

**WORKING WITH COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION  
EVALUATING US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES IN ASIA**

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**Introduction**

The idea that US efforts to foster democracy abroad can help promote American security and economic goals is a longstanding one. Yet it is also a contested idea, involving debates about which countries are ripe for democracy promotion, which strategies most effectively accomplish this goal, and the extent to which US efforts to foster democracy advance US security goals or hinder them. The questions posed by the conference organizers for the panel *Working with Countries in Transition: Fostering Democracy* require an examination of these issues.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, it will briefly define democracy, and discuss its analytical components so that the countries of Asia can be categorized according to these components. This section will conclude that Asian countries differ tremendously along a democratic continuum, making it unlikely that any single democracy promotion policy will work effectively across the region. Therefore, the second section of this paper discusses three distinct strategies of democracy promotion and evaluates the relative merits of each. Adopting a strategy of democracy promotion is typically not a decision made in a vacuum but one that recognizes the potential conflicts with policies designed to advance US security goals. The third section of this paper, therefore, discusses the conditions under which the democracy and security imperatives of USFP will likely reinforce one another or conflict with one another. On the basis of the previous discussions, the fourth section of this paper analyzes the current democratization policies that the US has adopted toward several key Asian countries. Finally, the last section of this paper addresses the specific questions posed by the conference organizers such as the potential for an anti-democratic trend in Asia and the attitudes of Asian governments toward non-democratic states.

**Defining Democracy**

Democracy is a commonly used term that many political analysts find difficult to define precisely. At its core, democracy denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful political *competition* among individuals and groups for all effective positions of government power; an inclusive level of political *participation* in the selection of leaders and policies such that no major social group is excluded; and a level of *civil and political liberties* sufficient to insure the integrity of political competition and participation.<sup>1</sup> Democracy is often identified by its institutional infrastructure, such as a system of free and fair elections,

political parties, and representative legislative institutions. But as Fareed Zakaria has argued in a seminal article, for such institutions to perform according to democratic theory and ensure that political leaders remain accountable to the electorate, they must be built on liberal constitutionalism, which involves the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the protection of fundamental political and civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion and property.<sup>2</sup>

Freedom House, the leading research organization dedicated to measuring trends in democracy, recognizes this distinction and in its annual survey, *Freedom in the World*, evaluates the extent to which a country is democratic not only according to a broad array of political rights, but also according to its protection of civil liberties. Only those countries with strong democratic institutions and electoral processes, as well as civil rights, are considered fully free or liberal democracies. Countries that possess formal democratic institutions but fail to protect civil liberties are often termed procedural rather than substantive democracies. Zakaria coined the term “illiberal democracy” to describe such regimes.

### **The Diversity of the Democratization Issue in Asia and the Democracy Imperative for USFP<sup>3</sup>**

Making these analytical distinctions is important, because although the title given to this conference panel, *Working with Countries in Transition: Fostering Democracy*, implies that many Asian countries are in the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, a review of the Freedom House data presented in Appendix A reveals that this is not the case. In Northeast Asia, key US allies such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, are well-consolidated liberal democracies. There key democracy issue for the US in these cases is not how to foster democracy, but how to manage the policy preferences of new political actors when they diverge from American ones.

The two Southeast Asian treaty allies of the US, Thailand and the Philippines, are both liberal democracies according to Freedom House. Yet in both cases, civil liberties are more circumscribed than political rights and anti-democratic trends are on the rise. The democracy imperative with regard to Thailand and the Philippines is to help prevent any further backsliding, particularly with regarding to civil liberties, so that they do not slip into the category of illiberal democracies.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and East Timor have held pivotal elections in the past few years and some key leaders in each country have made the expansion and deepening of democratic practices prominent policy goals. Both can still be considered in transition to democracy because weak institutions and weak protection for certain civil liberties excludes them from the club of liberal democracies. The democracy imperative in these countries is to help strengthen the political processes and civil liberties so that democracy can be consolidated.

Significant parts of Asia, however, remain under authoritarian rule. The US enjoys extensive security cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia. These two countries that have long had formal representative institutions, but they restrict political and civil rights, thereby making it difficult for citizens to fully participate in the political life of their country and hold the

government accountable. The democracy imperative here is move from procedural to substantive democracy.

Finally, the Leninist regimes of China and Vietnam have in recent decades opened markets and adopted other economic reforms. But political leaders in those countries have made the retention of power by the communist party, not the transition to democracy, key political goals. Nevertheless, political and civil life has opened up dramatically in these countries over the past decade. China holds village elections and the National Assembly in Vietnam has taken on a more vocal role.<sup>4</sup> The democracy imperative with regard to China and Vietnam is to encourage further liberalization.

