

# Implementing the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review


Over the past 5 years, the United States and its military establishment have confronted a series of dramatic changes in the strategic environment. The attacks of September 11, followed by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, have presented complex new challenges to the Department of Defense (DOD). Many have concluded that the 9/11 attacks illustrated that the security of the U.S. homeland is inextricably linked with that of its allies and partners around the globe. Given that premise, what kinds of partnerships should the DOD develop to address these challenges? Moreover, the nature of recent operations has demonstrated the unpredictability of the contemporary security environment. How should the Pentagon prepare for future contingencies in the face of this uncertainty? What could and should the United States do to win the war on terror? How should DOD prepare to defend the homeland in-depth? Against this backdrop, the Department of Defense released its Quadrennial Defense Review report (QDR) in February 2006.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University convened a symposium on March 16–17, 2006, to explore these challenges and the QDR's key findings. A series of

panels comprised of senior government officials and distinguished experts assessed the QDR's major recommendations in each of four "capability focus areas": defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in-depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction. Panelists also examined a number of cross-cutting issues raised by the QDR, including proposals to improve interagency cooperation and strategic planning.

There was broad agreement among panelists on a number of the QDR's conclusions:

- The QDR correctly assesses the strategic challenges that the United States will have to confront. Many of these challenges, including prosecuting the war on terror and combating weapons of mass destruction, will prove to be generational challenges.
- Enhanced interagency coordination is required to create greater unity of effort across the U.S. Government. Many of the breakdowns that have occurred in recent operations were at the interagency level. This QDR indicates that the way in which the U.S. Government organizes itself for unity of effort has a big impact on the success of many operations.
- Enabling partners and allies is essential. In many instances, DOD is the only agency with the operational mentality and planning culture



that allows for rapid, decisive action under duress. However, in dealing with some security problems, Defense is not the most appropriate instrument to advance U.S. interests. Allies or international partners, the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, state and local governments, or other government agencies might have the expertise or proximity to a crisis that gives them a comparative advantage in these situations. DOD must help these partners and other agencies to prepare better for future contingencies.

- The capabilities-based approach to defense planning helps mitigate—to the extent possible—the uncertainty of the emerging security environment. While there is a high degree of probability that U.S. forces will be engaged in coalition operations during the next 10 years, it is not clear where or when this will be. Rather than think of force levels in terms of peacetime and wartime, this QDR usefully distinguishes between steady-state and surge capacity.

While the symposium was not able to cover every topic associated with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, it did serve to highlight some of the key issues confronting the Department of Defense as it prepares to face new and emerging challenges.

## **The 2006 QDR Process: An Insider's Perspective**

At the outset of the symposium, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England noted that this Quadrennial Defense Review represents a refinement of previously articulated strategies rather than a fundamental reorientation. The 2001 QDR set the strategic direction for the Department of Defense but was finished shortly before the terrorist attacks of September 11. As such, it was not able to account for the altered strategic landscape that followed these events. This is a more informed QDR that takes full account of the 9/11 attacks. It also incorporates the vast amount of operational experience and lessons learned from Afghanistan, Iraq, tsunami relief, Hurricane Katrina, and other operations around the globe associated with the war on terror. The foundation of QDR 2006 is the *National Defense Strategy*, published in March 2005, which noted that while the Armed Forces not only must maintain predominance in traditional warfare, but they also must enhance capabilities to address a wider range of irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive security challenges.

An important innovation contained within this QDR was the development of new business practices that seek to achieve more flexible and effective allocation of resources. The Pentagon cannot be as responsive as it needs to



be if it is mired in a 2-year budget cycle. As a result of legislation that shifted the completion date, this QDR was submitted in tandem with the Fiscal Year 2007 budget request so that new initiatives can be implemented as quickly as possible. DOD business practices, organizations, and methodologies all need to be reexamined if it is to address 21<sup>st</sup>-century challenges effectively.

This Quadrennial Defense Review set out 141 tasks associated with the decisions made in the review. The senior leadership of the Pentagon is looking to implement these tasks over the next 18 months. To do so, a series of roadmaps are being developed so that each task can be completed in a timely manner. Now that this QDR process has come to a close, the Department of Defense will focus on implementation.

## **Building and Sustaining Partnerships**

Panelists agreed that the war on terror will be a “long war” that is primarily a political and ideological, not a military, struggle. What does this mean for the U.S. military establishment? How should the rest of the U.S. Government organize to meet this challenge? What kinds of

skills and knowledge do personnel require to prepare effectively for this long war?

