The Impact of National Missile Defense and other Arms Control Issues on Transatlantic Ties

The Impact of National Missile Defense and other Arms Control Issues on Transatlantic Ties - A European Perspective

Joachim Krause

European reactions to US plans for National Missile Defense (NMD) so far have been predominantly negative. In comparing last year’s reactions, however, with those that can be heard today, some changes can be identified. Besides that, much more differentiated arguments can be found below the political level, i.e. among government and non-government experts in Europe. This paper will try to explain to an American audience how Europeans think about missile defense: what are the reasons for different assessments and public disputes and what can be done in order to prevent the missile defense issue from becoming a decisively dividing issue for the Atlantic Alliance? There is a real such danger although the subject in principle needs not to be so divisive. In contrast, it is my conviction that at a juncture where missile defense, for the first time, might become a real possibility — not a fiction as during the times of SDI and not another night-mare as during the first phase of nuclear tipped missile defense in the 1950s and 1960s — a carefully crafted policy can lead to much more benefits than dangers for Western security.

I will proceed in five steps: part I is dealing with European reactions to the NMD-plans by the Clinton-Administration; it also addresses the reasons why the Europeans were — and still are — so adamantly against missile defense; part II is looking at current changes in European policies after the new Bush-Administration had demonstrated that it was ready to consult with the allies more closely than her predecessor. Part III deals with possible areas of transatlantic disputes over missile defense in the coming years and outlines strategies for preventing further damage.

I. European Reactions to the NMD-Plans of the Clinton-Administration

One of the reasons for the negative reactions of the Europeans towards the Clinton Administration coming up in 1999 with plans for NMD was the fact that this policy came overnight and was a turnabout in contrast to its earlier policy which came along with no major explanation. In fact, the Clinton Administration came into power in 1993 with a by-and-large negative attitude towards NMD. During that year the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was dissolved, however, much of the old SDIO’s staff was taken over to the new Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), which mainly dealt with Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and with ways and means to improve tactical missile defense. TMD was high on the agenda, since the Gulf War of 1991 had demonstrated how big a difference a missile threat can make under such a tense situation. The Clinton-Administration invested heavily in tactical missile defense and in particular in TMD — both for land forces and for the Navy (THAAD, Navy Theater Wide Defense). In pursuing TMD-options the Clinton Administration diligently tried not to alienate the Russians and to cooperate with them in finding a reasonable compromise between maintaining the ABM-Treaty and keeping open all possible TMD-options.

Things became difficult after the Republicans took over both Houses of Congress after the elections of November 1994. Already in 1995 Clinton had to veto legislation, which was intended to oblige him to start constructing a nation-wide system to fight ballistic missiles as soon as technically feasible. In 1996, Clinton accommodated to Congress by announcing his 3+3 policy, according to which research and development efforts for a NMD-system should be initiated during a three-year-period, after which a second three-year period should give opportunities to test existing systems and to inquire about the threat assessment. However, things went different after the bipartisan Rumsfeld-Commission Report in July 1998 came to the conclusion that the danger of missile attacks coming from rogue states (or states of concern) against the territory of the U.S. might come much earlier than expected hitherto. The Clinton-Administration hence adjusted her policy and in January 1999 both President Clinton and Secretary of Defense Cohen pointed to the possibility of further efforts and investments in the field of NMD. In July 1999 Clinton signed the National Ballistic Missile Defense Act, demanding the establishment of a NMD as soon as it was technically feasible. This legislation had passed both Houses of Congress with overwhelming majority.

The Clinton-Administration, however, never really gave in to the Republican approach. It was the Administration’s policy that the NMD component was to be kept as limited as possible and directed only against a few states of concern, namely North Korea, Iran or Iraq, which might acquire the capability of threatening the U.S. within ten years. Representatives of the Clinton-Administration time and again made it clear that they wanted not to infringe upon the stability in U.S. Russian strategic relations wrought about by the ABM-Treaty from 1972 and they initiated talks with the Russians on modifying the ABM-Treaty in a way that would keep the basis elements intact (i.e. a renunciation to employ a nation-wide ballistic missile system that would make the U.S. invulnerable against a Russian missile attack). They assured the Russians of this intention by repeatedly using the language that the ABM-Treaty was the “cornerstone of strategic stability” between the U.S. and Russia.

