

“Democratization” of Civil-Military Relations in Japan:

Implications for the US-Japan Alliance

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Outline

1. **“Democratization” of CMR:** *what, how and why?*
2. **Trends in Public Opinion**
 - Attitudes towards US
 - Defense of Japan
 - Case Study: Iraq
3. **Implications for the Alliance:** *Asset or Liability?*
 - Overall
 - GWOT
 - Base Realignment

“Democratization” of CMR

1. ***Bureaucratic*** Control → ***Political*** Control
2. ***Restrictive*** Control → ***Positive*** Control
3. ***Public Opinion*** more important

1. Bureaucratic → Political Control

- How it WAS:
 - Series of “***ex-ante***” ***controls***: Article 9, arms export ban, restriction on overseas dispatch of troops, ban on collective self defense
 - Politicians ***delegated*** day-to-day monitoring to bureaucrats (fire alarm vs police patrol)
 - “***Auto Pilot***” ***control?***

1. Bureaucratic → Political Control

- How it is CHANGING
 - Gradual loosening of “ex-ante” controls
 - Search for means of “ex-post” controls
 - More ***political intervention/leadership*** in the planning process
 - ***Electoral concerns***: sensitive to public opinion

No longer auto pilot

→ Politicians want the “steering wheel” back, less incentive to delegate

2. Restrictive Control → Positive Control

- How it WAS
 - Debate over “what the SDF **CAN** do, in accordance with the constitution, not what the SDF **SHOULD** do.
 - Concern over “protection **FROM** the military”, lack of attention to “protection **BY** the military”

Civilian control = “**Containing**” the SDF?

2. Restrictive Control → Positive Control

- How it is CHANGING
 - Series of enabling legislations: “***outside-in***”
 - PKO Law
 - Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan Law
 - Emergency Situation Law
 - Anti-Terrorism Law, Iraq Reconstruction Law
 - Role of the legislature (Diet) reconsidered
 - Ideological debate → ***substantial*** debate

3. Public Opinion

- Public more ***interested*** in defense issues:
 - insecurity driven?
- Public more ***sensitive*** to defense issues:
 - gulf war “trauma”, “international contribution”?

Pacifist versus Neo-Nationalist dichotomy
→ *not useful!*

WHY did such changes occur?

1. External

- End of Cold War: need to redefine US alliance
- Lessons from the Gulf War: need for ***international contribution*** ↑
- Taepodong shock: sense of ***insecurity*** ↑

2. Institutional


- *Electoral Reform*: inter-party competition
- *Administrative Reform*: PM power enhanced
- *Diet Reform*: democratic accountability

→ ***Changes are not temporary!***

Effect on US-Japan Alliance?


- What is clear: “***Opening up***” of the alliance
- Issues of alliance have gone beyond the hands of the few
 - Uncertainty, or more grass-roots support?
- Important variable: ***Public Opinion***
 - Are the Japanese public “Alliance Nationalists”, “Internationalists”, “Neo-Nationalists” (INSS Strategic Report, Prof. Deming) or “Pacifists”?
 - Generational/Gender differences?

Attitudes towards the US: (1)overall




(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Survey, Oct.2003, N=2072)

Attitudes towards the US: (2)generation?



(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Survey, Oct.2003, N=2072)

Attitudes towards the US: (3)gender gap?




(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Survey, Oct.2003, N=2072)

Attitude towards the US:(4)worrying signs?


- Yomiuri/Gallup Poll: December 15, 2004
 - Japanese → Americans
 - Trust 38%
 - Distrust 53% (worst in five years: +8% from 2003, Distrust >Trust since 2003))
 - Overall relations “good” 49% (+9%)
 - Americans → Japanese
 - Trust 67%
 - Distrust 29%
 - Overall relations “good” 53% (-1%)
 - WHY?
 - 75% Japanese disagree with post-war Iraq management (Americans: 47%)
 - 61% Japanese do not have favorable impression of President Bush (Americans: 39%)

Defense of Japan:(1)Likelihood of War




(Source: Japan Cabinet Office Opinion Poll, Jan.2003, N=2126)

Defense of Japan: (2)US alliance?



(Source: Japan Cabinet Office Opinion Poll, Jan.2003, N=2126)

Defense of Japan:(3)SDF Image?



(Source: Japan Cabinet Office Opinion Poll, Jan.2003, N=2126)

Defense of Japan: (4)Role of SDF

(past roles)


- Disaster Relief: 86%
- PKO:28%
- Prevent aggression :27%
- Civilian support:22%
- Domestic order:18%
- Spy ships,etc:15%
- Anti-terrorism:7%

(future roles)

- Disaster Relief: 68%
- PKO: 37%
- Prevent aggression : 58%
- Civilian support: 20%
- Domestic order: 31%
- Spy ships,etc: 28%
- Anti-terrorism: 26%


(Source: Japan Cabinet Office Opinion Poll, Jan.2003, N=2126)

United Nations:(1) participation in PKO




(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Survey, Oct.2003, N=2072)

United Nations:(2) Security Council?




(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Survey, Oct.2003, N=2072)

Iraq: (1) pre-deployment support/opposition




(Source: Nihon Television, Monthly Opinion Survey)

Iraq: (2) Why support?




(Source: Nihon Television, Monthly Opinion Survey)

Iraq:(3)Casualty aversion?



