called to attention Moscow's questionable human rights record and infringements upon democratic principles both inside Russia's borders and regionally.

As President, Sarkozy's policies toward Russia have been somewhat of a mixed bag, as he has not hesitated to continue bilateral cooperation and commerce with Russia while attempting to draw NATO and Russia into closer discussion. Presently, France's Russia policy appears to be one of cooperative engagement on mutual diplomatic interest, with Sarkozy's own designs adding a twist to the policy by pressing for tighter relations between Russia and NATO. President Sarkozy had worked to broker a ceasefire agreement scheduling the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgia's South Ossetia province after a brief 2008 incursion and occupation of Georgian territory. While Sarkozy, himself, hailed the accomplishment as a victory for French diplomacy and lauded the cooperative nature of relations between Paris and Moscow, Russia has not necessarily followed the script in regards to withdrawal timetables, indicating that parity still exists between French and Russian interests. Most recently, France's blatantly bilateral deals with Russia concerning investments in Russian energy resources and the sale of French warships to Russia have drawn displeasure from a number of NATO and European Union member nations, particularly apprehensive former-Soviet states, yet seemingly received a nod of approval from Sarkozy, who initially favored eastern European nations over the Kremlin.

For several decades, France's approach to Russia has been essentially motivated by a wish to strengthen its own position in international relations.[123] At opposite ends of the continent of Europe, Russia isn't perceived as a looming local threat that many eastern European nations feel it is, nor is it necessarily an emerging market for intense French investment as the Germans see it. For France, Russia is, and has been, a valuable ally sharing common interests. For the most part, this has remained unchanged, as Sarkozy strives to parlay France's tradition of diplomacy into a more collaborative, functional relationship between Russia and NATO. French rationale for this is multifaceted; and partly based on its perception of the United States as a looming hegemonic power that serves as a destabilizing force and frequently acts unilaterally. First, as a fellow nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has occasionally been a useful ally in the French opposition to U.S. hegemony.[124] Exemplified by the solidarity shown by then-French President Jacques Chirac, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and Russia's President-turned-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin boisterous opposition to U.S. operations in Iraq, Paris did not hesitate to use its diplomatic ties with

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[123] Mark Leonard and Nick Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. November 2007. p. 37 <http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1ef82b3f011e075853_0fm6bphgw.pdf>

[124] Mark Leonard and Nick Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. November 2007. p. 37

Russia to present a unified opposition of U.S. military operations. The decision to join with Russia in opposition displayed the willingness of Paris to split from a NATO ally and side with an adversary of the organization. However, let it be noted that France and Russia have historically been more comfortable dealing with each other than with the United States and Britain.[125] Predictably, this has manifested rifts throughout NATO, with the most recent falling-out developing as a result U.S. military actions in the Middle East. Particularly, French interest in oil supplies in Iraq and Iran have prompted officials in Paris to shape policy that, in spite of France's NATO membership, is contradictory to United States Middle East policy; and since Russia is similarly tied to these Middle Eastern states, if only because of oil, France has found itself a natural ally in curbing U.S. efforts throughout the region. In fact, both France and Russia had been some of the leading powers sympathetic to Saddam Hussein, having been linked by oil contracts, military sales, and loans.[126]

Secondly, France values Russia as a partner in curbing nuclear proliferation. Paris considers Moscow to be a key partner in Iran, providing a diplomatic alternative to address Iran's nuclear ambitions as opposed to the more punitive approach pursued by Israel and the United States.[127] An aggressive approach to punish or entirely isolate Iran, both Russia and France fear, would antagonize Iran and also impact Iran's citizens more so than Iran's government. France clearly values Russian participation in containing Iran's designs for nuclear capabilities, and for France this provides yet another example for the benefits of setting an inclusive policy toward Russia. By including Russia French policymakers feel that Moscow will then be more cooperative in regards to other major NATO issues such as the war in Afghanistan, North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and the saber-rattling accompanying China's economic ascension.

Furthermore, retaining Russia as a bilateral partner, especially on global issues, enables France to entrench its multipolar vision in the international community, providing not only another diplomatic option, but a means to orient the EU-Russian dialogue.[128] Again, the collective opposition of France, Germany, and Russia to the U.S.-led liberation of Iraq served usefully during the Iraq debate because the three shared common interests, and successfully consolidated a joint diplomatic stance toward Washington, supported international law, and promoted Paris' multipolar vision.[129] For France, an

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[125] David M. Shribman, "Russia, France Offer Gauge for Iraq Policy." Boston Globe. March 12, 2002. As viewed at Global Policy Forum at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168-general/34675.pdf>, and <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/boston/access/110413684.html?FMT=ABS&date=Mar 12, 2002>
[126] David M. Shribman, "Russia, France Offer Gauge for Iraq Policy." Boston Globe. March 12, 2002.
[127] Thomas Gomart, "France's Russia Policy: Balancing Interests and Values," The Washington Quarterly, Washington DC: CSIS (April 2007) 30:2, p. 149.
[128] Thomas Gomart, "France's Russia Policy: Balancing Interests and Values," The Washington Quarterly, Washington DC: CSIS (April 2007) 30:2, p. 149.
[129] Thomas Gomart, "France's Russia Policy: Balancing Interests and Values," The Washington Quarterly, Washington DC: CSIS (April 2007) 30:2, p. 151.

inclusive policy toward Russia, along with Germany, is a potential making of a multipolar international system. Such a system, it is felt, serves as a means to counterbalance U.S. unilateralism, which they see as the main source of international destabilization, while also provide a framework to contain the rise of Chinese power safely while creating a global coalition against Iran.[130] France's policy toward Russia, then, may be explained by its belief that a multipolar global environment provides stability that hegemonic powers cannot. Fyodor Lukyanov, chief editor of the Moscow-based journal *Russia In Global Affairs*, suggested as much, stating that "the French position has been very clear…since de Gaulle. They see the diversification of relations with freat powers as a guarantee of stability in Europe."[131]

The presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, however, was expected to present a shift in typical French policy toward Russia. Sarkozy campaigned as a pro-Western, "Atlanticist," who favored eastern European EU members over Russia. He did not hesitate to condemn Moscow on controversial issues. Before his election in 2007, Mr. Sarkozy distanced himself from Jacques Chirac's pro-Russia stance, sharply criticized Moscow's human rights record and its actions in Chechnya, and said he would rather shake the hand of President George W. Bush than that of Vladimir M. Putin.[132] Also, in August 2007 Mr. Sarkozy said that he wanted to reverse the 1966 decision of President de Gaulle that pulled France out of NATO's permanent military structures; an effort to strengthen transatlantic ties that met controversy in France.[133] Sarkozy followed through with his NATO ambitions in spite of apprehension in France regarding what it sees as a decaying structure, subject to manipulation by the United States, and France symbolically returned to NATO's military command in April 2009.[134] Perhaps this decision was an effort on the part of Sarkozy to enhance multilateral cooperation; upon increasing France's involvement in NATO, Sarkozy broke a longstanding taboo in French foreign policy, and opened the possibility of a dramatic improvement in EU-NATO co-operation.[135] Sarkozy's policy toward Russia as president, however, has contrasted his positions as presidential candidate. Sarkozy brokered an end to Russia's invasion of Georgia, a self-proclaimed success, and backed the sale of French warships to Russia all while citing the need to establish trust for Moscow in light of their assistance in negotiations with Iran and

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[130] Thomas Gomart, "France's Russia Policy: Balancing Interests and Values," The Washington Quarterly, Washington DC: CSIS (April 2007) 30:2, p. 151.
[131] Ben Hall and Charles Clover, "Sarkozy shifts stance towards Russia," Financial Times, March 3, 2010. As viewed at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e0486dc8-263f-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=7c485a38-2f7a-11da-8b51-00000e2511c8,print=yes.html>
[132] Ben Hall and Charles Clover, "Sarkozy shifts stance towards Russia," Financial Times, March 3, 2010.
[133] Charles Grant and Thomas Valasek, "Sarkozy's Bold European Defence Initiative," Financial Times, March 24, 2008, London, UK: Centre for European Reform. As viewed at: < http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grant_valasek_ft_24march08.html>
[134] Dominique Moisi, "Wishful Thinking Fuels Kremlin's Temptaion," The Japan Times, March 18, 2010. As viewed at: < http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100318a2.html>
[135] Tomas Valasek, "France, NATO, and European Defence," London, UK: Centre for European Reform, May 2008, p. 1 < http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_eu_nato_26march08.pdf>

providing transportation routes for non-military NATO supplies into Afghanistan. Sarkozy has also signaled desires to bring Russia into a collaborative role with both NATO and the European Union. Leading by example, a deal was struck in early 2010 to sell Mistral-class French warships, equipped to carry 16 attack helicopters and allow for troop transport, raising eyebrows in the United States and Europe, particularly among Baltic nations vulnerable to Russia.[136] France has defended its plans, saying it is important to build relations with Russia – something NATO as an alliance is seeking to do to improve cooperation on global security issues, namely in regards to securing more Russian support for its mission in Afghanistan.[137] Sarkozy, specifically, suggested that it is time for NATO to start trusting Russia as an ally on security issues, citing paradoxical policy in defense of the sale: "…how can we tell Russian leaders, 'we don't trust need you to make peace, we need you to resolve a certain number of crises in the world – notably the Iranian crisis…but we don't trust you."[138] The defense sale, for President Sarkozy, was designed to be a quid pro quo for Russian cooperation in diplomatic efforts to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions.[139] Aside from assistance with diplomatic measures, Russia is perceived as a valuable ally in the fight against Islamist extremism, a struggle Russia shares with a number of NATO nations. Sarkozy's recognition of NATO's need for assistance with this very same task in Afghanistan and elsewhere has appears to have led him towards traditional French policy of friendly partnerships with Russia to pursue mutual interests, while seizing the opportunity to establish political balance in light of French apprehension of U.S. hegemony.

