Thailand’s Security Environment

Since the end of the Cold War, the overall security environment in Thailand and surrounding areas is largely stable. Although bilateral relations with neighboring countries, particularly with Myanmar, fluctuate within a narrow range between local tension to smooth interaction at time, Thailand has always been able to maintain a friendly relationship with all states sharing common borders and beyond. In part, because of the idea that promoting peace, stability, and economic prosperity in neighboring states is perceived to serve Thailand’s prime national interest. And also, the spirit of ASEAN, which puts the premium on cooperation, allows dialogue to take precedent over confrontation.

Being a continental Southeast Asian country and the front-line state during the Cold War, Thailand had always perceived a land threat from northeast and north directions. The end of the Cold War, the rapid economic development in the decade prior to the economic crisis in 1997, and on-setting trends of transnational issues and crimes altered Thailand’s threat perception drastically. Clear-cut and identifiable threats were replaced mainly by uncertainties. The need to protect the extended exclusive economic zones (EEZ) brought about by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), sea lines of communication, as well as the need to participate in the multilateral effort to keep the regional maritime areas safe compelled Thailand to re-prioritize the development of the Armed Forces.

The post Cold War reality has been reflected in the ways security is now perceived. By belonging to ASEAN since its inception in 1967, Thailand has embraced the concept of national and regional resilience in which comprehensive security is the norm. However, having been the frontline state of the Cold War battleground in Southeast Asia, Thailand put more emphasis on the military or traditional dimension of security. The absence of a viable threat and the strong economic growth, which began well before the final episode of the Cold War – the conclusion of Cambodian conflict in 1991, enabled Thailand to broaden its outlook on security. Emphasis on human, environmental, or economic dimensions is now occupying the center stage of security policies in Thailand.

Rising China has certainly raised the level of anxiety among most of the Southeast Asian states, Thailand included. China has shown a strong desire to peacefully and constructively engage regional countries in the bilateral and multilateral forums like ASEAN, APEC, or ARF. However, fact remains that China is the resident major power with ambition to become a super power in a decade or two. The possibility of major powers’ rivalry, which could destabilize the whole region, cannot be discounted. The involvement of China in the competing sovereignty claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea can only be viewed with concern because of the potential for disruptive outcomes. The Code of Conduct, which has been in the drafting stage in the ARF process for some years, still shows no sign of materialization. As for the security of Thailand, China’s growing influence in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia has become noticeable. Of late, Myanmar has been the main source of uncertainty for Thailand’s security. China’s strong military and commercial presence in that country, particularly in the Bay of Bengal, has started a strategic-counter move by India in terms of high-level military exchanges with Myanmar, maritime force build-up, and expansion of the naval area of operation into the South China Sea. Again, the competition of the two major resident powers for influence, both unsatisfied with the status quo, in the periphery of ASEAN could send repercussions throughout the region.

Thailand’s security environment at present is directly linked to neighboring countries in the north. While armed conflicts cannot be ruled out completely, the possibility of a large-scale inter-state confrontation in the near to medium term future is very low. One of the main security concerns for Thailand is the large number of illegal immigrants. The improvement in the capabilities of Myanmar’s armed forces, with the assistance from China, to suppress ethnic minority resistance is evident all along border areas. This has resulted in the increasing influx of ethnic Myanmar minorities, seeking safe sanctuaries and better living conditions, in Thailand. It is estimated that there are now more than 1 million illegal migrants and refugees (mainly economic) residing in towns, cities, and refugee camps – mostly along the western border. Although some progress has been made on the repatriation of these illegal entrants back to their home countries, technical problems concerning proof of citizenship tend to stand in the way of smooth return. This is especially true in the case of illegal entrants from ethnic minorities in Myanmar whose official identities are non-existent.

Of all security issues, which are transnational in nature, Thailand is now faced with an amphetamine epidemic despite successes in opium and other drug eradication programs. For the past 5 years, the number of amphetamine seized has increased from approximately 21 million tablets in 1997 to more than 60 million tablets during the first 6 months of the year 2001. Most of this dangerous drug, which is called “YA BAA” – meaning mad drug in Thai, are produced by small but mobile factories in an area known throughout the world as the “Golden Triangle.” This area, which is located inside Myanmar, is mainly controlled by the United Wa Army, an ethnic minority in Myanmar, which has long been involved in the drug trade.

