AFTER KOSOVO: INSIGHTS INTO FUTURE OPERATIONS
CORRELATION OF
FORCES
Senior Scientist,
RAND Corporation
BACKGROUND
Every conflict spawns a cottage industry
of lessons learned and Kosovo is no exception. The
first wave of “lessons learned” came from the journalist community and of
necessity drew the most obvious conclusions from the rush of information that flooded the
airwaves this summer. The next lessons
learned reports came from the governments of the participating nations. Such reports tend to be turned out hurriedly since
behind the desire to draw appropriate lessons is a political imperative to weigh in to the
debate with the right story. Senior DoD and
military officials will follow with a quick-look lessons learned if for no other reason
than to make sure that the story told gives appropriate credit where credit is due, not
the least motive being to ensure the desired effect on the future budget requests.
For Kosovo, the US and its allies are
beyond this initial phase and the time has arrived for serious, objective, in-depth
analysis. This is a strength of the Western
alliance. While the initial instinct is one
of self-congratulation (or damage limiting by spinning the events), over time, defense
analysts are allowed the freedom to do systematic analysis and reveal findings that find
their way into decisions about the future of our defense policy and the configuration of
our armed forces.
REASONS
FOR ANALYZING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
In the spirit of the “third
wave” of lessons learned analysis, this paper will review Operation Allied Force in
Kosovo. The aim is not to chronicle events but to determine what
insights Kosovo provides into future military operations with a focus on coalition
operations.
In
what ways was Operation Allied force representative of future military operations?
With each conflict and each lessons
learned exercise there are prudent analysts who point out, correctly, that the next war
will inevitably be different than the last. Military
plans crafted on the basis of experience of the last conflict are assured of being off the
mark when events present us with a different adversary or, if it is the same adversary, he
learns some lessons himself and changes tactics against us.
That said, there are elements of Operation
Allied Force that are highly likely to be typical of future operations. These are well worth paying attention to and
integrating into the framework in which defense policy is crafted and force planning is
done.
1. National survival of the US or of its
coalition allies is not likely to be at stake.
There is no country or coalition of
countries that can field enough conventional military power to challenge that of the
Western allies. National survival against
classical military invasion is no longer the primary challenge for defense planners that
it was in the cold war where defense planning in NATO was very much focused on the
national survival of Germany and other member states in the Center Region. The conflicts the US and its allies are engaging
in on the periphery of NATO territory have a great deal to do with maintaining a civilized
political and social order in Europe with democratic institutions at its base. Ensuring that member nations of NATO will not be
invaded and occupied by a hostile country will continue to be a bedrock of official NATO
policy, but it is not where the action is.
This trend is likely to hold even as the
US looks beyond the periphery of Europe. In
other key regions, more attention is being paid to the damage that hostile states using
weapons of mass destruction could inflict while overt invasion and occupation seems less
likely than as recently as a decade ago.
2. Campaign objectives will be limited.
Since national survival will not be at
stake, the campaign objectives will be limited. The
United States and its Western European allies felt an imperative to intervene in Bosnia
and more recently in Kosovo, but in both cases the political authorities felt a
countervailing imperative to limit their involvement.
This was due both to concerns to put bounds on the effort to be expended and
to a realization that over the long term, the communities affected had to establish their
own modus operandi for governing themselves and providing for internal security.
Even in the case of Desert Storm where a
critical interest of the West (access to a secure and steady flow of oil) was at stake,
the objectives were limited to a restoration of the pre-war borders. The coalition halted well short of destroying the
Iraqi Republican Guard, which it could have done, let alone move on to Baghdad.
3. National Command Authorities will take
interest in the details of the military operation.
In every conflict there is a measure of complaint from the military commanders about constraints put on the execution of the operation. The experience in Kosovo was no exception. As far as the military commanders were concerned, they had to labor under political authorities who
· were slow to commit forces to the operation;
· insisted that casualties be minimized;
· insisted that collateral damage be minimized; and
· pressed for the operation to be brought a quick close.
There were important political reasons
behind each of these, and every reason to believe that they will typify coalition
operations on the periphery of Europe (and even beyond).