Much like other European Union nations, France's difficulties in defining a successful Russia policy lie in establishing a balance between interests and values. Russian authorities do not necessarily share common values with France, and are not willing to compromise theirs, even if at times Moscow shares certain interests with Paris.[140] Sarkozy, in spite of sharp anti-Kremlin campaign rhetoric, publicly stated that he "wants to turn the page on the Cold War."[141] Staying true to French foreign policy form, maintained France's diplomatic role as "balancers" internationally and engaged both NATO, by re-joining military command, and Russia, with a combination of warm relations and the naval fleet sale, and

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[136] Angela Charlton, "Energy, Culture on Tap for Medvedev Trip to France," Associated Press, March 1, 2010. As viewed at: < http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9975137>

[137] Jason Hovet, "NATO chief sees no chreat from Russia-France deal," International Business Times. March 5, 2010. As viewed at: <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20100305/nato-chief-sees-no-threat-from-russia-france-deal.htm>

[138] Angela Charlton, "Energy, Culture on Tap for Medvedev Trip to France," Associated Press, March 1, 2010. As viewed at: < http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9975137>

[139] Ben Hall and Charles Clover, "Sarkozy shifts stance towards Russia," Financial Times, March 3, 2010. As viewed at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e0486dc8-263f-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=7c485a38-2f7a-11da-8b51-00000e2511c8,print=yes.html>

[140] Thomas Gomart, "France's Russia Policy: Balancing Interests and Values," The Washington Quarterly, Washington DC: CSIS (April 2007) 30: 2. p. 150.

[141] Angela Charlton, "Energy, Culture on Tap for Medvedev Trip to France," Associated Press, March 1, 2010. As viewed at: < http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9975137>

called for collaboration between each of the two apprehensive parties. It appears that President Sarkozy's personal rapprochement with Russia has been driven by the calculation that France's diplomatic and commercial interestes are best served by friendly ties to Moscow.[142] French Russia policy exemplifies Sarkozy's, and Paris', perceptions that multipolarity breeds stability. Internationally, according to Sarkozy, multipolarity is not an end in itself but rather the start of a new alliance of the major powers.[143] If this is the case, France's Russia policy of cooperative engagement on mutual diplomatic interests and strategic partnerships could be seen as French intentions to establish a multipolar global environment and provide segue to closer NATO-Russian relations.

Russia-German Relations

German policy toward Russia is derived from economic and cultural engagement policies originating in the 1970s, influenced by various economic and commercial factors, and closely aligned with energy security policy. That is not to say that longstanding cultural ties, broader NATO and European Union policy, and Germany's recent designs for a newer, more cohesive international policy were not contributing factors as well. Furthermore, Germany's power-sharing coalition government appears to handcuff any radical evolution away from its present Russia Policy, or *Russlandpolitik*, which is still largely shaped by ex-chancellor Gerhard Shröder's political party of Social Democrats. In its present state, Russia's relationship with Germany is arguably closer than Russia's relationship with any other European nation, let alone among NATO nations. Simultaneously, German officials perceive NATO to be declining in power and increasingly a mechanism the United States uses to antagonize Russia. By engaging Russia diplomatically and economically, rather than isolating it, Germany hopes to channel Russia's resurgence into positive cooperation globally and, more specifically, among European Union members. The problem, as the German policy-makers see it, does not lie in deciding whether or not to engage Russia, but how to engage the nation. German policy-makers are struggling to strike a balanced policy that can successfully promote business ties, engage Russia on liberal reform, and foster growth of the post-Soviet state.[144]

Even after the end of the Soviet Union maintaining the stability of the teetering colossus was the uppermost maxim of German policy towards Russia, which had simply adopted the paradigm of the Cold

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[142] Ben Hall and Charles Clover, "Sarkozy shifts stance towards Russia," Financial Times, March 3, 2010. As viewed at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e0486dc8-263f-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=7c485a38-2f7a-11da-8b51-00000e2511c8,print=yes.html>

[143] Tomas Gomart, "Paris and the EU-Russian Dialogue: A New Impulse with Nicolas Sarkozy?" Paris, France: IFRI, (October 2007). p. 14 < http://www.ifri.org/downloads/ifri_RNV_Gomart_RussiaEU_sept2007_eng.pdf>

[144] Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," The Washington Quarterly, 30.2 (2007) p. 138. <http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_rahr.pdf>

War.[145] A stable Russia offered energy security, investment opportunities, and a government willing to adhere to calls for nuclear nonproliferation actions. In this regard there was continuity between the governments of Kohl, Schröder and Merkel.[146] As a result, German policy oftentimes appears to accommodate Russian interests, sometimes to the dismay of fellow NATO members. German policy toward Russia is defined as 'rapprochement through economic interlocking,' or 'Annäherung durch Verflechtung,' an extension of German 1970s Soviet policy of 'change through rapprochement,' or 'Wandel durch Annäherung.'[147] Berlin's policy of 'rapprochement through interdependence' is an attempt to bind a resurgent Russia into the European order with a tight web of economic, political, and social ties.[148] Present policy leans heavily upon integrating the respective economies of Germany and Russia; a trend which escalated rapidly under the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder, whose party of Social Democrats is much more pro-Russian than present Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Christian Democrats. A Körber Foundation policy paper pertaining to German policy on Russia calls for such a policy on Russia based on 'convergence through integration' that should embrace all aspects of political, societal, and economic activity, including the mutual opening of strategically significant segments such as the energy sector.[149] It is no surprise that each of these elements factor into Germany's *Russlandpolitik*, states Tomas Valosek, Director of Foreign Policy and Defense at the Centre for European Reform, in a policy report: "When you run an export-dependent economy like Angela Merkel does, you run your foreign policy based on two things: access to resources and finding markets for goods that Germany makes."[150] Because of this, domestic economic and commercial interests contribute to how Germany's *Russlandpolitik* takes shape. Some 4,600 German companies were said to be active in Russia and 70,000 German jobs depend on business with the country.[151] Germany's business lobby makes sure Chancellor Merkel and her pro-business Christian Democrat party never forget how much their companies depend on

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[145] Eric Gujer, "No More Hypocrisy, Germany Is A Great Power," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung: February 2009, p. 51 < http://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/internationale_politik/pdf/Koerber_Policy_Paper_No.1.pdf>

[146] Eric Gujer, "No More Hypocrisy, Germany Is A Great Power," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung: February 2009, p. 51

[147] Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," Foreign Affairs, 88.2 (March/April 2009). p. 94.

[148] Owen Matthews and Stefan Theil, "The New Ostpolitik: Germany Has Become Russia's Best Friend, But To Whose Benefit?" Newsweek, August 3, 2009. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/208650>

[149] Eckart Von Klaeden, "No Private Trains To Moscow: German Policy On Russia Must Be European," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. April 2009. pp. 12-13 < http://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/internationale_politik/pdf/Koerber_Policy_Paper_No_4.pdf>

[150] Owen Matthews and Stefan Theil, "The New Ostpolitik: Germany Has Become Russia's Best Friend, But To Whose Benefit?" Newsweek, August 3, 2009.

[151] Jack Ewing, "Germany on Russia: Forgive and Forget. Its economy is becoming increasingly dependent on Russia," Business Week. October 9, 2008. < http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_42/b4104000670377.htm?chan=magazine+channel_in+depth>

the former Soviet state.[152] Overall economic policy is also intertwined with Germany's *Russlandpolitik*: Germany's longstanding economic strategy of maintaining relatively high wages throughout exports of high-quality, value-added industrial goods and expertise requires that German businesses perpetually seek new markets; the growth of the Russian economy over the last eight years promises new opportunities for these German exports.[153] Chancellor Merkel, who has referred to German-Russian relations as a "strategic partnership" has no intention of slowing economic interdependence between the two nations.[154] As proof, in 2008 trade between Russia and Germany stood at €68 billion, or just over $90.7 billion USD.[155] The commercial exchange, however, is not one-sided; Germany needs Russia as a growing market to export their goods and Russia is increasingly desperate for German investment. With each nation providing for a need of the other, German policy makers are responsible for keeping a two-sided balance that ensures Russia does not use its assets as a political weapon against the German people and, to a greater extent, the people of Europe.

As it stands today Germany relies heavily upon Russia for energy in the form of both oil and natural gas. Back in 2004, 34% of Germany's oil imports, and 42% of German gas imports, all came from Russia.[156] Since then, the formulation of a national energy policy which relies less and less on coal and excludes the use of nuclear energy will force Germany into ever greater energy dependency on Russia.[157] This dependence will surely increase further upon the projected 2015 completion of the Baltic Sea Nord Stream pipeline brokered by then-Chancellor Schröder in 2005. The project will establish a direct pipeline of gas from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. Upon completion, the pipeline will make Germany the chief distributor of Russian gas in Europe, bypassing the present land-route pipeline transit country, and vociferous NATO member nation of Poland who, along with various other Baltic States and Ukraine, is already suspicious of Russia's allocation of its energy resources to impose political discipline on former Soviet republics.[158] Aside from snubbing eastern European nations, the project will increase Germany's

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[152] Jack Ewing, "Germany on Russia: Forgive and Forget. Its economy is becoming increasingly dependent on Russia," Business Week. October 9, 2008.
[153] Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 51, No. 2, London: Routledge (April/May 2009) p. 112
[154] Lionel Beehner, "Energy's Impact on EU-Russian Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, January 10, 2006. < http://www.cfr.org/publication/9535/energys_impact_on_eurussian_relations.html>
[155] Owen Matthews and Stefan Theil, "The New Ostpolitik: Germany Has Become Russia's Best Friend, But To Whose Benefit?" Newsweek, August 3, 2009.
[156] Roland Götz, "Germany and Russia – strategic partners?" Geopolitical Affairs. Berlin: SWP (April 2007) p. 4 < http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=1&ved=0CAYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.swp-berlin.org%2Fcommon%2Fget_document.php%3Fasset_id%3D4646&rct=j&q=Germany+and+Russia+-+Strategic+partners&ei=jl7WS9SOMMT68AaQssS-BQ&usg=AFQjCNEakA4JGhPRPEoiAVCYI_SeusSqXA>
[157] Eckart Von Klaeden, "No Private Trains To Moscow: German Policy On Russia Must Be European," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. April 2009. p. 62
[158] Eckart Von Klaeden, "No Private Trains To Moscow: German Policy On Russia Must Be European," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. April 2009. p. 54

dependence on Russia's energy supplies and exacerbate speculation that energy security policy is shaping Germany's foreign policy, namely with Russia.

Previously, ex-Chancellor Schröder's pro-Russia policies allowed the nation to utilize its renewed economy and energy assets divisively as political muscle and, consequently, establish bilateral relations with Germany at the ire of eastern Europe. This is not uncommon, as Russia has sought bilateral agreements with various European nations on a number of occasions in an effort to manipulate Europe by dividing it. On account of the Russo-German special relationship created by Schröder and Putin, the impression arose that the purpose of the Baltic pipeline was to maintain the supply of gas to Germany and the central and west European market, thereby making it far easier to use natural gas in order to impose political discipline on former Soviet republics.[159] Schröder saw no problem with this, even if the Nord Stream pipeline does pit NATO, and even European Union, nations against each other. For Schröder, the German Chancellor's responsibility was, first and foremost, to increase what is of benefit to the German people and to keep the nation out of harm's way.[160] The Nord Stream pipeline met both of these objectives by establishing a direct, secure energy source to meet Germany's energy demands and a warm partnership with a nation that desperately needs the influx of German capital.