Thai security forces estimated that total of 700 million amphetamine tablets were smuggled across the border into Thailand in 2001. A majority of these drugs (85 %) managed to escape the dragnet of Thai authorities and reached around 3 millions local consumers, many at young age. Attempts have repeatedly been made to obtain cooperation from Myanmar to suppress this deadly threat to Thailand’s social fabric. Responses, both from local and higher levels, are often less than encouraging. Reasons given by Myanmar authorities range from their inability to police the Wa-controlled territories to the lack of resources to carry out military operations. These reasons are rather difficult to accept as credible given the fact that, in the past several years, the Myanmar Army has been increasing in strength steadily toward a 500,000-strong target – with China’s assistance.

Besides the menace of amphetamines to the long-term national well-being, the internal security environment in Thailand has been largely stable in the recent past. Although protests against the early-phase of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan by activists of 6-million Muslim-Thai population took place in the country, this should be regarded as normal in any democratic country. However, this is not to say that the 4-province area in the southern-most part of Thailand, which is populated mainly by Muslim Thais, has been completely pacified. The fact is there are still some small groups of Islamic radical, which sometime resort to violent tactics in order to make their presence felt, are still posing problems to public safety in the south. The latest act of terrorism occurred in Thailand last year on April 7, 2001 when the Haad Yai train station was bombed resulting in the death of a young boy, injuries to several passengers, and severe damage to property. In addition, the ongoing war on terrorism offers an opportunity to many regional countries to join in the international effort to rid extremist groups in their territories. The crack down on terrorist organizations, with connections to international terrorist groups like Al-Queda, may spill over into this sensitive area. The possibility of local Islamic radical groups in the south giving sanctuary or staging location for future attack to fellow neighboring or international factions cannot be totally discounted. It has been a concern among Thai and friendly countries. Authorities have known for quite some time that many Muslim Thai activists went overseas to Islamic schools, where they came under influence of hard-line teachers. Some were reported to have joined the jihad war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and returned to Thailand as extremists.

Implications of the September 11 attacks in the United States on Thailand’s security environment are still emerging. War on drugs, which has been on top of the national priority list in these past many years, is being integrated into plans to combat terrorism, particularly insofar as cooperation with coalition partners is concerned. But one has to wonder if the focus on the drug threat to Thailand’s security has not been obscured by the international attention on war on terrorism. Furthermore, the U.S. Enlargement Policy on human rights and democracy has been quietly overlooked in order to rally wider support for the fight against terrorism. And this “benign neglect” can certainly be understood to be applicable only to specific or special circumstances. Nevertheless, a precedent has been set. For Thailand, the situation in Myanmar, where the individual liberty and democratization are considered unacceptable by western standard, has a direct bearing on the security environment as previously mentioned. Deviation of the relevant U.S. policies toward that country, intentionally of otherwise, can cause anxiety for Thai security planners and decision makers.

THAILAND’S DEFENSE CONCEPT

Thailand’s defense concept is premised on the Thai national foreign and security policy, which has been formulated on the basis of common comprehensive security. By this, it means that the stability of countries in the region has become intertwined. And that the regional resilience can only be achieved only if the national resilience of regional individual countries is jointly promoted. Consequently, Thailand subscribes to ASEAN’s concept of cooperative security by using, bilaterally and multilaterally, confidence and security building measures and preventive diplomacy to maintain peace and stability with all neighboring countries. From this framework, one of the main features of the defense concept rests with the defense diplomacy.

In the past, Thailand planned the defense of the country from internal and external identifiable threats based on national strengths, deterrence from collective defense arrangements, and the total defense concept. Traditional security threats such as border disputes, overlapping sovereignty claims, and inter-state tension still remain to be resolved- and continue to require some measure of readiness. However, the possibility of armed conflicts between states is increasingly unlikely. One reason is ASEAN’s way of conflict prevention and management has become the norm for most countries in the region. The cost of armed conflict in terms of economic, social, political, and international damages often is perceived to be unacceptable to regional communities. For Thailand, the defense concept has to be adjusted accordingly. Besides defense diplomacy as previously mentioned, defense cooperation with regional countries, traditional allies and friendly countries are considered vital to deter open hostility. Military exercises are being planned to include officers from countries, which are former adversaries, as observers. More and more Thai officers participate in regional security organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum along with defense and civilian officials from Thailand and other member countries. Socialization of defense personnel in the region to create confidence and trust has become an important part of conflict prevention in the defense concept.