The reluctance to commit forces lay in a
hope to resolve the situation with a minimum of effort and a minimum of violence. In fairness to the political leadership, the air
strikes in Operation Deliberate Force (in Bosnia) had succeeded in bringing President
Milosevic to the negotiating table with only one-tenth of the force (as measured in combat
sorties flown) as finally proved necessary in Operation Allied Force. What appears to have been underestimated was the
degree to which Serbia was facing pressure at the same time from Croatian ground forces to
the north.
The imperative to minimize casualties
derives from the condition that immediate vital interests of the allies, let alone
national survival, was not at stake. Large
portions of the body politic in allied capitals felt the operation was of minimal
significance to their own interests and from this follows a reluctance on the part of the
national command authorities to have to defend a high price in lives. This held not only for allied forces and refugees
but also for Serbian civilians. Too much
bloodshed and support for the operation could have been undermined.
A related consideration is the careful
avoidance of collateral damage. This was the
chief motivation for the close review of the tight constraints on the targets chosen for
attack. There was direct intervention by
senior political leadership to place classes of targets, and in some cases even specific
targets “out of bounds”. Again, the
appropriate desire to manage the operation with a minimum of damage coupled with a strong reluctance to inflict damage
disproportionate to the objectives of the campaign.
Ironically, when the limited early
commitment of forces failed to bring Serbia to halt operations, pressure grew from the
political leadership to bring the operation to a close rapidly. The consensus the allies had forged was delicate
and it was uncertain how long it could be maintained.
Political support in some key capitals (Paris and Berlin to name two) had
been marshaled by underscoring the humanitarian nature of the operation. As the conflict dragged on, it began to look more
like a military operation with a cloudier end-game than had been presented at the outset. Naturally, it is impossible to say how long the
coalition would have stayed intact if Milosevic had not called back his forces when he
did. That said, in any operation short of one
that directly threatens a critical national interest, support can be expected to wane as
it drags on.
4.
Future military operations
will be done in coalition.
Military planning for and execution of
coalition operations are inefficient. The
need to accommodate forces that are not fully interoperable in equipment or in doctrine
with and that may not be up to the same standard of US forces, makes the whole less than
the sum of its parts. Since the end of the
cold war, there has been an unresolved debate over the extent to which and how US force
planning and operational planning should account for contributions from allies. US military planners can make the argument that,
with the exception of very limited circumstances (most notably, the breakout of a
“second major theater war (MTW)” while the US is engaged in a MTW and
elsewhere an SSC elsewhere), the need for a military contribution from allies is marginal.
· The US defense budget is larger than that
of the next seven largest defense budgets combined. Five
of these are
allies with whom we have formal defense treaties.
· The US spends more on personnel and
training than the next five countries, four of which are allies, which helps to
ensure that US forces will continue to be well-trained and ready to fight.
· The US is programmed to spend more on
procurement over the next five years than the next ten countries combined,
seven of which are allies. This makes it a
good bet that among the “the next militaries” the US will be dominant.
·
The US has programmed
more for military research and development than all the militaries of the world combined,
thus giving the US the chance to expand the technology and capabilities gap in “the
militaries after next”.
Granted these investment figures are
“input measures”. Resources
translate into battlefield capability only when managed and invested wisely. That said, investing to attract, train, and retain
quality soldiers; steadily modernizing the capital stock of military equipment; and
investing in developing the next generation of equipment pays off over time.
But military capability is only half the
story. Political support for an operation is
needed both at home and in allied capitals. Indeed,
in any operation far from our shores, the political imperatives for operating in a
coalition are going to outweigh considerations of military efficiency. In future operations on the periphery of Europe
and beyond, we will be in the field with allies and partners. The challenge for the US is to work with them to
make the most of their military contributions.
IT
IS DANGEROUS TO EXTRAPOLATE INTO THE FUTURE EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED IN OPERATION ALLIED
FORCE.
While the characteristics of Operation
Allied Force described above can be expected to characterize future operations as well,
the injunction to be careful about planning the next war based on the last one should be
given equal time. The most prominent anomaly
in Operation Allied Force may well turn out to be the marginal involvement of ground
forces. While the desire to minimize
casualties, especially among US and allied forces, steered the political authorities away
from the commitment of ground forces, eschewing their employment in advance was probably a
tactical mistake and may have prolonged Milosevic’s resistance.