Presently, Chancellor Merkel, far more pro-Western and pragmatic in regards to Russia when compared to her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, wants to shape policy that is more inclusive of Germany's pro-NATO, eastern European neighbors and appears determined not to let energy security undermine policy with Eastern Europe. The enthusiastic support for the German-Russian energy alliance of the Schröder days is gone, and Merkel will not go over the heads of central and eastern European partners to strike deals with Russia.[161] Conversely, it could be argued that since gas imports to Germany represent one quarter of Russian gas imports to Europe German energy security is predicated upon mutual dependence, and serves as an example that Germany sees its *Russlandpolitik* of interdependence and economic integration as a means to keep Russia from using energy and natural resources as a political weapon.[162] Regardless of the perceptions pertaining to Germany's bilateral energy deals with Russia, Germany's dependence on Russia's energy, and considering the presumed cooperative nature of the Nord Stream pipeline, ultimately keep energy policy entrenched in foreign policy regardless of which political party holds the Chancery.

Politically, while Germany's political parties may not differ drastically in their respective *Russlandpolitik*, there has been a rift in Germany's grand coalition in regards to collaboration with a

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[159] Eckart Von Klaeden, "No Private Trains To Moscow: German Policy On Russia Must Be European," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. April 2009. p. 54
[160] Eckart Von Klaeden, "No Private Trains To Moscow: German Policy On Russia Must Be European," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. April 2009. p. 54
[161] Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," The Washington Quarterly, 30.2 (2007) p. 143.
[162] Roland Götz, "Germany and Russia – strategic partners?" Geopolitical Affiars. Berlin: SWP April 2007. p. 5

resurgent Russia. The power-sharing political structure could be masking the disparity and providing some continuity to *Russlandpolitik*, as Schröder's pro-Russian, Social-Democratic party has, until recently, maintained control of the foreign ministry for much of Merkel's time as Chancellor. Furthermore, conventional wisdom holds that the German political landscape is split between those who are suspicious of the Russian embrace and those who choose to walk into it deliberately – between bear haters and bear huggers.[163] Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democratic Union is considered to be more apprehensive when shaping policies involving Russia, cooperating with more caution and awareness of eastern European opinion. Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the Social Democratic Party appear to be comfortable with a *Russlandpolitik* that is less apprehensive when shaping policy toward Russia, occasionally in spite of the disdain of eastern Europe and, in some instances, the United States. From 2005 through 2009, the German Foreign Ministry was controlled by Frank-Walter Steinmeier of the Social-Democratic Party. Steinmeier's Foreign Ministry took aim at establishing an Eastern Policy, or *Ostpolitik*, that tightened relations with Russia and even wanted to export this policy to the rest of the European Union in the form of a broader policy toward Russia just as Merkel was set to undertake her term of rotating responsibilities as President of the European Union. An internal paper prepared by the Foreign Ministry, which was dominated by Social Democrats at the time, titled "The German EU Presidency: Russia, European Neighborhood Policy, and Central Asia," offered the following pro-Russia policy formulation suggestion: "Russia will play a central role in the German EU Presidency. Germany wants its chapter of close German-Russia relations to be brought into the wider development of a European-Russia partnership."[164] Experts who advise Merkel, on the other hand, suggest that she seeks a more even-handed approach that takes into account the interests of Poland and the Baltic states who frequently lobby for the EU to keep a distance with Russia, and lean heavily on NATO members to restrict the breadth of Russia's influence in Europe. Some eastern European nations perceive the Social Democratic Party's influence in the Grand Coalition, as well as Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democratic Union's close ties to a German business lobby which benefits immensely from investments in Russia, to be handcuffing the Chancellor from shaping a *Russlandpolitik* that is multilateral and inclusive of eastern European interests.

Social Democrats within Germany's governing body continued to push for closer Russo-German relations even after Schröder was defeated by Angela Merkel, of the center-right, Christian Democratic Union, for the Chancery. By suggesting that Germany undertake a policy that would essentially distance

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[163] Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," Foreign Affairs, 88.2 (March/April 2009). p. 96

[164] Judy Dempsey, "New policy on Russia splits German leaders – Europe – International Herald Tribune," The New York Times. October 6, 2006. < http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/world/europe/06iht-politic.3062482.html>

itself from NATO allies: the idea of *Äquidistanz*, or equidistance, between Moscow and Washington, D.C. Peter Struck, Gerhard Schröder's former Minister of Defence and head of the Social Democratic parliamentary group argued in 2007 that "Germany should have the same proximity to America on one hand and Russia on the other hand.[165]" Another notable foreign-affairs voice within the Social Democratic party, Gert Weisskirchen, suggested efforts to export German policy toward Russia under Schröder to the rest of Europe, stating that "our policy is to one day bring Russia into Europe, where it belongs in its heart and in its culture. Russia wants and needs partnerships."[166] Conversely, political insiders close to Merkel deny the Chancellor's involvement in the foreign ministry's pro-Russia policy paper, and evidence suggests that Merkel is much more conscious of Eastern Europe's sensitivity towards a strong German-Russian relationship and has made efforts to quell suspicious eastern European nations: The Chancellor attempted to reconcile anger over the Nord Stream project by offering a Polish arm of the pipeline as a concession to Warsaw, hoping to turn a bilateral energy agreement of the Schröder era, one which agitated Poland and other ex-Soviet states, into a multilateral energy deal.[167] Merkel has also taken measures to counter the Russian policy on Europe, which seeks to "divide and rule" by bilateralizing relations with its European partners, by turning down the Russian offer of a national German share in the Shtokman gas field in favor of European participation.[168]

Merkel realizes that Germany needs Russia's energy, especially after domestic decisions were put into action to reduce the number of Germany's nuclear power plants; and Merkel's Christian Democratic Union would like to remain in the good graces of Germany's business lobby, which is largely pro-Russian due to commerce and economic development opportunities. Because of this, the Chancellor appears set to support Germany's partnership with Russia insofar as energy and economic matters are concerned. Having grown up in East Germany during the Soviet occupation, however, she is skeptical about Russia's democratic prospects as well as their human rights record and seems to share many of the post-Soviet states' anti-Russian sentiments.[169] During her visit to Russia as chancellor, in January 2006, Merkel made a point of meeting with human rights activists, and also called for an investigation into the murder of the activist Natalia Estemirova, who was abducted in July 2006 from her home in Chechnya's Grozny and

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[165] Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 51, No. 2, London: Routledge (April/May 2009) p. 109.
[166] Robert Marquand, "Why Germany's giving Russia a bearhug," The Christian Science Monitor. February 3, 2010. < http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0203/Why-Germany-s-giving-Russia-a-bearhug>
[167] Eric Gujer, "No More Hypocrisy, Germany Is A Great Power," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung: February 2009, p. 39
[168] Eckart Von Klaeden, "No Private Trains To Moscow: German Policy On Russia Must Be European," Körber Foundation International Affairs. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. April 2009. p. 59
[169] Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," The Washington Quarterly, 30.2 (2007) pp. 141-142.

shot.[170] This is where Schröder and the Social Democrats' sought *Russlandpolitik* differ in perspective with Chancellor Merkel and that of the Christian Democratic Union's. The Social Democratic Party, which dominated the foreign ministry for some time under Merkel's Chancery, feels that human rights issues and Russia's questionable record with democracy should be left out of a German *Russlandpolitik*, which should be tailored to German national interests – as they perceive them – of economic development and security.

In spite of these differences, there are a number of issues embedded in Germany's *Russlandpolitik* where consensus prevails, occasionally at the expense of both U.S. and NATO interests. Opposition to a third round of NATO enlargement in the wake of the August 2008 crisis has intensified across the German political spectrum, with seemingly all within Germany against setting Ukraine and Georgia on course for NATO membership.[171] Personally, Merkel herself is also firmly opposed to extending NATO membership to Ukraine or Georgia – a red line for the Kremlin, which now says it is entitled to a zone of influence in its near abroad.[172] The broad conclusion throughout Berlin is that neither Ukraine, nor Georgia, possesses the political stability to begin pursuing NATO membership, especially after Russia disabled gas supplies through Ukraine and invaded Georgia in the not-so-distant past. Furthermore, acquisitions such as these antagonize Russia at a critical time when Moscow has permitted the use of its territory to bolster NATO efforts in the war in Afghanistan. Both conservatives and liberal Social Democrats within Germany's government also expressed collective opposition to a U.S. Missile Defense system in Eastern Europe, seeing this also as antagonistic toward Russia. Heinrich Kreft, senior diplomat and foreign-policy advisor to the Conservative parliamentary group in Germany, stated that "policies that strengthen the hawks in the Kremlin should be avoided," and called for policymaking that favored a stable Russia.[173] This is not to say that consensus does not take shape in Berlin against Russia, but it is more in rhetoric than in policy. Upon Russia's invasion of Georgia, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier called Russia's actions 'illegal' and 'disproportional.' The German Chancellery and the German Foreign Ministry – not previously known for agreeing much on Russia policy – were at pains to demonstrate total unity on the subject.[174] Merkel also condemned the incursion as unnecessary publicly while in Russia, but went no further in criticizing the event.

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[170] Luke Harding, "Germany and Russia: likely bedfellows," The Guardian. September 25, 2009. < http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/25/germany-russia-special-relationship>
[171] Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 51, No. 2, London: Routledge (April/May 2009) p. 108
[172] Luke Harding, "Germany and Russia: likely bedfellows," The Guardian. September 25, 2009.
[173] Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 51, No. 2, London: Routledge (April/May 2009) p. 118, *citing* an interview with Heinrich Kreft.
[174] Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," Foreign Affairs, 88.2 (March/April 2009). p. 94.

