REPORT ON NDU 1998 EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM
"NATO 2010: A STRATEGIC VISION"
February 10-11, 1998

MAJOR INDICATIONS FOR NATO'S
NEXT STRATEGIC CONCEPT 

Charles L. Barry
Visiting Research Fellow
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University 

Executive Summary 

I.  Main observations from the Symposium: 

•  The dominant theme throughout was that the future tasks and strategic direction of the Alliance lie in the protection of collective interests rather than simply the defense of NATO territory. 

•  Moving toward 2010, the Alliance will have to deal politically and militarily with increasing threats from rogue and failed states, as well as WMD and other trans-national threats, in order to remain relevant to the security needs of its members. 

•  Perspectives varied on where threats will have to be dealt with, but most experts focused on NATO's southeastern flank, from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.  However, a minority wanted NATO to become a global actor.   

•  There was a sense that the next Alliance Strategic Concept should more clearly address the shift toward the protection of interests beyond NATO's borders, especially in the Concept's guidelines for military force posture. 

•  There was disagreement about how far the Allies can or should go in writing their commitment to out of area interests into the Strategic Concept, with U.S. attendees from outside government urging more explicit commitments, and those inside government and most Europeans urging less specific commitments. 

 •  During the Symposium there were indicators of the need for a more direct strategic dialogue between the U.S. and Europe on the nature of their future partnership, especially on burden sharing, responsibility sharing, and regarding what is necessary in terms of defense investments.

II.  Two very different, almost diametrically opposed strategies were described as being executed simultaneously within the Alliance: 

•  One is a linear-logic strategy, focused on cleaning up after the Cold War and the relations between major powers.  Its objective is to stabilize transition states and the relationships between major powers.  It is about Article Five and collective defense guarantees, and it includes a residual nuclear component.  A lot of consensus has been achieved on what to do, the Alliance acts as a whole on a well-defined course, and there are well-developed institutions at work.  This strategy is focused on geographic issues and is primarily political in execution.  The Alliance is in essential equilibrium in executing this strategy, and can not push in any direction too far without creating disequilibrium among several competing values.  In the main, this strategy is at work along NATO's northern tier, where the key European stakeholders are Britain, Germany, the Benelux and Nordic members. 

•  Another strategy had evolved for NATO's response to the instability of the post-Cold War era.  This strategy is non-linear and attempts to deal with small states, including rogue and failed states, and even non-state actors.  The strategy is necessarily more about Article Four and collective security than Article Five and collective defense.  The course NATO follows here is not well charted - it is reactive and ad hoc, with few institutional structures to rely on.  Responses tend to be operational in nature, and undertaken by coalitions of the willing rather than by the Alliance as a whole.  It is an interest-based strategy, and marked by little consensus.  A general state of dis-equilibrium exists among the interests and participants, creating a constant state of crisis or near crisis.  This strategy is operative along NATO's southern and southeast frontiers, and its primary European stakeholders are NATO members bordering the Mediterranean and to some degree, Britain. 

NATO in 2010 and the Next Strategic Concept 

A.  What the Symposium Indicated about NATO in 2010. 

Military Missions. 

•   NATO operations out of area will likely grow in number and duration as crises threaten Allied collective interests.  The Allies may gradually expand the area of contingency operations, however there is unlikely to be any a priori agreement, even for planning or exercises, to commit the Alliance to defend interests in the Middle East or Persian Gulf.  Rather, each crisis will be unique and dependent on political will.  The further away a crisis occurs, the more likely it is that NATO will spawn "coalitions of the willing" rather than act as an Alliance.  

•   Of necessity, NATO will continue to underscore prominently its core mission of collective territorial defense.  Periodic exercises of the reinforcement and defense of Europe, along with nuclear release, will be required - likely via simulations. 

Force Structure. 

•  NATO member force structures will be increasingly smaller, more flexible, less conscripted, and equipped with better technology.  Look for overall force size to shrink as European economies improve and reserve units are retired to reconstitutable force plans.  Multinational force trends could accelerate among European allies if they warm to (or are forced into by economic factors) a more cohesive European identity.  The proliferation of 'euro' formations will continue, and the U.S. may not be able to count on any active European units of corps or division size except through ESDI.   

The Integrated Military Structure. 

•  The integrated military structure is likely to become primarily a planning and support structure for training, deploying, sustaining and providing the strategic-operational interface for CJTFs.  The SC's could become the equivalent of U.S. combatant commands.  The overall structure will continue to serve the political purpose of Alliance cohesion, and will be an important training vehicle for NATO militaries in combined operational planning and operations. 