(Source: Nihon Television, Monthly Opinion Survey)

Iraq: (4) after the deployment



(Source: Nihon Television, Monthly Opinion Survey)

Summary

- **OVERALL**
 - Attitudes towards US: favorable
 - Support for the alliance: steady, but some worrying signs
 - Expected SDF role changing
 - Constant support for internationalist missions
- **Case of Iraq**
 - Pacifist/nationalist dichotomy not useful
 - “internationalist” support > “alliance” support
- ***IMPLICATIONS for future alliance relations?***

Implications for the Alliance:(1)Overall

- **Long-term: Positive?**
- **Short-term: Difficult?**
 - “opening up” of decision making process
 - Less predictability: public opinion
- **Possible Uncertainties**
 - After Koizumi?
 - Casualty Aversion?
 - Civil-Military Gap?

Implications for the Alliance: (2)GWOT

- **“Framing” of issue important**
 - Emphasis on alliance may alienate internationalists
- **“*Spreading freedom and democracy*”**
 - Not necessarily shared as a foreign policy agenda
- **“Minding the gap”**
 - Attention to the division of roles and missions

Japan's Role in the World?

- Contribution to global peacekeeping and peaceful resolution of regional conflict: 52% (+1%)
- Contribution to global issues such as environmental issues: 39% (+1%)
- Humanitarian support to refugees and displaced citizens: 25% (+0%)
- International effort to preserve universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights: 16% (-4%)
- Cooperation to help developing countries: 15% (+2%)
- International cultural exchange and cooperation, preserve world treasures: 6% (+0%)

(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Survey, Oct.2003, N=2072)

Implications for the Alliance: (3) Bases

- ***“Rashomonisque”* support/opposition**
 - Support: strategic, political, economic
 - Opposition: pacifist, nationalistic, NIMBY
 - Every base issue is different!
- ***“Anywhere but Okinawa”*?**
 - Overall agreement on excessive burden on Okinawa, but no one wants a base in their back yard
- ***Is “Joint Use” the answer?***
 - Political / Operational / Financial aspects (HNS)
 - So far, opportunity overlooked? Misperception?

Conclusion

Democratization of CMR: Asset or Liability?

- ***Long term: POSITIVE***
 - Deepening of alliance relationship, public support and understanding
- ***Short term: DIFFICULT?***
 - “Opening up” the decision making process
 - Less predictability of public opinion

Final Thoughts

- ***Democratic Accountability is KEY!***
 - More transparency, explanation required
 - Surprises may be counterproductive
- ***Favorable Image of US***
 - \neq unconditional support for the alliance
 - \neq unconditional support for every mission

Okinawa Governor Survey (Okinawa Times, August 2004)

- *General consensus on “Okinawa’s excessive burden,” yet no intension to accept in their prefecture*
- Kanagawa: not clear no, but “options must include moving overseas
- Yamanashi: Anti-base sentiment strong, all bases must be abolished
- Shiga: More open debate for continuation of having bases necessary
- Kochi: Burden on Okinawa excessive, yet somewhat envious of the side payments
- Saga: If Saga is chosen, would demand detailed explanation from governor, and seek understanding of the public

China?

- Yomiuri/Gallop Poll (December 15, 2004)
 - Relations with China
 - Japanese: “bad” 59%, (+28%)
 - Americans: “bad” 16%
 - China: Trustworthy?
 - Japanese: “no” 71%
 - Americans: “no” 57%
- Yasukuni Shrine Visit (after the riots)?
 - “not this year” (Asahi 49%, Yomiuri 48%)
 - “continue” (Asahi 39%, Yomiuri 45%)

Constitutional Reform?

- Asahi (11/04/04):
 - Overall: Yes 53%, No 35%
 - Yes>No since 1997, but first time 50%+
 - WHY? Need to include new rights: 26%, desire for “own” constitution:14%
 - Article 9? Change 31% No Change 60%
 - WHY Yes? “clarify SDF’s international role”
 - WHY No? “article 9 preserved peace of Japan”
- Yomiuri (20-21/03/03):
 - Overall: Yes 65%; Article 9: Yes 64%

Accountability?

- Jiji Press Poll (16/12/04)
 - Explanation by Koizumi “insufficient”: 90%
 - Extension “YES”: only 9.6%

Dr. Deming's Definitions

- **Alliance Nationalists**
 - Japan's future policy should remain centered on the US-J Security treaty
 - Boundaries of cooperation should be expanded
 - Removal of restraints on collective self defense important
 - Koizumi, Ishiba, Hashimoto, older generation?
- **Internationalists**
 - Increase orientation toward cooperation under a UN or other multi or regional FW
 - Cautious about lifting restrictions on collective self defense, unless "areas surrounding Japan" or "UN"
 - LDP, DPJ, Komeito
- **Neo-Nationalists**
 - Need for a more independent security policy to hedge against a weakening US commitment and to give Japan more foreign policy and strategic room for maneuver
 - "MacArthur-imposed constitution" as a matter of national pride, drastic re-writing
 - Less than 10%, Ishinara, some younger politicians?

Difference: extent of participations in military activities (1) *unrelated to the defense of Japan* that are (2) *not sanctioned by the UN Security Council*

Iraq: Important Dates

- Important dates:
 - May 23: Bush-Koizumi Crawford Meeting
 - July 26: “Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq” passes the Upper House
 - August 19: Bombing of UN Headquarters in Iraq
 - Sept. 20: Prime Minister Koizumi reelected
 - Nov. 4: General Election
 - Nov.30: Killing of two diplomats in Iraq
 - Dec 9: Cabinet Approval of Basic Plans for the Iraq operation, Koizumi speech
 - Dec 20 : Kanzaki (Komeito) visits Samawah
 - Dec 26: JASDF departs
 - Feb 3: JGSDF departs
 - May: Shelling of the compound, death of Dutch soldier
 - June-July: Transition, controversy over “joining multilateral effort”