



# ***Emerging Strategic Challenges***

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## A Quick Overview: *What attributes define the emerging global security environment?*

- ***Big trends are clear:***
  - Continued globalization & (eroding) American preeminence
  - Rise (albeit uneven) of Asian powers
  - Rapid technological innovation and its spread – IT and WMD(d)
  - Empowered non-state actors; dominance of sub-state warfare
  - Regional volatility; corrosive conflicts; under-governed areas
- ***Aggravating (or cushioning) factors?***
  - Increasing cross-cultural tension; demographic shifts; resource scarcity. (*Offset by growth hubs?*)



## ***How will these trends shape the security environment over the next five years?***

- ***Predictions are difficult...***
  - Linear extrapolations miss “landscape altering” catalytic events
  - Symptoms can also be causal factors (i.e., “drivers”)
- ***Analytic hazards?***
  - Too general: no actionable insights
  - Too detailed: loses the forest for the trees
  - Tyranny of over-simplified categories (terrorists vs. insurgents)
  - A chronic lack of self-knowledge (how to weigh our own influence...?)



## *Mapping Threat Convergence?*

- ***The method: tracking distinctive trends whose threatening impacts are greatly magnified by their combination***
- ***The object: “Perfect Storm” analysis -***
  - Prime example: a nuclear 9/11 - terrorists within striking distance of a vulnerable, high-value target
  - Critical issues: motive, means, opportunity?
- ***Is this approach useful? Yes, history provides some telling examples. BUT:***
  - Don't let the dominant specter overshadow other threats:
    - **Ambitious authoritarians armed with the oil weapon?**
    - **States facing existential threats but with the capacity to embroil us vis-à-vis their neighbors.**
  - Don't forfeit an “upstream” view (e.g., why is Jack Bauer having such a bad day?)



## ***Framing the Analysis:***

- ***Five years after 9/11, the U.S. finds itself in the midst of a dangerous passage, heading toward either:***
  - Continued upward climb toward a more stable, inter-connected global order (marred by episodic mass violence but within ‘peripheral’ areas); or
  - Descent toward a more fragmented, violent world, beset by conflicts on a scale sufficient to embroil the great powers and disrupt globalization’s progressive tendencies
- ***Impossible to pinpoint where we’ll be on that ladder early in the next decade. Much depends upon how well we handle seven looming challenges:***
  - Outward focused: countering transnational terrorism; combating WMD threats; stabilizing conflict-prone regions; engaging/hedging regional powers/potential peer competitors
  - Inward focused: protecting the homeland; sustaining our alliances and partnerships; transforming defense posture



## Challenge #1

# *Transnational Terrorism*

*Remarks by Joe McMillan*



## *The Argument in Brief:*

- ***AQ-style “jihadist” terrorism, unlike other, more nationally-focused, variants of terrorism, is best understood as a globalized, transnational “insurgency.” Diagnosing the phenomenon in this way carries major implications for how we assess the threats that it poses and the methods for countering, containing and ultimately defeating this insurgency.***



# *How is Jihadism an Insurgency?*

- ***What is “insurgency”?***
  - A conflict between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities involving the use of political resources and violence to change, reformulate, or uphold the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. (Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 1990)
- ***Jihadists***
  - Seek to change existing political systems
  - Use political resources toward this end
  - Use violence toward this end



## ***Why Does It Matter That Jihadism Is an Insurgency?***

- ***Terrorism is politically directed, not “mindless”***
  - “Military action is a servant to policy.” (‘Atiyah)
- ***Issue is legitimacy of political status quo***
  - “All the existing so-called ‘Muslim’ societies are... un-Islamic and illegal.” (Qutb)
- ***Center of gravity is public opinion***
  - “We are in a race for the hearts and minds of our umma.” (Zawahiri)
- ***Force-legitimacy paradox comes into play***
  - “Force America to abandon its war against Islam by proxy and force it to attack directly, [thus generating] anger over the obvious, direct American interference in the Islamic world.” (Naji)



## ***What Makes an Insurgency “Globalized?”***

- ***Globalization: “the integration of political, economic, and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated peoples.”*** (Defense Science Board)
- ***Globalized insurgency characterized by:***
  - Challenge to transnational political order, not just individual regimes
  - Political agenda aimed at people in multiple states
  - Leveraging global political impact of local operations
  - Rapid worldwide dissemination of information and ideas
  - Social effects of globalization on organization and operational style




# *Jihadism as Globalized Insurgency*

- ***Loose, shifting alliance of transnational groups***
  - Key groups comprise multiple nationalities
  - Network operates across state boundaries
- ***Jihadist ideology global***
  - Inherent transnationalism of Islam
  - Jihadists (and other Salafis) reject validity of state system
  - Draws on intellectual strains from numerous countries
  - Coopts and unifies disparate local struggles and grievances
- ***Legitimacy under challenge is transnational***
- ***Organization and operational style shaped by globalization***
  - Adaptive network structure
  - Parallel, quasi-coordinated operations
  - Use of technological and social fruits of globalization