In future operations, especially against
paramilitary forces and classical forces operating in small, dispersed units as Serb
forces did, the only way to bring a conflict to closure may be to defeat them on the
ground with a strong contribution from the air. A
question for the “lessons learned” exercises to address is what it would have
taken to prevail on the ground had the Serbian paramilitary forces not been firmly under
Milosevic’s control (i.e.- if they had to be driven out by military force). This is a key area for future planning: how to cope with paramilitaries or with dispersed,
dug in conventional forces operating on territory familiar to them.
THE
ALLIED CONTRIBUTION
Within the context of what experiences the
US ought to pay attention to in Kosovo, the section that follows reviews the salient
features of Operation Allied Force and looks at the contributions the allies made. It goes further and cites key areas where allied
forces were either inadequate or malconfigued for the operation. It further identifies high leverage investments
the allies can make to upgrade their capabilities for future operations.
1.
Aircraft committed
Beginning
with the aircraft committed to Operation Allied Force, two items are worth noting:
·
by the end of the operation, the allies
had committed almost as many aircraft to the operation as has the US.
·
the US, on the other hand, supplied the
overwhelming majority of support aircraft (tanker, lift, jamming, defense
suppression, and
reconnaissance).
Naturally, the number of aircraft
committed is not a good measure of the military contribution made to the conflict. Not all aircraft are equal in capability and some
air forces provide the support and training needed to maintain a higher sortie rate than
others. Moreover, the quality of pilot
training and of munitions delivery make a considerable difference in combat effectiveness. That said, by supplying about 45% of the total
combat aircraft for tasking by the SACEUR and his component air commander COMMAIRSOUTH
General Short, the allies showed their willingness to put significant forces into combat. The allied record is less impressive in the
category of support aircraft, notably transport, tanker, jamming, defense suppression and
battlefield management aircraft. In this
category, the allies provided less than 25% of the total leaving the lions share to the
US.
The aircraft build-up was slower than the
NATO commanders had wanted. It was not until
a month and a half into the war that the forces committed to the SACEUR reached the 900+
that he had requested at the outset. This was
due to a number of reasons, most prominently the expectation on the part of the political
authorities that Milosevic could be frightened to the negotiating table by a relatively
modest effort. But there were two operational
reasons for the slow build up as well. First,
air base capacity in the region was limited. Second,
in the air forces of some of our Continental European allies, the ground attack squadrons
are kept in a lower state of readiness than air to air combat squadrons. This made sense in the cold war when expectations
were that a conflict would open with massive air attacks on NATO’s rear installations
by Soviet bomber and attack aircraft. Air to
air combat squadrons would be needed first. When
air superiority was established, the alliance could then turn its attention to attacking
targets on the ground and ground attack squadrons would begin operations. This makes less sense in a conflict like Operation
Allied Force. Serbia launched only a handful
of aircraft and if anything NATO had more than enough air to air assets.
2.
Sorties flown
Sorties flown is a better, though not
perfect measure of the contribution the allies made.
The allies flew roughly the same number of ground attack sorties as did the
United States. While this sounds like an
impressive contribution, and it is, there are two reasons to be careful with the
interpretation of these data.
· First, Operation Allied Force was much different than the air campaign in Desert Storm. In Desert Storm, the ground attack sorties made up almost half of the total. In Operation Allied force, ground attack sorties made up only about one-third of the total sorties flown.
· When it came to support sorties, the US flew almost 80% of the total. This was critical since for every ground attack sortie, the US and its allies flew over two support sorties.
The reason for the high proportion of
support sorties was three-fold.
First, the imperative to minimize the loss of coalition aircraft resulted in a heavy
allocation of sorties to attack Serbian air defenses where possible and to jam those that
were not destroyed.
Second, most of the air bases the allies
had to use were remote from Yugoslavia. During
the 40 years of the cold war, NATO developed an infrastructure of air bases well located
to strike targets in the center region of Europe. This
constellation of bases is not well situated to strike targets in the Balkan region. Many aircraft had to be refueled to provide the
range to reach targets from bases remote from the target area.