By and large, this was rather a half-hearted, inhibited approach but not the kind of strategic leadership that might have been the beginning of a major shift in paradigm as many of its proponents had hailed missile defense. Given the circumstances and the half-heartedness of the Clinton-Administration, most European governments reacted in a rather critical manner. The main arguments Europeans used against NMD can be summarized as follows:

1. U.S. National missile defense is upsetting the strategic balance:

This is the pet-argument of both French and British observers. It mainly points to the possible disarray NMD might bring to the relations with Russia and with China and it also serves as a reminder that nuclear deterrence was still considered to be valid. As French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin had put it: „We have never been in favor of such an initiative, since it seems to us capable of upsetting the strategic balance we [sic!] have managed to maintain until now...“[1][2] He was echoing what the British Chief of Defense Staff, Sir Charles Guthrie, had stated earlier: „What I think we have to do is talk to the Americans, the rest of Europe has to talk to America, and make quite sure that the balance of destruction in the world is not made worse by this...“[3] This argument could have been heard at various places during the past two years. It is indicating that there was a stability wrought about by a fine-tuned system of mutual deterrence that has proven to be better than any other instrument. NMD would upset this formula, and consequently it was a French observer who said that the acronym NMD should be spelled „no-more-deterrence.”[4]

2. The US NMD-Plans might trigger arms races:

This is the German version of the same argument mentioned above, however, even French President Chirac has shown no reluctance to reproach the US for risking another arms race.[5] This argument was most openly espoused by German and Scandinavian politicians, such as Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer, or Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh.[6]. Chancellor Schroeder – very much to the surprise of the U.S. President – warned Bill Clinton in May 2000 against an impending arms race with Russia in case the U.S. was continuing with the NMD-plans. Also Uta Zapf, Chairwomen of the Subcommittee on Disarmament and Non-proliferation of the German Parliament, and member of the SPD Parliamentary Party very strongly felt about this: in a speech in the German Parliament she was outlining a scenario of an arms race between the U.S. and Russia and then between the U.S. and China, whereby the Chinese efforts would trigger off other arms races (India, Pakistan, Middle East and so on).[7]

3. The threat analysis — focusing so much on problematic states, or “rogues states” — is flawed:

This argument can be heard in almost all European states, most pointedly, however, in France, where Defense Minister Vedrine last year had noted that there was no translation for “rogue state“ in French. “It's not a geopolitical category we use,” he said, and he added that is was difficult for Europeans to imagine one of these rogue states attacking the United States.[8] As a team of the Atlantic Council recently had shown, however, there is ample evidence that among “officials and outside experts, although not in the public consciousness, there is a clear recognition that the spread of ballistic missile technology to countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan has created a new strategic situation with which the allies must deal.” However, they also point to the fact that many experts rightly argue, that there was not yet a direct threat to the U.S. homeland from these new missile-owning states.[9] For many observers, the simple fact that a small and starving country such as North Korea could cause the huge USA to start a 60 billion Dollar endeavor with the purpose of making continental US invulnerable against missiles they might produce in ten years was beyond their wit.

4. The US is looking for military-technical solutions where political and arms control solutions might be cheaper and more appropriate:

This argument follows from the preceding one. In the opinion of many European politicians and experts, the NMD-plans of the Clinton Administration were a technological response to what is essentially a political and diplomatic problem. For them it was it was deplorable that the United States has opted for a technological and military rather than for a political/ diplomatic solution.[10] The U.S., so the continuation of this argument, often tends to go for military solutions where political solutions might be more appropriate. Europeans, on the other hand, would rather look for political solutions and have a better sense for preventive diplomacy. Their approach might take time but eventually may prove to be more lasting than technological fixes or military solutions that come too late.

5. The technologies envisaged are technically unproven:

This argument is mainly resorting to critical studies from US universities and institutions such as Union of Concerned Scientists and the MIT[11] and is being used by European natural scientists too. Many European politicians have picked up this argument in order to exhort the Clinton Administration not to go too far. In combination with the other arguments it sounds as if the US Administration was deadly wrong, as the following quote by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh may show:

“The United States' plans for a national missile defense system cause serious concern. In today’s globalized world, we must always take account of the global effects of our decisions. It is hard to see how a possible threat, from a few states, would best be countered by a missile shield that may or may not work, and which risks setting off a renewed arms race, with immense costs in terms of wasted resources and loss of human security.”[12]

Indeed, the main concern by governments whose finances are terribly out of control, is that the US may spent a lot of money in vain and may cause its allies to do the same.