## *Jihadist Cooptation of Local Conflicts*





# *Popular Support*

- ***Key to success or failure***
  - Insurgencies depend on popular support—or at least indifference
  - Legitimacy is determined by popular perceptions
- ***Types of popular support***
  - Passive and active
  - Intellectual and mass
- ***Techniques for gaining support***
  - Charismatic attraction
  - Abstract ideology
  - Solutions to concrete grievances
  - Action (propaganda by deed)



## *Propaganda by Word and Deed: Then...*



**“We must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda.”**

**- Mikhail Bakunin,  
1870**



## *... and Now*



**“Anyone who understands the particular character of this religion will also understand the place of struggle with the sword, which is to clear the way for struggle through preaching.”**

**-*Sayyid Qutb,***  
**ca. 1964**



## ***Propaganda by Word and Deed***

- ***Jihadists understand and employ this distinction***
  - *Da'wa* (preaching) and *jihad* (fighting)
  - Leaders recognize synergy between two legs of strategy
- ***Logic of “propaganda by deed” explains preference for mass-effects terrorism***
  - Attacks less about the Western victim than about the Muslim audience
  - High-visibility actions raise credibility of insurgents
  - Brings “force-legitimacy paradox” to the fore



# ***Force-Legitimacy Paradox***

- ***Insurgent use of force generally works to insurgents' advantage***
  - Shows seriousness of purpose
  - Demonstrates credibility of insurgent challenge
  - Forces people to take sides
  - Shows that status quo is ineffective
- ***Establishment use of force also generally works to insurgents' advantage***
  - Shows inability to govern by moral suasion
  - More damaging if excessive, mis-targeted, or applied by outsiders
- ***Some important exceptions***
  - Insurgent/terrorist excesses that hurt popular interests
  - Tightly focused, short duration, decisive action



# ***Ideology and Jihadist Insurgency***

- ***Insurgencies grow from real discontents***
  - Ideology a catalyst, not the cause
- ***Ideology converts amorphous social discontent into insurgent action***
  - Generates and motivates recruits
  - Strengthens active and passive support base
- ***Islamist-based ideologies particularly potent***
  - Religion is key identity marker—trumps all other loyalties
  - Provides moral rationalization for terrorism
  - Gives home-grown, traditional cover to radical ideas
- ***Jihadist ideology serves as surrogate command and control***
  - Unites loosely affiliated—or unaffiliated—groups in common purpose
  - Enables intent-based action with little or no C2
  - “Globalized” adaptation of *Auftragstaktik*



# *Our Strategic Response?*

- ***Global counterinsurgency on two tracks:***
  - ***Suppressing jihadists: capture, kill, disrupt***
    - Prevent them from acting effectively
    - Keep them from escalating conflict
    - “Homeland” security—but not just at home
  - ***Break nexus between insurgents and people***
    - Weaken jihadist credibility
    - Strengthen credibility of existing order
    - Address discontents
    - Challenge jihadist diagnosis and prescription
- ***Two tracks tightly intertwined***
  - Sometimes in tension with each other
  - Sometimes mutually reinforcing

**“Think globally; act locally”**



## *Track 1: Suppressing Jihadists*

- ***Preference for local and non-military suppression of jihadists***
- ***When military means must be used, apply minimum effective force precisely and intensively***
  - “When forced to resort to arms...the operation must be pursued energetically and expeditiously in order to overcome the resistance as quickly as possible.” (USMC *Small Wars Manual*, 1940)
- ***Pick shots carefully; every use of force has a political cost***
  - Our operations are also propaganda by deed



## ***Track 2: Breaking Nexus with People***

- ***Understand why Muslim populations support, sympathize with, or tolerate jihadist terrorism***
  - Varies from person to person, place to place
  - Jihadists provide unified field theory of grievance
- ***Promote alternative diagnoses and prescriptions***
  - Do not try to change what Muslims are or what they believe
  - Help Muslim opinion leaders articulate why certain behaviors are inconsistent with Muslim beliefs
- ***Support alternative responses to grievances***
  - Encourage political reform--local and international
  - Mitigate regional conflicts
  - Revisit U.S. policies
  - Improve quality of life (economic, educational, etc.)
- ***Do not reinforce jihadist “clash of civilizations” message***



## **Practical Challenges: *Balancing the Political & Military***

- ***Synergy essential between actions on political and military tracks***
  - Kinetic actions have rhetorical effects
  - Counter-insurgents must practice “propaganda by deed”
  - Near-term vs. long-term benefits
- ***Escalation dominance***



## Practical Challenges, cont'd:

# *Building Partner Capacity*

- ***Suppression track best carried out by locals***
  - US involvement plays into jihadist strategy
  - Locals less obtrusive, more familiar with social terrain
  - Local successes reinforce legitimacy
  - Problem is deficit of will and capability
- ***Political track can only be carried out by locals***
  - Conflict largely about legitimacy of local authorities
  - Externally imposed solutions counterproductive
  - Political solutions must be sustainable—anything run by outsiders is not
  - US and other foreigners must play low-viz supporting role



## Practical Challenges, cont'd:

# *Unity of Effort*

- ***Integrating instruments of power across agencies***
  - Central strategy, distributed implementation
  - Authorities to compel cooperation
  - Echelonment
  - Agility
- ***Managing shifting coalitions***

