Discussing NATO enlargement
and EU enlargement means discussing security in the Euro-Atlantic region -
security not narrowly defined only in military terms, but in a broader sense,
encompassing democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, i.e. common
values as described in the preamble of the Washington Treaty in 1949, but also
economics, trade, social justice, environment and last but not least defense.
Putting defense at the end
does not aim at a division of labor where some are assigned the risky job of
taking care of hard security and others choosing to limit themselves to the
more comfortable soft security issues.
Such a perception would be utterly wrong. But it is true that people in the US and in Europe tend to put a
different emphasis on what constitutes security. From a US point of view security means hardware, whereas for
Europeans the ‘paraphernalia’ of hardware are at least equally important. The different outlook on both parts of the
Atlantic to some extend reflects the geographical distance of the US and the
closeness of Western Europe to the problems both of us are confronted with in
the former Yugoslavia and in Central and Eastern Europe. The challenge is to rebuild societies,
economies, and security structures in countries that have experienced
dictatorship for more than forty years.
These decades of communist rule have left not only physical traces of
neglect - sometimes even destruction - they have also suppressed democracy and
individual freedom, and thus shaped the minds of generations.
For ten years the EU has
been engaged in Central and Eastern Europe in the arduous task to help build up
or stabilize democratic societies, with all the shortcomings such an endeavor may
have in a transitional stage of democratic development.
While in some EU member
states a discussion is underway, on what should be the place of the nation
state in an integrating Europe and what this could mean for the political
structures of an ever more uniting European Union, countries in Central and
Eastern Europe are rediscovering their nationhood and the satisfaction they
derive from being free and independent countries, from being able to shape and
build up on their own.
It would be an
oversimplification to say that both of these approaches are incompatible. But they are certainly not identical. It is probably easier to transfer part of
your sovereignty to an international organization, if - having had the privilege of being free and independent for
decades or even centuries - it seems to be in the national interest to do so,
than if you regained your cherished freedom and independence only
recently. However, objectively the problems
in all of these countries are so manifold that their governments would take a
much longer time if left alone in their efforts to tackle and solve what has
been piling up in decades.
So, the task the EU and NATO
are called upon to deal with in Central and Eastern Europe is not a task for
months or years but - speaking more than ten years since the experience of
German unification began - this is a task for decades which will absorb a good
part of our energy and resources. Such
a statement could not have been made in the early nineties, but meanwhile in
Germany we have realized that we simply underestimated the magnitude of the
problems we have inherited from the communist past. And what used to be East Germany is perhaps not representative
for all the problems we see in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The EU and its member states
are certainly closer to these issues than the US. They have to find solutions on a daily basis, concentrate on
these ‘paraphernalia’, which for stability in the Euro-Atlantic region are at
least as important as hardware. The
Kosovo crisis in 1998/99 and the subsequent military operations against
Yugoslavia revealed to policy makers in Europe not only the deficits in terms
of military capabilities, but also in terms of non-military capabilities. It was generally felt that the International
Community (IC), in particular the EU, was lacking at least some of these
non-military instruments in order to deal more effectively with crises. A case in point was also the inability of
the IC to provide in fall 1998 on short notice the 2.000 observers that the
OSCE was supposed to send into Kosovo after the Holbrooke-Milosevic
Agreement. Another example of the IC
lacking non-military instruments were the difficulties encountered in summer
1999 to field within six months the 4.800 police men required to stabilize
Kosovo. The experience of not being
able to deal swiftly and efficiently with crisis situations and post-war
necessities (law and order, judicial system, building up local administration
etc.) very much accelerated European efforts to strengthen existing
non-military tools or make additional tools available. We are learning from our failures in the
recent past.
This different outlook in
the US and Europe may explain why security interests are defined in a somewhat
different way: on the one side the US taking a global view of security, on the
other side the EU continuing to focus primarily on Europe and its periphery and
the Eurasian area while becoming aware of the increasing necessity to involve
itself more in crisis areas beyond this region.
