



# ***Strategic Opportunity? The Role of Allies, Partners, & Great Powers in the NMS***

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# ***Bush on Allies and Partners***

- **NSS:** Organize broad coalitions of willing & able to defeat terrorism and advance freedom & other common interests
  - ✓ Transformed NATO & East Asian alliances are core; can play larger regional & global roles
  - ✓ Flexible, mission-based partnerships elsewhere
  - ✓ '06 NSS affirmed centrality/value of alliances
- **NDS Strategic Goals:** Strengthen alliances, develop new partnerships, and build capacity to defend common interests
- **QDRs:** Both call for strengthening; new forms of security cooperation for assurance & deterrence
  - ✓ '01 enhance interoperability
  - ✓ '06 need to build partners' capability for integrated operations



# *Bush on Great Powers*

- **NSS:** Historic opportunity for cooperation given absence of fundamental conflict
  - ✓ Explore limits of mutual interests; Prevent reemergence of rivalries
  - ✓ '06: new path with India; hedging strategy on China; Russia's internal weakness and regional assertiveness limit cooperation
- **NDS Strategic Goal:** Dissuade potential adversaries; deter aggression; counter coercion
  - ✓ Hedging: “Key states” face decisions about global regional role
- **QDRs:** Limited coop + hedging by dissuasion & deterrence
  - ✓ '01: emphasis on East Asian balance of power; potential for conflict with unnamed rising power. Cautious on Russia
  - ✓ '06: Shape choices of countries at “strategic crossroads.” China: near peer; Russia: potential spoiler; India: strategic partner



# *Value of Allies & Partners*

- **None of 21st century threats amenable to unilateral solutions**
- **31 U.S. treaty allies + many close partners among the countries benefiting from globalization/open economic system**
  - ✓ **Capable core group that share stake in maintaining global stability + promotion of prosperity, good governance, rule of law**
  - ✓ **Despite differing strategies/capabilities, augment & complement U.S. efforts to protect, prevent, prevail ; avoid over-extension**
  - ✓ **Support gives greater legitimacy to U.S. actions**
  - ✓ **Sound alliances diminish inclination to counterbalance**
- **Effective alliance relations essential to implementation of global strategy and force realignment plans**
- **Need to adapt, expand, and better integrate activities of U.S. alliances & partnerships to create a global web of relationships for effective common action**



# *Alliances/Partnerships, Europe*

- **Europe:** Major adjustments of NATO's membership, missions, and capabilities since 1990
  - ✓ 10 new members; new missions (Balkan S&R/Afghan COIN); new security cooperation in Eurasia, broader Middle East, globally
- Threat perception gap (esp. on WOT); different strategies; capabilities gap widening; “useability” problems; NATO-EU rivalry; growing partnerships/limited impact; demographic trends & spending priorities limit capabilities long term
- **Mid-term:** Enhance integrated security planning; reform NATO cost sharing decisionmaking; better cooperation with EU; address further enlargement; reinvigorate partnerships
- **Long-Term:** Encourage sometimes fragmented, often reluctant Europe to become fuller & more capable partner in addressing security regional and global challenges
  - ✓ Press to maintain core & niche military capabilities
  - ✓ Develop clearer division of labor, esp. with EU, that takes account non-defense contributions to global stability/security



# *Alliances/Partnerships, Asia*

- **Alliances with Japan & Australia adapting well**
  - ✓ Common assessments; embraced wider regional & global role
  - ✓ JSDF transformation underway, USFJ realignment proceeding, missile defense coop building, political support strong
- **U.S.-ROK alliance strained but still strong**
  - Bilateral & internal ROK differences on dealing with North and future alliance structure being managed but volatile
  - ✓ ROK open to regional & global role; hesitant on North and China
  - ✓ Progress in USFK realignment, transfer of missions to ROK, & ROK force improvement; differences over strategic flexibility contained
  - ✓ Developing common vision; support for alliance remains strong
- **Security cooperation with other allies (Thailand & Philippines) & partners (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mongolia) advancing**
- **Key Challenges:** build consensus on dealing with China's rise; show how security ties to U.S. complement regional cooperation; strengthen partnerships on transnational threats



# *Other Partnerships*

- **Middle East:** Security relationship with Israel strong; coop with others in region less robust, fragile. Escalating turmoil in Iraq and Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and expand its influence complicate picture
  - ✓ **Key challenges:** balance U.S. support to Israel's security with efforts to promote a durable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to advance cooperation with moderate Arab states; head off regional hegemony by Iran; promote gradual reform
- **Western Hemisphere:** Uneven adaptation of security relations.
  - ✓ U.S. and Canada have increased CT & border cooperation; differences remain on missile defense.
  - ✓ Cooperation with LA/Caribbean govts. on transnational threats evolving; real progress with Chile, Brazil, and Central American governments on regional and global concerns; U.S. support to Colombia critical to stability there and in Andean ridge.
  - ✓ **Key challenges:** overcome lingering suspicions of U.S. policies doubts about commitment; build consensus on a comprehensive vision & strategy for regional security.



# *State of Great Power Relations*

- **China and India** confident, rising powers; **Russia** uncertain, limited capacity to shape events, looking to preserve influence
- All three are transitional states with greater challenges at home than abroad. Ability to tackle these successfully unclear.
- Each relationship has mix of cooperative and competitive elements that require continuous and careful balancing
- Important strides made in cooperation on terrorism, WMD proliferation and certain regional conflicts; differences remain that limit effective joint action.
- Working with these powers not easy:
  - ✓ No tradition of stable relations, regular consultations
  - ✓ All are wary of U.S. dominance unilateral exercise of power
  - ✓ Concerned about U.S. military presence in neighboring regions
  - ✓ Russia and China oppose U.S. democratization efforts; India's support more tempered



# *Managing Great Power Ties*

- **China** biggest challenge & opportunity due to economic power, dynamism, geopolitical ambition; only potential peer competitor
  - ✓ Good cooperation on N Korea, terrorism; progress on nonproliferation; acquiescence on Iraq, Iran in UNSC
  - ✓ Potential flashpoints on Taiwan; space
  - ✓ Concerns about military buildup & nature of global engagement
  - ✓ Internal turmoil fraught with negative consequences for US & allies
- **Key Challenges:** Hedging strategy: neither containment nor straightforward great power competition for resources, access, and influence; balance ties with Japan and India
  - ✓ Dissuade disruptive military developments; deter aggression
  - ✓ Encourage internal reform & responsible global/regional behavior
  - ✓ Test expansion of cooperation in areas of common interest: e.g. North Korean instability; engagement in international humanitarian and peace operations
  - ✓ Deepen dialogue on crisis management/strategic stability



## *Managing Great Power Ties, 2*

- **Russia** seeking to capitalize on new-found prosperity as “energy superpower” to recover global role. Competitive spirit has returned to U.S.- Russian relations around its periphery and in several hot spots.
  - ✓ Russia can be a spoiler. U.S. efforts to contain or punish Russia of questionable effectiveness, & risk undermining Russia’s still fragile recovery. A stumbling Russia likely to undercut variety of U.S. interests; precludes opportunity for geopolitical balancing
- **India:** democratic values & absence of geopolitical rivalries make it most promising U.S. partner; rising status cannot conceal its poverty, uneven development, & growing pains.
  - ✓ Preserve independence; different view of intl. system
  - ✓ Many common interests; key divergences—Pakistan
  - ✓ Modernization requirements limit role as full-fledged partner soon
  - ✓ Sizable, well-trained military formidable, but faces block obsolescence, budget & personnel constraints, limited mobility