The nature of the war was the subject of much discussion during this panel. One expert argued that the war on terror must be tightly focused on the most threatening organizations to achieve the long-term objective of discrediting violence. The focus should be on Salafist, al Qaeda-affiliated or inspired groups resident primarily in Western countries, from where they can most easily launch attacks. These groups do not hate globalization; they are taking advantage of it as a global movement. Loose rhetoric and blurring the boundaries of the war on terror could create new enemies where they do not exist. This panelist contended that Iraq should not be viewed as part of the war on terror at all, except that U.S. presence has attracted terrorists to a place where they did not exist before. References to Iraq as part of the war on terror encourage misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict. Furthermore, America should be careful not to place its humanitarian operations in the framework of the war on terror; indigenous populations could misinterpret a gesture of goodwill as an act that serves other U.S. interests.

As one panelist argued, the battleground of the war on terror will rarely be in combat zones. Indeed, Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to be seen as aberrations rather than the norm as the war on terror continues. Planners should prepare for contingencies in areas where the United States is not at war. This will have significant implications for how the military shapes its forces as it conducts the war on terror.

The military piece of the war on terror will be fought primarily with special operations forces (SOF), rather than general purpose forces. While general purpose ground forces need to be adapted somewhat, the requirements associated with the war on terror will drive the sizing and shaping of SOF. Indeed, this is reflected in the QDR's decision to increase active duty special forces battalions by one-third and create a Marine Corps Special Operations Command—the United States will be building the biggest SOF component that it has ever had, with a much smaller conventional force. The QDR acknowledges the need to develop new personnel skills, but one panelist felt it does not

adequately address how to restructure personnel systems to develop critical specialties and utilize them effectively.

The United States will also require highly specialized forces to perform civil affairs and psychological operations, as well as direct action, counterinsurgency missions. Furthermore, the QDR distinguishes between steady-state and surge capacity; if DOD conducts the war on terror successfully, it will be won with a steady-state posture.

The QDR recognizes the need to build partnership capacity to help defeat terrorist networks; however, one panelist contended that it proposes a sub-optimal approach to achieving this goal. Building partnership capacity through lend-lease type arrangements, financial and logistical support, and enhanced training and equipment are all steps in the right direction. The QDR recognizes the difficulty of working effectively with allies in this area but then assigns tasks as if building partnership capacity (assigned to general purpose forces) requires less expertise than direct action (which is focused in SOF). This panelist argued that U.S. Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) should give more resources and attention to indirect action, engagement with partners, and assessing networks that support terror.

A major remaining challenge is at the interagency level. Other national security agencies need to restructure their personnel systems to develop civilian specialties that may be required in future contingencies. As one panelist argued, this must go beyond developing “al Qaeda-ologists” similar to the corps of Soviet experts during the Cold War. The United States must also look to leverage the technological advantages that it currently possesses to defeat this amorphous enemy, such as making use of databases and social network analysis. Coordination of efforts in Washington and across the U.S. Government is a necessity to achieve real unity of effort in implementing these solutions. As one panelist noted, without this unity, Washington will be speaking with different voices, making it difficult to work with partners and allies. Neither the 9/11 Commission Report nor the QDR go to the heart of this problem; each department has its own reasons for maintaining the status-quo situation rather than transforming to meet the new challenges they face.

In building partnerships, the United States must carefully choose with whom it works and how. As one panelist argued, local conditions must be taken into account as the United States undertakes these missions. From an indigenous perspective, building and bolstering internal security establishments could be misinterpreted as supporting and reinforcing dictatorial regimes, creating greater anti-American sentiment in the long term. In states where this



might be an issue or when dealing with states with very limited capacity, where rapid action is required, the United States should act alone against the most dangerous terrorist cells.

## Defending the Homeland

The realities of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the U.S. Government's response to Hurricane Katrina, raised many questions regarding how DOD prepares for and equips itself to perform homeland defense missions, as well as to support civil authorities in coping with terrorist and natural disasters. What is the proper division of labor between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security in protecting the Nation? What role should the National Guard play? What is the right balance between local, state, and Federal authorities? How should the U.S. Government prepare for biological attacks, and what part will DOD play?

