


Strategizing about Strategy


Dr. Steve Randolph
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
17 November 2006

Standard disclaimers apply




Why go through this?

- Alignment, rationalization, integration of guidance documents
- Capture changed circumstances or assessments of threats, opportunities, etc
- Make adjustments to course based on experience of five years of GWOT and three years of Iraq
- Compensate for failure in existing processes, strategies, guidance, etc.




...given the costs involved

- Staff time and expertise (opportunity costs)
- Senior leader time and attention
- Political capital (internal and external)
- Time
 - Tradeoffs among time, clarity, comprehensiveness, security
- Document fatigue, credibility of planning system, and short time span before new administration



Opportunities raised yesterday: the job jar


- Impose a national strategic concept and derive a force structure from it
 - Let's try the COA test on this
- Assess the strategic environment
- Prioritize among major mission areas
- Define operational concepts that matter and drive the right force structure
- Reform joint doctrine
- Revitalize the joint strategic planning system/recreate a sound relationship between strategy and resources
 - A historical note as long as I'm on the subject: pre-GW joint planning and the evolution of the Joint Staff
- Reform the UCP
- Make the COCOMs play nice



A little more on context: A small dose of Sun Tzu


- Domestic:
 - Economy/deficits and strategic flexibility
 - Energy dependence, access, and costs
 - Health care and entitlements
 - Society/politics
 - Let's project out two years along current trends...
- Security:
 - Defense establishment halfway through several awkward transitions: CW to GWOT, Industrial Warfare to Information Age Warfare, restructured JSPS, peace to war footing, etc
 - Incredible bow wave of requirements for all Services—and yes, prioritization will happen somewhere, done by someone
 - Stumbling movement toward integration of instruments of power and orchestration at national level
 - A nation at war? A government at war?

Toto—we're not in
1938 any more




Meanwhile the world has changed

- Nation states and the system
 - China
 - Iran and the Middle East
 - Korea
 - Rapid, dramatic, apparently irreversible deterioration in Iraq
- GWOT and America's position in the world
 - Strategic communications?
 - Alliances?




And we've had a lot of experience in GWOT and its Iraqi component

- National decision making
- Civil military relations
- Interagency effectiveness
 - Devising strategies and policies
 - Marshalling the instruments of power toward a common end
- Over-reliance on the military instrument of power
- Failure of strategic communications
- Limitations of high-tech warfare when our opponents get a vote
 - Intelligence in an urban setting when it's their back yard
 - Precision targeting resting on that intelligence
 - PS The Israeli experience in Lebanon is also relevant
- Shortcomings in culture and command among US military forces
 - The war we want to fight, or the war we need to fight?
 - Some corrections underway: QDR, Svc responses, SAEs, etc
- Interplay of domestic politics, war strategy, and theater strategy
- Inability to understand our adversary and his strategy



Let's let reality intrude on our deliberations



So what do we do in this strategy?

- Timing and justification: capture and respond to lessons learned over first half-decade of war
- Focus and objectives:
 - Integrate proliferated sub-strategies
 - Capture lessons learned where able, both internally and with respect to linkages across the interagency—establish a vector and priority for ongoing work
 - Demonstrate to all audiences that our strategy is:
 - Reactive
 - Integrated
 - Prioritized

What we can do here,
fortunately,
is what needs to be done.