6. The US policy of NMD spoils the international diplomatic and political non-proliferation efforts:

This argument has in particular being made in Germany, France, and the Scandinavian countries. As the French Chief of Staff, General Jean-Pierre Kelche, put it, NMD was “...the road of pessimism, the road of abandonment of nonproliferation, which was at the heart of our common policy, the policy of the international community.”[13] Even stronger words were used by French President Jacques Chirac, who argued that National Missile Defense was “...of a nature to retrigger a proliferation of weapons, notably nuclear missiles. Everything that goes in the direction of proliferation is a bad direction.”[14] Main concern is that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM-Treaty) of 1972 might be in jeopardy. Although the Clinton-Administration had made it clear that it was still sticking to the ABM-Treaty and that it was looking for agreements with the Russians in order to maintain the core of the ABM-Treaty, most European criticism did not differentiate between the attitude of the Democratic Clinton Administration and of the Republicans in Congress. All European governments have made it clear that they consider the ABM-Treaty as a cornerstone both of strategic stability and of transatlantic security. Maintaining the substance of the ABM-Treaty is seen as the basis for the continuation of nuclear disarmament within the framework of the START-process. In this regard, they repeatedly joined with Russian President Vladimir Putin. On the occasion of Putin’s visit to France, French President Jacques Chirac stated:

“The European Union and Russia have an identical viewpoint. We have condemned any potential revision of the ABM treaty, believing that such a revision will involve a risk of proliferation that will be very dangerous for the future.”[15]

Many are also afraid that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty might be as well in danger as START-II, not to speak about the bleak outlook for START-III.

7. Missile defense may be outmaneuvered by unconventional means of employment of weapons of mass destruction:

This argument is repeatedly being used in Europe in order to ridicule the US NMD plans as well as any missile defense plans. It says that a determined actor such as Saddam Hussein might find more subtle ways of bringing weapons of mass destruction to either Europe or the United States. Hence, it is argued, there was no point in setting up missile defense. It would be the same wrong logic that let the French in the 1930’s to invest in the wrong defense — the fortification of its North-Eastern borders (the Maginot-line) — instead of preparing for a more likely contingency.[16]

8. The plans in the field of NMD are conceived of as a typical example of US unilateralism and drive for hegemony:

The US, since it has become the only superpower, is viewed with increasing skepticism in Europe — as well as in other parts of the world — since its leaders both in the White House and much more on the Hill tend to act more and more as they see fit, but not necessarily after consultation with their allies. There is a growing populist temptation both in the political field as well as in the scholarly realm, to paint the U.S, as the single hegemon, the „only rogue state in the world“ or as the main problem for world order.[17] The rapid turn-about in the Clinton Administration’s policy as well as the lack of consultation with the European allies was seen by many as another example of the growing assertiveness of the US. The authors of the above quoted report by the Atlantic Council rightly have pointed to the fact that there are various tabloid forms of this concern that should not be taken at face value. However, they also mentioned that there is a more sober form reflecting a sense “that the U.S. engagement in European and wider international affairs is no longer so broadly supported in the United States, notably in the Congress, as in the past and that the United States can no longer be relied upon to the same extent to take the lead in responding to contingencies that may seem important to European governments.”[18]

9. The U.S. drive for NMD is motivated by pressure from the U.S. defense industry and is reflecting a desire by the U.S. political leadership to maintain a technological lead over the rest of the world:

This argument can be found in most government and political quarters in Europe as well as in industry, where the U.S. has turned out to become a more and more difficult market.

10. The U.S. plans for NMD are creating zones of different security with the North Atlantic continent being more secure than Europe:

This argument has become more muted in the past few months, however, it was present at the European debates, often expressed by politicians or observers concerned about the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance under conditions of a U.S. missile umbrella and the Europeans becoming an easy target.

The striking point with all these arguments is that some of them are quite valid and need to be debated within the Alliance, while others are simply reflecting the fact that most European governments have been poorly prepared and still are clinging to the logic of the Cold War. The French and British criticism against the alleged unsettling of the strategic balance is in effect an attempt to save their respective national nuclear forces from being put into question. They have lost their strategic rationale with the end of the Cold War and anything that serves as a tool towards a paradigm shift away from deterrence logic back to the logic of defense is being viewed with criticism. Russia’s dismay about the US plan is often cited as a proof of that attitude, however, Russia has become much more pragmatic since.

The alleged arms race that might be triggered by U.S. NMD would be difficult to demonstrate. Russia is poor and no longer able to maintain its current nuclear apparatus. It would be a bad candidate for any arms race. China might be a more suitable candidate, since it could conceive of NMD as a means to counter her strategic arsenals.[19] However, China has started with a major modernization program of its strategic, theater and tactical missiles a long time before the Clinton Administration was even pondering NMD options. The arms race argument is thus flawed and reflects a Cold War mentality.