While defense of the nation is still the fundamental mission of the Armed Forces, globalization has created a security environment that is marked with interdependence and interconnectedness. Thailand’s defense concept has been adjusted to reflect this new reality. Thai Armed Forces have joined international peace operations under the auspices of the United Nations in various locations around the world. Thailand has continued to provide a force commander and troops for the United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), and work side by side with other international coalition forces on the nation-building task. In addition, Thailand has taken a keen interest in joining multilateral efforts to tackle transnational issues and crimes with the view that these emerging challenges are no longer confined to individual country or region. Of late, Thailand has offered to the United Nations, to send engineer troops and medical teams to Afghanistan. So far Thailand’s contribution for the war on terrorism has been modest. But as often mentioned by many leaders of the free world, the next phase of the war effort to completely root out terrorists will be long and hard. Thailand should be in position to participate more actively, as terrorism itself is one of the security concerns of the country.

Like most countries, the traditional role of the Thai Armed Forces has always been the defense of the country in the forward areas. During the Cold War, when Thailand was faced with the presence of large hostile military forces across the north and northeastern borders, the defense concept was primarily based on the forward defense strategy. Partly it was because of the geographical configuration of the country and the lack of strategic depth for the defense of the heartland. At present, the security environment along the same borders remains similar. The difference is that non-traditional and transnational issues such as drug and human trafficking now replace traditional military threats. In essence, borders remain the area where security concerns for the country emanate from. Looking at it in this light, the concept of forward defense is still very much valid for today’s circumstances. Although the role of the military forces has generally been of supporting responsible governmental agencies in tackling most transnational issues, border control, particularly in sensitive areas where threatened by drug problems, is still very much the function of military forces. In the case of a piracy threat on the high seas, the responsibility falls on the Royal Thai Navy almost solely, in addition to the protection of sea lines of communication.

Past experiences of the Thai Armed Forces in combating insurgency still characterize Thailand’s defense concept today. Part of the success in stopping the advance of communist-inspired insurgency, which threatened to engulf the entire region during the Cold War, came from the strategy of development. In the present era when human security has gained even more currency, this strategy is still relevant. Thailand continues to incorporate development in the defense concept to meet transnational challenges. The Thai contingent, which is performing peacekeeping duty with UNTAET in East Timor, has been commended for its success in using this concept to help East Timorese in their nation-building task. Presently, the Thai Defense Ministry is in the process of introducing the “Cross- Border Development Concept” to alleviate security problems, which originate from the border areas. The idea is to use development to create a belt of safety and relative prosperity along both sides of troubled border. This belt of development would offer protection from the spillover of problems from neighboring countries, problems that often become security concerns for Thailand. Although success of the concept is very much dependent on cooperation and willingness of governments of neighboring states, the non-threatening nature of the scheme should be attractive enough to assuage any fear which might arise.

ROLES OF THAI MILITARY FORCES IN COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

The constitution of Thailand stipulates the following missions for the Royal Thai Armed Forces:

- To defend the country and sovereignty

- To maintain the internal stability in the country

- To maintain peace and order in the country

- To assist in the development of the country

From the constitution, the primary role of the military forces is still to defend the country. However, the constitution has also clearly assigned secondary roles for the armed forces as indicated above. These secondary missions in internal stability are the basis for the armed Forces roles in countering transnational threats.

As previously mentioned, the background of Thai Armed Forces’ involvement in counter insurgency has been an asset in meeting transnational threats. Many old ad-hoc security organizations set up during the Cold War such as the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) still exist. Mainly military personnel staff the remnants of these non-traditional/coordinating organizations; many of them have vast experiences of operation other than war. The Government of Thailand, faced with a host of issues, has reoriented most of these units toward the task of counter transnational threat. ISOC, for example, is now the main policy-coordinating agency for counter-drug operations. Thai Armed Forces continue to support these organizations with necessary personnel and staff.