When it comes to Germany's *Russlandpolitik*, the bottom line for most German leaders is that the isolation of Russia is unacceptable and must be avoided at all costs.[175] Instability and insecurity from within Russia, they fear, could lead to disastrous consequences that have already begun to manifest themselves in the form of military incursions, using gas imports into Europe as political weaponry, and apprehension among eastern European nations pertaining to looming aggressors within the Kremlin. Therefore, Germany continues to champion a fairly consistent *Russlandpolitik* of economic integration to assimilate Russia into Europe hoping that their example develops into a broader European Union policy and ultimately interlocks the economic interests of Russia and Europe, prompting Russia to think twice before taking either aggressive actions against nations it relies on commercially and economically. Merkel will concentrate on building consensus on a common EU foreign and security policy within EU member states and will cautiously avoid any indication of a German special relationship with Russia so not to distance sensitive eastern European nations.[176] Meanwhile, for Germany specifically, energy security and economic and commercial interests remain firmly embedded in an integrationist R*usslandpolitik*.

Russia-UK Relations

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, relations between the United Kingdom and Russia have deteriorated rapidly during the second half of the past decade. The U.K.-Russia relationship has gone from 'strategic partnership' to open diplomatic tension and mistrust.[177] Frequent instances of Russian espionage, and accusations of such from both Moscow and London, along with politically-motivated pressure upon bilateral commerce, disputes over Russia's handling of Chechen separatists, and Moscow's perceptions of the British Parliament as hypocritical have all contributed to near-Cold War era levels of mistrust. For the United Kingdom, tension has also heightened recently due to the realization of Britain's rising energy consumption and feared prospect of dependence on Russian energy supplies; a resource that Moscow does not hesitate to utilize as a political tool. Furthermore, recent tit-for-tat provocations by each of the respective governing bodies have only exacerbated apprehension between Moscow and London.

Britain's security forces have identified Russia as the third most serious threat facing the island-nation in 2008.[178] This is due, in large part, to the continuation of a long-standing, post-Soviet trend of espionage between the two nations. In May 2005, Britain's military intelligence service, MI-5 reportedly

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[175] Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. Vol. 51, No. 2, London: Routledge (April/May 2009) p. 116.
[176] Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," The Washington Quarterly, 30.2 (2007) p. 145.
[177] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Affairs. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 42 http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1ef82b3f011e075853_0fm6bphgw.pdf.
[178] Philip Webster, "Russia rated UK's biggest threat after al-Qaeda, Iran," The Times Online, July 4, 2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4265569.ece.

warned government departments in the United Kingdom of the existence of 32 Russian agents operating under diplomatic cover from the Russian embassy in London.[179] Perhaps the most significant spy scandal between the two nations occurred one year after MI-5 issued the notification when, in November 2006, former KGB officer and then-British citizen, Alexander Litvinenko was presumably poisoned while residing in Britain. Suspected of poisoning Litvinenko with radioactive polonium was Russian Andrei Lugovoi, a former KGB bodyguard.[180] When Russia refused to extradite Lugovoi, Britain responded by expelling four Russian diplomats and Moscow followed suit, with Russian officials describing the action as a retaliatory measure.[181] Both Moscow and London also imposed visa restrictions on travelling officials.[182] Moscow's refusal to extradite Andrei Lugovoi could also have been a retaliatory response to London's 2003 refusals to extradite the oligarch Boris Berezovsky and Chechen leader Akhmed Zakaev, both wanted for crimes in Russia.[183]

London's refusal to extradite Zakaev was particularly alarming for Moscow and indicative of a broader, longstanding disagreement over Russia's policy toward the North Caucasus region. Russia sees its efforts in Chechnya as a conflict against radical Islamic terrorists and separatists and, after September 11, 2001, it was easy to include the Chechen conflict as part of the broader, global 'war on terror.' In response, London pursued a nuanced approach to Russia's actions in Chechnya, sympathizing with Russia as a victim of brutal terrorist attacks at the same time as seeking to promote human rights within Chechnya.[184] However, as criticism throughout the United Kingdom – namely in the media – grew, Moscow became perturbed by the perceived hypocrisy of U.K. opinion. Pertaining to human rights concerns with regard to the way in which Russia prosecuted the Chechen conflict, officials in Moscow began to accuse the West of applying double-standards when criticizing Russian action in Chechnya while supporting the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.[185] Prime Minister Putin also publicly questioned the perceived hypocrisy of the British asylum law protecting dissident Akhmad Zakayev:

"Why do you allow Great Britain to be used as a launch pad? That is why it is not possible to

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[179] Dr. Andrew Monaghan, *ed.* "The UK and Russia – A Troubled Relationship," Conflict Studies Research Centre, London, UK: Defence Academy of the UK (May 2007), p. 20. http://studies.agentura.ru/centres/csrc/ukruss.pdf

[180] Guy Faulconbridge, "Russia suspends British Council regional offices," Reuters, December 12, 2007. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1288433020071212?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&rpc=22&sp=true.

[181] "UK – Russia Diplomatic Row Worsens," BBC News, January 14, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7186718.stm.

[182] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Affairs. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 42.

[183] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Affairs. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 42.

[184] Dr. Andrew Monaghan, *ed.* "The UK and Russia – A Troubled Relationship," Conflict Studies Research Centre, London, UK: Defence Academy of the UK (May 2007), p. 16.

[185] Dr. Andrew Monaghan, *ed.* "The UK and Russia – A Troubled Relationship," Conflict Studies Research Centre, London, UK: Defence Academy of the UK (May 2007), p. 16.

build a normal relationship. It would be like Russia allowing known IRA terrorists to use Russia as a safe haven to plan attacks."[186]

Alluding to perceptions throughout the Kremlin that London was accommodating the Chechen rebel movement from within the United Kingdom, even if inadvertently, Putin's statement encapsulates the diverging perspectives pertaining to Russia's Chechen conflict: Moscow perceives Chechen rebels to be terrorists and criminals while London, sensitive to Britain's growing Muslim population, is fearful of backlash in the form of ethnically-motivated violence within their own borders and, thus, refuses to accommodate Moscow's extradition requests while continuing to criticize human rights violations in Chechnya. This rift in opinion of Russia's actions in Chechnya, and the debate in definition of Chechen rebels as freedom fighters or terrorists, continues to hamper relations between Moscow and London, mostly because it had evolved into tit-for-tat snubbing of extradition requests as seen when London demanded the extradition of a suspected spy murderer some years later.

London's mistrust of Moscow has also begun to manifest itself in U.K. energy security strategy. Upon Russia's invasion of South Ossetia in 2008, then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown issued remarks calling for a shift away from British utilization of Russian energy. The Prime Minister's remarks reflected fears that the territorial conflict over South Ossetia could have risked spilling into an energy war, with Russia using its vast supplies of oil and gas – on which many European countries depend – to blackmail the West into submission.[187] Prime Minister Brown pressed further, issuing a statement to U.K.-based *Guardian News* stating his hopes that the United Kingdom and Europe would collaborate to avoid an energy war with Russia by pursuing a collective energy strategy, rather than seek separate, bilateral energy deals with Russia: "I will encourage European partners to use our collective bargaining power rather than seek separate energy deals with Russia."[188] For Gordon Brown, Russia's invasion of Georgia may have been the final straw, as earlier in 2008 Russian co-owners of British Petroleum filed suit for control of the joint project with Russia's state-owned Gazprom. This incident was not the first, however, as Gazprom wrested control over multibillion dollar gas projects from joint ventures led by both Shell and BP in 2007.[189] However, a shift away from Russian energy supplies is seen as particularly difficult for the United Kingdom, but not because of over-dependency on Russian supplies. The nature of the U.K.'s energy business relationship with Russia is a very different one [than that of Europe], dominated not by

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[186] Richard Beeston, "Putin tells Britain: relations can only improve when you remove dissidents," Times Online, September 12, 2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4734450.ece.
[187] Gaby Hinsliff, "Russia will not hold us to ransom – Brown," Guardian News, August 31, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/aug/31/gordonbrown.russia
[188] Gordon Brown, "This is how we will stand up to Russia's naked aggression," Guardian News, August 31, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/31/russia.georgia/
[189] Katinka Barysch, "Russia, realism and EU unity," Centre for European Reform, London, UK: CER (July 2007), p. 3. http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_russia_FINAL_20july07.pdf

U.K. imports of Russian hydrocarbons, but by inward investment into the Russian oil and gas sector by U.K. companies.[190] As such, it is perceived that it will be much more difficult for the United Kingdom to shy away from Russian energy supplies since a great deal of British energy companies are partaking in energy projects with Russian companies.

A European Council on Foreign Affairs study in 2007 categorizes the United Kingdom in a group with Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden as nations tending to be "frosty pragmatists" relative to Russia.[191] These nations, the report states, are "pragmatic and oriented towards business interests with Russia but do not hesitate to raise concerns about democracy and human rights, and are likely to challenge Russia when it violates their commercial interests as well as diplomatic norms."[192] More recently, James Nixey and Dmitry Babich, wrote in 2009 that "one might expect the U.K. position [pertaining to Russia] to fall in line with whatever a U.S. president is seeking to achieve," proceeding to explain that U.K.-Russian cultural, educational, commercial, and political underpinnings vary from those of the United States and Russia. In 2009, the United Kingdom's then-Shadow Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Philip Hammond, cited a lack of engagement with Russia as the main cause of the current predicament between the two nations – a "deep frozen non engagement" – and suggested that Gordon Brown was deliberately avoiding engagement with President Medvedev.[193] Upon Gordon Brown's resignation, tensions still exist between Russia and the United Kingdom based largely on mutual apprehension and lack of political cooperation, in spite of the existence of workable commercial relations.

Russia-Italy Relations

Italy and Russia are considered to be strategic partners and, as such, are said to enjoy a 'special relationship' – one that, from time to time, undermines broader European Union polices and objectives.[194] Similarly to Germany, France, and Spain, Italy engages Russia in political and economic partnerships of mutual interest. Occasionally, the bilateral nature of the Italian-Russian relationship draws ire from fellow EU and NATO member nations more skeptical of Moscow's intentions, in particular Italy's participation

[190] Dr. Andrew Monaghan, *ed.* "The UK and Russia – A Troubled Relationship," Conflict Studies Research Centre, London, UK: Defence Academy of the UK (May 2007), p. 37.
[191] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Affairs. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 42.
[192] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Affairs. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 42.
[193] "UK – Russia relations 'deeply frozen," EPolitix, October 14, 2009. http://www.epolitix.com/latestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/uk-russia-relations-deeply-frozen/
[194] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Affairs. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 2. http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1ef82b3f011e075853_0fm6bphgw.pdf

in, and approval of, Russia's South Stream gas pipeline set to rival the Nabucco gas pipeline which excludes Russia.

