

RESPONSES TO PANEL DISCUSSIONS
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HOW HAVE US MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ AFFECTED OUR
SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES,
PARTICULARLY THE TRAINING OF AFRICAN MILITARIES?

1. Security cooperation between the US and African military institutions in the recent past have been centred on the following areas:
 - a. Training assistance for deployment on Peace Support Operations (PSO) through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), now known as African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA). This programme helped to prepare countries like Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal for PSO duties in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
 - b. Provision of limited equipment support for deployment of troops for PSOs within the West Africa Sub-region.
 - c. Provision of strategic lift capability for deploying troops to trouble spots.
 - d. The establishment of a Logistics Base in Sierra Leone to assist in the maintenance of West African troops on peace support operations in the Sub-region.
 - e. Amphibious training along selected coastal areas involving US Ships and crew and their African counterparts.
 - f. Sponsorship for African troops on courses in US military institutions under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme.

- g. Medical outreach programmes in deprived communities.
2. One would have thought that, with the might of the US military establishment, its commitment to African countries would not be affected by its engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Apart from genuine resource constraints, brought on by over concentration of military hardware for the war effort in the two countries, certain perceptions might have informed US Government decision to withhold military assistance to Africa. Some of these perceptions are:
- a. The apparent influence of the Al-Qaeda Organisation on some African countries, which turns such countries against the US and its interests in Africa.
 - b. The direct involvement of people of African origins in certain terrorist attacks in parts of the Western hemisphere gives credence to the involvement of Africans in terrorist activities.
 - c. The African continent could be a possible breeding ground for potential terrorists, taking into consideration the levels of poverty and economic deprivation, which can easily lure people into joining terrorist groups.
 - d. In addition to being a potential recruiting ground and refuge for terrorist, Africa has the potential to fund their conflict activities through the smuggling of diamonds and other precious metals, money laundering, drugs and other criminal activities.
3. Whereas the above-listed concerns could discourage the US Government from providing the requisite resource and training support for African countries, in some cases, genuine resource constraints compelled the US authorities to withdraw ships earmarked for the West African Training Cruise 2005 (WATC 05) with Ghanaian troops for deployment in Iraq. This development, for instance, has necessitated changes in exercise dates, which will adversely affect the impact of the exercise in the long run.

4. In the area of courses, the war on terrorism has expanded the frontiers of training by the inclusion of more topics on terrorism in the training programmes of most US military training institutions. Thus more vacancies are being extended to African countries to participate in these terrorism programmes.

WHAT KINDS OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMMES ARE OTHER COUNTRIES CONDUCTING IN AFRICA? WHAT ARE THEIR IMPACTS ON AFRICAN SECURITY AND US INTERESTS?

5. In recent years Africans have realised the need to build sufficient capacity to enable them resolve conflicts in Africa. Hence one of NEPAD's priorities is to 'establish the conditions for the sustainable development of ensuring peace and security'.
6. The AU defined in 2002 an agenda including the setting up of an African Peace and Security architecture (ASPA) based on the five sub-regional organisations providing a brigade each for the African Stand-by Force (ASF)
7. The reality of the state of Armed Forces, governance and regional integration in Africa requires massive external assistance approach to address the capacity building efforts. Regular and standardised training based on harmonised doctrine, strategic lifts, establishment of logistic support and explicit command and control arrangements from the AU through Regional Commands are essential requirements. AU Mission to Dafur is currently facing serious shortcomings in this regard including the shortage of capable peacekeepers.
8. The AU and the sub-regional organisations recognised this during their meeting on African Stand-by Force on 24 March 2005 which they discussed with the G8 and other partner countries on 04 April 2005 in Addis Ababa.
9. The UN Secretary General, in his report on 'Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity' in November 2004, indicated the need for the UN to assist the AU in its plans and called for the International Community "to provide adequate support to strengthen African peace building capacity".

10. Countries involved in providing support and security co-operation and military training programmes are;

a. **France**

- (1) It is actively supporting African peace support training through its RECAMP exercises, in building a Peace Support Training Centre in Koulikuri in Bamako and has more than 300 liaison personnel on the continent.
- (2) French Language laboratories and instructors have been supportive in the multi-lingual setting of Africa.
- (3) Is also actively involved at the **Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Centre (KAIPTC)** in Accra, Ghana.
- (4) France is also providing training courses for basic, junior and senior level Military Personnel in France.

b. **Germany** - Is providing:

- (1) Financial Support for infrastructural training development.
- (2) Technical Staff for peace support operations and transportation.
- (3) Course Vacancies in German Military institutions.
- (4) Language Laboratories and mine awareness programs.

c. **United Kingdom**

- (1) The UK has a number of permanently deployed training teams in Sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to assistance provided to the AU, ECOWAS and

other partners through the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) comprising three UK Government departments; DFID, FCO, MOD worth £60m per annum.