The criticism with regard to threat analysis has to be looked at in a differentiated way. It is quite understandable when European critics feel discontent with the way the Clinton-Administration was touting its NMD-decision. The Clinton-Administration was intrinsically against NMD and they did very poor in selling this concept to the rest of the world. Many Republicans argued at that time that they did misperform intentionally. Whatever the reason was, it surely sounds strange to hear that the ailing North Korean state’s missile program might leave the huge U.S. with no other choice than to start a 60 billion Dollar missile defense. It would have been better if the U.S. Administration would have developed a broader concept of missile defense that would have opened more positive perspectives instead of focusing to such a degree on a limited threat. The more valid threat analysis refers to the Middle East and the danger that the war of 1991 might repeat itself in the not too distant future — this time with more and more sophisticated missile threats against U.S. and allied forces on the ground and European cities. Yet, that kind of threat scenario was less suitable to be used as an argument in favor of an U.S. NMD because of the geographic remoteness. What is still missing is a joint understanding between Europeans and the U.S. about the nature of threats in this region and the possible role weapons of mass destruction and missiles could play in order to prevent the U.S. and its allies from playing a stabilizing role in the region. First efforts have been made within NATO in the mid-90’s, resulting in a joint threat analysis as well as in the definition of joint force goals for extended air defense.[20]

The alleged U.S. penchant for military and technological solutions instead of political solutions is an unfair proposition. It reflects a sense of ignorance and bad-will on the side of many European commentators and politicians. Many of its proponents entertain the impression that the U.S. is behaving like a cowboy, while the Europeans are more inclined to preventive diplomacy. This argument can be heard particularly often in the field of nonproliferation. However, it was the U.S. that has taught the Europeans during the past decade a couple of lessons in preventive diplomacy, most prominent the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (for which there is still no similarly sized European counterpart for lack of funding),[21] the Agreed Framework with North Korea from August 1994 and the various attempts to mediate in regional conflict theaters where Europeans since long have absented themselves. The Europeans have their record too, especially with regard to Eastern Central Europe and — after the U.S. brokered peace agreement from Dayton — the Balkans, yet this does not constitute any reason to come down on the U.S. in such a way. The only valid argument one might find in the whole area is the issue of Iran. Is the containment policy of the U.S. with regard Iran actually the best way to deal with Teheran or would a strategy of engagement be the better solution?

As to the argument that technologies are unproven and most likely will not result in any tangible change, the proof is still to be made. As was mentioned earlier, there are technologies, which hold the possibility of becoming successful, and it would be somewhat premature and strange for the Europeans, who have much fewer experience than the U.S., to know it better from the start.

The argument according to which the US policy of NMD might spoil the international diplomatic and political non-proliferation efforts should be taken much more serious by the U.S. It points to the fact that international arms control is in a crisis and that perceptions often play an important role in it. It is not to say that NMD by definition will be the problem, but the mere fact that the U.S. as the leading power of nonproliferation diplomacy seems to turn to military means mainly directed to secure itself is perceived by many Europeans as an indicator for the failure of nonproliferation diplomacy at all. At the heart of this is the problem that the Europeans have some rather established views about arms control, which are, in principle, not wrong, but which deserve some refurbishment. Most Europeans still cling to the idea that arms control and disarmament need broad participation and thorough preparatory work to be successful. Hence, most European governments have a preference for bulky and comprehensive documents such as the Chemical weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Such treaties can be taken to the parliaments and being subjected to ratification procedures that create something of a more durable character. This in itself is not wrong, but on the other hand, there have been exemptions to this rule that at least deserve some attention: the success of the CTR-Nunn-Lugar program which has been handled in a less bureaucratic way and only with Congressional oversight but not with a difficult ratification process; and the drama of START II ratification, where ratification procedures took longer than the negotiation process with results that came close to catastrophe. Europeans — i.e. politicians as well as government experts and many non-governmental experts too — need to be flexible with regard to this. However, the U.S. should not disregard the necessity to arrive at multilateral agreements deserving ratification procedures. There is a need for more flexibility, but flexibility should not imply to jettison established procedures that have their good reasons.

