The end of the Cold War was a triumph for the allies. Democracy vanquished totalitarianism without NATO ever having directly to confront the Warsaw Pact militarily. But that triumph brought its hard questions. What was NATO for in the future? What was the mission? If it were to continue- and by no means all players were convinced that it should-who should belong and how should tasks be apportioned? It took time to work out the questions. We are still trying to give the answers.
Events never wait on theory. The Gulf war and its political aftermath demonstrated that it would be vain to hope that coalitions of the willing would be the basis of a global role for NATO. Gradually, under the impact of events, it has become clear that its mission is essentially regional though without clear or agreed boundaries. The conflict in the Balkans demonstrated that if the so called North Atlantic area was not going to be the basis for a global role for NATO, it was certainly wider than in the Cold War. Implicitly, it involves an enlarged Europe - wider than NATO’s existing or possible future membership - in which, because of its underlying instability, active American leadership remains indispensable.
This is not theory. We have evidence. The Allies were slow and reluctant to grasp the full significance of the break up of former Yugoslavia. NATO did not involve itself at an early stage when it should have done. Instead there was the European experiment of peacekeeping in Bosnia, without the United States, using an inappropriate United Nations model, which was a failure - seriously aggravated, it might be said, by American hostility at the time towards it. The United Nations has yet to recover from the damage inflicted upon it. Finally, coming late to the game, NATO asserted its exclusive right to peace enforcement in Europe (no United Nations mandate, please) which it now cannot simply relinquish at its pleasure without regard to the effects in the region and to its reputation. Will it succeed in the task it took on and will it pass its self-imposed tests?
Thus far, through all the disputes and internal tensions, the transatlantic partners have stuck together over the Balkans. Milosevic could not seriously have expected to defeat NATO militarily. He did however expect to defeat NATO politically. He bet the bank - his hold on power in Serbia - on the NATO allies falling apart - and he got it wrong. In relation to their first task, suppression of conflict, the allies have had a high degree of success and (so far) can be said to have passed the test of effectiveness, though Southern Kosovo and Macedonia remain unfinished business. The second task - bringing sufficient stability, which means making sufficient political and economic progress to allow international forces to reduce their presence to token levels (if not depart totally) - is far from completion and success is not automatically guaranteed.
A durable peace settlement is certainly within the technical capabilities of the allies. But big challenges remain. Two sets of questions are relevant here. The first relate to the coherence of underlying strategy. Bosnia’s right to international recognition was granted on the basis of a technicality relating to the status of the Republic’s boundaries in pre independence Yugoslavia. The Contact Group also went to great lengths to prevent the emergence out of Bosnia of ethnically based statelets. The territorial arrangements, the governmental and international administrative structures devised at Dayton contain numerous less than perfect features. But the overall strategy has, in its own terms, proved reasonably successful, despite the slowness of progress towards interethnic cooperation and honest, competent government.
The longer term outcome In Bosnia, however, remains dependent on the establishment of political stability in neighbouring countries, especially Serbia.
In Kosovo, it cannot be said that a strategic way forward has yet been found and agreed by the parties, (even unwillingly, as in Bosnia, let alone willingly). Indeed there is profound disagreement between the parties on the long term outcome, which the international negotiators have been unable either to bridge or, because of related complications including the future of Montenegro, simply take sides and impose an outcome. Putting the long term in baulk, however, while avoiding one set of difficulties, has aggravated others and contributed to the rising and extremely dangerous instability on the Southern border of Kosovo and in Montenegro.
These are fundamental, and highly sensitive, issues, which it may only be possible to settle over time and in the context of an evidently stable and democratic Serbia, which is some way off, though pointing in the right direction. It should go without saying that the major player in the Rambouillet negotiations and the dominant power in NATO, the United States, should not regard itself as free to leave the scene of action to others before these are much nearer resolution and the situation on the ground much calmer. Were the US to depart, it would forfeit the ability (and, indeed, the right) to influence policy. Disastrous, destabilising political signals would be sent out in the region. Bosnia would in all likelihood travel backwards, the reformers in Belgrade would be undermined and what is at present a smouldering situation in the southern Balkans, containable with a modicum of skill (though there are no guarantees) could well become a major conflagration. The side effects on NATO could be mortal for the organisation.