**There is no purely military battlefield in counter-insurgency operations, and the campaign can only be won by combined civil-military efforts.— *Paget, 1967***



## Challenge #2

# *Combating WMD Threats*

*Remarks by Chuck Lutes*



## ***The Argument in Brief:***

- ***The actual or potential spread of WMD capabilities will exert a profound influence upon the emerging security environment.***
- ***Whereas in the Cold War the main threat was a peer competitor and managed principally with one instrument – deterrence – today’s challenges are more diverse:***
  - **Terrorists, rogue states, a growing global black market in WMD materials and know-how, homeland defense, as well as onward proliferation and political instability/radicalism in WMD-capable states.**
- ***Overall, a greater diversity of threats = a greater number of military missions, a fact that poses big integration challenges for our future national military strategy.***



# *The Paradigms of Combating WMD*

**Emphasized Challenges**

	<i>Cold War</i>	<i>Post Cold War</i>	<i>Post-9/11</i>
<i>Adversaries &amp; Actors</i>	Traditional States	Rogue States	Terrorist Networks, Rogue States
<i>Capabilities</i>	Nuclear	Nuclear, Chemical, Missiles	Nuclear, Biological, Missiles

**Emphasized Responses**


<i>Preventing Acquisition</i>	Nonproliferation treaties and regimes	Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)	CTR, Interdiction, Preemption
<i>Preventing Use</i>	Deterrence	Containment	Preemption
<i>Defense/Mitigation</i>	Civil Defense or none	Protection of military forces	Protection of forces and populace

*National policy with respect to WMD has moved to the Post-9/11 paradigm, but DoD organization and capabilities are more in sync with Cold War and post-Cold War paradigms.*



# National Military Strategy to Combat WMD

## Strategic Military Framework






# National Military Strategy to Combat WMD

## Military Mission Areas

**Mission:** Dissuade, deter, defend against & defeat those who seek to harm the United States, its allies and partners through WMD use or threat of use, and, if attacked, mitigate the effects and restore deterrence .






# Strategic Challenge: Terrorist seeking WMD

- **Actors of Concern:**

- *al-Qaeda*
- *Hezbollah*
- *Others?*

Likelihood: Moderate

Consequences: High



- **Intersection of combating WMD and WOT & integration of strategies**
- **Need to synchronize with interagency & foreign partners**
- **Reduce supply of material to the extent possible**
- **Premium on detection and intelligence, especially HUMINT**



# Strategic Challenge:


## Rogue states developing WMD programs

- Actors of Concern:**

- North Korea
- Iran
- Syria

Likelihood: High

Consequences: Moderate



- **Rogue states are both regional and global problems; consider linkages among rogue states and with terrorists**
- **WMD may be used unconventionally**
- **May require full range of military WMD responses**
- **Requires new thinking about deterrence with clearly established red lines and consequences**




# *Strategic Challenge:* Instability in WMD-armed state

- **Actors of Concern:**

- North Korea
- Iran
- Syria
- Pakistan

Likelihood: Moderate

Consequences: Moderate - High




- *Environment may be permissive, semi-permissive, or non-permissive*
- *May require significant stability operations component*
- *Potential range from SOF to large conventional commitment*



# *Strategic Challenge:* Conflict with near-peer WMD adversary

- *Actors of Concern:*
  - *Belligerent China*
  - *Recidivist Russia*



Likelihood: Low

Consequences: High


- *Deterrence as primary means*
- *WMD may be used in unconventional ways (e.g. high altitude nuclear detonation to take out space-based ISR)*



# Strategic Challenge: Onward nuclear proliferation

- **Actors of Concern:**

- Saudi Arabia
- Egypt
- Turkey
- Taiwan
- Venezuela
- Brazil
- South Korea
- Japan



Likelihood: Moderate

Consequences: Low - Moderate

- Possible breakdown of NPT due to rogue state WMD programs
- **Security assurances** will be essential tool in assuring allies
- Each case will require tailored approach




# Strategic Challenge: WMD black markets

- **Actors of Concern:**
  - *Emergence of AQ Khan-like networks*
  - *Witting or unwitting states*
    - *North Korea*
    - *Iran*
    - *Pakistan*
    - *Russia*

Likelihood: Moderate

Consequences: Moderate



• **Heavily reliant on international partnerships, law enforcement, and detection capabilities**




# Strategic Challenge: Homeland defense

- **Actors of Concern:**
  - Terrorist groups
  - Rogue state with delivery capability
  - Near-peer conflict

Likelihood: Moderate

Consequences: High



- **Defense-in-depth strategy requires addressing previous WMD challenges**
- **Defending US populace and recovering to responding to WMD attack on homeland should be last resort**



# ***Integrating WMD Challenges into the NMS***

- ***Next US conflict likely to be about or have a significant WMD component***
- ***Currently, WMD problems are addressed by planners on a case-by-case basis***
- ***No single strategy integrates, synchronizes, and prioritizes among WMD challenges or, more importantly, with other defense and national security issues***
- ***NMS should lay out a strategy for addressing and integrating solutions to the major strategic challenges***