What is of utmost importance is not so much the debate about instruments — whether written treaties or simple agreements -, but the whole thrust of nonproliferation. The support and sympathy for the U.S. plans in the field of missile defense would be much larger if the U.S.-Administration would have been more positive in her policy, i.e. it would make an enormous difference if NMD-plans as well as other missile defense concepts would be combined with a scheme to drastically reduce nuclear strategic arsenals, especially to do away with all kinds of nuclear overkill that was a leftover of the Cold War.[22]

The argument according to which missile defense may be outmaneuvered by unconventional means of employment of weapons of mass destruction is so stupid that it is hard to believe that there are still those whole truly believe in it. It is as if one would argue that there was no point in maintaining police, since criminals would find ways to successfully circumvent the rule of law. No one yet has claimed that missile defense can settle all problems resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – and, in deed, there is reason to care about so-called unconventional ways. But most Europeans are not aware of the fact that in the U.S. there are other, less spectacular efforts underway to bloc unconventional ways to employ weapons of mass destruction (such as Nuclear Emergency Support Teams, new equipment for customs control etc.). It is hard time that European politicians think about this too.

The allegation that the U.S. was going for hegemony and for technological superiority is gaining support not only in Europe but in Asia Pacific and other parts of the world as well. As often there is truth to this argument, but in most cases those who criticize the U.S. for being a “hegemon,” a “rogue state” or a “monopolist of power” often in an irresponsible way overdo the subject. Fact is that from a European standpoint the U.S. policy often is characterized by a tendency to go for unilateral decisions — either because of the indecisiveness of the international community or because there were so many different voices involved in the U.S. decision-making process that no one really thought about the allies. The latter is the typical case in export control, often in the past aggravated by more or less ignorance on the side of the Europeans regarding the security related aspects. There is a lot to do in terms of attaining mutual understanding between Europeans and Americans in this field, or as Francois Heisbourg has put it, we need a „deliberate policy to improve mutual understanding“[23] There are many among us who are engaged in this business and we have achieved a lot. But sometimes, by a single stroke, the achievements of years can be made undone. One recent example was the decision by the Bush-Administration — which was reflecting the majority of Congress views — to back out from the Kyoto-Protocol. This step was a dagger into the back of those in Europe who fight for more understanding between Americans and Europeans. It helps those who like to depict the U.S. as ruthless, ignorant, short-sided and selfish.

The final argument that NMD will create zones of different security has been rightly greeted in the U.S. with some astonishment. And in deed, looking back at 50 years of transatlantic security relations, the first major crisis erupted in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, when the USA was loosing its invulnerability towards Soviet nuclear strikes. At that time, mainly France was decrying the grave loss of security wrought about by the coming vulnerability. Hence, there are less and less people believing that the security guarantee the U.S. is delivering might be damaged as a consequence of NMD.

On balance, the reactions of the Europeans — as far as one can generalize among them — do in part reflect serious concern, in part, however, they reflect serious misunderstandings and poor preparedness as far as the U.S. policy is concerned. Most European governments so far have not fully understood the nature of the proliferation problem nor have they devised any deeper understanding of U.S. concerns and policies. For someone who is following events since ten years, it is no surprise to see most European governments today being loath or even being unable to face new threats and risks as a real and serious threat. There are many reasons for this. The above mentioned study group of the Atlantic Council attributed this to the fact that Europeans have a different strategic horizon. For them organizing security among themselves has utmost priority and is often hard to understand for outsiders. The efforts towards creating a European security architecture allowing, on the one hand, more room for EU-common foreign and security policy and, on the other hand, establishing a framework within which a cooperative and dialogue oriented structure could be established covering the whole of Europe and entangling Russia into a network, is of paramount importance. Especially German foreign policy has been almost exclusively focused on issues of European security architecture since 1990. There are only very experts and politicians caring for broader concerns. During the preparation of the NATO Summit of 1999, the German government was among those most vividly arguing against any formula that could have extended the area of competences of NATO outside Europe.

It is against this background that the opposition of most European governments and public opinions has to be seen. The Clinton-Administration did a lot in furthering such trends by being not very enthusiastic in consulting with their allies over such issues as missile defense and nonproliferation. Although President Clinton is on the record as having put nonproliferation and arms control on the top of his agenda, he was never very enthusiastic in convincing his European colleagues of the necessity to invest more and to cooperate stronger in the field of nonproliferation. The price for his lack of personal interest was the failing of the CTBT in Congress and the stand off we are facing now in the field of missile defense. With a clearer vision of the President and with a greater sense of consultation, the allies would have reacted differently to the change in his policy in 1999.