•  CJTF will become the mainstay of the Alliance military.  The current system of headquarters nuclei may have to be made more structured and permanent as the role of CJTF's grows.  Regular exercises, both in the field and simulations-based will be needed to hone and sustain a sizable multinational reservoir of planners, operators, logisticians and commanders at every level that can respond effectively together, with or without a NATO flag over the operation.   

Threats to Alliance Territory. 

•  The primary threat to NATO territory will come from WMD.  WMD are increasingly seen by rogue states and actors as a counterbalance to the superior forces of industrialized states.  Terrorism and other trans-national threats such as organized crime should also to be expected.  

•  No discernable conventional threats to NATO territory were raised at the Symposium.  However, it should be noted that the area most proximate to potential instability and border violations is southeastern Turkey.  This situation could improve by 2010 in terms of Iran and Iraq.  However, the addition of Caspian Sea oil to the equation of this unstable area suggests it will remain a concern. 

•  Note:  The situation between Greece and Turkey will remain tense for some time, although by 2010 the issue of Cyprus could be resolved.  Depending on the nature of that resolution, there could be a much better situation in the Aegean.  In the mean time, this area poses the greatest risk to Alliance territory, e.g., a fratricidal war. 

Threats to Collective Interests Other Than Territory. 

•  The threats to Allied interests beyond NATO borders are likely to grow.  The Balkans will still be an unsettled place in 2010 and other disruptions to European stability are possible.  The threats to Middle East peace, energy supplies, and lines of communications such as the Suez Canal are also sufficient to cause concern.  WMD and terrorism are the most likely nature of the threat, however conventional threats cannot be ruled out.    

ESDI.

 •  Although ESDI will no doubt remain an effective concept, how European security will develop by2010 is difficult to project.  Two possibilities should be considered.  On one hand, Europe could take responsibility for a military operation, either a new crisis or relief of the follow-on to SFOR at some point in the future.  Not only will the U.S. have to acquiesce before Europe proceeds, it will have to actively encourage Europe to venture into this uncharted area.  Also, the U.S. will be obliged to support the operation with U.S.-unique resources, NATO resources, and political positions that fall short of a veto over operational, if not strategic outcomes.  If such an operation succeeds, the ESDI concept will evolve  and become a viable alternative to a U.S lead NATO in situations where the U.S. chooses not to take the lead role.   

•  The alternative ESDI scenario is that Europe does not take the lead on an operational commitment by 2010, either under NATO or the WEU.  Then the ESDI concept remains effectively moribund.  The swing factor in these two scenarios is political will.  Any military resources contributed to European security in support of the ESDI concept also enhance NATO capability.  Key employment shortfalls are strategic C³I, long line logistics and experience in contingency operations.  The political will behind the ESDI concept depends a lot on the U.S. - whether it continues to lead operationally (obviating the need for Europe to do so), and whether it is perceived as taking a positive or negative approach toward ESDI.

Bosnia. 

•  All indicators suggest that Bosnia will still need international supervision of some sort well beyond 2010.  However, what presence is needed will depend on progress toward reconciliation and a situation that supports unchaperoned peace.  In the best of circumstances, civilian peace monitors and observers might be all that are needed.  These could fall under the UN or OSCE, with financial aid under the continuing stewardship of the EU.  Should Chapter VI peace keeping forces be needed, they, too, might be deployed under the UN or OSCE, with the WEU as yet another possibility.  Under any of these scenarios, in 2010 NATO will almost surely retain a reaction force mission that will call for periodic exercises.   

•  If Chapter VII peace enforcement is still needed in 2010, NATO will still be engaged in Bosnia.  However, NATO will not be able to continue operations in Bosnia too much longer before it must act to relieve the growing strain caused by a long running contingency mission.  In other words, NATO will have to stabilize its operation in Bosnia by creating a more or less fixed, in place command element, with relatively fixed force strength and budgets, similar to Combined Forces Command in Korea, or MFO Sinai, or Operation Northern Watch in Turkey.  Whether such a command is still operating in Bosnia in 2010 depends on other factors, but that is a distinct possibility.   

•  Bosnia is not an independent variable.  If trouble erupts in Kosovo or elsewhere, it will mean maintaining a NATO presence in the region, and that will likely mean using Bosnia as a base.

RMA. 