Commercially, the two countries have warm business ties, even as Russia's trade relations with other European countries have soured.[195] In 2007, Italy was the second highest exporter to Russia, behind Germany, and the third-highest importer, behind both Germany and the Netherlands.[196] During a 2007 meeting, then-Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia was "open to a close and comprehensive partnership with Italian businesses," and that he saw no reason for the bilateral partnership not to "expand and strengthen."[197] However, by 2009, due to the global downturn bilateral trade between Italy and Russia registered a 30% drop.[198]

The energy sector is an area whereby Italy and Russia cooperate considerably. While Italy does rely upon Russian gas supplies, bilateral projects between the two nations are aimed at energy diversification inclusive of nuclear energy as well. In April 2010, Italy and Russia signed an agreement of cooperation in the nuclear sector aimed at exchanging technological know-how and building new power plants.[199] While the Italian and Russian research ministries launched a joint study on nuclear fusion, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Italian oil giant Eni and Russia's Inter Rao Ues to collaborate in the construction of nuclear power plants and in boosting energy efficiency, technical innovation and distribution in Russia and Eastern European countries.[200] Italy is also an active supporter of Russian-led South Stream gas pipeline project designed to transfer gas from Central Asia to Europe starting in 2015.[201] Presently, Russia's Gazprom and Italy's Eni each own 50% of the 900-kilometer-long (560-mile) South Stream.[202] Pending a June 2010 signing, however, each of the two stake-holders is set to cede 10% of their respective shares to French Electricite de France SA.[203] The South Stream pipeline, once completed, will rival the European-backed Nabucco pipeline, which was explicitly conceived as a

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[195] Andrew E. Kramer, "Italy and Russia Complete Flurry of Deals," New York Times, April 8, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/business/global/08gazprom.html

[196] Fraser Cameron and Aaron Matta, "Prospects for EU-Russia Relations," Pan-European Institute. Turku, Finland: PEI (June 2008), p. 7: "In 2007, Germany was the top exporter to Russia (€23,132m) followed by Italy (€7,639) and Finland (€6,200m). Germany again leads the import list with €29,023m followed by the Netherlands (€17,018m) and Italy (€13,592m)."

[197] Abdul Ruff, "Russia-Italy ties," Global Politician, April 23, 2008. http://www.globalpolitician.com/24577-italy-russia

[198] "Italy, Russia sign nuclear agreement," People's Daily Online, Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6964487.html

[199] "Italy, Russia sign nuclear agreement," People's Daily Online, Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010.

[200] "Italy, Russia sign nuclear agreement," People's Daily Online, Xinhua News Agency, April 27, 2010.

[201] Abdul Ruff, "Russia-Italy ties," Global Politician, April 23, 2008.

[202] Lyubov Pronina and Jeffrey Donovan, "Medvedev, Berlusconi Oversee South Stream Accord (Update 1)," Bloomberg, December 3, 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=AZA%3AIM&sid=adTpyYMH5lbE

[203] Anna Shiryaevskaya, "Gazprom, Eni to Sell Equal South Stream Stakes to EDF (Update 1)," Bloomberg Business Week, April 27, 2010. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-27/gazprom-eni-to-sell-equal-south-stream-stakes-to-edf-update1-.html

means for European Union nations to diversify their energy imports under the pretext of increased energy security. This has prompted a rift throughout the European Union, as vulnerable East European nations have called for a common EU energy policy over bilateral deals between EU nations and Russia; one which shifts away from reliance upon Russia's energy supplies that East Europe fears will be used as a political tool. Politicians in EU nations having warm relations with Russia – namely France, Germany, Spain, and Italy – insist that it is mainly up to the East Europeans to improve their energy security and thus reduce their vulnerability to Russian troublemaking.[204]

Just as Italy and Russia cooperate closely commercially and within the energy sphere, cooperation is likewise prevalent politically. As a member of both the European Union and NATO, Italy has worked to establish dialogue between Russia and the two organizations when appropriate, but also has hampered decisions made in the respective organizations that would isolate, disenfranchise, or otherwise antagonize Moscow. Italy was among the leading sponsors of the creation of the NATO-Russia Council upon its inception, a forum designed to promote cooperation between the two rivals.[205] However, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi more recently publicly favored a proposal by Russia for a new European security agreement that could prevent the eastward expansion of NATO if the alliance harms Russia's interests.[206] This statement came at a time of heightened pressure among many within NATO to offer membership action plans for Ukraine and Georgia, thus snubbing the efforts of several NATO members. Similarly, Italy's relationship with Russia frequently transcends broader EU-Russia relations. Italy, along with France and Germany, had all signed separate bilateral visa facilitation deals with Russia, which breached Schengen trans-national travel rules and were ultimately suspended by the European Commission, prompting the entire EU to negotiate a visa facilitation deal with Russia well ahead of similar negotiations scheduled with nations within Europe.[207] While Italy's visa agreement with Russia ultimately prompted the establishment of a broader EU negotiation, the initial bilateral nature of the agreement indicates Rome's willingness to collaborate with Russia outside of the EU realm. However, in spite of Italian intent to seek bilateral cooperation on some of the aforementioned issues – visas and energy – Italian officials have recently expressed their desire for EU-inclusive collaboration with Russia on others. Speaking on the recent Russia-EU summit in May 2010, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs

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[204] Katinka Barysch, "Should the Nabucco pipeline project be shelved?" Centre for European Reform. London, UK: CER (May 2010). http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_Nabucco_5may10.pdf
[205] *Ed.* Yan, "Italy, Russia pave way for closer military cooperation," Xinhuanet, May 21, 2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-05/21/c_13307009.htm
[206] Lyubov Pronina and Jeffrey Donovan, "Medvedev, Berlusconi Oversee South Stream Accord (Update 1)," Bloomberg, December 3, 2009.
[207] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Affairs. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 16.

Franco Frattini expressed optimism on reaching a framework agreement on joint crisis management in countries including Georgia and the Balkan states.[208]

Much like France and Germany, Italy does not hesitate to cultivate a bilateral relationship with Russia. However, some cooperation does address broader EU, NATO, and global concerns, and many of the bilateral meetings focus on the promotion of Italy-Russian collaboration on issues such as terrorism, Iran's nuclear program, Afghanistan's peace keeping mission, and the exchange of military information and personnel.[209] Regardless of the significance and global nature of the issues discussed, there still exists a divergence within the European Union over addressing Russia multilaterally or bilaterally. Apprehensive eastern European nations frequently disapprove of what they see as Italy undermining alleged cohesion of EU nations' policies.

Russia-Romania Ties

A recent report put forth by the London-based European Council on Foreign Affairs on present EU-Russian relations tabbed Romania's actions toward Russia as resembling that of a 'frosty pragmatist,' inclined to interact with Russia based upon business interests, but more likely than most to be suspicious and speak out against Russian behavior on human rights and other issues.[210] Romania is, in fact, apprehensive of Russian activities throughout the Black Sea and Balkan regions that Romania is sandwiched between; and since joining both NATO, in 2004, and the European Union, in 2007, Romania has proactively lured both organizations into geopolitical affairs challenging the Black Sea region.

Romania sees itself as a regional rival of Russia and, as such, has one of the more aggressive Russia policies among NATO nations. Upon its accession into both NATO and the European Union, and the election of President Traian Basescu, Romania has actively engaged in collaborative strategies designed to marginalize Russian influence throughout the Black Sea, the Balkan region of Europe, and into parts of Eurasia all while Romania attempts to entrench itself as an influential member of the European Union. Its eventual accession in NATO in 2004 and the European Union (EU) in January 2007 came as a result of Romanian's unyielding commitment for their 'return to Europe' as well as Romania's special geopolitical significance for both institutions.[211] While dismayed by Romania's blatant attempt to disrupt what Moscow sees as the establishment of stability by way of Russian hegemony, Russian leaders

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[208] *Ed.* Yan, "Italy, Russia pave way for closer military cooperation," Xinhuanet, May 21, 2010.
[209] *Ed.* Yan, "Italy, Russia pave way for closer military cooperation," Xinhuanet, May 21, 2010.
[210] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007). p. 2. <http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_pr_russia_power_audit/>
[211] Nikolaos El. Popakostas, "Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good," Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece: IIER (June 2009). P. 5 < http://www.idec.gr/iier/new/PAPAKOSTAS%20REPORT-%20ROMANIA%20-%20FINAL-%2013-5-2009.pdf>

were particularly alarmed at what was viewed as pandering to United States efforts to antagonize Russia. Furthermore, all of this came at a time when some of the most influential nations in Europe were united with Russia in opposition to what many perceived as U.S. designs for global hegemony under the Bush administration. With the pro-Russia days of former President Iliescu having been swept away seemingly overnight with the election of President Basescu and accession into NATO, bilateral relations between Bucharest and Moscow have deteriorated rapidly.

As a relatively new member of the European Union, and an active collaborator throughout the Black Sea region, Romania hopes to play off of European fears of Russian energy dominance over Europe and force the EU's hand in containing Russia's resurgence. Comprehensive foreign policy amongst EU members has also been perceived as a viable means by which Romania could gain influence in the region. Through the intensification of European cooperation on foreign affairs, Bucharest wishes to promote its policies in the Black Sea and the Balkans by utilizing the political, economic, and military support provided by the Union.[212] Romanian foreign policy, since its admission in the EU in 2007, has been characterized by its strong support to projects and initiatives aiming at intensifying EU Neighborhood Policy (ENP) through tightening the Union's relations with South East European and the Black Sea countries.[213] Striving to prove to the European Union that it can be a stabilizing regional player, thus Romania's cooperation with fellow Black Sea resulted in a number of cooperative initiatives that, as Russia felt, were designed to undermine and marginalize Russia's resurging influence regionally, particularly in regards to fears that Russia sought to use energy resources to manipulate the European Union. Oftentimes, challenges to Russia's energy sector dominance are at the heart of Romania's antagonism. Romania's strong support for the establishment of a common European energy policy which will maximize EU's ability and authority to finance energy projects in cooperation with Black and Caspian Sea countries is again derived from its aspiration to minimize Russian influence both with regards to the EU and the Black Sea region.[214]

Several of Romania's cooperative initiatives explicitly exhibit Romania's willingness to challenge Russia regionally, utilizing a 'strength in numbers' approach. Romania and other nations from the Baltic and Black Sea regions created the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) in December 2005in hopes of "removing the remaining divisions in the [Baltic-Black Sea] region, human rights

[212] Nikolaos El. Popakostas, "Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good," Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece: IIER (June 2009). p. 21
[213] Nikolaos El. Popakostas, "Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good," Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece: IIER (June 2009). p. 15
[214] Nikolaos El. Popakostas, "Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good," Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece: IIER (June 2009). p. 20

violations, and any type of confrontation or frozen conflict."[215] Officials selectively identified their apprehension of Russia, insinuating the organization was an opportunity to coalesce publicly against Russia. Georgia's State Minister Giorgi Baramidze defended the organization, stating "It is extremely important that we should know who's going where, because, democracy-wise, Russia is in a very difficult situation today – to put it mildly. In nearly all domains, we can often see alarming signs of authoritarianism [there]."[216] Insinuating Russia's resurgence would evolve into aggression throughout both the Baltic and Black Sea regions, Baramidze readily admitted the new alliance was being formed, if not to confront Russia, then at least to counterbalance its influence.[217] Through cooperative regional councils and coalitions such as these, and by influencing the European Union, Romania seeks to hedge Russian designs for regional control.