II. New Horizons?

The new Bush-Administration, now in office for more than 100 days, has obviously tried to draw their lessons from the failures of the Clinton-Administration and to strike a different tone. So far the following new elements are there:

· A clear “yes” to missile defense that goes along with a positive vision of both reducing the nuclear overkill and of coping with new threats and risks posed by rogue states. This is not the half-hearted, frightful and undecided position of the Clinton-Administration.

· A clear policy of consultative leadership; i.e. the U.S. is devising a new concept of strategic stability and, before implementing it, is ready to discuss these ideas with European allies and with Russia.

These two elements, as espoused in President George W. Bush’s speech given at the NDU on the first of May 2001, signal to the Europeans that the time of tinkering is over and that from now on serious business talk is to start. As the reactions to President Bush’s policy, and in particular to his speech from May 1 have shown, there has been no unified European reaction. By and large, the pessimistic tones seemed to prevail, especially in the often poorly informed media. But looking at the official reactions there are some differentiations that deserve to be looked at.

On the one hand there is almost no change in sight on the side of French policy. The negative rhetoric of French President Chirac as well as of his cabinet has not subsided. The tone of President Bush‘s speech might even have aggravated French concerns, since Bush is questioning the utility of deterrence — which forms the very heart of French security strategy. Great Britain is in a similar position as regards deterrence, yet Her Majesty’s government has been much more flexible. Prime Minister Tony Blair has come out quite positive about President Bush’s policy on various occasions. After Bush’s speech from May 1 he stated before the House of Commons parliament that it was too early to say whether Britain would support the US on this “highly sensitive” issue, but government spokesman Alastair Campbell later called the US proposal “broadly” a good idea. Britain could be involved in the controversial project through several US surveillance installations based in England.[24] The German government seems to shift, at least was this indicated already in February 2001 by Chancellor Schroeder and repeated by his Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer — however with less emphasis.[25] Fischer’s reaction on Bush’s speech was interesting. Although he is still fretting about the prospect of a new arms race, he seems to have understood that missile defense might improve considerably the chances for deep cuts in strategic offensive nuclear weapons — for someone who went to the streets two decades ago to oppose the morality of nuclear deterrence at all, this is a somewhat logical step. Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh, however, has remained as ardently opposed to NMD as before, even after Bush has opened the possibility of large scale nuclear weapons cuts.[26]

An interesting contribution came from NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, who acknowledged that there is a security problem to be addressed by the allies and that it is of utmost importance that consultations both with the allies as well as with the Russians are going to start. Lord Robertson stated:

“I have listened with great interest to US President Bush's speech on the growing challenges to global security, including the requirement for missile defences. The President is right to focus on these new security challenges, and I welcome his commitment to close consultation with the Allies...When I met with Russian President Putin in February, he also focused on the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, and the need for some military response in addressing these threats. So there is a wide consensus on the need for defences against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and I look forward to working closely with the US Administration and other Allies on exactly how these challenges will be met.[27]

The most interesting thing is the modest reaction by Russia.[28] Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov has described the ABM treaty as a key part of global security, but said, he was ready for talks with the U.S. on new structures for international defense. In February 2001, Moscow offered NATO to discuss a regional missile defense system. Moscow, while being ready to discuss missile threats and the role of missile defense in coping with them, is still not prepared to accept a U.S. NMD, since this might deprive Russia of the psychologically important ability of threatening the territory of the USA — which is widely seen as a prove of Russia’s great power status. Paying attention to Russia’s concerns is an important element of German, French and British policy, however, one has to wait and see how far the European governments are ready to support Russia in its claim for superpower status at a time when it had lost the requirements necessary for such an ambitious role.

III. Problems ahead

Most Europeans welcomed President Bush’s commitment to close consultation with allies, this was in particular expressed by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said that to avoid a global or regional arms race, cooperation with Russia and China was necessary. The simple fact that consultations are underway is not necessarily reassuring so long as one cannot be sure about the constructive nature of such consultations. It might be too early to speculate about the nature of such consultations, but a few tendencies are clear to see. On balance, it seems that there are five clusters of problems that might structure these consultations in the coming years.