•  Whether or how fast European forces close the growing technology gap with U.S. forces is unclear.  What is clear is that Europe is making slow progress toward rationalization of its defense industry, and recognizes the importance of new technologies.  This suggests that Europe will ultimately follow the U.S. lead into RMA modernization.  There is no reason to anticipate that the current gap will close altogether by 2010, but essential interoperability will be maintained. 

NATO-Russia. 

•  Russia in 2010 remains largely uncertain, although its trends are far from completely negative.  At present, Russia verbally opposes enlargement in spite of its foregone outcome.  Key factors in Russian external affairs are its intent to maintain as large a Great Power role as possible, and to extract from the west the maximum assistance in turning around Russia's internal crisis (although Russia wants aid on its own terms to the extent it can make such demands).  Much of the future of democratic reform will be clearer after the upcoming transfer of Presidential power.  For NATO the primary concern is that Russia maintain control of its nuclear weapons.  Russia's participation in both PfP and the Permanent Joint Council arrangement in 2010 can be expect, however suspension of activities are a likely response to any rift. 

Enlargement. 

•  NATO will likely have taken in more new members by 2010.  Austria, Slovenia and Romania are the most obvious candidates for early admission in the next century, but additional offers to join may take place by 2010.  Later candidates are less certain, but could include Bulgaria, Slovakia, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden or even Croatia.  More problematic are the Baltic countries, and CIS states such as Ukraine.  The key consideration in the latter cases is Russia's reaction.  Parallel to NATO enlargement and less contentious for Russia, is EU enlargement.  EU enlargement is more complex, however some new members are anticipated following EMU and another IGC, perhaps in 2003-05.  However, it is unlikely that the EU will be able to take in all eleven countries it has invited by 2010.   

PfP. 

•  PfP should continue its strong contribution to regional stability in 2010.  Its utility as a permanent arrangement short of membership might become increasingly attractive, especially in the mid-term, as aspirants concentrate on EU qualification.  They will be reassured by the richness of PfP cooperation, and perhaps by a continuing absence of visible threats or intimidations. 

Defense Against WMD. 

•  With PfP, enlargement, and CJTF well into execution, counter-proliferation and defense against WMD - the least-pursued commitment of the 1994 Brussels summit - should enjoy a higher priority.  Aiding this trend will be the increasing awareness that the WMD threat is real and proximate.  Investment in theater missile defense and territorial defenses will be expensive.  Therefore, expect much to hinge on public support generated by sound, layman's explanations of the need and perceptions of the threat.  Short of clear threats, budgets are unlikely to rise and offsets may be necessary to sustain investment. 

NATO's Political Decision Making Process. 

•  With the addition of three new members in 1999 and more on the horizon, NATO will have to return to the task of internal adaptation in order to remain an active decision making body based on consensus.  Already, the four major powers - the U.S., UK, France and Germany - frequently drive NATO's agenda as an informal steering group.  That process may be sufficient, however new innovative methods will be needed to sustain organizational effectiveness in 2010, with perhaps 25 or more member countries.  In addition, staffs - already burdened by NATO’s many large, frequent venues - may have to expand, reversing reductions since the Cold War. 

US Forward Presence. 

•  The issue of U.S. forward presence was not raised directly, but can be inferred from discussions of burden sharing and the other issues, such as the integrated military structure, CJTF, challenges to stability, and the nature of the U.S commitment.  In essence, the U.S. SACEUR personifies the U.S. commitment to Europe's security.  In turn, it is U.S. military presence (albeit disproportionate) that justifies retention of SACEUR's billet in U.S. hands.  The argument follows that the U.S. will maintain sufficient forces in Europe to continue this arrangement as long as there is a NATO.  Current force levels could be reduced within these tenets.   However, one unknown variable is ESDI.  Were it to grow capable of responding to most crises, the need for U.S. presence would diminish.

Burden Sharing. 

•  Burden sharing could cease to be a smoldering source of tensions in 2010 if two adjustments took place.  First, significant contributions to non-military investments that help NATO (property, damage payments, tax credits, etc), and to stability beyond NATO (foreign aid), could be bundled into the burden sharing equation in order to satisfy European concerns.  Second, within a broader definition of burdens, greater weight should be given to direct investments in military resources, particular for active, ready forces, R&D, and modernization programs.  These are the most significant burdens.  They are long term commitments and are difficult to reduce to divest in the short term.  They also have no ancillary return on investment, such as foreign aid can create.