In short, the diversity of the “democratization issue” in Asia means that there is no “One size fits all” policy prescription for democracy promotion in the region. The following section will now discuss specific policies related to democracy promotion and link them to cases where are most likely to be successful.

### **Democracy Promotion Policies**

There are two general paths from authoritarianism to democracy.<sup>5</sup> In a negotiated transition, non-democratic countries may undergo a controlled, top-down process of political change in which political space and contestation are progressively broadened until the point where democracy is achieved. Taiwan, and South Korea can be classified as Asian examples of this approach, although there was much more social mobilization in the latter. On the other hand, the failures of an authoritarian regime may lead to its collapse and a subsequent attempt to create a democratic system. The 1973 collapse of the military regime in Thailand, the 1986 collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines, and the 1998 fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia are Asian examples of the collapse scenario. According to Thomas Carothers, one of the leading experts on democratization, the number of cases in which authoritarian governments collapse far exceed those with a negotiated transition.

Despite the limited number of negotiated transitions, this approach is often favored by Western policy-makers due to the relative stability of the transition in contrast to political turbulence often associated with the collapse scenario. The US has adopted three basic strategies designed to promote gradual transition: an economic first strategy; an indirect democracy promotion strategy; and a direct democracy promotion strategy. Each will be discussed below.

Advocates of an economic first policy contend that since most successful negotiated transitions were preceded by economic success, prosperity is the core driver of political change. The familiar logic is that expanding opportunities in the private sector reduces people’s dependence on the state, encouraging a more independent civil society and media, and a middle class with a wider range of political ideas. Overtime, these expanding social actors demand greater political freedoms. In this view, therefore, the US should concentrate its reform efforts in the economic domain.

The key attraction of an economic first policy from the perspective of US policy-makers is that since most Asian leaders are already pursuing an economics growth strategy, there is a

congruence of interests between the US and the target government. Therefore, this strategy generally avoids the dilemma inherent in other democratization promotion strategies of antagonizing the political leaders with whom the US desires cooperation on security and economic issues. This strategy does, however, have several downsides. It takes a long time it takes to bear fruit--somewhere between twenty and thirty years in the cases of Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, since economic legitimacy has traditionally been critical in securing public acquiescence to authoritarian rule, it may prolong, not hasten, a transition to democracy.

The indirect democratization strategy advocates policies aimed at promoting better governance and other state reforms as well as expanding and strengthening civil society. These strategies are labeled indirect because they do not grapple with the core issue of political contestation. The most common types of policies embodied under an indirect strategy of reforming governance and the state would include:

- \*strengthening rule of law, particularly through judicial reform;
- \*strengthening parliaments, through efforts to build better internal capacity and bolster constituency relations;
- \*reducing state corruption, through anticorruption commissions, bureaucratic rationalization and advocacy campaigns
- \*promoting decentralization, through training for local government officials and legislative actions to increase the authority of governments.

Programs to expand and strengthen civil society often consist of the following:

- \*funding for NGOs devoted to public interest advocacy, such as on human rights, the environment and anticorruption issues;
- \*support for human rights organizations;
- \*strengthening independent media;
- \*underwriting formal and informal efforts to advance democratic civil education.<sup>6</sup>

An indirect strategy of democracy promotion is attractive for a number of reasons. First, these activities often find a real response in host societies, not only in the NGO sector, but also among some reformist government leaders. And many of these activities, especially those related to good governance and corruption eradication, can be sold to skeptical governments as necessary for economic growth. Once again, this helps avoid the dilemma of stepping on the toes of authoritarian leaders whose cooperation is needed in other areas. The negative aspect of an indirect democracy promotion strategy is that regardless of the positive outcomes these policies may produce, they are unlikely to lead to regime change in the short term. Efforts to improve government performance and strengthen civil society typically work best in countries already undergoing transitions to democracy and are therefore more critical to democratic consolidation rather than a driver of democratic transition.

Finally, a direct approach helps liberalizing countries build a bridge to democratization. US assistance in this endeavor, however, requires that governments have already taken some pivotal steps such as: moving toward broad respect for political and civil rights; opening up the domain of public contestation to all political forces that agree to play by democratic rules;

obeying the rules of fair political contestation by not manipulating elections; and expanding the domain of contestation to all include all key seats of power.