- (2) The UK additionally provides Technical assistance at various training institution for PSO and provides training courses at various UK military institutions.
 - (3) The UK provides funds for infrastructural development in various PSO training institutions on the African continent.
 - (4) Provides Directing Staff for Peace Support Operations at the senior and junior staff course levels.
- d. **USA.** The US is actively supporting African peace support training and providing logistics support through its ACOTA training programmes. The support provided by EUCOM has been excellent. There is the need to acknowledge the tremendous efforts of the EUCOM Commander and his Deputy and all staff of the Command for their outstanding support through:
- (1) Joint training exercise involving all services
 - (2) Outreach programmes
 - (3) Constant visits by Very Senior Commanders and Staff for co-ordination and consultations.
 - (4) Partnership programmes involving strategic level planning for Disaster Relief Operations (DRO) and operational level planning for DRO. Partnership between Utah and Morocco, New York and South Africa, Ghana and North Dakota are currently in place. Nigeria and Senegal are to benefit from the programme shortly.

e. **Others.** Other countries actively engaged in peace support capacity building are Canada, Norway and the Netherlands. The EU has come up with a number of initiatives to support the AU in the field of peace and security through the European Peace Facility.

f. **Impacts on African Security and US Interests**

- (1) For emphasis the UN Secretary General in his report on ‘Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity’ (Nov 2004) recognised the need for the UN to assist the AU in its plans and called for the International Community “to provide adequate support to strengthen African peace building capacities”.
- (2) The AU and sub-regional organisations have recognised the need to focus on the ‘Roadmap on the operationalization of the ASF’ (24 March 2005) which was shared with the G8
- (3) US, France and UK speak regularly on conflict resolution and Co-ordination in Africa.
- (4) Collectively a **Joint G8/Africa Plan** was agreed in Evian in 2003 committing both sides to work together to ensure that Africans take over the responsibility for peace, security and stability.
- (5) Prime Minister Tony Blair has made Africa a focus of the UK, G8 and EU Presidencies in 2005. **The Commission for Africa** is to take a fresh look at Africa’s present and future challenges, for additional International Community assistance. At the Gleneagles G8 Summit in July 2005, a package of additional commitments including field logistic support for ASF, civilian police training, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction were addressed.
- (6) The G8 will hopefully support the services of workshops that have been planned in the framework of the ‘Roadmap’ by the AU and regional organisations.

- (7) The above are all in the interest of the AU, G8 and the US – for any negative or positive impact on the stability of Africa will have direct or indirect consequences on all partners involved. Africans may want to take ownership of their future, yet they are woefully incapable of doing so without significant support and assistance from their partners. The journey to capacity self-sufficiency is a long one which requires good planning, patience, political will and resilience to get there.

HAVE WE STRUCK THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN DEVOTING RESOURCES TO MILITARY TRAINING AND PEACEKEEPING FORCES, LIKE ACOTA AND CPOI AND DEVOTING RESOURCES TO OTHER NON-MILITARY PROGRAMMES TO PREVENT CONFLICT?

11. Military institutions, being at the forefront of conflict resolution, tend to be the recipients of greater proportions of resources than non-military institutions engaged in conflict prevention efforts. In a situation where resources are scarce, it is only natural that those organisations that have attained a certain level of reputation in their chosen fields would receive recognition before others.
12. Therefore, when it comes to resource allocation for conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations, military training, geared at preparing troops for peace support operations, will take precedence over other non-military programmes. Thus ACRI/ACOTA/RECAMP initiatives and their related courses would receive more attention than latter day NGOs desperately trying to make inroads into conflict prevention issues.
13. For instance, the Chieftaincy institution and Religious bodies in Africa play a major role in conflict prevention and resolution on the African continent, but no donor nation or organisation would be prepared to channel resources for such purposes through these institutions.

14. Usually, in PSO situations, more attention is given to the peacekeeping aspect to the detriment of peace building measures, which in the long run guarantee lasting peace for the people. Very often, the handling of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees in war afflicted areas is relegated to the background. Thus, funding is more in favour of keeping the peace than building peace afterwards.
15. There is absolutely no doubt that imbalance in the provision of resources for PSOs by donor countries/organisations tilts very much in favour of military training and preparations for peacekeeping operations than for non-military programmes.

