

Sudan's Peace Settlement: Progress and Perils


Symposium Proceedings
September 11, 2006

On January 9, 2005, amidst much international acclaim, the government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This first comprehensive peace agreement between the two parties gave hope to the citizens of a region that had been embroiled intermittently in civil war for over 40 years. The protracted conflict between the North and South is estimated to have caused 2 million deaths and resulted in the displacement of over 4 million people from their homes. Since the signing of the CPA, the parties to it have made a number of positive steps toward implementing the provisions of the agreement. Implementation has also faced some serious setbacks and challenges, such as the untimely death of SPLM leader John Garang. Furthermore, the recent attention given by the international community to the crisis in the western Darfur region has tended to detract from the continuing need for the international community to remain engaged in order to further the successful implementation of the CPA.

In response to this continuing need, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars convened a symposium at the National Defense University (NDU) on September 11, 2006, to present a comprehensive assessment of the progress made and the challenges remaining for the implementation of the CPA. The symposium included a series of panels and speakers comprised of senior government officials, distinguished experts, and international representatives. The panelists provided a realistic assessment of the current state of CPA implementation and offered suggestions for the next steps that should be taken. The featured speakers framed the CPA within the larger context of the Sudanese Peace Process as well as U.S. foreign policy. The 2006 National Defense University topical symposium, *Sudan's Peace Settlement: Progress and Perils*, provided attendees with an in-depth analysis of the peace process as a whole, frank critiques, and concrete policy recommendations.

Throughout the day, panelists and speakers generally agreed on several main conclusions pertaining to both the assessment of the CPA and future policy options and recommendations:

- The implementation of the CPA has progressed extremely slowly. Furthermore, while some delays were anticipated, if protracted delays and setbacks remain unresolved, they could eventually threaten the peace process as a whole.
- A reinvigoration of the Sudanese Peace Process and the implementation of the CPA are necessary for achieving a lasting peace in Sudan. Without renewed attention on the CPA and the actors involved,



implementation of the agreement will likely slow to a halt and civil war may once again break out in the South.

- The Sudanese Peace Process will not be successful without sustained engagement of the international community. Sudan lacks the necessary resources, capacity, and technical expertise to implement the CPA effectively without external help. While there was some disagreement about which international bodies and regional organizations should provide this assistance, there was a broad consensus expressed that both the United Nations (UN) and the United States were the two essential actors required for the effective implementation of a lasting peace.
- Finally, any lasting peace must take into account the disparate conflicts within Sudan, including the ongoing violence in Darfur, the unresolved territory disputes in the eastern regions, and other widespread social tensions (which were described as political, ethnic, religious, and ideological).

While the symposium was not able to cover every topic associated with the complex implementation of the CPA, it did serve to highlight

many of the crucial challenges, principal achievements, and key requirements for future success.

Negotiating the CPA

Since gaining independence from the British in 1956, the Republic of the Sudan has been plagued with conflict, civil war, and internal division. Various efforts were made to secure a lasting peace at various times throughout this period, yet it was not until January 2005 that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the two warring parties in the North and the South.

The opening keynote speaker of the conference, Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, was the chief mediator of the peace process led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and he offered unique insight and inside knowledge into the development of the CPA. Although General Sumbeiywo was not appointed until 2001, the mediation effort itself began in 1994 when multinational members of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), under the auspices of the IGAD, initiated talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Led by representatives from Kenya, the peace talks between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army collapsed as soon as they began due to disagreement over two key principles:

the right of self-determination for southern Sudan and the separation of religion and state.

In July 1997, the talks were revived when the two parties signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP), which would serve as the framework for negotiations over the next 8 years. The DOP identified the key issues of the conflict between the North and South as:

- the right to self-determination for the people of southern Sudan
- separation of state and religion
- participatory system of governance
- sharing of resources
- ensuring security arrangements.



The talks and negotiations languished for the next 3 years, but a turning point in the peace process came in January 2001 when the heads of state and government of the IGAD rejuvenated the peace process by appointing General Sumbeiywo to lead a concerted negotiation. This time, the entire international community was engaged in support of the process, and the parties responded by resuming serious negotiations.