Once these steps have been taken, a direct democratization strategy would require diplomatic pressure to encourage political leaders to broaden the process of organized political contestation by holding free and fair elections. Policies that the US could adopt in this regard include:

- \*programs to strengthen political parties
- \*aid to strengthen election administration entities and pressure on governments to give these entities political independence
- \*support for election monitoring
- \*aid to civic groups that work to improve electoral processes by organizing candidate forums, providing voter educations and promoting voter turnout
- \*respecting the outcome of the elections, even if they are not to the US liking.

The logic of a direct strategy is that if the existing processes of political contestation can be gradually infused with the principles of fairness, inclusion, honesty, and openness, governments and their citizens will begin to give more real authority to elected parliaments and local governments and citizens will begin to value these institutions. Over time, this would lead liberalizing elites to reduce the power they keep outside the process of political contestation and eventually contemplate the actual democratization of the state.

The main attraction of a direct strategy is that in contrast to the others, it actually provides a roadmap to democratization and enables the US to say it is fighting the good fight. The potential drawbacks, however, are high. This strategy involves the greatest US role in the domestic affairs of another state and hence risks antagonizing political elites, which may retaliate by halting the moves toward greater political freedom or withholding cooperation in other issue areas.

In summary, just as there is a wide diversity of regime types in Asia, so too are there a differentiated set of democracy promotion policies available to the US. Moreover, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. In Indonesia today, the US is supporting programs to strengthen the research capacity of Parliament and strengthen local elections, components of a direct strategy, as well as judicial reform and support for civil society organizations, components of an indirect one. Which strategy, or combination of strategies will be chosen will depend not only on the political conditions inside the target country, but also on the extent to which the adoption of such a strategy will involve trade-offs in the security realm.<sup>7</sup>

### **Democratization and Security in US Foreign Policy: Recognizing the Trade-Offs**

During the Cold War, the US promotion of democracy toward communist regimes was an integral part a strategy designed to illustrate the bankruptcy of the Leninist system and win hearts and minds around the world. In USFP toward Soviet bloc countries, therefore, the democratization and security imperatives were mutually supportive. This was true in US relations with non-communist, right-wing dictators. In its relationships with countries such as

South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and South Vietnam, American Cold War security interests conflicted with its interests of democratization. In these cases, the “high political interests” of security trumped the low one of democratization, at least until Asian leaders such as Chang Ching-Kuo decided to democratize.

With the end of the Cold War, the lack of an overarching security threat and numerous transitions to democracy meant that there were fewer trade-offs between these two foreign policy goals. Moreover, the Clinton administration advocated a policy based on the democratic peace: since democracies do not fight one another, democracy promotion could be viewed as part and parcel of US security strategy. Even in cases where privileging the democracy imperative entailed economic and security costs, such as the US imposition of sanctions on China after Tiananmen Square, and its pressure on Suharto to liberalize politically and undertake military reform, US policy-makers willing to incur these costs.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the security and democracy imperatives are once again ambiguous. The Bush administration has committed itself to fostering democracy in the Middle East. Driving this policy is the belief that the lack of democratic freedoms is a key factor behind the rise of Islamic terrorist groups. In short, efforts to promote freedom are seen as an antidote to terror.

But the reverse may also be true. The opening of political space may also provide new opportunities for terrorist groups to operate and gain political support. According to this logic, democratization will facilitate terror, putting the democratization and security imperatives in conflict once again. Recognizing these trade-offs and attempting to weigh the potential costs and benefits associated with them is vital step in devising policies to meet broad US national interests.

### **Current Conditions, Possible Strategies, and Potential Tradeoffs**

Based upon the preceding discussions, this section will identify the current US democracy promotion strategies in key Asian states that are not currently consolidated liberal democracies, and discuss the potential costs and benefits of policy shifts. Once again, the focus will be on those countries with major security interests to the US, not the more peripheral ones.

#### **China and Vietnam: Economics First**

The US is currently pursuing an economics first strategy in these two countries, combined with some programs to promote good governance and build civil society associated with an indirect strategy. In Vietnam, for example, the STAR program funded by USAID, supports legal and regulatory reform efforts. Liberalization in neither country has proceeded sufficiently for a direct strategy to work effectively. Moreover, leaders in both countries would vehemently oppose it. Vietnam has a longstanding policy of opposing “peaceful evolution,” its term for democratization. However, under pressure of being labeled a “country of concern” under the Religious Freedom Act, Vietnam did agree to take some steps toward expanding religious freedoms. The US was willing to pressure Vietnam on this issue because it assumed—correctly—that the asymmetries in the bilateral relationship would lead Vietnam to

accommodate US demands. Vietnam needs American support for its entry into the WTO and engagement in the region as a counterweight to China. In this case, the US could aggressively promote one key civil liberty because it faced no significant economic or security trade-off.

