

WMD and the 2006 QDR

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Evaluating the QDR's WMD Results on Its Own Terms

1. The introduction states that “the Department will greatly expand its capabilities for addressing such contingencies” [“the dangers posed by states that possess WMD and the possibilities of terrorists gaining control of them”].
2. The description of how strategy will be operationalized includes a long list of tasks necessary to prevention and response and a dozen associated capabilities (as echoed in a bold vision of combating WMD readiness).
3. The QDR also commits to anticipating future CBRN threats and to putting in place the capabilities to defeat them.
4. The QDR seeks to leverage changes in the defense enterprise to accelerate reorientation of the joint capability portfolios.
5. The QDR also seeks to achieve unity of combating WMD effort in complex interagency operations abroad and at home.

“Greatly Expand Capabilities”?

1. Capability expansion won't come through increased investment—cross-portfolio trades were not permitted.
2. Capabilities for elimination and interdiction will be expanded. Their future sufficiency must be weighed in terms of the requirements of operational plans and their scalability will be an issue.
3. There is no evidence to suggest that there will be any expansion of other capabilities described as priorities at the start of the QDR—expedient BW defense, EMP vulnerability reduction, or the ability to sustain military operations under adversary WMD attack.

“Prevent and Respond”?

Preventive dimension:

- Build and expand global partnerships.
- Help friendly governments improve controls.
- Discredit WMD as instruments of national power.
- Detect, identify, locate, tag, and track WMD.**
- Interdict WMD etc. in transit.**
- Identify and penetrate criminal networks.

Responsive dimension:

- Locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy WMD.**
- Detect fissile materials.
- Render safe NBC devices.**
- Help mitigate effects, initiate or support ongoing consequence management efforts, actively support others.

**Relevant QDR decision

“Anticipate Future CBRN Threats”?

Biological weapons: Reallocation to develop broad-spectrum medical counter-measures.

C? N? R?

“Leverage Changes in the Defense Enterprise”?

Good news for combating WMD:

- The effort to reinforce the role of the COCOMs in setting requirements.
- The commitment to develop more effective processes for strategic management.
- The efforts to improve performance for Homeland Defense, the War on Terror, and conventional campaigns ought also to pay dividends for the combating WMD effort.

Discouraging news:

- Organizational changes to more effectively oversee WMD-related matters were considered but rejected.
- Three capability portfolios were selected for management in an experimental new, more horizontal way. The combating WMD portfolio was not selected but it could be a poster-child of the crippling effects of stove-pipes.

“Unity of Combating WMD Effort”?

Partner capacities for combating WMD:

- Nothing in vision (although the homeland defense vision does have a WMD element).
- Cited progress to date: NATO CBRN battalion, PSI.
- Decisions: nothing mentioned.

Partner capacities for the New Triad: only mentions are BMD with Japan and info sharing.

Other Metrics?

Is there a way to assess QDR results other than in its own terms?

Let's shift the analytic focus from the distance from the starting line (the Persian Gulf War of 1990/91) and try to focus on the distance to the finishing line. What is the finishing line?

What the President wants (from the 2002 NSS):

- To not remain idle while dangers gather.
- To ensure that we can prevail against WMD-arming adversaries if need be.

What the 2001 QDR said:

- To project and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access and area-denial environments.
- To defeat CBRNE by protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and friends).
- Also to deter (where possible), to assure, and to dissuade.

2006 QDR Force Planning Construct

| <i>Objective Areas of Activity</i> | Homeland Defense | WOT and Irregular Warfare | Conventional Campaigns |
|--|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Steady state | | | |
| Surge | | | |

Adapting the New Force Planning Construct to the cbt WMD Capability Portfolio

| | Homeland Defense | WOT and IW | Conventional Campaigns |
|--------------|---|---|--|
| Steady State | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detect and disrupt CBRN in development. • Detect and disrupt in transit through all environments. • Defeat attacks underway. • Reduce threats cooperatively. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and disrupt OCONUS WMD development activities. • Defeat OCONUS attacks. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailored deterrence. • Tailored assurance. • Tailored dissuasion. • Mop up Libya-like penitents. |
| Surge | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support local response to a single WMD event. • Enable national response to 2 nearly simultaneous events. • Help manage complex requirements of campaign attacks. • At same time, cope with surge conventional campaign. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counter the CW variant of the IED. • Grab loose nukes. • “Win” in a civil war where protagonists are using CBR. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project against a state adversary willing and able to employ low-lethal WMD to attack TPDFD plan and allies/partners in order to buy time to achieve a fait accompli reversible only at high cost to US. • Prevail against state adversary willing and able to escalate and counter-escalate to secure regime survival. |

The 10 Joint Capability Portfolios

1. Joint Ground Forces
2. Special Ops Forces*
3. Joint Air Capabilities*
4. Joint Maritime Capabilities
5. Tailored Deterrence/New Triad*
6. Combating WMD*
7. Joint Mobility
8. ISR*
9. Net Centricity
10. Joint Command and Control

*indicates some WMD aspect

Tailored Deterrence/New Triad

No separate NPR this time. “Mainstreaming” seen as essential for ensuring desired COCOM integration and capability-based planning.

QDR vision:

- Deterrence: from one-size-fits-all to tailored.
- Implementation of New Triad (including responsive infrastructure).
- “Nuclear weapons will be accurate, safe, and reliable, and tailored to meet modern deterrence requirements.”
- Joint C2 survivable in face of adversary WMD attack.

QDR characterization of progress to date:

- First increment of BMD.
- Deployments of new conventional strike systems.
- “DoD is working with DOE to assess the feasibility and cost of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and, if warranted, begin development of that system. This system could enable reductions in the number of older, non-deployed warheads maintained as a hedge against reliability problems in deployed systems, and assist in the evolution to a smaller and more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.”
- Bolstering of STRATCOM’s capabilities.

Deterrence Portfolio (continued)

QDR Decisions:

1. Within 2 years, deploy a conventional SLBM.
2. Reduce Minute Man III (MM3) deployments from 500 to 450.
3. Begin adaptation of C2.
4. Increase reliance on UAVs for persistent surveillance.
5. Better coordinate defensive and offensive cyber missions.
6. Begin to reconfigure strategic bomber fleet.
 - Increase penetrating component of long-range strike by a factor of 5 by 2025 with 45% of future strike force unmanned.
 - Develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018 while modernizing current bomber force.

Status:

- Congressional support for some initiatives is uncertain.
- Congress remains strongly interested in the DoD-DoE-NNSA partnerships and by many accounts is not happy.
- Whether RRW is the right capability for the requirement will be debated.

An Aside

“In the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred of years of war (sic), culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Allied forces destroyed entire cities, while enemy leaders who started the conflict were safe until the final days. Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation. Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy of war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent.”

President George W. Bush, from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, announcing cessation of major combat operations in Iraq, May 1, 2003.