In July 2002, the milestone Machakos Protocol was signed, which defined the precise role of religion in politics and governance, and also guaranteed the right of self-determination for the South, which it was agreed would be exercised through a referendum on secession in 2011. Continued hostilities on the ground, however, made further negotiations difficult, so a Verification and Monitoring Team was established to identify and resolve the violations that were impeding the talks.

In 2003, Ali Osman Taha and John Garang, representing the North and South, respectively, agreed to engage in direct talks in Naivasha, Kenya. The result of these talks was a series of agreements, which included the Security Arrangement Protocol of September 2003, Wealth Sharing Protocol of January 2004, Power Sharing

Protocol of May 2004, and an agreement speaking to the Conflict Areas of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile States, and Abyei Area, also signed in May 2004. In November 2004, the UN Security Council enacted a resolution endorsing the six protocols signed since 1997 as constituting a Core Peace Agreement and acknowledging the parties' commitment to reaching a final comprehensive agreement by December 31, 2004. Though the final Comprehensive Peace Agreement was not signed until January 2005, the

support of the international community, especially the International Partners Forum, African Union (AU), and UN, was ever present, thus providing much needed political and diplomatic support.

However, the speaker noted that the successful negotiation and signing of the CPA has failed to achieve a comprehensive peace, and the implementation of the agreement has been met with challenges, delays, and a pervasive lack of trust between the two parties, any of which carries the potential to threaten the peace process altogether.

In closing, General Sumbeiywo noted that the CPA has the potential to succeed, but only if the international community remains engaged and visible in the process. Sustained international pressure, exerted on both parties, will be essential to achieving the goals outlined in the agreement. Both regional and international powers must demand that the North and South implement the CPA sooner, rather than later.

Assessing Progress

All panelists agreed that implementation of the CPA has been slow. Yet they also acknowledged that steps were being taken, however small or fragile, to continue to move the process forward. Questions addressed included: What have these steps looked like? How has implementation varied from the terms of the agreement in the areas of wealth-sharing, power-sharing, border dispute resolution, and military integration? Have implementation measures taken to date been effective? What needs to happen from this point forward?

In the arena of wealth-sharing, one panelist argued, the effective implementation of CPA provisions is not going well. Though implemented in principle, the majority of institutions and operating procedures designed by the CPA to divide and distribute national wealth and oil revenues fairly between the North and South are not functioning effectively. There appears to be a significant disconnect between revenue generated and revenue accounted for within the oil industry. If issues of transparency are not addressed immediately, the panelist warned, the South risks being plagued by a scarcity of financial resources, which may lead to a further deterioration of conditions due to corruption and the misuse of its own natural wealth.

Citing a lack of capacity, infrastructure, and political will, the expert condemned both the government of Sudan and the government of southern Sudan (GOSS) for their failure to engage in sound energy policy and the monitoring of oil production and revenues. Following the signing of the CPA, the GOSS was granted 30 days to review all documents and contracts pertaining to oil production between the GOS and foreign partners. GOSS officials have failed to invoke this right, thus undermining their own legitimacy and claim to oil revenues. Further degrading its credibility, the panelist argued, GOSS has invested in companies, which now claim drilling rights on territories covered by pre-existing contracts, which were granted immunity from government tampering. Finally, the expert cited the overwhelming lack of audit committees and other bodies to oversee and verify oil production in the South. Without these institu-

tions, he warned, there is no way to account for the over \$1 billion in annual oil revenues produced there.

GOS has been fairly content to continue the status quo, reaping the benefits of lucrative oil contracts while denying the GOSS access to the opaque workings of the Ministry of Energy. Reluctant to place all the blame on the shoulders of the GOSS, another panelist noted that before the signing of the CPA, there were only two commissions operating within southern Sudan. After enactment of the CPA, there were to be over 40 commissions and committees established in a matter of a few years. The panelists agreed that there was a paucity of qualified personnel to serve on these commissions and committees, which contributed to the overall lack of capacity and slow implementation of the process as a whole. Nevertheless, the effect of poor implementation of the agreement will have long-term implications and serve as disincentive to both current and potential investors.