The second set of questions relates to the commitment needed to see through the detail of reform and reconstruction. Whereas the allies have demonstrated their political cohesion and military effectiveness in the face of a direct challenge, they have yet to show conclusively that they have the necessary patience to graft their own values on to other societies in a way that makes them self sustaining.
A version of burden sharing has emerged pragmatically in the Balkans whereby the Europeans pick up much the greater part of the tab for reconstruction. (They are also supplying the lion’s share of the ground troops). Reconstruction is not just a matter of financial resources, vital as these are. It involves a process of many stages, starting with assuring internal security against the background of which the foundations for democracy can be laid. In the early stages, while internal security is not assured, reconstruction is not a task which can be accomplished by civilian agencies alone. The role of the military thus continues after the initial military operation. Bosnia and Kosovo have both shown how vital close cooperation between military and civilian agencies is to setting reform and reconstruction on a sound footing. The incoming Bush Administration appeared to cast doubt on whether this was a proper task for Americans – whose forces, it was being said, should not be escorting kids to school. Such judgement misses several points. First is the intrinsic importance of follow through on the initial military operation. Secondly, by implying that it is somehow perfectly OK for other forces to spend their time on such apparently trivial tasks, it exudes the unmistakable whiff of hierarchy between greater and lesser breeds within the Alliance, which creates bad feeling. It may well be sensible for armed forces inside the Alliance to be differently configured for a range of tasks involving role specialisation. But burden sharing has to be agreed. It cannot be dictated unilaterally by any ally to others. Thirdly it ignores the political signalling involved in military deployment.
The impact of the Balkan experience is still being worked through both sides of the Atlantic and definitive judgements of the effects are not yet possible. It has shown that the Allies can conduct successful military operations on the ground through the integrated military command. But they have yet to demonstrate to themselves or the world that they can successfully cope with the longer term consequences of their own intervention. The impact on European Union governments has been particularly profound. The gap between ambition and capability revealed by Bosnia as regards CFSP and by Kosovo as regards the empty shell of ESDI has led directly to the further development of CFSP and the birth of ESDP. These both have long term implications.
There is little disagreement across the Atlantic that, if risk is to be kept at acceptable levels, US military capability is indispensable to military operations of the kind undertaken in the later stages of the Bosnia conflict and over Kosovo. European forces have neither the necessary air power, nor the real time intelligence capability. Their forces also lack aspects of the necessary logistical underpinning and heavy lift which, unlike intelligence or sophisticated air cover, are well within their capacities to provide for themselves if they are prepared to make the necessary budgetary outlay.
Even were they to do this, however, they would still not possess the capability to run a Kosovo campaign of the type mounted by NATO in 1999. They should, on the other hand, be able to carry out at least certain short and simple operations in unchallenging environments without having to call on direct US involvement. More significantly perhaps, it is argued in Europe that possessing the capability to carry out the “Petersberg” tasks, implying the will and at least a certain capacity to back diplomacy with the threat of the use of force, would greatly increase the likelihood of the Europeans successfully policing their own backyard without having to call on NATO, thereby obviating the need in future for larger scale campaigns conducted by anybody. The greater the credibility of European crisis prevention and management, the less the chances of having to call for Alliance operations involving the United States.
According to this line of an argument, an Alliance rebalanced in this way would represent much more effective burden sharing than the present situation. Logically, the US should share this ambition and be prepared to accept consequential change in the Alliance. It is pretty clear, as a matter of political fact, however deplorable, that few European governments will make much effort in the name of NATO to increase defence expenditure and upgrade capability. They profess to be willing, however, to do more in the name of Europe. So, since having cake and eating it is not on, there is a strategic choice here for the US: does it attempt to hold the Europeans to their professions despite the risks involved, or does it attach so much importance to preventing the risk it sees of separation that it is willing to forgo, by active discouragement of the accompanying structures, the chance offered of the upgrading of European capabilities? And would an Alliance held together on this basis be satisfactory for either side of the Atlantic?
The problem from the US point of view, no doubt, is the suspicion that the Europeans speak with forked tongues and that their professed ambitions will, in reality, only lead to the simultaneous non attainment of increased capability and further reduction of the cohesion of the Alliance. The risk of this is undeniable especially as there is ambiguity about the real extent of the capability of any future intervention force which would come with the new structures. But the risk is also limited. No likely size of force will give the Europeans freedom to pursue policies with which the US disagrees. While the real usefulness of any force may be limited therefore, so should be its capacity for division.