Let there be no
misunderstanding: the Europeans need the US to secure stability in the Eurasian
region and the US may need increasingly the EU to secure stability in areas
beyond Europe. But the appropriate mix
of hard and soft security instruments for global tasks or for more limited
tasks remains to be determined as well as the respective role the US and the EU
could or should play in different regions.
And this is a topic requiring thorough
attention in the ongoing transatlantic dialogue.
I suppose, from a US
perspective there is a clear difference between NATO enlargement and EU
enlargement. In NATO enlargement the
US, as a prominent member of the Alliance, does have its role to play, whereas
in EU enlargement, the US - not being a member - has no direct role. On the other hand, the stability effects of
EU enlargement serve the same purpose and benefit the same countries. Both enlargement processes therefore deserve
equal attention by the US. One might
even argue that the enlargement process that does not directly involve the US
is of greater importance. Why? Because accession to the EU is bound to
change deeply each of the candidate countries, whereas the affects of NATO
accession are more limited.
NATO enlargement and EU enlargement are
indeed quite different processes:
NATO is an intergovernmental
organization, which depends on its 19 member states. It is up to these sovereign member states to decide on NATO’s
role in any field and in any conflict.
By contrast, the EU - besides being
intergovernmental - is also a supranational
organization to which member
states have relinquished part of their sovereignty (for instance in trade and
commerce). The EU is the central part
of the European integration project, the finality of which is still a matter of
intra-European debate, but the idea of European integration itself is not put
into question. Any European country
acceding to the EU is expected to accept what is called in EU jargon ‘the
acquis’, a multitude of European Union laws and regulations (87.000 pages which
have to be incorporated into the national legal system of each member
state). This implies also that a new
member of the EU, by the act of accession, agrees to the transfer of part of
its sovereignty to Brussels.
These few general remarks on
both enlargement processes may indicate that there is a qualitative difference
between them which led some people to conclude that joining NATO is a
comparatively easy step, a rather technical matter involving just the armed
forces and a hand full of diplomats - a view which is mistaken and which
underestimates the impact of Alliance membership on foreign and security
policy, military policy, arms control/disarmament, arms export policies etc.
Acceding to the EU, however,
is a fundamental decision with consequences far beyond foreign and security
policy, practically into all other policy fields, like trade, commerce,
agriculture, home and justice, fiscal and finance, etc.
This difference explains why
accession to NATO has taken less time (as we have seen in the case of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic: six months of negotiations after the invitation
by NATO at the Madrid Summit in 1997, plus ratification process), whereas
accession to the EU requires years of negotiations and lengthy internal
preparations in all policy fields. EU
accession affects each and every citizen of a new member country, because it
will change the political, social, and legal framework of his society. In short: accession to the EU will change
his daily life, accession to NATO does hardly affect him.
Will
NATO enlargement strengthen or weaken the transatlantic link (through EU-NATO
cooperation or competition)?
I have no doubt that a
carefully managed NATO enlargement will strengthen the transatlantic link.
It is a fact that the
European countries situated more to the East of Europe put emphasis - at least for the time being - on what they
consider to be a sometimes uneasy, sometimes precarious neighborhood with Russia. NATO continues to be seen as the only
organization able to provide security in face of a Russia that so far does not
instill to these countries the predictability and confidence they would need to
feel fully at ease.
To put it in a more casual
way: Russia is still not boring enough for these countries to see NATO
membership as a meaningless policy option.
For these countries, the US is the
member country of NATO that alone can provide the security they deem necessary
face to face with a Russia that is still on her way towards democracy. Therefore it is fair to assume that new NATO
members situated further east of actual NATO members will - to say the least -
refrain from taking steps which may encourage the US to consider a reduction of
their political and military presence in Europe. Quite to the contrary: these countries seem to define their
interests in a way pointing to a US presence and commitment in Europe
maintained at the present level, if not increased.
Germany has always held the
view that the US, with her political and military presence through NATO in
Europe, has become an established European power. This is a position that we would like to see preserved. The term ‘European power’ is a broad
description of the US role in Europe, which the potential new NATO members in
Central and Eastern Europe would probably be prepared to agree to.