The panelists acknowledged that many of the problems in the area of wealth-sharing are directly related to unresolved problems elsewhere. For example, the wealth-sharing provisions call for 50 percent of oil fields located in the South to be governed by the GOSS. Yet this stipulation is left unimplemented because that border has not been adequately defined.

Ambassador Petterson highlighted the particular difficulty of fixing the North-South border in the Abyei region. Rich in oil fields and home to three ethnic groups, the Abyei region has been transferred from one authority to another several times since the 1950s.

This complex and overlapping history coupled with the wealth of oil resources in the territory has made the Abyei region one of the most disputed territories covered by the CPA.

As stipulated in the CPA, the Abyei Boundary Committee (ABC), comprised of 15 members, (5 named by the GOS, 5 named by the SPLM, and 5 impartial experts), was formed in 2005 to determine the border between the North and South. Unable to reach consensus after hearing testimony from those living in the Abyei region and reviewing official records in Sudan, the five impartial international experts were required to make a decision. The Abyei annex to the CPA stated that the report of the experts would be “final and binding on the parties.” Following extensive research and investigation, the ABC set the boundaries and delivered their assessment to the parties on July 14, 2005. GOS, however, rejected the decision, and the issue has remained unresolved.

One senior official argued that a potentially explosive issue—the ambiguous status of the Abyei boundary—places a new importance on the outcome of the 2011 referendum, which could divide the disputed territory between two sovereign countries without a clearly defined border. Yet while the GOS rejects the ABC’s authority and the two parties are unable to come to consensus independently, the border in Abyei will remain unresolved and the corresponding provision of the CPA unimplemented. In conclusion, the senior official cautioned that with international attention turned toward Darfur, the Abyei dispute is even more likely to remain unresolved.

Despite the challenges in Abyei and the energy sector, another panelist viewed the implementation of the CPA with more optimism than his colleagues. Commenting on the implementation of military integration provisions, the panelist was encouraged by the creation of Joint-Integrated Units (JIUs), a Joint Defense Board, and the withdrawal of northern troops from the South. Although implementation of these provisions remains far behind schedule, between 20,000 and 35,000 JIU troops have already been put in place, accounting for 60 percent of all JIUs agreed to under the CPA. The panelist contended, however, that there was still a long way to go, particularly in the areas of security sector reform and North-South reconciliation. Justice, police, and military reforms are urgently needed in order to build competent and effective institutions. Well-trained police forces are particularly lacking and, as one expert argued, are essential to deal with community problems as they arise without turning to the SPLA.

While violent conflict continues in the western region of Darfur, the South has settled into a relatively uneasy peace. Security in Juba has been improving, and the city is even playing host to peace talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the neighboring government of Uganda. Yet the panelist contended, unity and reconciliation will not be achieved solely through military actions or reforms. Rather, a stable environment of trust and reconciliation must be created before lasting peace and security can be established. One component essential to creating such an environment, another expert asserted, is the resolution of power-sharing issues as outlined in the CPA. Several panelists maintained that

the Government of National Unity (GNU), which was designed to incorporate both southerners and northerners fairly into the political process, remains a discriminatory body overwhelmingly controlled by the Northern National Congress Party (NCP). Mirroring the lack of capacity to monitor the energy sector adequately, the South also lacks the human resources and expertise necessary to engage fully in the GNU, resulting in slow implementation of the power-sharing provisions dictated by the CPA.

One panelist stated that if the South was to hold the referendum on secession today, an overwhelming majority would indeed vote to secede from Sudan. Both the GOS and GOSS have failed to make unity seem an attractive option. The depth of suspicion and lack of confidence between the parties have greatly contributed to this vital but missing element in the implementation of the CPA. The panelist also contended that the division between the North and South is not merely a political divide, but is indicative of a larger crisis of national identity. Moreover, the North-South conflict itself appears to be but a part of a broader effort to transform the entire Sudan.