HOW CAN THE US, UN, EU AND THE G8 COORDINATE THEIR POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES TO IMPROVE PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION AND AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS?

16. The UN, EU, US, G8 countries, as well as other donor countries have various ongoing programmes with African nations and institutions to support the development of capacities for African countries to undertake complex PSOs and related activities. To avoid duplication and ensure the cost effectiveness of these programmes calls for coordination among donors and with African partners.
17. Fortunately, all the donor partners have come to embrace NEPAD, which is the programme to eradicate poverty on the continent, designed to place African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to enable them participate actively in the world economy and body politic.
18. In accepting NEPAD as a workable plan for Africa's development, the G8 countries proposed a joint plan to facilitate its implementation, known as the Joint Africa/G-8 Action Plan.
19. The Joint Africa/G8 Action Plan is therefore one of the measures to help channel individual and collective efforts towards the achievement of the African vision for its capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and consolidate peace. This will avoid duplication.

20. Extensive consultation among donors on their military and civilian programmes aimed at enhancing peace support capabilities with African countries can also eliminate duplication of efforts and enhance the programme.
21. The development of a reliable Data Base on donor activities, controlled at either the UN or G8 level will also help eliminate duplication. This can eventually lead to the development of Websites accessible to all donors and beneficiaries.
22. Other measures which can help avoid duplication of efforts and ultimately reduce costs are:
 - a. Establishment of a comprehensive roadmap which will identify lead players and establish a unified economic, political and social approach to preventive action.
 - c. Improved joint training opportunities, especially in mediation and problem solving approaches.
 - c. Exchange of personnel between regional organizations and the AU and UN and among AU member states.
 - d. Creation of dynamic focal points, particularly in areas of information collection and sharing to avoid overlap and duplications.
 - e. Use of liaison officers, joint action and interagency committees to integrate activities into coherent action plans.

WHAT ARE THE BEST ROLES FOR AU AND AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HOW CAN THEY BE STRENGTHENED?

23. The AU and African Regional Organizations can be assisted by the UN, G8 and other donor countries to play the under listed roles in peacekeeping operations on the continent:
 - a. Support the rule of law in member countries so as to eliminate conflict situations.

- b. Assist in reforming the security forces of member countries to be able to play their assigned roles.
- c. Assist in laying sound foundations for economic growth on the continent.
- d. Enhance the preparedness of sub-regional organisations for PSOs.
- e. Coordinate military doctrines, concepts of operations, training, logistics and management of PSOs along UN lines.
- f. Assist in the establishment of standby forces to facilitate their quick deployment to trouble spots on the continent.
- g. Monitor refugee camps and border regions in conflict areas.
- h. Assist in the formulation and implementation of policies related to HIV/AIDS in conflict areas.
- i. Protection for unarmed observers.
- j. Provide checks and balances to the manner of regional involvement in PSOs.
- k. Intensify mediation efforts in conflict areas so as to accelerate peacebuilding/peacekeeping.
- l. Coordinate activities performed by the various sub-regional organizations.

**ARE THERE SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL PROGRAMMES
THAT COULD SERVE AS A MODEL FOR OTHER
AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?**

- 24. In a bid to accelerate economic development on the continent in the 1970s, Regional Economic groupings were formed. However, these groupings could not discharge the responsibilities imposed on them due to the political instability which engulfed the continent thereafter. The focus of some of these economic groupings was therefore re-directed to the enforcement and maintenance of peace in their respective regions.
- 25. One such grouping which became prominent and a pacesetter in peacekeeping on the continent was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS, in

the 1990s became better recognised for its mediation/intervention efforts in conflict areas than for its economic integration aspirations.

26. Starting from its first intervention in Liberia through its ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), ECOWAS became the first regional organization in the world to successfully enforce and keep the peace in its member country, Liberia. This groundbreaking feat had since been replicated in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and, for a second time, in Liberia.
27. Over the year, ECOWAS has worked assiduously to improve upon its structures and protocols to the extent that it has become a model on the continent. With the promulgation of its fourth and most important instrument for peace and security, which is the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999, known simply as the ECOWAS Mechanism, ECOWAS has come a long way in establishing itself as a Regional Organization capable of maintaining peace in its sub-region.
28. The main features of the ECOWAS Mechanism are as outlined below:
 - a. **Objectives of the Mechanism.** The Mechanism has the following objectives:
 - (1) Prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-state conflicts;
 - (2) Implement the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty.
 - (3) Implement the relevant provisions of the protocols on Non-Aggression, Mutual Assistance in Defence, Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment;
 - (4) Strength cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines;