I find it difficult to
imagine a competition between NATO and the EU in their respective enlargement
processes. In many other fields we have
recently experienced an increasing cooperation between both organizations:
NATO with experience in the
field of political and military conflict prevention and crisis management, the
EU with a whole panoply of non-military instruments for conflict prevention and
crisis management. The area where there
will be some overlapping in the future is, of course, military conflict
prevention and crisis management.
Competition normally occurs when two actors have resources of comparable
size and quality at their disposal, and when they define their interests in a
fundamentally different way. This is
not the case with NATO and the EU and it is difficult to foresee this in view
of the fact that eleven EU members are members also of the Alliance. Both organizations will have to see to it
that the permanent arrangements between them - which are put into practice
since December last year - allow for sufficient transparency to avoid friction
in matters of substance.
Predict
the future of NATO and its political and military role in fostering European security,
and fostering US national interest in the region
Among my many weaknesses,
there is one I have never tried to hide: I am particularly bad as a
clairvoyant. Looking back ten years,
who would have dared to predict today’s NATO member countries? Who would have predicted the Permanent Joint
Council where the Nineteen meet on a regular basis with Russia? Who would have imagined a NATO Information
Office in Moscow in 2001? Who would
have had the farsightedness to describe the central role NATO at present is
playing together with non-NATO countries, including Russia, in trying to solve
the various crises in the Balkans? So,
any attempt to answer this point is bound to be somewhat speculative.
Let me first address the
political and military role of NATO in fostering European security. The key notion, from a German point of view,
is denationalization of defense and security policy. Creating interdependencies has been the basis for NATO’s success
ever since 1949.
It is a factual statement
that in the first 40 years of NATO the Alliance has established a degree of
transparency, trust, and cooperation among its members that has helped to
defuse intra-Alliance tension, to solve conflicts or even to prevent conflicts
from degenerating into war. This internal
function of the Alliance to foster political and military security within
NATO has sometimes been overlooked, especially during the Cold War, when
attention was focused on the threat emanating from the Soviet Union. And yet this intra-Alliance function of
conflict solving and conflict prevention has been important up to this day.
The fact that countries in
Central and Eastern Europe wishing to join the Alliance are, already now,
taking steps to solve problems existing among them, or between them and NATO
members (like improving the situation of ethnic minorities etc.) is another
beneficial effect (the EU, by the way has similar leverage through the prospect
of membership). The mere prospect of
becoming a NATO member contributes to fostering European security to such an
extend that the former Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, Gen. Naumann,
characterized these pre-membership policies as a welcome „fireworks of
reconciliation“. This is a development
whose importance for stability in the Euroasian region cannot be
overestimated. It is another proof for
the ability of the Alliance to positively influence political and military
developments beyond Alliance territory.
But what if all these countries
actually join the Alliance: will they keep their promises and commitments? Or should we expect that some of the
afore-mentioned problems will re-emerge?
In that case NATO could be compelled to devote a greater part of its
political attention to intra-Alliance conflicts and the preservation of
internal stability. It is not so much
the question of whether NATO’s intra-Alliance function will continue to be
needed (there is nothing bad about it), but whether the Alliance will be
absorbed by increased internal tension, thus reducing its role in conflict
prevention and crisis management beyond NATO territory.
Predicting the fostering of
US national interest in the region requires even more than simple German
clairvoyant capabilities. It
presupposes that I know how the US Administration to-day defines its national
interest in the region and that I know how the US will define it in the
future. Clearly, the US - being a
global power - it should maintain a strong interest in the Eurasian region,
because it is a region that will matter also in the future on account of its
history and its geo-strategic situation.
Even though it may sometimes
seem, perhaps from a US perspective, that Europe is an endless story of
problems and quarrels, I think one fact is undisputed: there is no other
region, no other partner with which or whom the US shares values, interests and
goals to the extend it does with Europe.