NATO appears to be yet another mechanism by which Romania can reinforce its aggressive tone against Russia with cooperative policy. As one of the NATO members supporting NATO expansion and, more controversially both within NATO and Europe, offering membership to Ukraine and Georgia, Romania eyes NATO influence in the region as a feasible means to counter Russia's encroachment. In 2008, Romania hosted the NATO summit in its capital city of Bucharest, Romania reaffirmed its support of the inclusion of the aforementioned nations into the organization. As the United States was one of the very few NATO members advancing efforts to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, Romania aimed at decreasing Russia's role in the region and promoting itself as a reliable U.S. ally in the latter's effort to create a buffer zone in Eurasia (through the antiballistic-missile shield in Eastern Europe, Georgia, and Afghanistan) in order to isolate both Russia and China.[218] Also signifying Romanian defiance of resurging Russian influence regionally, Bucharest agreed with the United States to house up to 24 land-based interceptor missiles after the overturning of initial plans to implement the missiles in Poland due to public Russian objection.[219] Chief Romanian negotiator Bogdan Aurescu touted the missile shield as "increased security for Romania, and more security for the Black Sea region as a whole."[220] Meanwhile, Romanian President Traian Basescu explicitly stressed that the medium-ranged land-based interceptor missiles will

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[215] Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community of Democratic Choice," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. December 2, 2005. < http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063461.html>
[216] Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community of Democratic Choice," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. December 2, 2005.
[217] Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community of Democratic Choice," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. December 2, 2005.
[218] Nikolaos El. Popakostas, "Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good," Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece: IIER (June 2009). p. 25
[219] Nick Thorpe, "Romania defends role in US missile shield," BBC News. August 3, 2010. < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8587946.stm>
[220] Nick Thorpe, "Romania defends role in US missile shield," BBC News. August 3, 2010.

not be directed against Russia.[221] Predictably, Moscow displayed both disappointment and apprehension to the deal, threatening that it may throw off course future U.S. – Russian rapprochement, in spite of reassurance from Bucharest.

Overall, Romania's antagonistic stance towards Russia is an outcome of its aspirations to acquire a regulatory economic and political position in the Black Sea and the Balkans both individually and as a member of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.[222] Seemingly, since most of the more powerful European Union members have recently sought a multipolar global environment which permits Russia's resurgent power and openly pursuing rapprochement towards Moscow, Romania's previously mentioned aspirations have manifested political positioning favorable to United States interests – housing the missile defense system and promoting the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO – which may be perceived as antagonistic towards Russia in EU member opinion.

Russia-Greece Relations

Both commercially and politically, Greece has enjoyed an extremely productive relationship with Russia; one that is reinforced by a foundation of ancient cultural and more recent geopolitical roots.[223] As with many other European nations, whether EU or NATO members, energy security commands a decisive share of influence shaping Greece's policies towards Russia, a major energy exporter. Furthermore, the volatile region in which Greece is located geographically is one where Russia holds some degree of influence, as Greece is wedged between an instable Balkan region and historical rival Turkey. Russia, therefore, provides Greece with a relatively influential ally, while Greece provides Russia with a spokesman within the European Union.

Former Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis previously cited the "excellent relations" between Greece and Russia, citing close cooperation at both the bilateral level and also in international organizations.[224] More specifically, the Foreign Minister spoke of Greece's "vanguard" role in strengthening relations between Russia and the European Union, as well as of close cooperation between the two countries in the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization.[225] Russia's

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[221] Sergey Borisov, "ROAR: Missiles in Romania 'may influence Russia – US reset," Russia Times. February 5, 2010. < http://rt.com/Politics/2010-02-05/roar-missiles-romania-influence.html>

[222] Nikolaos El. Popakostas, "Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good," Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece: IIER (June 2009). p. 31

[223] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 27 http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1ef82b3f011e075853_0fm6bphgw.pdf.

[224] Embassy of Greece (website), "Greece, Russia to draft new 2-year Action Plan on bilateral relations," Athens News Agency, as viewed May 24, 2010. http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=2&folder=24&article=19076.

[225] Embassy of Greece "Upgrading of Greek-Russian relations continues, FM says," Athens News Agency, November 23, 2006. http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=2&folder=24&article=19075

participation in the organization had been frequently challenged throughout the past decade by regional rival – and a fellow NATO member of Greece – Romania, whose leaders sought to undermine Russia's influence in the BSEC by attempting to alter the economic nature of the organization into one that is more politically pro-active, while also organizing the anti-Russian Community of Democratic Choice in December 2005 which included many regional and Balkan states.[226] Greek designs to enhance Russia's relationship with the European Union and, on a local level, nation states in Southeastern Europe contradict the efforts of EU and NATO member states, such as aforementioned Romania, either apprehensive of or competitive with Russia in one way or another.

One nation, and another fellow NATO member, particularly apprehensive of Russian-Greek relations is a longtime regional rival of both nations – Turkey. Likewise, Turkey is perceived by Greek security and defense policy as the main and most imminent source of external threat to its sovereignty and national interest.[227] Over the years, Russia has provided Greece with useful support in its dealings with Turkey and a ready supply of military equipment.[228] Since 2007, Russia has been in discussions with Greece to sell it significant amounts of military equipment, a first for a NATO ally.[229] Greece's Defense Minister Evangelos Venezelos, upon addressing plans between Russia and Greece to conduct joint naval exercises, acknowledged military-technological cooperation as a critical element of bilateral ties between Greece and Russia, stating in 2010 that "they play an important role both in the development of bilateral relations between Russia and Greece and in the development of Russia-EU relations in general."[230] As such, Turkey finds itself anxiously concerned about Greece's "weapons and pipelines" diplomacy with Russia.[231]

Energy supply projects between Greece and Russia are also an area of concern among EU and NATO nations, particularly since Greece has recently signed on to two pipeline projects with Russia designed to counter the EU's Nabucco pipeline. Greece and Russia are close to signing a contract to name an Athens-based company to coordinate construction of Greece's portion of the South Stream gas

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[226] Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Ukraine: Regional Leaders Set Up Community of Democratic Choice," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. December 2, 2005. < http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063461.html>, and Nikolaos El. Popakostas, "Romanian Foreign Policy Post Euro-Atlantic Accession: So Far So Good," Institute of International Economic Relations, Greece: IIER (June 2009). p. 28 http://www.idec.gr/iier/new/PAPAKOSTAS%20REPORT-%20ROMANIA%20-%20FINAL-%2013-5-2009.pdf

[227] Thanos Dokos, *ed.* "Greek Security Policy in the 21st Century," Hellenic Foundation For European and Foreign Policy. Athens, Greece: ELIAMEP (2007). http://central.radiopod.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/pp07_09_eng.pdf

[228] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 28

[229] John C.K. Daly, "Russia Wants To Sell Greece Weapons As Well As Gas," Eurasia Daily Monitor. Vol. 4, Iss. 236, (December 20, 2007). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33262

[230] "Russia, Greece to hold joint naval drills in 2010," RIA Novosti, March 30, 2010. http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100330/158365114.html

[231] John C.K. Daly, "Russia Wants To Sell Greece Weapons As Well As Gas," Eurasia Daily Monitor. Vol. 4, Iss. 236, (December 20, 2007).

pipeline.[232] As a participant transit country for the South Stream project, skirting transit countries Turkey and Ukraine, Greece seemingly undermines fellow NATO member Turkey yet again, as the pipeline will draw from the same underground resources as the Nabucco pipeline, which travels through Turkey into Europe. Athens is also participating in the construction of the first ever Russia-controlled oil pipeline in the EU: Burgas-Alexandroupolis which aims at reducing Greece's dependence on Middle Eastern oil.[233] The pipeline is designed to transfer Russian oil, shipped to Bulgaria by sea, from Bulgaria to Greece via pipeline, thus establishing Greece as a regional energy hub rivaling local transit nations such as Turkey and Ukraine.

In a 2007 report issued by the European Council on Foreign Relations on EU-Russia relations, authors Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu grouped Greece and Cyprus as 'Trojan Horses;' "nations who often defend Russian interests in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions."[234] More recently, Russian and Greek officials have issued joint-statements confirming the bilateral nature of their relationship on a broad range of issues from the economy, energy, trade to technology and culture, as well as in the EU and NATO frameworks.[235] In spite of blatant efforts on the part of Greece to block EU initiatives which Russia opposed – as when, in 2007, Greece stopped the EU from extending the mandate of the EU Border Support Team in Georgia to include the secessionist region of Abkhazia and blocking a 2006 EU peace support mission in Moldova, both of which Russia opposed – Greek officials continue to press for broader collaboration between the EU and Russia.[236] Prior to leaving office, former Prime Minister of Greece, Konstantinos Karamanlis, called for further rapprochement on international problems linked to both the European Union and Russia, with Greece leading the rapprochement by example.[237]

The Turkey Temptation

Russian leaders seem particularly interested in courting Turkey as a potentially disruptive force within NATO. Turkey's potential in this endeavor has been very much in evidence in recent months, including with respect to both Iran and Israel. During the Cold War, relations between Turkey and the

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[232] HK Tzanis, "Greece, Russia promote Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline," Southeast European Times. February 29, 2010. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/02/19/feature-02

[233] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 27, citing "Russia agrees to speed up Balkan oil pipeline project,' International Herald Tribune, September 4, 2006, found at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/04/business/worldbusiness/04iht-gas.2693137.html

[234] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), p. 2.

[235] "Greece, Russia sign joint action plan on economic cooperation," China View/Xinhuanet. December 3, 2009. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/03/content_12579265.htm

[236] Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations. London, UK: ECFR (January 2007), pp. 16, 36.

[237] John C.K. Daly, "Russia Wants To Sell Greece Weapons As Well As Gas," Eurasia Daily Monitor. Vol. 4, Iss. 236, (December 20, 2007).