1. The Future of Nuclear deterrence:

At the bottom of President Bush’s policy is the reduction of the role of nuclear deterrence as the cornerstone of national and allied defense and security policy. This is absolutely cogent in light of the fact that the Cold War is over since more than ten years and that there are no more any such high stakes involved that would necessitate to let the alliance’s military concept rely so heavily on deterrence, mainly nuclear deterrence, and to accept mutual nuclear annihilation as the cornerstone of stability. This attitude puts the U.S. at conflict with France, which is still wedded to a concept and a historically deeply rooted philosophy of deterrence. Leaving the path of deterrence would mean for France to do away with the lessons she draw from World War II and from the Cold War. In World War II France did have a defense strategy, which turned out to be useless, in the Cold War it was part of a deterrent strategy, which had been successful. So, why should France give up deterrence? There are critical voices among defense experts in France arguing that the times are changing and that with regard to new challenges in the Middle East one has to face situations in which the logic of deterrence might not work.[29] However, the political class in France is so deeply wedded to the notion of nuclear deterrence and to the special status nuclear weapons give to France within the European Union that the further pursuance of NMD-plans might turn out to meet deep resistance. In Germany, as in many other European states, reducing the role of nuclear deterrence for an increased role of defense might find more support. A special case is the United Kingdom, which, one the one hand shares France’s interest in keeping up with deterrence, but, on the other hand, has a political leadership much more relaxed than the French one and less concerned about its status.

2. Arms control and disarmament:

The second important element of President Bush’s concept relates to arms control and disarmament. The problem many Europeans have with the U.S. is that U.S. attitudes and preferences seem to shift at a speed only few outside the U.S. are able to follow. It was just ten years ago, when on the occasion of the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention or other multilateral instruments, we were taught by high level representatives of the then Bush-Administration that successful arms control presupposes diligent work on the detail (with everything written down in some kind of protocol, annex or explanation), because Congress will take a close look at it. Today we are told that there is no point in drafting bulky and thorough international documents, since the ratification process will take years, and — as could have been seen with the CTBT — might eventually fall prey to rather domestic concerns. Some more clarity and predictability on the hand of the U.S. — that means not only the Administration, but Congress as well — hence, might be more than welcome. Yet, for the time being the most interesting question is: how deep in terms of quantities and qualities will the Bush-Administration go in the nuclear arms reduction process? The outcome of this debate will very much influence the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and, hence, the whole international arms control framework. Here, the German government as well as others too, might want to play an important role in influencing the U.S. attitude during consultations. The problem with the German government, however, is that it seems to have no intention to yield any influence on the current U.S. decision-making process in this field. This is somewhat strange, since otherwise the German government entertains the notion that Germany is on the forefront of the international community’s desire for progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. In such a time of fundamental change in U.S. defense and arms control policy there should be some interest on the side of the German government to bring in own ideas and concepts, which might drive the U.S. further than it has thought so far in the field of nuclear arms reductions. So far, the German government has mainly insisted on Russian and Chinese acceptance of the U.S. concepts — because Germany’s Foreign Minister is so concerned about new arms races. This attitude might turn about to be problematic for two reasons: (1) it deprives the German government of any positive influence on U.S. policy, and (2) it provides China and Russia with a factual veto position for an intra-alliance debate. Both have a prime interest in seeing the U.S. remain vulnerable to their strategic weapons, since only this renders them a great-power status their leaders need so desperately for different reasons. But should Germany make itself the advocate of the Russian and Chinese great power ambitions?

3. Theater Missile Defense:

The general importance the Bush Administration is giving to missile defense will also have implications for the Alliance element of missile defense, i.e. theater missile defense (TMD) and extended air defense (including missile defense) for the European part of the Alliance. This is an area, where there is much more common ground, in fact, a lot of progress has been made during the past ten years within NATO. In late 2000 a concept of NATO Extended Air Defense was passed by the NATO Council, which paves the way for a major refurbishment of NATO’s integrated air defense system towards more flexibility and mobility. In June 2001, NATO’s Consultation, Command and Communications Agency is due to select two industrial teams that will be tasked with designing alternative concepts for a NATO Theater Missile Defense system.[30] However, there are two problems to be overcome: (1) the constant danger that the loaded debate over U.S. NMD plans might spill over in the field of extended air defense and TMD thus creating havoc there;[31] and (2) the danger that the financial crisis of most European states might inhibit them from actually envisaging another costly armaments project. Both of these dangers might be mutually reinforcing.