A more stable Europe, strengthened by NATO enlargement and EU enlargement,
is an asset in the pursuit of these common objectives.
Is
expansion of NATO in the best interest of the US? Europe? Why? Why not?
The term ‘expansion’ seems
inappropriate to me. It has a somewhat
aggressive connotation, making the countries in Central and Eastern Europe the
object of NATO policies, however well-intended these may be. After all, we are speaking about
self-confident, proud peoples and governments who - having defined their
national interests - made their choice in favor of the Alliance.
I therefore prefer to use
the term ‘opening of NATO’, since it offers an option welcomed by countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, without making them an object of Western
policies. But I can live with
‘enlargement’.
The enlargement of NATO is
not an end in itself; rather it is one among several means to project stability
into Central and Eastern Europe. The
accession of new members is supposed to secure peace and stability in a larger
area, either then part of NATO or a NATO structure, like the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC), respectively the EU or an EU association
structure. The realm of stability would
extend beyond the present territory of both organizations or would be enhanced
qualitatively.
Some people might argue that
the term ‘Europe’ means either the EU or Western Europe, but definitely a
Europe without Russia. Here I
disagree. If I say ‘stability is in the
interest of Europe’, this notion includes Russia, and I would also assume that
NATO enlargement as a means to securing more stability in Europe is in the interest
of Russia. Ever since Poland acceded to
NATO the Polish-Russian relationship has been improving - a fact nobody in
Russia can deny. However, the problem
in Moscow seems to be that not all policy makers in and outside the Russian
government would right now be ready to agree that NATO enlargement, by
increasing stability in Europe, be in Russia’s well considered interest. Of course, this is foremost a problem of the
Russian political and military elite and media people. They would refuse being told - by NATO, by
ourselves - what should be in their interest.
We should not allow their problems in perception and analysis of
security west of Russia become a major obstacle in our decision making process
for the further opening of NATO. ‘Red
lines’ are unacceptable. Russia does
not have a veto right.
On the other hand, we have
good reasons to continue to explain to Russia that NATO is not a threat to
Russia and that NATO enlargement is not a process designed to have a negative
impact on Russia’s security. This
dialogue is in the interest of both NATO and Russia, however, it should not
nurture the idea that it could be made an instrument to artificially slow down
enlargement.
Will
NATO itself be strengthened or weakened by enlargement in terms of her military
capacity and/or political stabilizing role?
Has NATO been strengthened
or weakened by the first enlargement round in terms of her military capacity
and/or political stabilizing role? Have
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic strengthened or weakened NATO? It may well be that a detailed study on this
would reveal findings varying from country to country and from criteria to
criteria. It may also reveal areas
where NATO would have liked to see a better performance. Yes, there probably are deficits in the
track record of the new members. And
yet, I have no doubt that their membership in NATO has contributed to NATO’s
military capacity and above all to NATO’s stabilizing role as a
politico-military player in the Euro-Atlantic region.
It should also be borne in
mind that, after the end of the Cold War, a considerable degree of enthusiasm
was reigning in the West to be able at last - after more than forty years of
the Iron Curtain - to overcome the
division of Europe. Inviting Central
and Eastern European countries into an Alliance of their choice - a right
enshrined in the CSCE Paris Charter of 1990 and in the OSCE Istanbul Summit
document of 1999, subscribed to also by the former Soviet Union/Russia - has
been one of NATO’s contributions to overcoming that division, the strategic
goal being a Europe whole and free.
Is the first round of
enlargement an indication of what we are going to see in the second round? No, it’s not. We are in a different world to-day. In a way, the enthusiasm of the early nineties has given way to a
more sober attitude towards potential new members, because the division of
Europe, in its meaning of the Cold War era, has been overcome. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe are
not any longer compulsory members of the defunct Warsaw Pact or part of a
sphere of influence. They are
free. But they do not feel secure.
The more reassuring
environment to-day certainly does not make things easier for candidate
countries. They will have to state
their individual case more convincingly.