As the panel opened, an administration official noted that the Department of Defense has the lead for efforts to secure the United States against direct attack. However, DOD will also support and enable other partners in the U.S. Government as they work to perform homeland security missions. In this "lead, support, and enable" construct, enabling other Government actors to prepare for and execute tasks is one of the most important aspects of the DOD strategy (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and National Maritime Security Policy). As the QDR process got under way, there was some discussion of whether to create specially trained military personnel to perform civil support missions. However, this

option was discarded in favor of using general purpose forces properly equipped for their new missions. The QDR also recognized that DOD has a culture of planning, continuing education, and training that it can share more effectively with other agencies, including by transforming the National Defense University into the National Security University.

One panelist argued that with respect to homeland defense, the QDR is a status quo document that does little to advance the mission. The National Guard needs to be substantially transformed in order to prepare for disasters, especially



catastrophic ones. This includes building the capabilities to deploy and sustain units rapidly, having enhanced medical capabilities beyond the currently used field hospitals, having a new kind of security battalion in the form of a constabulary rather than military police, and developing a mechanism to bring together the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and a corps of contractors to rebuild critical infrastructure. A Naval National Guard should also be created, as half of the American population

lives near water. Finally, an inspector general is needed for oversight at the outset of any major reconstruction project.

Another panelist with high level government experience contended that the QDR is not a status-quo document; rather, it reflects one point in a gradual shift in attitudes within DOD. Leadership in crisis response is critical and the Department of Defense is the only agency with the capacity to provide effective leadership. As President George W. Bush stated after Hurricane Katrina, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disaster, only DOD has the

capabilities to conduct effective relief efforts.

The Department of Homeland Security and other Federal civilian agencies, one panelist contended, are prepared for dealing with routine natural disasters and small terrorist attacks but would be quickly overwhelmed by a catastrophic event. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, local and state officials will expect the Federal Government to take charge of the response in catastrophic events. Homeland Security is not (with

some exceptions) an operational agency, and it and most other civil agencies do not have the planning culture necessary to take on such major actions under stressful situations. Only DOD does. This being so, it would have been useful for the QDR to have stated explicitly which tasks the Defense Department can and cannot perform with respect to providing civil support and leadership during a catastrophic event.

These questions sparked further discussion on the panel. The division of roles and responsibilities between government at the state and Federal levels was a key question that all panelists explored. One panelist argued that homeland security planning must be sensitive to federalism and to the rights of states and local communities. Another panelist elaborated on that notion, arguing that state and local governments are better able to respond to disasters; having one central authority designated to control the response will not be effective. While it is important to bear these considerations in mind, as another panelist noted, “Federalism: I like it too, but the Constitution is not a suicide pact.” Underscoring this point, there are many examples of the Federal Government assuming authorities in a crisis that traditionally lie in state government’s domain.

Katrina provided a wake-up call to the U.S. Government. That crisis made it clear that DOD is not properly organized for civil support. Indeed, one panelist mentioned that DOD is poorly organized for performing these kinds of operations and needs domestic “expeditionary” capabilities. That said, the realities of budgets and politics (as well as legal authori-

ties) make implementing many of the recommended policy changes problematic. The Department of Defense cannot stop what it is doing, reorganize, and then resume its tasks. To a large extent, it has to make do with existing capacities as it gradually transforms its homeland defense and civil support capabilities.

## **Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads**

How can the Department of Defense help ensure that major and emerging powers—that are neither allies nor partners nor with whom America has important differences—make policy decisions that foster cooperation and mutual security? How can DOD hedge against hostility and at the same time encourage limited partnerships with these states? To reinforce the interplay between U.S. action and other countries’ perceptions, the QDR made shaping the choices of countries at “strategic crossroads” a central DOD mission. As one former Defense official noted, highlighting these countries to be shaped was a way of recognizing that the way we treat other countries affects them—and affects the degree to which they want to act as partners or adversaries. As such, *shaping* is a broad concept that applies to friends and allies as well. This official also noted that the QDR did not just focus on China in this context. It also identified other states including Russia, Iran, and Venezuela as being at strategic crossroads.

One of the key national security challenges for the United States is to create a strategic context that will allow for a mutually beneficial partnership with China. The

United States does not view China as an adversary. Indeed, a key U.S. security goal is to try to ensure that China does not become one. The United States can use its military both to influence Chinese decisions in positive directions and to hedge against the possibility that China might choose an adversarial path. Several elements of the QDR, such as the enhancement of deep strike capabilities, are designed to send signals of U.S. resolve if China chooses the latter path. One panelist suggested that Chinese civilian officials would take these signals as a note of caution, while the military might see their worst fears confirmed. Another panelist stated that some Asians feel it is the United States—not China—that is at a strategic crossroads.