As a developing country with experience in combating insurgency with non-military weapons in the past, Thailand perceives transnational issues in a similar light as other non-conventional threats during the Cold War. Although actors in the current threat environment are mainly non-state, some of transnational threats have organization of the same nature, similar methods of operations, and pose no less danger to the Thai society than that of communist insurgency in the past. In general, transnational issues are viewed as external threats to the country. Borders continue to be considered important where strongest defense should be established as the first line. As earlier indicated, border security has always been in the realm of responsibility of the Armed Forces. Thailand has had border committees as mechanisms to coordinate security matters of mutual concern with all neighboring countries for a long time. With the consent of the Government and other civilian agencies, the Thai military continues to play key roles in these committees where transnational issues are often discussed systematically and bilaterally in a friendly manner.

The general trend for the role of Thai Armed Forces in countering transnational threats is to augment responsible civilian agencies in most areas of the country. One of the main reasons is that most of transnational threats, which Thailand faces, can be dealt with using existing legislations that are normally exercised by civil authorities already. But there are areas sensitive enough to maintain the use of martial law, which was left over from the Cold War, primarily along the border to the north. In such areas, the military force, although allowed by law to exercise full control, coordinate counter transnational threats with all concerned agencies before taking actions. In many localities, military units exercise operational control over all governmental agencies in the same manner as in counter insurgency operations. This arrangement has worked well particularly with the counter drug operation and the control of illegal migration.

Because of the gravity of the epidemic situation from amphetamine proliferation, Thai Armed Forces have been tasked to mobilize all available resources to counter this threat to the nation’s security. Beside border interdiction and search and destroy of production bases, the Thai Military has provided facilities, resources, and personnel in drug education and drug rehabilitation programs of the Government. As the result, the Thai public has seemed to be confident with the Armed Forces’ handling of the drug issue. The growing perception of all transnational threats to the country should come under the Thai Military’s responsibility has generated some debate in Thailand. This question will be addressed in the next section of this paper.

In the international arena, defense diplomacy and defense cooperation are increasingly used to address transnational threats jointly with neighboring countries. In multilateral forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Thai officers participated actively, side by side with their civilian colleagues, in special conferences and workshops designed to tackle transnational issues and crimes. Joint military exercises in anti-piracy, disaster relief, or other counter transnational threat are now common in the region. The Cobra Gold 2002 Exercise, which has been expanded to include many regional and Thailand’s neighboring counties as observers or participants, will incorporate an element of counter terrorism training this year

CHANGES IN MILITARY PLANS AND DOCTRINE TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

1. Transnational problems are long-term threats and often perceived to be destructive to the society but indirect threats to a nation state. The notion that, in the era of globalization, threats to human security can jeopardize the survival of the state is still emerging and relatively alien in Thailand. In an environment in which law enforcement or banking system are not yet fully operational, a country can easily fall prey to transnational crimes, for they could subvert the norm and institution of the state. Therefore, as Thailand’s military establishments get more and more involved with combating transnational threats, a new mindset is indeed required. There is a need to understand that these non-state perpetrators of transnational problems can be as detrimental to the society, thus the country, as organized-traditional enemies themselves. Relevant new doctrine in this regard should be useful.

2. In the effort to counter transnational threats in Thailand, there are many actors. Besides the Armed Forces, a number of civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations, or even international organizations that have field offices in Thailand often get involved. To be able to tackle the problems effectively, there is a clear need for better coordination and for instantaneous, if possible, exchange of information. Obviously, the Thai Military has the experience from counter insurgency days. Differences are that there are now more actors, all operating under new environments brought about by globalization. Therefore, changes in doctrine and military planning for these phenomena are required.