This is not the case with China. Democracy promotion is not absent from US policy, but the US does not bring the same degree of pressure to bear on China. Doing so would risk losing Chinese cooperation on key security issues such as North Korea's nuclear program, weapons proliferation and general stability in Asia. In short, despite similar domestic conditions in Vietnam and China, the US weighs the security and economic tradeoffs very differently in each case.

### **Singapore and Malaysia: Will the US Run the Risk of a Direct Strategy?**

Singapore and Malaysia are the two best candidates for a transition to democracy, based on their levels of economic prosperity, social stability and strong political institutions. The ability of the ruling regimes to deliver economic prosperity, relative social harmony and significant improvements in standards of living make it unlikely that these countries will suffer an authoritarian collapse. Instead, the fear among many political elites, as well as a fair number of Malaysian and Singaporean citizens, that democratization would threaten these goods has led to the longevity of the authoritarian regimes.

The US currently has an indirect democratization strategy toward both countries, although it is very limited in the Singaporean case. Both countries adamantly oppose US democracy promotion efforts, and were at the forefront the Asian values debate, which should be viewed as a backlash against US pressure for expanding political and civil liberties. During much of the 1990s, the US pressured Malaysia to revoke its Internal Security Act (ISA), which Mahathir used to imprison his political opponents. After Mahathir arrested Anwar Ibrahim, the US adopted a direct democratization policy toward Malaysia, at least at the rhetorical level, with Al Gore famously calling for *reformasi* at an APEC Summit meeting. The war on terror raised the costs of democracy promotion. Prime Minister Badawi came close to revoking the ISA, but reversed his position in the wake of the terrorist threat. In contrast to its earlier policy, the US did not take a strong stand. In the case of Singapore, the US rewarded the island city for its support of the war in Iraq by moving forward quickly with a bilateral FTA. In sum, it appears that the security imperative will trump the democracy one in USFP toward Singapore and Malaysia, making a policy shift toward direct democracy promotion unlikely.

### **Indonesia**

As Indonesia has made a transition to the world's third largest democracy, the US has pursued a direct democratization policy while continuing to engage in significant governance reform and civil society programming associated with an indirect strategy. The US has funded election monitors, voter education projects, and programs to train political parties. It continues to support efforts to strengthen press freedom, bolster social organizations, and promote judicial reform. Given the desire among most Indonesians to consolidate the country's nascent democracy, this aid has been generally welcomed by the four Indonesian administrations that have served in the *reformasi* era.

The broad congruence of interests between Indonesia and the US regarding democracy promotion does not mean that tradeoffs have been absent from US policy decisions. Home to *Jemaah Islamiyah*, an Islamic terrorist group responsible for the October 2002 Bali bombings that killed over 200 people, Indonesia is a front line state in the war against terror. At times, the democracy and security imperatives of USFP have come into conflict. For example, the scrapping of Indonesia's internal security law, which Suharto used to imprison political dissidents, is viewed by political reformers as a key achievement of the *reformasi* era. But the terrorist threat led key Indonesian leaders, including Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he served in Megawati's cabinet, to call for its reinstatement. The US supported the government's calls for a new law, much to the chagrin of its former allies in the *reformasi* movement.

One key obstacle to US democracy promotion efforts in Indonesia is the high level of anti-Americanism in the country. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, over 85% of Indonesians have a negative opinion of America, although the generally positive public response to the US role in the tsunami relief effort may have caused this number to decline. Such a high level of anti-Americanism produces skepticism regarding the motives behind US policies. For example, the US has committed \$157 million to educational reform over the next five years, with much of the money targeted for secondary education. According to analyst Rizal Sukma, many potential recipients, particularly peasantrans, viewed this as an attempt to manipulate the way in which Islam was taught and therefore refused to participate in the program. Thus, even in countries attempting to consolidate democracy—where there is a congruence of goals-- democracy promotion policies can create tensions in the bilateral relationship.