Effectively shaping China’s behavior requires a shared sense of goals and risks among U.S. officials. However, one panelist argued that there are now three schools of official thought with respect to the Asian security environment. One focuses on China as an economic and political partner, one focuses on bilateral relations with Japan and other Asian allies, and one views China as an emerging enemy. As a result, China is likely to remain suspicious about U.S. intentions. Another panelist responded by saying that policymakers must take all three schools into consideration in developing an effective hedging strategy vis-à-vis China. However, another panelist argued that a coherent China policy requires reconciliation of two parallel strategies. There is a dominant strategy focused on commercial engagement that is almost entirely divorced from the other strategy of military hedging. Because of the intense feelings and vested interest

in this issue, moving forward is going to require intense debate across the political spectrum and within each political party—a debate that is likely to play out over the next 8 to 10 years.

How are U.S. allies and partners reacting to this concept of shaping? There is no singular European perspective, but one panelist said that European allies are likely to be cautiously optimistic on shaping in general. While many would agree that there are indeed countries that need to be shaped, doing so is complicated and may have unintended consequences. It was also noted that while the QDR talks of integrating the other great powers, there is little explanation of how that could best be achieved. Europe is likely to prefer that

a far-reaching European strategy in this area are significant obstacles.

However, several panelists agreed that the United States should continue to engage Europe on these shaping issues. Europe does possess economic and political clout that can be used to create more benign strategic circumstances. With respect to China, strategic convergence between America and Europe has become a real possibility. The transatlantic debate over lifting the European Union arms embargo caused Europe to consider China from a security perspective rather than a narrowly economic one. On Iran, U.S.-European policy coordination appears to be working to some extent, although Europeans favor a steady escalatory approach in order to give Iran the opportuni-

senior U.S. officials, who have not been able to devote as much attention to Asia. As one panelist noted, many in the region believe that the attention of the United States will return to Asia in 5 years or so but worry that China's influence will be entrenched by that point.

Japan is also at a crossroads. While the United States welcomes Japan's efforts to take a more active role in regional and global security affairs, many governments in East Asia are wary of this development. In addition, there are heightened tensions in Japan's relations with China, which some fear could spin out of control. Finally, one panelist argued that given projected constraints on defense resources, U.S. shaping options may be even further limited over the next decade.



countries be shaped with economic and political tools rather than by military means. Creating some kind of U.S.-European division of labor to shape key countries might be possible, but as this panelist noted, limited European military capabilities, inertia, and the lack of

to discontinue its program before the stakes get too high.

Panelists argued that East Asian security affairs are being heavily shaped by China's rise and related decisions being taken by U.S. allies and friends in the region. Iraq and Afghanistan continue to preoccupy

## WMD Prevention

Terrorist groups and small states can now inflict damage of a kind that was once only in the realm of large nation-states. It is becoming increasingly difficult to account for the materials that can be used to create nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons internationally. How should the United States and the Department of Defense prepare to confront this challenge? What should the balance be between cooperative threat reduction and counterproliferation activities? What should the United States do to mitigate the effects of WMD use?

One panelist argued that combating weapons of mass destruction is also going to be a long war. The process of addressing this challenge will span a generation and will require a multifaceted approach. There is no silver bullet that will solve this problem. With this in mind, DOD is adopting a

multilayered approach that encompasses nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management activities. The question then becomes how to allocate resources for these functions.

The two major recommendations included in the QDR are improving WMD response capabilities including a render-safe program for a nuclear device, and investing in medical countermeasures against biological weapons. On the organizational side, U.S. Strategic Command is now tasked with organizing and synchronizing the combating WMD mission within the Department of Defense.

Two panelists felt that the QDR failed to provide adequate guidance on the department's full range of combating WMD responsibilities. They contended the QDR was largely silent on resource and management issues for combating WMD. Notwithstanding that, they praised the unique innovation that DOD has undertaken under its own initiative with the Green Line program, which seeks to create broad-spectrum countermeasures to these biological threats. The \$1.5 billion in this program was described as a "national service."