There are also differences
in the military capacities between the first three and those who were mentioned
as candidates for membership at the Washington Summit in 1999. The first Three - Poland in particular - are
relatively large countries with sizable, well established armed forces.
On the other hand the Three
had scarcely enough time to prepare themselves internally, especially their
military, for NATO membership (with respect to human resources, equipment,
infrastructure, policies etc.). The
present candidates have more time to prepare themselves and to put particular
emphasis on preparing staff for working with and in this politico-military
Alliance. This is where the Partnership
for Peace (PfP), the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the Membership
Action Plan (MAP) come in.
In the course of the
ratification process for the Three in April 1998 the US Administration was
asked in a ‘Sense of the Senate’ to answer three questions in case new
invitations to join the Alliance should be extended to candidate countries:
·
What is the US national interest in a particular country joining the
Alliance?
·
What is NATO’s interest in that country joining the Alliance?
·
What are the costs involved?
These questions put on the
table already in 1998, devoid of any enthusiasm, reflect the more business like
environment in which candidate countries to-day have to operate. It must seem to these countries that in the
first round of NATO enlargement the focus has been ‘What can we do for them?’
whereas today the focus has shifted - at least in the perception of candidate
countries - and appears to be ‘What can they do for us?’ or ‘What benefit can
we derive from them?’
If it is of any consolation to
candidate countries: At least the cost argument seems to be off the table,
since the first enlargement round has proven all cost estimates to have been
grossly exaggerated. So, this hurdle
has been put aside.
In sum, it may be impossible
to answer this question with a simple yes or no, but wherever the Alliance
should have questions on whether a potential member strengthens or weakens NATO
it should limit itself to those who leave no doubt.
Assuming
enlargement, what criteria should be adhered to for future enlargement of both
NATO and the EU?
First of all: maturity of
the democratic system, rule of law and individual liberty, i.e. the values
mentioned in the preamble of the Treaty signed here in Washington 52 years
ago. Sharing these values is fundamental
for an Alliance functioning on the basis of consensus, which means not only
‘one country one vote’. It also means
that countries who are able to act on their own in quite a number of issues,
can allow themselves to depend on smaller countries. So, this requires trust, of course not only on the part of the
weaker towards the stronger, but also vice versa. NATO’s capacity to act and its military credibility must be
preserved. Direction and speed of NATO
policies will be influenced by new members.
For this to work smoothly, we need a sufficient degree of insight and
confidence in the reliability of the political and military set-up of a
candidate country. To put it in one
sentence: the political landscape of an invited country should instill enough trust
for the Alliance to feel that it will be able to cooperate with any
democratically elected government.
In addition to these general
political criteria three questions will have to be answered with respect to
each candidate country:
·
What is the contribution country X can provide to Alliance tasks?
·
What effect would the accession of country X have on the performance
and cohesion of the Alliance?
·
Would the accession of country X contribute to increased stability in
that country, in the Alliance and in the Euro-Atlantic region?
A good record in the successive Annual
National Programs of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) of the Alliance would
certainly facilitate the answers.
Who
are the candidates and why or why not should they be considered?
At present, there are nine
candidates, and all of them will have to be considered.
For the NATO Summit in
autumn 2002 all options are available in principle - the ‘zero option’ as well
as the ‘group of nine option’, also called the ‘big bang’.
Of course, there also is the
option to envisage an invitation in principle of all countries in question, but
to make the individual accession date dependent on each country fulfilling a
catalogue of pre-determined basic political and military requirements (civilian
control of armed forces, restrictive arms export policies, military criteria
like mobility, command and control, sustainability etc.). Thus, the Alliance would want to ensure that
a new member is in a position to carry out essential tasks. This would be, in a way, an analogy to the
Copenhagen criteria determined by the EU for prospective EU member states. It provides for a certain predictability of
the enlargement process and would allow all concerned to prepare themselves
accordingly. It would not be easy to
negotiate such a catalogue. There may
be differing assessments with regard to the importance of certain military
capabilities. And how flexible should
the Alliance be in interpreting these criteria? Can the Alliance formulate objective criteria for the accession
process? There are certainly limits to
objectively measure the contribution of a prospective NATO member to Alliance
security. Views on what is objective
may vary from capital to capital among Alliance member states.