Third, the imperative to minimize
collateral damage (and civilian deaths) drove NATO commanders to commit heavy resources to
surveillance of the battlefield to ensure the best possible battlespace awareness.
To the extent that these factors are
typical of future operations on the periphery of Europe and beyond, to make a balanced
contribution, the allies will have to strengthen their fleet of support aircraft. In the US air force, over 40% of the total
aircraft are support aircraft while among our principal NATO allies; the proportion is
typically about 30%. This harks back to two
factors. First, the United States Air Force
has always been something of an expeditionary force.
A large part of it was always focused on deploying and operating overseas. Second, serious planning to prepare for operations
in the Persian Gulf in the late 70s and throughout the 80s made Air Force planners think
about how to cope with operations in a theater with a relatively austere host nation
infrastructure relative to the Center Region of Europe.
The tanker and cargo fleets were beefed up accordingly. Europe is only gradually realizing that its future
military operations are most likely to be fought a good distance from their home airfields
and will require a greater focus on support functions.
Finally, not all sorties are the same. The B-2 could, and did, carry up to 16 precision
guided (all weather) munitions. This allowed
it to strike up to 16 different aimpoints while most other aircraft were able to strike
one or at best two aimpoints per sortie.
3.
Munitions
Mention has already been made of the
imperative to minimize collateral damage and this put a high premium on striking targets
with precision. Thus, much moreso than in
Operation Desert Storm, precision guided air to ground munitions were the weapon of
choice. In Desert Storm, less than 10% of
all munitions dropped were precision guided. In
Operation Allied Force, the proportion exceeded 30%.
This too will be typical of conflict on the periphery of Europe (and beyond)
in the future.
This will require the allies to rethink
the makeup of their munitions stockpile. While
key allies have made progress since Desert Storm, stockpiles are still inadequate. For example, France ran out of laser-guided bombs
near the end of the campaign and the US drew down its stockpile of cruise missiles more
rapidly than had been programmed.
There was a secondary theme as well. The pressure from the political authorities to
conclude the operation promptly led the NATO commanders to try to keep the pressure on the
Serbs night and day, good weather and bad. The
commanders did not want to pause operations to wait for the sun to come up or to wait for
the clouds to clear. This, coupled with the
need to minimize collateral damage, led to a heavy use of all weather precision guided
munitions. Virtually all these sorties were
flown by US aircraft who could deliver GPS guided munitions, mostly Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAM).
WHAT
FORCE IMPROVEMENTS SHOULD WE BE ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES TO MAKE?
At the Washington Summit of April 1999,
NATO adopted a Defense Capabilities Initiative designed to improve the NATO forces’
ability to project military power outside its borders.
The initiative contains considerable detail that is classified, but the
broad themes are not and are well focused on precisely the deficiencies that showed up in
our allies’ forces during Operation Allied Force.
Among others they include:
Effective
engagement. NATO forces are going to have
to acquire more and better precision guided munitions to include those that can be
employed at night and in bad weather.
Survivability. A greater part of our allies’ force has
to include active defense suppression, electronic jamming of air defenses, and stand-off
weaponry to keep aircraft out of range of surface to air missiles.
Deployability. Operations such as that in Kosovo can be
fast-breaking and the allies need to be able to get to a theater and begin operations
promptly. Better lift, more prepositioning of
low cost, high weight materiel at forward locations could have shortened the deployment
times in Operation Allied Force.
C3. As
we move from analogue to digital means of passing information (including cockpit-cockpit
and ground-cockpit voice communication), powerful encryption techniques become available
to provide secure communications. The
technology exists today, and it is only a matter of careful planning to take advantage of
it.
Finally, many of our key NATO allies have
accepted the need to invest in their power projection capabilities rather than maintain
forces guarding borders no one is threatening. The
US would do well to encourage this development and push the our allies at the least to
maintain their current levels of defense spending shift more into procuring the means to
make it a reality. The alliance would be
stronger for it and the US would be better off for it.