Against this background, the second option of attempting to maintain the structural status quo may seem more attractive, but it is unlikely to be successful against the wishes of the Europeans, and therefore carries its own risk of erosion of the Alliance. The humiliation felt by the Europeans at their inability to have much influence over the course of events in the Balkans or the conduct of military operations there, deriving ultimately from the glaring inadequacy of European military capability, has unleashed a desire (and one hopes a determination) among Europeans not to repeat such experiences. They want more say, claim to be willing to put up more capability, and want the Alliance to accommodate the organisational changes which will arise from the further development of CFSP and an ESDP which will, in due course, provide the modest military capability to back it when NATO as a whole is not engaged.
At the present time, the rebalancing debate across the Atlantic is in danger of provoking more heat than light and of getting caught up in the tensions generated by the much larger changes which, over time, missile defences are likely to bring. A sense of perspective and proportion is needed on both sides. We need to get on with, rather than across, each other.
Is new burden sharing possible and
can Europe manage regional peace implementation without the US?
The short answers to the group of questions above are as follows. Here and now, US participation in the Balkans is no choice but a necessity. Secondly, in the present situation on the ground, a European ground force would arguably be adequate militarily, but certainly insufficient politically. Thirdly, over time, depending on
circumstances of any given peace keeping/peace enforcement operation and on how European capabilities develop (see above), the Europeans should be willing and able to take on a wide range of peace implementation ( but not major peace enforcement) tasks in Europe without the direct involvement of the US on the ground.
The current peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, however, are still heavily influenced by their genesis. US military and political leadership during the Clinton Presidency has been so dominant that the Balkan parties have taken the US, and only the US, seriously. This responsibility assumed by the US cannot be abruptly jettisoned without unacceptable consequences on the ground as well as serious prejudice to the United States’ claim to lead the Alliance. In this respect, reaffirmation by Secretary of State Powell of “in together, out together” has been profoundly reassuring inside the Alliance. Moreover, far from tying the US down on the ground for longer than it might otherwise have to stay in the Balkans, it should hasten the day when it is safe to depart, confident of not having to return. A statement of commitment and determination of this kind makes it clear to those parties- and they certainly exist- who hope to sit out the departure of heavyweight external presence from the region to be able to resume their own disruptive agendas, that this is a vain hope.
The allies, including the US therefore have to accept that they are likely to be in the Balkans for a further period, the length of which cannot be determined now, but which will be significantly influenced by what the allies do now. Premature withdrawal or excessive drawdown would be seriously counterproductive. This is no time, for instance, for the US to be lessening its presence on the unstable Kosovo /Macedonia border. Over time however, the level and type of US military participation admits of some choice. In my view, while it will always be vastly preferable, as much for political as military reasons, for there always to be at least a small American component on the ground in all the Balkan theatres of operation, it should be possible, as increasing stability permits, for primarily European composed forces to provide the ground presence and for the US contribution to be largely over the horizon. Support, notably in intelligence will continue to be vital. Indeed, this is an increasingly fair description of the current situation. The important point is that even after the apparent restoration of security, parties to conflicts must always believe that the Allies possess both the will and the capability to surge to prevent, or at least control, deterioration on the ground and that sensitive areas will always be adequately policed.
As for the authority under which any international military, or para military presence might operate in future (and there must be soldiers, not just civilian policemen involved), it should stay with NATO. I can see no advantage whatsoever in transferring to the OSCE (other than a budgetary one for the United States) since it is ill equipped to provide command and control functions and unlikely ever to acquire a credible capability in this area. Consideration of the EU is premature.
Peace implementation is not just about soldiers. US involvement in political and economic reconstruction is highly desirable but not essential. But it does mean bearing a reasonable share of the costs incurred since attempting to control policy while expecting others to pick up the bills tends only to create bad blood aggravated for Europeans when there is inadequate recognition in Congress of the contribution they are making.
How are these objectives similar and
different from NATO and US objectives?