At present it would not be
helpful to single out individual countries as likely or unlikely candidates for
the next round of NATO’s opening. Good
performers in MAP might get the impression that they have got the ticket to
NATO and therefore would see no more need to pursue their efforts. Bad performers would be discouraged thinking
that they will not succeed anyhow, so no more use in trying hard. Both reactions would be detrimental to the
internal reform processes in candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe
and to the overall stability of that region.
Germany will therefore continue to support the internal efforts of all
nine countries bilaterally and through NATO as well as the EU.
In the interest of the
Alliance as well as the candidate countries themselves the German government
adheres to the policy of ‘no names, no finger pointing, no beauty
contest’. We assume that in 2002, in
the run-up to Prague, the Alliance will discuss which country should be
invited, when, and under which conditions.
Should
NATO enlargement proceed ahead of EU enlargement?
There have been proposals to
the effect that a country should be invited to join NATO because it is unstable
and cannot - at least for the time being - accede to the EU. This would mean giving a premium to those countries
who have not - for whatever reasons - implemented internal reforms. Instability would thus be made a positive
selection criteria.
On the other hand it has
been proposed to invite a country to accede to the EU because it is stable and
cannot yet - for other reasons - be invited to accede to NATO. This would mean punishing countries who have
successfully implemented internal reforms.
Stability would thus be made a negative selection criteria.
From my point of view, both
approaches are intellectually unsatisfactory.
If instability becomes a positive selection criteria the credibility of
the Alliance would be questioned.
Membership offered as a kind
of consolation prize should be excluded from the list of options
available. It might also create misunderstandings
as to whether one organization is acting on suggestions of the other. Both NATO and the EU will not be interested
in establishing even the semblance of a hierarchy of organizations.
For the candidate countries
there is no other way but to be up to the requirements and standards
respectively agreed to in both organizations.
The decisions in NATO and the EU should be taken according to their
respective rules and requirements, on the merits of each individual
candidate. Anything else would be
difficult to justify, also in view of future enlargements, which - though not
under active consideration in the Alliance at present - after all cannot be
excluded.
Conclusion
There are convincing
arguments in favor of a continuation of the enlargement processes of NATO and
the European Union. If enlarging the
area of stability in the region is in principle a policy in the interest of
NATO, and that means of the US and Europe, such a policy nonetheless requires a
concept on the future of the Atlantic Alliance, on its finality. Where do Alliance members want NATO to
go? More specifically:
·
What comes after the next round of NATO’s enlargement?
·
What about the states on the territory of former Yugoslavia?
·
What about other countries not yet enlisted as candidates?
·
What are the conflicts that could affect NATO? Internally?
Externally?
·
How would an Alliance of about 30 member states function? Politically (how difficult would the daily
process of consensus finding turn out to be)?
Militarily?
·
Would internal changes have to be made, if yes, what changes?
·
Is it in the interest of NATO to define a geographical limit to
enlargement?
·
Is identity of membership between NATO and the EU an advantage? And if yes, for the EU? For the US?
·
Would it affect the position of the US in Europe if there were 28
European members?
The Alliance will not have
to give an answer to each of these questions before the Prague Summit in fall
2002. But answering none of them would
mean that NATO does not have an idea, let alone a unanimous position on the way
ahead. NATO’s future relevance depends
above all on the resolve and the ability of its member states to preserve its
role as a key actor in transatlantic security policy for the Euro-Atlantic
region.
So it would do no harm to
NATO if the Alliance started already now to chart its preferred course of
action, not only for the year 2002 but rather for 2020, even if in 2020 reality
should prove us all wrong and would tell our successors how limited
clairvoyance capacities were back in 2001.
But at least our successors will not tell us that we did not even try to
achieve what we deemed to be in our shared interest and in that of the
Alliance.