Soviet Union were strained due to Ankara's decision to ally itself firmly with the United States and its NATO allies. The pro-Western elite that dominated the country's foreign and defense policies viewed Turkey's affiliation with NATO as defining and ensuring its status as a core member of the Western camp. NATO simultaneously defended Turkey against the Warsaw Pact and benefited from Ankara's efforts to deter Soviet adventurism. Though confrontations occurred between Turkey and fellow alliance member Greece over Cyprus and other issues, these conflicts actually highlighted NATO's additional value in moderating differences between Athens and Ankara. Russian-Turkish ties remained troubled even during the first few years following the end of the Cold War and the demise of Soviet Union. The leaders of the new Russian Federation feared a strengthening of pan-Turkism among the Turkish peoples of Central Asia, with a corresponding decrease in Moscow's influence in the region. From the Turkish perspective, the Russian government's initial reluctance to label the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, despite its attacks against civilian targets in Turkey, and its support for the Greek Cypriots, presented major stumbling blocks to better bilateral relations.[238]

Relations between Turkey and Russia began to improve toward the end of the decade. One of the consequences of the 1998 Russian economic collapse following the Asian financial crisis was to force a softening of Moscow's approach toward Turkey. By then, Russian leaders had recognized that Turkey lacked the resources to establish a sphere of influence in Central Asia or the Black Sea region or take other measures that would weaken Russian primacy in the former Soviet Union. As part of their economic recovery efforts, Russian officials sought to expand economic relations with Turkey. They adopted corresponding political and security measures to improve the prospects of Russian-Turkish reconciliation. For example, the Russian government refused to give rebel PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan asylum in Russia. In addition, Moscow redirected S-300 air defense missile systems planned for the Greek government of Cyprus, which confronted the Turkish-supported government of northern Cyprus, to the Greek island of Crete instead.[239] Within Turkey, newly empowered societal actors such as ethnic lobbies, business associations, influential civilian politicians, and a resurgent religious establishment began to push for changes in long-established foreign and defense policies. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) that has been in charge of the Turkish government since 2002, has pursued better Russian-Turkish relations while still seeking to cultivate new partnerships in the Middle East and sustain good ties with Turkey's traditional NATO allies and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

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[238] Hasan Kanbolat, "Turkish-Russian Relations After Gul's Moscow Visit," Journal of Turkish Weekly, February 15, 2009, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/64590/turkish-russian-relations-after-gul-39-s-moscow-visit.html.
[239] Robert O. Freedman, "Russian Policy toward the Middle East under Putin: The Impact of 9/11 and the War in Iraq," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 2003), http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/putin.htm.

Maintaining good relations between the Turkey and the West has proved difficult. Disputes with EU countries over various Turkish domestic and foreign policies have led Turkish leaders lose faith that Ankara's will soon be invited to join the European Union (EU) as a full member. EU members have become preoccupied with organizational reform, economic restructuring, and integrating recent members. Efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) distinct from NATO have presented challenges for Turkey due to its limited influence on EU decision making. In addition, many Europeans evince continued reluctance to consummate Turkey's long-discussed entry into the EU. They characterize the accession negotiations that formally began in October 2005 as a decade-long process that might not lead to full membership even if Turkey completes them successfully.

Despite Ankara's unease with Moscow's policies toward Chechnya and ties with Armenia as well as concern over Russia's recent military resurgence, which has included talk of a revived Russian military presence in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, many Turkish leaders no longer believe they need NATO support to counter a imminent military threat from Moscow. Furthermore, the war in Iraq substantially weakened Turkish-American security ties and brought about a precipitous collapse in Turks' previously favorable opinion of the United States. Even Turkey's security establishment, long closely tied to Washington, criticized U.S. policies for creating an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq that has facilitated Kurdish-linked separatism and terrorism in Turkey. While the AKP government has sought to improve the status of Turkey's Kurdish minority, the Turkish military conduct raids into northern Iraq to combat the PKK terrorists based there. The winter 2008-09 Gaza War alienated the AKP from Israel, leading to unprecedented strains in the long-standing security alliance between Turkey and Tel Aviv.

In contrast to Turkey's strained relations with its traditional Western partners, Ankara's ties with Moscow have noticeably strengthened in recent years. Since Vladimir Putin became Russian President at the end of 1999, Russian leaders have cultivated relations with Turkey, exploiting that country's alienation from the West.[240] When Putin visited Ankara in December 2004, he and Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer signed six cooperation agreements in the areas of energy, finance, and security. The two governments also signed a "Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership," which established a formal framework that recognized past and contributed to the subsequent expansion of bilateral relations.[241] In subsequent years, the leaders of both countries have exchanged frequent visits. These reciprocal exchanges culminated in February 2009, with the first state visit by a Turkish president to Russia. In Moscow, President Abdullah Gul and his entourage met with Russian political and business leaders. The new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev,

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[240] Ömer Taspınar and Fionna Hill, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?", *Survival*, Vol. 48 No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 81-92.
[241] "Russia, Turkey Declare New Era with 'Strategic' Document," *Today's Zaman*, February 14, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=166883.

characterized ties between Russia and Turkey as "multifaceted cooperation and multidimensional partnership."[242] Gul then became the first modern Turkish president to visit Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, the largest of the Russian Federation's autonomous republics and home to many of Russia's Tatar Turk population. While Gul used the opportunity to promote business ties between Tatarstan and Turkey, the visit was more important as a symbol that Moscow no longer worried about ties between Russian Muslims and Turkey.[243]

The Black Sea region has represented another geographic reason of special mutual concern to both Russia and Turkey. In recent years, Russian-Turkish security cooperation in this area has been sufficiently extensive and exclusionary as to worry the West about Russian-Turkish interest in establishing a condominium in the region, which represents the main route through which Caspian oil and gas reaches Europe. For example, Moscow and Ankara have worked to limit the presence in the Black Sea of navies from the non-littoral countries belonging to NATO. They have resisted Alliance proposals to enlarge the scope of NATO's Operation Active Endeavour, currently active in the Mediterranean, into Black Sea waters. Russian policy makers do not want NATO to establish a major military presence in another region neighboring the Russian Federation, while Turkish officials also oppose any steps that might lead to a review of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which grants Turkey special privileges as possessor of the Bosporus Straits. According to Medvedev, when he and Gul met in Ankara on May 12, they "spoke about the fact that the Black Sea countries themselves, and above all the region's two biggest countries, Russia and Turkey, bear direct responsibility for the situation in the region."[244]
As an alternative, since the end of September 2006, Russian warships began participating in Black Sea Harmony, a Turkey-led multinational initiative, launched in 2004, designed to counter terrorism, narco-trafficking, and WMD proliferation in the south Black Sea region by tracking suspicious vessels and conducting security checks on ports.[245] The two navies track vessels and exchange data about possible illegal activities. Russian and Turkish government representatives maintain that Black Sea Harmony and other Russian-Turkish maritime security cooperation, such as the annual exercises of the Black Sea Naval Force (BlackSeaFor) involving the riparian states since April 2001, obviate the need to bring Active Endeavour or any other NATO naval presence into the Black Sea region. During the most recent military exercises, which occurred from April 9-27, 2010, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine each

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[242] "Press Statements Following the Russian-Turkish Talks," President of Russia website, February 13, 2009, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/13/2131_type82914type82915_212893.shtml.
[243] F. William Engdahl, "Turkey Hops Aboard Russia's Ride," Asia Times Online, March 4, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KC04Ak02.html
[244] Official Site of the President of Russia, "Joint News Conference with President of Turkey Abdullah Gul," May 12, 2010, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/173.
[245] "Russia Agrees to Join Turkish Security Operation in Black Sea," Global Security.org, June 29, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/06/mil-060629-rianovosti01.htm.

contributed a single warship in a multinational maritime exercise in which the combined fleet conducted more than 50 drills.[246] These drills ranged from maritime search and rescue, replenishment and refueling at sea, air defense, naval inspections, and communications exercises.[247]

From May 11-12, 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Ankara and met with President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and other senior Turkish officials. The trip coincided the signing of 17 agreements between the two countries, with the ones dealing with energy potentially having the most importance for their relationship. If these deals are fully implemented, Turkey would become even more dependent on Russia for its energy supplies, perhaps for decades to come. Turkish officials have resisted some of Moscow's demands, but Ankara's ability to pursue polices strongly opposed by Moscow on important Eurasian issues remains questionable.

CONCLUSION

The Russian Federation has experienced a remarkable geopolitical resurgence in the past decade. During the last few years, Moscow has reemerged as Washington's main geopolitical rival, exerting its influence throughout much of the world in ways often unwelcome by U.S. policy makers. In Latin America and the Middle East, Russian diplomats defend regimes—notably Venezuela, Syria, and Iran—that clash frequently with the United States. In Europe, Russian leaders continue to press the United States and its allies not to offer Ukraine and Georgia a membership action plan for joining NATO. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is also lobbying for a new European Security Treaty that could weaken the alliance while allowing Russia to retain military forces in several conflict regions. In their statements and actions, Russian leaders make evident that they have a vision of their preferred world order that sharply differs from that commonly sought in the West.

Yet, those looking at Russia's domestic developments see an increasingly precarious internal situation. The country faces severe economic, political, demographic, and military problems that, unless reversed, will undermine the foundations of Russia's foreign strength and internal cohesion. The Russian economy suffers from serious problems, including underinvestment in critical infrastructure, deteriorating public education and health sectors, and pervasive corruption. Russia is experiencing severe demographic problems. The overall Russian population is expected to decrease from approximately 141 million people today to less than 130 million by 2025. Russia is also struggling to maintain a world-class defense industry due to obsolescent technology, surplus capacity, and the decline of traditional defense export markets such as China. Finally, Russia suffers from the same underlying vulnerability as many other

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[246] http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100427/158768885.html
Blackseafor warships successfully complete drills in Black Sea 27/04/2010
[247] http://en.rian.ru/world/20100420/158667646.html
Blackseafor warships leave Bulgaria to conduct next stage of drills ; 20/04/2010

authoritarian political systems: the lack of an agreed method for transitioning political power between leaders. At present, the succession problem manifests itself in the uncertain distribution of power between Russia's two major political leaders, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Russia's economic recovery during the last decade, which has provided the underlying basis for Russia's diplomatic and military resurgence, has fragile foundations. The Russian economy suffers from serious problems, including underinvestment in critical infrastructure, deteriorating public education and health sectors, and pervasive corruption. Russia's state capitalist model of development—in which the government either controls or owns the commanding heights of the national economy, including the country's strategic energy and defense industries—risks discouraging foreign investors fearful of losing control to newly empowered Russian bureaucrats. Russia has made only modest progress in diversifying its economy away from its dependence on fossil fuel exports. The recent collapse in world oil prices underscores Russia's vulnerability to commodity speculation. Unlike during Soviet times, Russia has become tightly integrated into global economic processes.