Sudanese, who perceive themselves as Arab despite the fact that Arabs are an ethnic minority, believe that this characterization should serve as the framework for a national identity. Rather than an explicit question of ethnicity, the question of Arab/Islamic versus non-Arab/non-Islamic shapes the larger discussion of national identity as a whole. In the eyes of Garang, the South was fighting not to secede, but to address the question of national identity and to transform Sudan into a unified country

where the question of Arab versus African would be resolved. The South does not want to be in a country ruled by Arab Islamic policies. In closing, this panelist concluded that until this identity issue is addressed, resolution of the conflict is impossible.



reminded attendees that the resolving the continuing violence in the western region of Darfur was a necessary condition to achieve ultimate success for the CPA. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is not entirely comprehensive, nor does it represent a solution to address all of the conflicts within Sudan. Questions include: Where does the CPA fit into the greater

What next?

Unity must be made attractive to southerners, he argued. It is important to strengthen the GOSS and to bring development to the region as evidence of a peace dividend for the people of the South. The SPLM must be strengthened as a political party on both local and national levels. Finally, he argued, peace will not endure without the engagement of the international community to ensure a credible implementation of the CPA.

In the security sector, the panelist advocated continuing international and U.S. support for the SPLA and the training of capable police forces. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts must also be supported and communicated more effectively to the public. Finally, in continuing support of the JIU, the actors involved should push for more joint training and joint exercises within the units.

With regard to the energy sector, a panelist advocated a policy of “tough love” for the government of Sudan. The energy sector needs to create provisions to provide for transparency and accountability immediately. Donors should withhold additional aid until transparency is

established between the North and South. External actors should endeavor to gather independent data on the energy sector, which could shed light on how to optimize production, determine the cost of constructing a pipeline to Kenya, and estimate how much revenue would be generated by maximizing the existing infrastructure in both the North and South.

Another panelist suggested that the United States should take a lead role in forming a coalition of the willing to engage directly in an effort to advance the implementation of CPA, with special attention paid to the Abyei area.

Asked to summarize their views of the conflict, all of the panelists agreed that unity and confidence-building between the North and South should be encouraged. Additionally, sustained and focused international attention will be vital to achieve sustained success of the peace process as a whole.

More than North-South

Throughout the symposium, panelists and speakers called for a more rapid and thorough implementation of the CPA. They also

conflict(s) within Sudan? What is the role of Darfur? What other challenges lie ahead?

In an earlier session, one panelist contended that the mandate of IGAD applied uniquely to the conflict between the North and South. As such, in negotiating the CPA, they were unable to address other sources of national tension, such as the Northern Democratic Opposition or the violence in Darfur. Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, violence in the Darfur region has steadily increased. This increased instability resulted in a surge of international involvement early in 2006, which yielded the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May of 2006. The agreement, however, was signed by only two of the multiple warring parties and has not precipitated a decrease in violence; rather, it has served to increase tensions between the GOS and the international community. Worry surrounding the insecurity of Darfur, the implementation of the DPA, and the transition from an AU to a UN peacekeeping force is so high that one high-ranking official slated to speak on the

subject deferred comment due to the extreme political sensitivity of the issue.

Reflecting on the CPA, the speaker observed that the ongoing conflict in Sudan is one of the principal challenges facing Africa today. The conflict acutely reflects the basic challenges facing all African countries and highlights the problems and challenges inherent in negotiations pursued by the international community in that region. The support of IGAD is a prime example of the sustained will of African countries to resolve such conflicts. The official also noted that despite the presence of political will, most African states lack the resources and monetary means necessary to assist in the reconstruction and development of Sudan. Thus, the involvement of the international community, particularly the United Nations and the United States, is essential for the continuing support of the Sudanese Peace Process.

Charting a Way Ahead

The speakers and panelists agreed that a refocusing of attention on the CPA was necessary to ensure its viability and ultimate success. How should this effort be orchestrated? Who should take the lead? How does the Darfur crisis affect the implementation and success of the CPA?

One panelist maintained that attention must first and foremost be focused on demonstrating to the government of Sudan that the international community is committed to the implementation of the CPA. Arguing that the GOS is slowly eroding the peace process to the point of nonexistence, the panelist defined commitment as sustained,

high-level attention, which clearly communicates to the GOS expectations and consequences of failing to meet them. Failure to meet with expectations must then be followed by concrete actions to demonstrate commitment. The United States is the only country perceived to be strong enough to enforce such a hardline position and therefore should do so in relation to both the CPA and DPA.

