1.See for example, Stacy Sullivan, “Convince the KLA the War Is Over,” Washington Post, June 6, 1999, p. B3.

2.See DoD News Briefing, June 10, 1999; John A. Tirpak, “Victory in Kosovo,” Air Force Magazine (July 1999), pp. 24-27; House Armed Services Committee, “Kosovo Update,” June 25, 1999 (available at http://www.house.gov/hasc); on the challenges of carrying out accurate bomb damage assessment, see Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 55-144.

3.See Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, “Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1999), pp. 128-140.

4.Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53; Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 54-89; Barry R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” International Security, vol. 21, no. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 72-111; Michael O’Hanlon, Saving Lives with Force (Brookings, 1997), pp. 47-61.

5.John Barry, “Why Troops Take Time,” Newsweek, April 26, 1999; Thomas E. Ricks, “Why the U.S. Army is Ill-Equipped to Move Troops Quickly Into Kosovo,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1999, p. 1.

6.Thomas E. Ricks and Carla Anne Robbins, “NATO Develops a Plan to Dispatch Troops into Kosovo After Bombing,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1999; John Keegan, “Milosevic Keeps Allies Guessing As He Prepares to Play Waiting Game,” London Daily Telegraph, April 21, 1999; Rachel Schmidt, Moving U.S. Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1997), pp. 13, 80; Michael O’Hanlon, “Military Dimensions of a Ground War in Kosovo,” unpublished paper, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 26, 1999 (available at http://www.brook.edu); Michael O’Hanlon, “Sins of omission,” Washington Times, May 24, 1999, p. A19.

7.James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995-1996), pp. 59-69

8.Nick Cook, “Serb air war changes gear,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 7, 1999.

9.On the situation today, see Nick Cook, “NATO battles against the elements,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 21, 1999, p. 4.

10.William B. Scott, “Bad Weather No Deterrent For New Long-Range Weapons,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 3, 1999, pp. 66-67.

11.Michael O’Hanlon, “Military Dimensions of a Ground War in Kosovo,” unpublished paper, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 26, 1999 (available at http://www.brook.edu).

12.Michael O’Hanlon, “Should Serbia Be Scared?,” New York Times, March 23, 1999, p. A31; on counterinsurgency warfare, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 7-16, 157-163.

13.See Michael O’Hanlon and Jerre Wilson, “Shoring Up Military Readiness,” Brookings Policy Brief #43, January 1999.

14.See Steve Kosiak’s frequent updates at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments on the costs of the air war, available at www.csbahome.com, as well as the Congressional Budget Office’s less detailed analysis released as a letter from Director Dan Crippen of April 1999. Through the war’s first month, it is fair to estimate its total U.S. military cost as something approaching $1 billion, divided into four main elements: the costs of cruise missiles (nearly a quarter of a billion dollars), the costs of other munitions expended (perhaps an average of one munition costing $100,000 for each of the 3,000 attack sorties, adding up to $300 million), the added costs of flying airplanes in fuel and maintenance costs and spare parts (probably approaching $200 million), and the costs of moving supplies to the theater and otherwise conducting intensive operations away from home bases (perhaps $100 million).

15.Operation Desert Storm cost a total of some $70 billion, expressed in 1999 dollars, of which nearly $50 billion was attributable to around 400,000 ground forces (including Army and Marine units). Scaling this data to the deployment of some 75,000 U.S. ground troops to Kosovo and allowing for a somewhat longer mission suggests costs of $12 billion to $15 billion for the ground campaign (on top of the costs of aerial and naval operations). A similar result obtains from the fact that it cost the United States some $3.5 billion to deploy 20,000 troops to Bosnia and a few thousand more to neighboring countries during the twelve months of the IFOR operation.

16.Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 156.

17.Les Aspin and William Dickinson, Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1992), pp. 32-33.

18.This doubles the estimated cost of the limited ground war and also assumes that considerably more U.S. equipment would be destroyed and that the operation would take longer to complete.

19.A good deal of combat force structure would remain in the Army National Guard, but it would be difficult to get most of it into good fighting form in much less than 6 to 9 months; see Thomas F. Lippiatt and others, Postmobilization Training Resource Requirements: Army National Guard Heavy Enhanced Brigades (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1996), pp. xv-xviii, 1-21; Michael O’Hanlon, How to Be a Cheap Hawk (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998), pp. 166-171.

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