3. Most of Transnational threats today have dynamics that are found to be beyond regional armed forces’ capabilities to keep track. Sources of these threats are diversified while intelligence services continue to be constrained by budget shortfall as the result of the 1997 economic crisis. Thai Armed Forces have been trying to alleviate the problem by intensifying the cooperation and intelligence exchanges with allies and friendly nations. Attacks on the United States by the Al Queda terrorist group on September 11 also help expedite interactions among military establishments so that there will be no surprise of the sort in the future. However, most activity occurs at the bilateral level. Perhaps time has come for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral forum in which transnational threats have often been discussed, to consider institutionalizing the military participation. Inclusion of ministers of defense or equivalents in the annual ARF conference could be a good start. Separate meeting of defense officials attending various annual ARF gatherings, specifically to address this kind of issue, can go a long way toward defense coordination and cooperation to counter transnational threats.

4. As previously stated, an effective way to counter transnational threats has to come from a joint civil-military effort. Although Thailand has had long experience of civil and military personnel working together from past counter insurgency operations, Thai military tended to be dominant in the past. In the present environment, civil institution has been fully developed. The Thai Military largely plays supporting role in most areas of the country except in some sensitive borders. There is a clear need for the civil-military relation to be thoroughly understood by both quarters in order to meet transnational challenges such as drug or human trafficking effectively.

5. In order to utilize full potential of military forces in counter transnational threats, soldiers have to be properly trained and equipped. In the case of Thailand, it is found that there is also a requirement to establish appropriate and specific rules of engagement for the task. The legitimacy of the role of the military in countering transnational threats frequently becomes the subject for debates in the country. Promulgation or amendment of some civil laws to allow the military to have appropriate jurisdiction could go a long way toward smoother operations. In addition, differences in working ethic and culture still exist between civil and military agencies. Increase in cross-agency training and education can minimize frictions that may occur. And as indicated earlier, transnational issues and crimes threaten human and societal security. State and non-state actors, individual, and society have to be involved in order to successfully counter these threats. In this regard, Thai Armed Forces have joined other governmental agencies in the public relation campaign, designed to first educate people of transnational threats, and second to solicit for cooperation to counter them. This is especially true for the drug problem.

6. Thai Military Forces face a similar dilemma as many other countries’ armed forces. That dilemma is the expectation of the Government and the people for the Armed Forces to be able to accomplish a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. Transnational threats to the country have just emerged recently. The Royal Thai Armed Forces are expected to work with other agencies to successfully counter these threats. The most serious challenge before defense decision makers is how to transform a large formation of Thai Armed Forces with top-heavy structure, constrained by limited budget, built up over a long period of time for conventional warfare, into a small versatile and sufficiently equipped fighting force. Like in many countries, in case of Thailand, the answer lies in the defense reform. However, although the Thai defense reform plan has been in force for the last 3 years, turning the desire into a reality has not been a smooth sailing. Adjustments have to be made. Part of these adjustments will have to accommodate the need to face up to the dynamics of transnational threats.

INFLUENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL THREATS ON MILITARY PLANNING

1. Transnational threats, particularly drug, have been on top of Thailand’s national priority for the past few years. While the world’s attention is now focused on the war against terrorism, the spread of drug is still regarded as the most serious threat to the Thai national security - and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Thai Armed Forces are committed to combat these threats along with other agencies with all resources available. Naturally, repercussions on programs for force modernization and capability planning are not negligible. However, compensation for the reduced readiness is being made. The most cost effective way is perhaps to improve of the intelligence capability. Robust intelligence can, not only increase the warning time for various uncertainties Thailand is facing now and in the future, enable the Armed Forces to better prepare to meet transnational threats as well.

2. In Thailand, transnational issues and crimes often make headlines in local newspapers. Local television stations routinely feature seizures of amphetamines or gang of thug that preys on illegal migrants. Therefore public awareness of transnational threats is quite high. Furthermore, effects of the 1997 economic crisis still linger in the mind of most people. These factors have made the Thai public to perceive the military modernization, particularly acquisition of modern military platforms, as unnecessary and that defense spending should be further curtailed. At the same time, public demand for the Thai Armed Forces to be more involved in fighting transnational threats keeps getting louder. The quandary is difficult to reconcile.