## **Conclusion and Policy Recommendations**

The preceding analysis yields a number of conclusions, which in turn generate a series of policy recommendations. First, in every case analyzed above, even Indonesia, the security imperative sometimes triumphs over the democratization imperative in USFP. One can debate the wisdom of these policy decisions in specific cases. However, since it is likely that security concerns will continue to trump democratization ones at times, the US should recognize that it suffers a loss of credibility when this occurs. The gap between the sweeping democratization rhetoric currently emanating from Washington and the substance of some US policy breed cynicism abroad and make it more difficult to for the US to accomplish its democratization goals. One recommendation that follows from this analysis is to frame US policy not in terms of the lofty democracy rhetoric that appeals to an American audience, but in terms of the key components of good governance reforms that often have much greater resonance to target countries.

### **How can the US support democracy in Asian countries without interfering in its internal affairs in counterproductive ways?**

This is an extremely difficult task and one of the reasons why the direct democracy promotion strategy is not used more often. One way to get around this dilemma is for the US to

support local initiatives, rather than create its own. In 1989, for example, Paul Wolfowitz used the occasion of his farewell speech after three years as Ambassador to Indonesia to underscore the proposals by some insiders for greater openness or *keterbukaan*. At that time, a former head of the internal security agency, General Sumitro, had just published an article urging Indonesia to adopt a more representative parliamentary system and a presidential contest with more than one candidate. Using this as an entry point, Wolfowitz called for greater political pluralism in his speech, being careful to use the term *keterbukaan*, not democracy. This speech drew widespread attention within Indonesia and was echoed by calls for liberalization from many quarters. The combination of internal and external pressure reinforced Suharto's inclination to experiment with greater openness.<sup>8</sup>

### **What is the potential for an anti-democracy trend in Asia? What are the sources of such a movement?**

Poor democratic performance, the inability of a government to provide economic prosperity and social stability, is the most likely source of an anti-democratic trend in Asia. It is important to distinguish the desire for performance from good governance. In many cases of democratic backsliding, the lack of good governance is perceived as the cause of poor performance, leading voters, or their representatives, to replace leaders viewed as corrupt and ineffective with others perceived to be cleaner and more capable. This was the case in Thailand in 1997. When the corrupt Chavalit administration was unable to manage the Asian Financial Crisis, the Thai Parliament responded with a vote of no confidence and replaced it with Chuan Leekpai and the Democratic Party. A similar logic was at work when Jose Estrada was removed from the Philippine presidency and replaced by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In both cases, it was hoped that better governance would produce better performance.

But this is was not the case. Chuan and the Democrats were unable to meet public expectations regarding economic recovery. The lack of performance created the conditions for Thaksin's rise to power and his adoption of populist economic policies that produced strong economic growth. Thaksin currently enjoys tremendous public support. But as the good governance data from the World Bank presented in Appendix B indicate, the quality of governance has declined significantly Thaksin. In Thailand, good economic performance had led many to accept the argument that a firm hand is needed to restore growth and order.

The opposite scenario is currently unfolding in the Philippines. President Arroyo's inability to jumpstart the economy has led to a significant decline in popular support only a year after winning the presidential election. Most ominously, the military is rumbling about coups. In the Philippines, all six indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law) used by the World Bank to measure good governance have declined significantly between 1998 and 2004. In this case, lack of performance, combined with declining quality of governance has created the conditions for an anti-democratic trend.

### **What is the attitude of most Asian governments toward promotion of democracy outside their own borders? How are they dealing with non-democratic states? Is there a growing regional consensus on dealing with such states?**

There is no apparent consensus among the countries of East Asia toward the promotion of democracy. Indonesia almost alone among the countries of Southeast Asia has given lip service to the promotion of democracy abroad. But no one is pressuring Singapore to loosen its controls on civil and political life. However, a consensus appears to be developing that it is increasingly legitimate to criticize foreign governments for what are perceived as bad policy decisions that impose costs on their neighbors. This is most evident in policy toward Burma. ASEAN as an organization, as well key members acting on their own, have pressured the SPDC to hold a constitutional convention, and work with the opposition toward national reconciliation. In this case, the regime's gross violation of international human rights norms, and its refusal to address them have even caused the ASEAN states to relinquish its non-interference principle.


This willingness to criticize neighboring countries on governance issues is not limited to non-democracies. Indonesia and Malaysia have been extremely critical of Thaksin's policy toward the Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand. They contend that the insurgency has expanded and deepened in response to the repressive policies of Thaksin's government, which has treated the issue as a security problem rather than a political one. In summary, there seems to be a growing regional consensus not on democracy promotion, but on the promotion of good governance when its absence creates negative spillovers in the region.