One panelist noted that most of today's DOD transformation efforts are being funded through supplemental requests. The budgetary "top line" increases have gone toward funding pre-9/11 programs. Another panelist echoed this point, contending that the QDR did not call for substantial increases in investment or cross-portfolio trades to enhance the combating WMD mission.

In the estimation of one panelist, biological weapons will be a key challenge in the next 10 years. Biotechnologies are advancing, in-

cluding development of pathogens that spread from human to human, with the potential to produce staggering casualties. Despite praise for the Green Line program, which seeks to create broad-spectrum countermeasures to these biological threats, two of the panelists did not believe that the 2006 QDR went far enough in addressing this critical challenge. Two panelists felt the QDR was a little too narrowly focused on consequence management and medical countermeasures and, as a result, did not look broadly at what all this activity means. Furthermore, it did not lay out any concrete plans to guide resource and management decisions for combating weapons of mass destruction over the coming years.

Addressing the challenge posed by today's nuclear threats—particularly terrorist nuclear threats—requires a strategy focused on denying adversaries access to fissile materials and weapons. However, too much of the current effort is focused on detecting and defending against weapons once they are in an adversary's possession.

Also, two panelists contended that the QDR gave inadequate attention to the roles and requirements of U.S. nuclear forces and deterrence more broadly. There was no nuclear posture review undertaken alongside this QDR. In 2001, the Nuclear Posture Review laid out a vision for the future of U.S. strategic capabilities, called the New Triad. This included offensive strike, missile defense, and responsive infrastructure capabilities, underpinned by enhanced intelligence. During this QDR, the issues associated with the New Triad were mainstreamed and

forced to compete for priorities and resources—a little noticed but important development.

Ultimately, despite the clear and longstanding national and DOD policy on the need to enhance capabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction, there is little evidence in the QDR that any major enhancements will occur except in the areas of elimination, interdiction, and the longer-term development of broad-spectrum biological countermeasures. But, as one panelist argued, the problems of biological and nuclear terrorism are fundamentally solvable problems. The nuclear challenge can be resolved by controlling the materials. With the appropriate preparatory work, a biological attack can become a contained fizzle.

## **Crosscutting Issues, Interagency Cooperation**

After exploring the four major challenges that the National Defense Strategy and the QDR seek to address, the symposium wrapped up with a look at the issues spanning these four focus areas. How should the U.S. Government and DOD prepare for the future when it is difficult to forecast? What kind of interagency cooperation is needed to make the capabilities of the U.S. Government more effective? How should the Department of Defense best engage to build the capacities of its partners?

There was broad agreement from panelists on several QDR recommendations:

- the need for more preventive action and better forecasting, which is especially difficult in an era of uncertainty
- the need to enhance agility of military forces, analyses, and decision-

making in DOD and with agency partners

- the elevation of homeland defense, irregular warfare, and stability operations to main military tasks
- the need for building partner capacity and unity of effort with interagency and coalition partners (though one panelist observed that will take 8–10 years to come to fruition, and DoD will need to minimize risk if contingencies occur in the meantime)
- the need to improve interagency contingency planning for high priority missions.

An issue on which there was not agreement was the QDR's conclusions about the DOD Force Planning Construct, the guidance for sizing the Armed Forces.

One view was that the force planning construct and overall size of the force are about right, although a somewhat different mix of forces might be needed for the current environment. Another view was that, given the growing challenges of failed states and global instability, there is likely to be a steady-state demand for major stabilization and reconstruction operations, and even with a different concept of operations and more reliance on partners, these missions will likely require more, not fewer troops.

The Department of Defense is preparing for an uncertain future. Radical extremists around the world are presenting asymmetric challenges to the United States and its partners. A number of Asian countries are developing nuclear weapons and the international community is also going to have to adapt to the rise of China. Furthermore, by the middle of this century, the combined population of all of Europe and North America

will be 10 percent of the world's population—with the greater economic imbalances likely to occur in conjunction with these demographic developments, no amount of foreign economic assistance will stabilize the rest of the world. Additional, complementary approaches are required.

With all these challenges in mind, panelists discussed a number of strategies that can equip DOD to prepare better for this strategic uncertainty. One way is to enhance DOD agility to ensure that the department can rapidly adapt to changing circumstances.

Training, improving doctrine, experimenting, and developing new concepts are all mechanisms that will help DOD adapt in the future. One panelist argued that with respect to these processes, the Defense Department has moved to a lowest common denominator approach rather than a competitive process that brings out innovation. Another panelist contended that cultural training needs to be pursued by total immersion rather than language studies from afar.