Even earlier than for defence and security policy, the Balkans have been a testing ground - indeed forcing bed - for EU common foreign and security policy. From a disastrous start during the infamous “hour of Europe” over recognition policy and peace process mediation, which showed that the EU was neither united internally in its objectives nor equipped with the machinery to make active (as distinct from declaratory) policy, the EU has come a long way. EU states no longer back different horses in the Balkans. They pursue a single policy which is increasingly implemented through common institutions. The creation, out of necessity, of the Contact Group for Bosnia, which was deeply disliked at its inception by many of those EU states which were not members, led directly to the Union adopting the more institutionally advanced, but more widely acceptable, solution of the single representative - not quite the Foreign Minister of the EU but increasingly acting as such in areas where the EU pursues a common policy. With Chris Patten, the European Commissioner for External Affairs, Javier Solana has recently been acting in close cooperation with the Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson, to bring the tense situation on the Kosovo/Macedonia border under control. This is a current example of the European institutions working together with NATO in a common strategy. There is no reason of principle why this should not be the normal working model.
It is not possible to isolate EU CFSP related objectives in the Balkans from wider EU objectives. For most of those countries lying on the borders of Western Europe, the pull of “Europe” is enormous. Even a country with as strong an identity and pride as Turkey, is not immune to its attractions and it resents exclusion from European labelled activity. From its inception, a major policy instrument of the Union has been the fashioning of a variety of relationships between the institutions in Brussels and the EU’s neighbours, accompanied by at least the expectation, if not explicit promise of eventual membership. The Fifteen are, are however, finding running the existing store increasingly hard going, without any further extensions and the chances of Balkan countries joining in any meaningful time frame are low.
Instead, the EU is slowly fashioning the instruments of another sort of close collective relationship with third countries - such things as the Stability Pact are examples - which aim at inducing new standards of behaviour by systematised incentives and disincentives, without falling into the trap of creating a pensioner mentality. It is not easy to create an honest, democratic entrepreneurial self help mentality in societies which have never known it. The verdict on success is not in and will not be for some time. There is however no better long term act in town. Historically, in such policy areas as assistance to third world countries, the EU has shown the will and the patience to plug away at unpromising situations in return for slow and small incremental improvements. It is this EU strategic approach to the Balkans which provides the context in which the US will in due course be able to draw down its own effort.
When it comes to ESDP however, most Europeans probably hope that any separable European intervention force, which is still an aspiration, will have no role in the Balkans because current efforts will have succeeded by the time it comes into being. Were such a force to be deployed in an implementation role, it seems inconceivable that it would be used for purposes with which the US disagreed. If a more robust peace enforcement force were still needed in the years ahead, Europeans would take the view that this was a task for NATO as a whole.
EU, NATO and US objectives in the
Balkans.
The nature of the military presence in the longer term
Long term strategy and policy in
Bosnia and Kosovo
It does not seem to me that there are real differences in the long term objectives between either the institutions or the governments involved in the stabilisation of the Balkans. Across the Atlantic we share a commitment to securing democracy and human rights in the Balkans and in broad terms the strategy for achieving them has been hammered out in common. Differences of technique and priority arise form time to time, for instance over the use of sanctions to enforce compliance with Western objectives, the role of the United Nations or the right of NATO to authorise its own operations. These differences usually reflect divergences which go wider than
the Balkans themselves, though arguments about the correct policy approach to the region can sometime aggravate differences rather than reduce them.
Since the United States has a legitimate expectation of being able to limit and finally end its involvement in the politics of Balkan countries, it also has an interest in due course in agreeing with the Europeans an alternative framework of international authority and accountability in the Balkans which is not as NATO centric, and thus as US dependent, as are present structures. The Europeans, who face the task of integrating the Balkan countries into the European mainstream, will not be let off the hook. Indeed, if they are serious about giving the countries of the region a future connected to the European Union they are obliged to prepare the ground from an early stage. This means they must involve themselves in a micro level of detail; focus on the compatibility of Balkan constitutional and legal frameworks and public policy with European standards as well as to forge regional cooperation among Balkan states. For the EU, competition among Balkan countries to achieve a preferred status with the European Union and, effectively, steal a march on each other, is not a sound long term basis for policy which aims at integration of the Balkan region as a whole and of the region with the European Union. A point the Balkan countries have yet to take fully on board is that their individual relationships with the European Union will be handicapped for as long as they are unable to establish normal relations with each other.