## APPENDIX A

### 2005 Political Rights and Civil Liberties from Freedom House

Country	PR	CL	Freedom Rating*	Regime Type**
Brunei	6	5	Not Free	Authoritarian
Burma	7	7	Not Free	Totalitarian
Cambodia	6	5	Not Free	Authoritarian
China	7	6	Not Free	Authoritarian
East Timor	3	3	Partly Free	Illiberal Democracy
India	2	3	Free	Liberal Democracy
Indonesia	3	4	Partly Free	Illiberal Democracy
Japan	1	2	Free	Liberal Democracy
Laos	7	6	Not Free	Authoritarian
Malaysia	4	4	Partly Free	Authoritarian
Nepal	5	5	Partly Free	Authoritarian
North Korea	7	7	Not Free	Totalitarian
Pakistan	6	5	Not Free	Authoritarian
Papua New Guinea	3	3	Partly Free	Illiberal Democracy
Philippines	2	3	Free	Liberal Democracy
Singapore	5	4	Partly Free	Authoritarian
South Korea	1	2	Free	Liberal Democracy
Sri Lanka	3	3	Partly Free	Illiberal Democracy
Taiwan	2	1	Free	Liberal Democracy
Thailand	2	3	Free	Democracy
Vietnam	7	6	Not Free	Authoritarian

Note: Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) rankings are base on events from December 1, 2003 though November 20, 2004. A ranking of 1 represents the most free, and 7 the least free.




Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004  
(<http://www.worldbank.org/ubi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html>)

### Statistical Table: all 6 governance indicators for PHILIPPINES

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)	Estimate (-2.5 to + 2.5)	Standard Deviation	Number of surveys/polls	Sources
Voice and Accountability	2004	47.6	+0.02	0.15	11	List
	1998	63.4	+0.46	0.23	5	List
Political Stability	2004	15.0	-1.01	0.19	12	List
	1998	48.5	+0.03	0.24	6	List
Government Effectiveness	2004	46.2	-0.23	0.15	12	List
	1998	67.8	+0.22	0.21	7	List
Regulatory Quality	2004	49.8	-0.06	0.18	10	List
	1998	72.8	+0.71	0.21	6	List
Rule of Law	2004	32.4	-0.62	0.12	14	List
	1998	59.5	-0.04	0.18	10	List
Control of Corruption	2004	36.5	-0.55	0.12	13	List
	1998	54.6	-0.26	0.14	9	List

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004.

**Note:** The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.



Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004  
(<http://www.worldbank.org/ubi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html>)

### Statistical Table: all 6 governance indicators for THAILAND

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)	Estimate (-2.5 to +2.5)	Standard Deviation	Number of surveys/polls	Sources
Voice and Accountability	2004	52.4	+0.24	0.15	10	List
	1998	55.0	+0.11	0.23	6	List
Political Stability	2004	41.7	-0.15	0.19	11	List
	1998	59.4	+0.28	0.24	7	List
Government Effectiveness	2004	65.4	+0.38	0.15	12	List
	1998	62.8	+0.12	0.20	8	List
Regulatory Quality	2004	51.2	-0.01	0.18	10	List
	1998	56.0	+0.27	0.21	7	List
Rule of Law	2004	51.7	-0.05	0.12	14	List
	1998	69.2	+0.40	0.17	11	List
Control of Corruption	2004	49.3	-0.25	0.12	12	List
	1998	54.6	-0.26	0.14	10	List

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2005: Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004.

**Note:** The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.

<sup>1</sup> Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, editors, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*, (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1989) p. xvi.

<sup>2</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 1997; 76, 6.

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<sup>3</sup> This author's research focuses on Southeast Asia. Therefore, while countries outside of this region will be discussed at times, most of the discussion will focus on the Southeast Asian region. Given that much of Northeast Asia is democratic and that the 11 countries of Southeast Asia provide a wide range of democratization experience, this should not pose a problem to the topic at hand.

<sup>4</sup> Due to space limitations, this paper will not discuss some of the smaller Asian countries such as Laos and Cambodia that are peripheral to US security goals. Nor will it discuss North Korea or Burma.

<sup>5</sup> The discussion in this section draws heavily from the strategies discussed in Thomas Carothers, "Is Gradualism Possible? Choosing a Strategy for Promoting Democracy in the Middle East," Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Working Paper Series* Number 39, June 2003.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> There are obviously economic trade-offs that may influence policy-makers in their choice of democracy promotion strategy as well. In the interest of space considerations and because this conference is geared to security practitioners, the paper will focus only on security trade-offs.

<sup>8</sup> This example is from Catharin E. Dalpino, *Deferring Democracy: Promoting Openness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) p. 95.