Building and maintaining freedom of action will be important in realizing agility, which is why the global posture review and moves toward global force management have widely received “high marks,” according to one panelist. The Department of Defense has to consider how to deploy rapidly into areas where the United States might not have many allies. Prepositioning and basing are key because forces may not get to where they need to go fast enough if they are based in the United States. While this process is still incomplete due to ongoing negotiations over basing and access, panelists agreed that these are all moves in the right direction.

Another way to prepare for uncertainty is to emphasize prevention, another key theme in this QDR. As one panelist noted, major wars are relatively rare. What the United States is likely to deal with on a daily basis is the breakdown of weak states. The Department of Defense is adept at handling crises after they emerge, but less so at preventing problems before they become calamities. However, it was noted that DOD security cooperation programs can play a valuable role, together with efforts of other governments and interagency partners, to help weak states strengthen effective governance and control of their borders and territory.

An administration official noted that one of the biggest themes in this QDR is that of building partnership capacity. This applies to both interagency partners and foreign governments. All panelists praised the emphasis in this QDR on enhancing interagency capacity and developing unity of effort among elements of the U.S. Government, as well as the earlier development of both DOD and national interagency plans for homeland security and defense. The QDR also called for creation of a National Security Planning Guidance to set priorities and clarify the roles and responsibilities for various national security agencies. The need for more operational capacity and “jointness” in civilian agencies was noted, as well as the President's need for greater flexibility in allocating resources among them. One participant outlined the State Department's progress in transformational diplomacy, which is making it more operational and capable of working with DOD on program implementation, particularly in post-conflict stability operations.

However, one panelist contended that the QDR should have gone further. During much of the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Government struggled to get the military services to work together. The key challenge in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is getting the interagency process to work more effectively. Five years into the war on terror, Washington lacks an integrated grand strategy. This panelist called for more effective strategic planning at the national level by means of a comprehensive national security review, akin to the Eisenhower administration's Project Solarium. This process should identify priorities for policy development, execution, and resource allocation and lead to an interagency concept of operations for specific mission areas. Another way to enhance interagency cooperation would be to tie Senior Executive Service promotion to service in other agencies.

Building partnership capacity also applies to developing the internal security and stability capabilities of foreign governments that adhere to basic principles of

good governance and human rights. However, as one panelist pointed out, this will only emerge over a span of 8 to 10 years. DOD will have to think through how to minimize risk if contingencies occur in the meantime. As an administration official noted, wherever possible, the Department of Defense must seek to achieve economy of force and economy of effort in order to best avoid overextension. This means that Defense should place an emphasis on indirect approaches to security through leveraging the efforts of other partners. In so doing, DOD will have to think through how it can best work with others with different languages and cultures, as well as different interagency actors.

As the session came to a close, one panelist reflected more generally on the nature and purpose of the QDR process. Successful QDRs need to be leadership driven, not bureaucratic efforts, and should focus on key areas rather than become comprehensive, soup-to-nuts undertakings. They must also help frame choices about priorities and

risk. This panelist argued that QDRs are most useful when conducted during the first term of an administration, as it is difficult for a second term administration to rethink its approach fundamentally. This argument was somewhat reinforced by Deputy Secretary England's opening comment that the 2006 QDR was a refinement of the strategy articulated by the Bush administration in 2001, rather than a fundamental shift in direction. Having already adjusted the timing of QDR completion, Congress might want to reconsider the nature and scope of a QDR undertaken in the second term of future administrations.

*Rapporteur:* Kathleen McInnis. Final Report reviewed and revised by the symposium's panel moderators, Dr. Stephen Flanagan, Director of INSS, and Marianne Oliva and Gerald Faber, INSS. Final editing and layout by NDU Press.

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Upcoming Symposium: The 2006 Pacific Symposium, *China's Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests*, will be held June 20, 2006, at the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. Registration for the symposium and further information is available at <[www.ndu.edu/inss/Symposia/INSS\\_Conferences.htm](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Symposia/INSS_Conferences.htm)>.

Each year, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University conducts three to four major symposia, a variety of special programs and over 100 workshops, conferences, round-tables and meetings. While most are conducted under nonattribution rules, a summary report is prepared for some events, provided to attendees, and made available to other interested persons. Publicly available reports can be viewed at and downloaded from <[www.ndu.edu/inss](http://www.ndu.edu/inss)>.

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