Russia is the largest net exporter of gas and the second-largest seller of oil in the world. Moreover, it has the largest proven reserves of natural gas and the sixth largest reserve of oil. Russia is also the sixth-highest producer and third-largest net exporter of coal. Russia ranks fourth in terms of installed nuclear capacity; some of this energy is also exported. Yet, Russia derives as much influence from its control over the distribution of these resources as it does from their control. Moscow can use the transportation routes to exert leverage both on upstream and on downstream countries.

This control over energy transportation routes could become even more important as Russia's domestic natural energy resources are exhausted. Production levels are already stagnating. The growth in the production of natural gas was only 1% in 2007, while Russian oil production increased by only 2% that year. Some 75% of all known Russian oil and gas fields are already in production. The high debt of Russia's state-run energy monopolies Gazprom and Rosneft will make it difficult to exploit the remaining fields, which are located in challenging geophysical environments, without the infusion of considerable capital. Potential domestic investors lack the adequate financial resources, while Russian government policies, such as expropriating investments on trumpted-up environmental grounds, have made foreign companies and entrepreneurs reluctant to invest in Russia. Some estimates anticipate that the country's oil reserves could be exhausted within 10 years.[248]

To remain an energy superpower, Russia will need to retain control over the distribution of the vast energy resources of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Most former Soviet energy pipelines

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[248] Lilia Shevtsova, "The Medvedev's Presidency: Russian Direction and the Implications for Foreign Policy", *EnergyForum*, May 2009, p. 21, http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/WorkingPapers/russianenergy/russianenergy09.html

directed their oil and natural gas northward into Russian territory, where Russian companies would export large volumes to customers in Europe at a hefty mark-up. Since their independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union, their governments have, to varying degrees, been encouraging the construction of alternative energy transportation routes westward into Europe, eastward into China, and occasionally southward into Iran. Despite the recent downtown due to the world recession, European, Central Asian, and South and East Asian energy importers will likely increase their demand for energy in coming years. In addition to this, Russian and Central Asian internal demand will probably grow further.

Recent developments in Turkmenistan highlight this problem. On January 6, 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov formally opened a new 182km natural gas pipeline. The new route adds to the existing Korpeje-Kordkuy pipeline connecting the two countries that has been in operation since 1997. It will eventually raise Turkmenistan's annual natural gas exports to Iran, currently around 8 billion cubic meters (bmc) of gas annually under the terms of a 25-year deal reached in 1997, to 20 bcm. The previous month, Chinese President Hu Jintao opened the valve of a new gas pipeline transporting Turkmen natural gas to China's western province of Xinjiang. Turkmen gas deliveries to China through the 2,000-kilometer pipeline, which traverses four countries, are expected to reach about 6 bcm next year and increase to around 40 bcm in 2015. As a result of these developments, Russia no longer has a monopoly on all Turkmenistan's natural gas exports the way it did during the Soviet period and until 1997. When Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Berdymukhamedov signed their latest gas contract in December 2009, after months of haggling over the price for the gas and responsibility for an explosion of a joint pipeline transporting Turkmen gas to Russia last April, Turkmenistan only agreed to sell 30 bcm, not 56-60 bcm as in previous years. In addition, Russia's state-run Gazprom energy corporation has had to agree to pay full market prices to Turkmengaz for Turkmenistan's gas. Finally, to add insult to injury, the gas for the new pipeline to Iran comes from the same field that Turkmenistan has been using to supply Russia.

In addition to these energy challenges, Russia is experiencing severe demographic problems. The overall Russian population is expected to decrease from approximately 141 million people today to less than 130 million by 2025. In less than a decade from now, Russia is projected to have only 650,000 18-year-old males. Even if they were all healthy and willing to serve in the military, the Russian armed forces currently employs 750,000 conscripts. Russian leaders have evinced a strong reluctance to allow more non-Russian immigration, allocate the resources needed to develop a fully professional army, accept a substantial reduction in the size of the Russian armed forces, or take the other steps needed to manage this demographic problem.

In addition, the share of ethnic Muslims in Russia's population will grow from 14 percent in 2005 to around 19 percent in 2030 to perhaps 23 percent in 2050. Their military skills and willingness to

participate in future counterinsurgency campaigns in the Muslim-majority regions of the North Caucasus or Central Asia is likely to prove extremely problematic. Indeed, dissatisfaction among Russia's ethnic minorities, especially Muslim groups, could be seen as another source of Russian strategic vulnerability in that, partly due to Soviet and Russian polices, they have lower levels of education and skills than non-Muslim groups. In certain cases, moreover, their alienation from Russian society has manifested itself in the use of violence against Russian government institutions and Russia civilians.

Russia is also struggling to maintain a world-class defense industry due to its obsolescent technology, surplus capacity, and the decline of traditional defense export markets such as China. According to Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, only 10 percent of Russian armaments could be considered "modern," with production levels of new weapons lagging far below what is needed to replace systems withdrawn from service. The new armament program, which is set to commence in 2011, aims to achieve a 30% proportionate of modern weapons by 2015 and 70% by 2020.[249] Yet, defense analysts who have analyzed the Russia's military performance during the 2008 Georgia War found major operational deficiencies in Russian training and tactics, shortcomings that even the more sophisticated weapons on order will not overcome.[250] These problems have led the Russian government to accelerate Russia's military rearmament following the Georgia War, but the decision could prove problematic. Since the formation of the Russian Federation in 1991, the Russian government has been careful to limit military spending to avoid the Soviet mistake of engaging in a ruinous arms race with the West. Earlier in 2008, before the Georgia War, then President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed that, even though a new global arms race had begun, "We must not allow ourselves to be drawn into this."[251] After the war, however, Russian defense spending has risen further even while the Russian economy has been devastated by the recent world economic crisis.

Russia's future ability to sustain its high levels of defense spending in the midst of the worldwide recession is suspect. According to the latest data, the Russian economy is suffering severely from the global financial crisis, perhaps more so than any other major emerging economy. As in during the 1998 meltdown triggered by the Asian financial crisis, Russia has proven exceptionally vulnerable to a global economic crisis. Russia's GDP fell almost 10% in 2009. The official unemployment rate is also approaching 10%. Russia suffers from other problems, including high levels of unused industrial production capacity, instabilities in the financial sector, one of the world's worst-performing stock

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[249] Pavel Felgenhauer, "Medvedev Publicly Supports Serdyukov," Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 19, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34731.
[250] Thom Shanker, "Russians Melded Old-School Blitz with Modern Military Tactics," *New York Times*, August 17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17military.html.
[251] "Putin Says Russia Won't Be Drawn Into New Arms Race," RIA Novosti, February 8, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080208/98758020.html.

markets, and high levels of corporate debt. In addition, the fall in value of the Russian ruble—especially against the American dollar—could increase inflation still further by making foreign imports more expensive. The credit squeeze caused by the inability or unwillingness of Russian banks to continue lending large sums to Russian businesses has seen a worrisome revival of the non-payment crises that led to widespread wage arrears under Yeltsin. At present rates of consumption, Russia's rainy-day stabilization fund will become exhausted by the end of 2010, while the Russian government fund supporting an ambitious array of national projects, seen as essential for renewing Russian economic strength by investing in leading edge commercial sectors such as biotechnology, will run out of money in 2012.[252]

Thus far, the current financial crisis has not induced widespread social instability in Russia. Protests have remained restricted to a few localities, such as Vladivostok, and have been easily dispersed by the security forces. Yet, the emergency could exacerbate an underlying vulnerability of the current Russian political system: one-party states under the control of a single dominant individual are prone to serious secessionist crises. The country's political parties have become ideologically neutered bodies in which personality clashes rather than policy issues dominate the discussion. The current "tandem" system in which power is mysteriously shared between President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin imposes additional complications. Russian political elite has been blaming the United States for Russia's economic problems, while the government-influenced media is limiting its coverage of Russia's economic difficulties and highlighting government efforts to spur economic growth.[253] This strategy conveniently absolves the heads of the Russian government and the country's major economic institutions and businesses of responsibility for the slowdown. But should these techniques lose their persuasiveness, then the current system of dual power in Moscow could, as in previous decades, lead to vicious infighting and a resurgence of the "kto-kogo" ("who-whom", meaning alternately who controls whom, who does what to whom, etc.) question that has dominated Russian and Soviet politics.

If the Russian economy unexpectedly returns to its explosive growth of a few years ago, Russia's rising middle class could demand more political rights and opportunities, but the country's short-term, personality driven political system seems ill-suited for taking their views, or those of other potentially alienated actors, into account. Should Russia's economic problems persist, Russia's military modernization program as well as its importance as an energy superpower will remain under threat, potentially relegating Russia back to the ranks of a middle-range power, inferior to the United States in military strength and lagging behind China as the world's rising economic powerhouse.

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[252] Nikolas Gvosdev, "Can Russia Fix Itself by 2012?," Tatiana Serafin: Global Markets and Ideas, January 11, 2010, http://www.tatianaserafin.com/speakers/.
[253] "Debating Russian Coverage of the Financial Crisis," RFE/RL, May 1, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Debating_Russian_Coverage_of_the_Financial_Crisis/1620039.htm.

At some point, Russia's profound domestic economic, political, demographic, and military problems could undermine the foundations of Russia's foreign strength and internal cohesion. A fundamental uncertainty is how and when this will occur. One key issue is that of timing—when will these domestic problems weaken Russia's external potential sufficiency that Moscow can no longer present a major challenge to Western interests? Another question concerns confluence—how could these adverse secular trends interact and commingle, perhaps by reinforcing one another, and with one effects? A third issue relates to probability—what events could happen in the future, including perhaps due to changes in Russian government policies as they react to these unfavorable developments, to reverse these trends? A final question is how the United States and its allies should manage Russia's long-term decline—specifically during the window of vulnerability when Moscow can still act as a globally disruptive player, as well as after, when Russia has declined to the status of a mid-range regional power comparable to France or Iran in capabilities? What U.S. policies would help shape Russia's decline in non-threatening ways? What Western strategies could prudently hedge against threatening Russian policies designed to reverse Moscow's declining great power potential?