3. The 1997 economic crisis, which resulted in the downslide of defense budget in real term in the past 4 years, no doubt has taken its toll in conventional readiness of the Thai Armed Force. Modernization programs have become even more incremental. Intense scrutiny by the public and the Parliament has made military procurement more transparent and accountable, which is a blessing in disguise. To meet the challenge of transnational threats, planning for force modernization have to account for capabilities that are applicable to both conventional and other than war tasks. The new reality has forced planners to prioritize the scarce resource for use to counter transnational threats more and more. Guard against corrosion of conventional readiness and professionalism of the military in conflicts must be erected.

4. Finally, military planning in the post-Cold War era has never been easy. The absence of identifiable military threat and the emergence of transnational threats have a strong influence on how planning for new capability and modernization should be approached. Thailand’s defense reform, which was approved by the Defense Council in 1999, was formulated partly on the basis of scenario planning. Although this method has been around in more advanced countries for quite a number of year, it is still relatively new to Thailand. With transnational threats becoming increasingly prominent concern of the country, planning for future capabilities and modernization perhaps should take this line of approach.

REQUIREMENTS FOR INTRA-AGENCY AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

1. Transnational threats are multi dimensional. And as mentioned earlier, there are many actors, governmental and non-governmental, involved in effort to fight against these threats. Most of them operate relatively independently form one another. There is a definite requirement to coordinate all the counter-threat activities for each specific kind. The Thai Armed Forces have played useful role as a central contact point for counter drug operations in the border areas. There are needs to establish more of them in national, operational, and tactical levels. Military establishments are suitable to act as command and control headquarters for only certain type of transnational threat, anti-drug, or anti-piracy to mention a few. Civilian agencies will certainly have to share the burden. The most important requirement is that once these contact and liaison points are established, they must be given full authority to command and control all activities in their respective realms.

2. To counter transnational threats effectively, interoperability among many actors must be insured. Government’s effort in Thailand, unfortunately, is often constrained by problems of interoperability among military services and governmental agencies because of the culture of working independently. Therefore, there is a strong requirement for the cultivation of interoperability in terms of hardware, software, as well as peopleware.

3. Transnational threats should be clearly defined by a set of criterion that is accepted and understood by all concerned. Some of which are on the borderline between crimes or threats to national security. Cyber attack is a good example. A policy guideline, which contains inputs from responsible agencies, may be required in order to mitigate real threats that are destabilizing or destructive to the nation.

4. The September 11 attacks in the United States have globalized transnational threats in the way that has never been done before. Cooperation to counter these threats, not only terrorism, will need to be expanded and expedited. Interconnectedness and interdependence, which characterize the world at presence, have deemed the necessity for joint effort to fight against these threats. Linkages between various types of transnational threat are not far-fetched. Terrorist groups could easily finance their operations from drug trade profit or piracy bounty. As a country facing these threats, Thailand has been keen to foster an internationally joint effort to counter the trend and connection. By proposing to ASEAN to soften the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries a few years ago, Thailand had hoped to use the multilateral forum such as ASEAN to cooperate with neighboring countries to mitigate some common transnational issues at the time. Militarily, the Cobra Gold Exercise is a good example how a multilateral training can have utility in counter transnational threats. The Cobra Gold 2002 will contain an element of training on anti-terrorism. In November 2000, after the conclusion of the annual rifle shooting competition, Thailand hosted the first conference of ASEAN Armies’ Chiefs in which transnational threats were discussed. Conferences at the level service chief have since become a tradition among ASEAN armed forces. It is an exercise of defense diplomacy. Closer multilateral cooperation particularly in areas like intelligence exchange could easily be the next step as the war on terrorism is now spreading to the region.

CONCLUSION

Thailand will continue to be preoccupied by the war on drugs for the foreseeable future. But this does not mean that The Thai Government and the Military will neglect other transnational threats such as illegal migration, piracy, or smuggling of small arms. The Royal Thai Armed Forces have been involved in fighting against transnational threats for many years. Although resources have become even scarcer recently, measures have been taken to alleviate problems by concentrating on developing of selective capabilities that are more cost effective for countering both conventional and transnational threats. However there have been concerns about the erosion of traditional military skills as tasks other than war show tendency to divert more limited resources. The expectation of the Thai public for the Armed Forces to always accomplish the mission with minimum support, particularly when faced with transnational threats or when other governmental agencies fail, is a challenge and a dilemma for the Thai Military.