4. The future of allied activities out of area:

The differences in the NMD debate are reflecting a still relatively strong transatlantic divide over how to deal with crises and conflicts out of NATO’s area of concern. This divide has two aspects: (1) differences in the general attitude towards a “globalization” of NATO; and (2) differences in interpreting specific crisis regions, such as the Gulf or Israel/Palestine. On the occasion of the drafting of the New Strategic Concept for NATO’s Anniversary Summit of 1999, the Clinton Administration had tried to convince the Europeans that NATO should not be confined to European contingencies only. At that time the Europeans had resisted any proposal for a globalization of NATO. It is hard time for the Europeans to realize that their reluctance was a bad idea. The negative consequence has been a lack of consultation over the real issues and capabilities at hand in these crisis areas. As a result, the allies have disagreement over almost all subject areas in the Middle East. To put the whole thing into perspective, one has to remember that in the past the Alliance was the most successful peace and stability producer in the world. Whenever the Alliance worked together, Europeans and Americans were able to quench the fire of local conflicts and to lay the groundwork for a more stable future on the Balkans. Together they are the most important asset in terms of international stability and order. What is needed is a transatlantic process of consultation and cooperation in dealing with regional crises of major concern. This should not involve the exchange of prepared statements between high and medium level bureaucrats, but the cooperation among allies in assessing the nature of regional threats and in devising proposals for the political leaders about how to deal with them. It seems that the recently established Center for Weapons of Mass Destruction within NATO’s International Staff might be a promising step in that direction. Again, as in the field of arms control, the right balance between unilateral acts, alliance action and global multilateralism has to be found.

5. Technology sharing:

Many of the current transatlantic problems in the field of NMD result from difficulties in the field of technology transfer or sharing. This is an area of dispute that is almost as old as the Alliance itself. In the past, most common armaments projects have failed for this reason. The Memorandums of Understanding that were once signed in order to let the Europeans have their share in the SDI development, have never been very successfully implemented. The easiest way of technology sharing has always been the sale of — mostly U.S. — equipment to the other allies. The current debates on NMD and TMD are unsurprisingly filled with mutual suspicion as to the sincerity of the respective other side’s motives. While Americans often think that Europeans are aiming for technology sharing in order to make up in the cheapest way possible for their failure to invest adequately in the field of military R&D, Europeans often look at the U.S. as the global hegemon, who is jealously guarding his technological edge — for both military and economic reasons. It is high time for both Europeans and Americans to develop attitudes that might overcome these mutual suspicions. In this regard there seems to be some ray of hope, since in May 2000 it was possible for the joint US/German/Italian project for a Medium Extended Air-Defense System (MEADS) to arrive at a detailed plan for technology sharing and transfer that is considered by both sides as very satisfactory.

To sum it up, the European reactions to the US NMD plans reflect both a low degree of preparedness on the side of the Europeans and the fact that some very fundamental issues of transatlantic and international security have been raised by the American Initiative. The seriousness and depth of this change is often underestimated in the U.S., while the Europeans seem to shy away from any major systemic change, even if this was in their long-term interest. The Atlantic Alliance has already undergone a profound process of change during the past 15 years. Due to the fact that its strategic environment is further changing and due to the fact that for the first time in history defense against ballistic missiles is becoming a real possibility, there are much more radical changes ahead that need to be addressed. It is my sincere hope that by helping to understand the nature of this change it might be possible to exert some constructive effect on this ongoing process. May be that the NMD-debate as well as the TMD-debate will force politicians in Europe as well as in the U.S. to give up the last remnants of Cold War thinking. What is needed on the European side of the Atlantic is a greater sensitivity for strategic developments, for new threats and ways and means to cope with them. Also, some kind of constructive self-assertiveness is needed in Europe. What is needed on the U.S. side is more patience and more understanding if others do not follow suit to the U.S. strategic debates. What is also needed is that the U.S. is making its peace with multilateralism. In today’s world, multilateralism is one of the cornerstones of international cooperation and peace, since it renders a forum for diplomatic action and for getting legitimization for international action. It was the U.S., which was the mastermind behind the restructuring of the international order after WW II — and multilateralism was an essential element of it. Today the U.S. is the power most critical with regard to multilateralism. This often results in ideologically loaded fights over financially insignificant membership fees for international organizations and in a generally condescend language with regard to individual members of the UN-family. Multilateralism today is far away from being at a satisfactory stage, and it might be useful to put into question the existence of established ways to run international organizations. However, reacting on the crisis of multilateralism by increasingly embarking on a unilateral policy might find some applause in the short run, but in the long run it will run counter to the interests of the USA too. Making peace with multilateralism should not imply that the U.S. is condoning with all abuses of international organizations and all kinds of mismanagement, but that it is trying to use multilateral institutions to build up consensus in areas that are eventually essential to U.S. policy. The alternative might be a growing isolation and the building up of centers of anti-power to the U.S. — which would spell a relapse into the old times of an truly anarchic international order, in which no order exists except the rule of the strongest.