Geography and history make Serbia a key player in the region and Milosevic blighted the future not only of the Yugoslav federation but of her neighbours too. The advent in Belgrade of a government that aspires to democracy and reform opens up prospects for the whole region. The situation in Belgrade is far from consolidated, and much remains to be done to make the commitment to reform irreversible. The future of Kosovo is unresolved and the area turbulent. Macedonia, always fragile, threatens to disintegrate. Whereas the problem that outside negotiators grappled with hitherto was that of the overbearing state, which deprived citizens of their rights, the emerging danger in the southernmost part of the region, generated by ethnic Albanian insurgency, is that of the failed state, unable to guarantee order and thus unable to institute the rule of law.
This is arguably a greater problem still to which there are no quick solutions. It is urgent to contain insurgency which cannot be rewarded by political concessions. At the same time it is vital to consolidate the gains already made already in the former Yugoslavia and to prevent them being upset by new threats. Focussing on the future, giving the citizens of the region a sense that they are no longer trapped behind national boundaries and ethnic barriers will be important to turning round attitudes and persuading people to look to the future rather than dwell on the injustices of the past.
In those communities where the allies have taken on themselves a high degree of direct responsibility for governance, notably Bosnia and Kosovo, the aim must be to transfer responsibility to local authorities as soon as possible. The debate about protectorates lies outside this paper. Those who argue however that the international community should have taken even more authority than it did in order to get things done should recognise how difficult it becomes to move in the opposite direction when all responsibility is removed from the inhabitants. This does not mean departing the scene. Far from it. But it does mean refraining from interposing external authority except when absolutely necessary, and it should result in international administrators increasingly holding the ring rather than driving political life and government. The international military forces, with reduced (but still some) heavy armour should gradually move further into the background, still visible but less prominent and properly trained local police forces should increasingly assume responsibility for local law and order. The situation in Kosovo does not yet permit of much movement in this direction. But it should increasingly be part of the agenda in Bosnia, where the time is coming for the presence of the international community to be slimmed down and streamlined.
The issues in Belgrade are somewhat different. War damage is serious and the despoiliated economy is in a desperate state. Getting it moving is urgent, not just for humanitarian reasons, which could be acute next winter, but for political reasons too. Since justice and ethnic reconciliation are intimately linked, the Allies are, legitimately in my view, exercising leverage over access to sources of economic assistance to ensure compliance with the requirements of the war crimes tribunal. This must however be done in a way which secures the goal of getting the Serbs to face up to the past rather than arousing renewed nationalism. However difficult they find their situation, the Serbs have the immense psychological advantage of having retained the right to run their own affairs. They should be able to get moving in a new direction.
Regional cooperation should now become much more active. Many old market links which have been cut by new international boundaries would quickly revive if allowed to do so. But for a major transformation of the economic future of the region, national leaders must be willing to associate and actively cooperate with each other. The EU can and will help in relation to commercial and economic issues. The Danube should once again become a major artery and economic and political life should be opened up with Bulgaria and Romania, which have been caught behind the barriers thrown up by conflict. NATO, though Partnership for Peace and the provisions of the Dayton agreement, should bed down a permanent arms control regime, guaranteed from outside, which removes the capacity of any of the countries of the region to threaten its neighbours. Further down the line the issue of Balkan states’ membership of regional organisations will be inescapable. If the Baltic states join NATO, it will become increasingly hard to resist claims to membership from states on the southern flank. Similar arguments will apply to membership of an enlarged EU which is likely to take in Slovenia in the next round.
The region is poised at an important juncture. It has travelled a long way since Dayton and much has recently gone in the right direction. With the changes in Belgrade, and despite the fragile situation in Kosovo and Macedonia, a greater part of the region now has the chance to escape from the events of the last decade to join the route which the countries of central Europe started to travel after the fall of the Berlin wall. The loss of time is significant, but not fatal. The geographic, economic and, above all, human assets of the region are immense. This is no primitive, remote region, but one which is well located and next door to the European Union which is one of the hubs of the world.
That said, threats remain, very little is consolidated and the future, while opening up, is far from assured. What this means for the international community is that it must stick at it to consolidate the gains. Those who must stick at it include the United States, which must remain actively involved in policy and continue, for the foreseeable future, to maintain a military presence on the ground.
To draw down militarily a lot further now, let alone pull out would be highly destabilising and would imperil the hard won gains of the last few years. Conversely, if consolidation can be achieved, there is every reason to hope that the talents of the inhabitants can be released and increasingly rapid progress made towards the time when the current massive external intervention in the region can be very significantly reduced.