Another speaker countered this view, maintaining that the United States has always had high-level attention focused on the CPA and Darfur. The previous panelist cited U.S. actions in the Darfur peace process as evidence of a lack of seriousness. Examples used to support his case included the early withdrawal of the U.S. State Department envoy after only one rebel group signed the DPA, and the reluctance of the U.S. Government to appoint a new special envoy. The United States was not able to pressure the parties to make the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force an explicit component of the DPA and has subsequently been unable to persuade the GOS to accept such a force despite a UN Security Council resolution for that purpose. The panelist also condemned the UN for failing to enforce sanctions which were passed in March 2005, which could be used as leverage against the government of Sudan. Overall, the United States the UN, and international community have continued to offer carrots rather than sticks to the GOS. This diplomatic model, the panelist contended, is ultimately ineffective in correcting the “bad behavior” of the GOS. In this panelist’s view, the violence in Darfur has served as evidence to southerners that the NCP is a group of “mass-murderers” will-

ing to do anything to retain power. The violence in Darfur has had a catastrophic impact on implementation of the CPA, encouraging the government in Khartoum to divide would-be allies in Darfur and the South in an effort to derail the peace process completely.

Another panelist disagreed with the negative views of his predecessor. He noted that the CPA, while not perfect, is in fact a remarkable achievement that should be talked up rather than played down and criticized. Rather than looking back at what could have been done differently, the warring parties and international community should look ahead to the upcoming elections in 2011 and other steps in implementation. For instance, preparation for ensuring free and fair elections must start now. Current delays in implementation should be addressed immediately through continued engagement with both the GOS and GOSS. The international community should encourage coalition partners to play a full role in international affairs and encourage the SPLM to play a larger role nationally on the political front. Efforts should be made to convince both parties that generosity and compromise will serve them better in the long term than trying to maximize short-term gains today. Rather than focusing on the probability of failure and return to civil war, the international community should strive to make all Sudanese citizens realize that good relations between the North and South will remain essential, regardless of the outcome of the 2011 referendum. The UN, the expert concluded, is best positioned to lead the coordination of this effort, although the involvement of non-governmental organizations will also be essential. The international

community should strive for a balanced, united approach, follow through on promises of sticks as well as carrots, engage with all actors to coordinate donor commitments, and provide the necessary training and equipment required for the long road ahead.

A third panelist took a slightly different approach to addressing the international involvement in the peace process. While acknowledging the fundamental importance of American and UN involvement, this panelist argued that the United States should focus on partnering with China to achieve a successful outcome in Sudan. One-half of all of Sudan's exports of oil and petroleum is purchased by China, and China serves as a major arms supplier for Sudan. As such, the People's Republic of China has a considerable interest in a stable and peaceful Sudan. However, China has avoided becoming involved in the political process and abstained from the Chapter 6 UN Security Council resolution to deploy a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Given its large investments in Sudan and strong relationship with the GOS, China can and should play an influential role in the peace process, the panelist maintained.

Possible incentives for China to become more involved might include appealing to China's sense of multilateralism and internationalism in order to establish a high-level contact group to bring full pressure on the government of Sudan. Alternatively, the United States could also enter into broader discussion with China on energy security in order to allow them to obtain reliable

alternatives to Sudanese oil, thus allowing them to disengage from the region.

The panelist then commented on a more common theme and the need for a transition from an AU to a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Yet unlike the other panelists and speakers, this expert contended that the international community has not fully considered the implications and the challenges of deploying the UN force. Citing increasing requirements generated by current or pending UN peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Darfur, UN plans call for no less than 45,000 additional troops to support these operations. These requirements must be considered in the broader context of past peacekeeping operations where the UN, on average, has deployed only 1,400 troops per month. If this deployment rate could not be significantly increased, it would require anywhere from 15 to 26 months to deploy the 21,000 troops required for the Darfur mission alone, thus making the January 2007 deadline outlined in the resolution unattainable. The UN has little experience in the simultaneous execution of three large missions. That alone, however,


does not mean that such a mission is impossible to execute, only that such a mission would require highly sustained attention from donor countries and all other parties involved.