- (5) Maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community;
- (6) Establish institutions and formulate policies that would allow for the organization and coordination of humanitarian relief missions;
- (7) Promote close cooperation between member-states in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping;
- (8) Constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region, whenever the need arises;
- (9) Set up an appropriate framework for the rational and equitable management of natural resources shared by neighbouring member-states which may be causes of frequent inter-state conflicts.
- (10) Protect the environment and take steps to restore the degraded environment to its natural state;
- (11) Safeguard the cultural heritage of member-states, and
- (12) Formulate and implement policies on anti-corruption, money laundering and illegal circulation of small arms.

b. **Conditions of Applicability.** The conditions under which the Mechanism can be applied include the following:

- (1) Cases of threat, aggression or conflict in any member-state.
- (2) Conflict between two or several member-states.

- (3) Internal conflicts which threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or pose a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region.
- (4) Events that pose a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region.
- (5) Situations of serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law.
- (6) In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.
- (7) Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council.

c. **Organisational Structure.** The ECOWAS Mechanism also outlines the institutional and organizational structure of the Protocol all with defined responsibilities and aims that address the peace and security situation in the sub-region as follows:

- (1) **The Authority.** The Protocol accords the Heads of State and Government constituting the Authority, the highest decision-making body.
- (2) **Mediation and Security Council.** At the level of heads of state and government, ministers and ambassadors, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) is mandated to take appropriate decisions for the implementation of the provisions of the Mechanism relating to the deployment of troops.
- (3) **Defence and Security Commission.** The Defence and Security Commission (DSC), is made up of Defence Chiefs and military technocrats, is to serve as the technical advisory body to the Mediation and Security Council in the formulation of the mandate of peacekeeping missions and their terms of reference.

- (4) **Executive Secretary.** There are also provisions under Article 15 for an Executive Secretary with powers to initiate actions under the Mechanism, including fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict. The Executive Secretary also has the responsibility of deploying the Council of Elders, depending on his or her assessment of a given situation.
- (5) **Department of Political Affairs, Defence and Security.** Within the Secretariat is a newly established Department of Political Affairs, Defence and Security (PADS) headed by a Deputy Executive Secretary. In addition to having the responsibility for policy formulation and implementation in all military peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the department controls the observation and monitoring centre in the Secretariat and its counterpart centres in the four designated zones within the sub-region, where the collation and analysis of day-to-day data gathered from member states are carried out.
- (6) **Council of Elders.** A Council of Elders, comprising eminent personalities drawn from within and outside the sub-region, is constituted annually by the Executive Secretary, in accordance with African traditional practice, to assume the roles of mediation, conciliation and negotiation in a situation where there are indicators of potential conflict. Its mandate is essentially that of preventive diplomacy. The Council of Elders will be constituted annually by the Executive Secretary from an approved list stored in a data bank in the Secretariat.
- (7) **Standby Force.** ECOMOG was formally established as a multipurpose standby force, ready for immediate deployment. ECOMOG is described as multipurpose in the sense that it can assume one of several functions of observation, monitoring and peacekeeping. It can be deployed for humanitarian intervention or the enforcement of sanctions and can also undertake policing activities in order to control fraud and organized crime.

The Executive Secretary nominates a Force Commander from a list for approval by the Mediation and Security Council.

(8) **Special Representative of the Executive Secretary.** The Special Representative of the Executive Secretary is nominated from the list of eminent persons as the Head of Mission.

(9) **Early Warning System.** An early-warning system, in the form of a regional observation network, has also been created under Chapter IV. Established within the Executive Secretariat in Abuja and also in four specific areas within the community (Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia and Cotonou) are observation centres or bureaux, where data on states ranging across the economic, political, security and social sectors are collected and analysed in order to detect warning signals that may signify potential conflict. The system known as the ECOWAS Regional Information Exchange System (ERIES), has been expanded to link all member countries by satellite. This was done by the US European Command (USEUCOM) and is considered an important tool in the early detection of conflict that should then inform conflict-prevention strategies.

29. This model has so far worked for the ECOWAS Sub-region. However, its successful application has very often been hampered by lack of resources.

30. **SHIRBRIG.** The Multinational Standby Force High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) model for Europe can be modified and adopted by the African Regional Organisations.