U.S. Policy in Sudan

A key factor in the Sudanese Peace Process, U.S. policy toward Sudan is viewed as a key component in the success of the process. What are the interests of the United States in Sudan? What is the current policy of the United States toward the peace process, the implementation of the CPA, and the resolution of conflict in Sudan? How might this policy change?

Focusing on the conflict in Darfur and the DPA, rather than on the CPA, a senior administration official stated that the issue of peace in Sudan remains a Presidential priority. Citing an executive directive on January 22, 2001, the official noted that President George W. Bush directed his National Security Advisor to create a policy aimed at resolving the conflict in Sudan. Since that time, U.S. policy toward Sudan has been one of overarching diplomacy and multilateralism.

The United States has a moral interest in ending the killing of innocent civilians, women, and children in Sudan, most notably in the Darfur region, the administration official maintained. Arguing that U.S. interests in Sudan are quite straightforward, the speaker explained that American interests in peace and regional stability reflect the view that there is an international



responsibility to protect the innocent. One expert argued earlier that no country's interest in Sudan is pure, citing oil and geopolitical strategy. Yet the administration official reiterated that any discussion about oil or recolonization as driving American interests in Sudan is simply not accurate.

Since the outset of U.S. involvement in Sudan in early 2001, Washington has maintained that there is no military solution to the conflict in Sudan. This message has been consistently conveyed to the GOS and to other countries and mediators. Yet the senior official conceded that during the negotiation of the CPA, the United States more closely identified with the southern parties because they were perceived as the aggrieved parties in the conflict. The official also stated that the same approach has come into play in the negotiation of the DPA and conflict in Darfur.

Commenting on the current situation and highlighting Darfur, the speaker outlined a three-pronged approach to U.S. policy in Sudan: continued humanitarian assistance, continued pressure on nonsignatories to the DPA to join the agreement, and continued support to strengthen the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) forces until a UN mission can be successfully deployed.

The United States has contributed over \$1.3 billion to Sudan over the last year alone. A major contributor to AMIS, the United States has been a powerful force in the humanitarian response to victims of the conflict, particularly in Darfur. However, one expert pointed out that the government of Sudan has been refusing humanitarian groups

access to victimized populations and that visible improvement in the southern region is marginal at best.

Given the current status of the conflict in Darfur and the slow implementation of the CPA, the official highlighted the necessity of putting diplomatic pressure on both the nonsignatory parties to the DPA as well as the GOS. An earlier panelist disagreed with this policy, countering that not enough pressure was being applied to the government of Sudan and that the Darfur Peace Agreement itself was flawed and insufficient. The U.S. official defended the DPA, stating that it is a good agreement that has provided a provision for aggrieved parties to come to the table.

The senior U.S. official also called for a transition from the AU peacekeeping force to a capable, neutral, and impartial UN force in order to implement and enforce the DPA. Championing the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1706 on August 31, 2006, the senior official asserted that the international community has spoken with one voice about the need for UN forces in Darfur, arguing for the effectiveness of Resolution 1706.

To conclude, the official postulated that the U.S. Government is confident that it will be able to use diplomatic pressure to secure a transition to a UN force. In addition, the United States views the current rejection of a UN force by the government of Sudan as an act in bad faith on its part. The recent GOS offensive in Darfur is also viewed as a violation of its agreement in the DPA. Moreover, as long as killing continues, there is no prospect for the improvement of bilateral relations between Sudan

and the United States. Yet despite the ongoing violence, the impending end of the AMIS mandate, and the refusal of the GOS to allow UN troops into the country, the official stated that the United States is not yet ready to enforce harsher measures such as a no-fly zone. Instead, the United States prefers to pursue a diplomatic route in resolving the stalemate.

Rapporteur: Maya Soble. Final report reviewed and revised by the symposium's panel moderators, Ambassador Johnnie Carson (Ret.), Ambassador William (Mark) Bellamy (NDU Senior Vice President), Dr. Stephen Flanagan (Director of INSS), Col James Murtha, USMC, and Gerald Faber, INSS.