The Balkans and Future Transatlantic Responses

Daniel Serwer

I appreciate the opportunity to review the situation in the Balkans with you today, not the least because I have been recently in Podgorica, Belgrade and Skopje, having also visited Pristina and Tirana in March. The views I offer on what is going on there and elsewhere in the Balkans are my own and not those of the US Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues. Nor are they the views of the US Government.

As I am going to be relatively optimistic about the longer-term prospects for the Balkans, I want to start by underlining how difficult and complicated the problems are today. This map is my effort to structure the issues. The red triangle is where the US entered the Balkans in 1995, when Zagreb and Belgrade were trying to dismantle Bosnia. We still face serious problems with Croat and Serb nationalists there. The blue triangle represents the continuing dissolution of Yugoslavia: Podgorica and Pristina have achieved a large measure of de facto independence from Belgrade in the past few years, but the juridical status of Montenegro and Kosovo remains unresolved. The green triangle--connecting Pristina, Tirana and Skopje--represents the issue of Greater Albania and the threat Albanian nationalism and organized crime pose to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia. This is not a simple puzzle, nor an easily solvable one.

I am nevertheless pleased to be able to report that democratic processes are proving, as they have often in the past, an antidote to violence. Let me look first at the foci of current potential conflict: Podgorica and Skopje.

In Podgorica, an exemplary Parliamentary election has produced a yellow warning signal: pro-independence forces have enough votes to call and perhaps win a referendum, but not enough to make the referendum valid or to implement an independence decision. Both pro- and anti-independence forces in Montenegro and Serbia have made it clear that they will refrain from violence and seek their ends through constitutional means. I believe a negotiated solution is possible and desirable, but it will require a stronger dialogue not only between Belgrade and Podgorica but also among Montenegrins. The main international concern should not be the outcome, but rather the process. If the process is peaceful and negotiated, the outcome will not set a negative precedent for Bosnia or Kosovo.

In Skopje, the situation is tense and polarized due to Albanian extremist attacks, which are within a whisker of precipitating conflict among ordinary citizens. The formation of a broad government coalition that includes all the major political parties is a step in the right direction. But President Trajkovski is in a race: can he produce results in the political negotiations before the guerrillas are successful in tearing the country apart? The US Government--as well as our European Allies—has wisely awakened to the need to give him ample support. The Europeans—with Solana as point man--have made a good start, but they will need to pay more attention to the security dimension. The guerillas are not going to disappear because a new government is formed. We are going to have to build enormous pressure to force them to withdraw. Macedonia poses real risks to regional stability--its collapse would dramatically undermine US interests in Europe and beyond.

Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade, Tirana and Pristina also demonstrate the importance of building democratic institutions in the Balkans.

When Croatian President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan took office less than a year and a half ago, Zagreb was a troublemaker in Bosnia and a scourge to the Croatian Serbs. Today, Zagreb is a good neighbor of Bosnia and Herzegovina and has begun to make amends for its treatment of its Serb citizens. Last weekend's municipal elections failed to obliterate the remainders of the Tudjman regime, and progress on refugee returns may continue to be difficult. But the direction is nevertheless clear.

Inside Bosnia, the remarkable turnaround in Zagreb has made Croat nationalists, deprived of support and under pressure from the international community, desperate. Their efforts to undermine the Dayton agreements and Bosnian sovereignty should be seen for what they are: the death throes of a criminal/extremist enterprise. The Croat rebellion has inspired nationalists in Republika Srpska to renew violent resistance to multiethnic

Bosnia with riots in Banja Luka and Trebinje. This must be taken seriously--it echoes throughout the region. An Albanian leader in Macedonia told me recently he doubts the international community's commitment to multiethnicity and hesitates to sacrifice for it because of the weak reaction to Serb and Croat nationalists in Bosnia.

In Sarajevo, there are at last non-nationalist governments of the Croat/Bosniak Federation and of the Bosnian state, for the first time since Dayton. This opportunity should not be wasted. The central government should be strengthened, but with sensitivity to the need for strong local governance as well. The Bosnian "entities," the two nationalist-dominated halves of the country, should be weakened and their capacity to interfere with Dayton--especially return of people to their homes--eliminated.

Progress in Bosnia requires greater cooperation from Belgrade, where change is real but slow. Important steps have been taken: not only the arrest of Milosevic but also the careful handling of the Albanian extremists in southern Serbia, the cut-off of payments to the Bosnian Serb Army, the beginnings of an attack on corruption and indictment of at least some of those thought to be responsible for war crimes in Kosovo. Most importantly, people in Belgrade are no longer afraid. But large parts of the old regime remain in place. The police and judiciary are unreformed. President Kostunica governs with the support of an unreformed Army while Zoran Djindjic, his one-time campaign manager, undertakes unpopular but necessary reforms as prime minister of Serbia.

Serbian nationalism today is taking less virulent forms, but segments of the leadership and population continue to blame everyone but themselves for the suffering of the past ten years and even harbor lingering dreams of a Greater Serbia. The West moved quickly to disarm itself diplomatically vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. We now have little leverage other than the "atomic bombs" of postponing the donors' conference or voting against World Bank loans. It will be unfortunate if it proves necessary to use these weapons.

Albania has made major progress since the collapse of early 1997. Democratic institutions there are far from consolidated, but they are strengthening, and it shows. Economic growth is strong, Parliamentary elections are being prepared well, and there is hope that the major opposition party will not only participate but accept the results. And most importantly: all but a few people in Albania recognize that Greater Albania is a myth, one they think not worth pursuing.

While last fall's municipal elections in Kosovo have been an important step forward, I believe that major improvement there requires a Kosovo-wide governing structure with democratic legitimacy. Elections this fall will not be too soon--only by having democratically elected representatives who can be held accountable will Kosovo begin to become a more normal place. And only by participating in those elections can Serbs and other minorities assert their rights and ensure their reintegration into Kosovo.

The result of the Kosovo elections is in one sense a foregone conclusion: Albanian parties committed to independence will win. But they need to understand that no change in the status of Kosovo is possible without a new UN Security Council resolution. The Russians and Chinese have their own reasons for not wanting any change. Only if Belgrade asks them will they abstain. So Kosovo's status depends ultimately on reaching an accommodation between Belgrade and Pristina. This is true in any event: whatever Kosovo's ultimate status, it will need a good relationship with Serbia for security and economic reasons. Chasing Serbs from their homes and mistreating other minorities will make it all the more difficult to reach such an accommodation.

What does all this mean for the United States? First, it means that perseverance in the right direction brings results. While no one can be happy so long as Serbs are mistreated in Kosovo or extremist rebellion threatens Macedonia and Bosnia, the situation is dramatically improved from ten years ago. We are now dealing with a "two percent" problem of bad actors, not national leaderships with popular support bent on war. Concerted action by Europe and the United States--with many other countries pitching in--is slowly consolidating support for democracy, free markets and protection of human rights as the shared goals of most people in the Balkans.

Not everyone, however. We and our European partners need to learn how better to defeat extremists and strengthen moderates. We did badly to rely heavily on Milosevic and Tudjman after Dayton, and we do badly when we fail to react vigorously to their political heirs in Bosnia. We could do better in preventing men, money and arms from reaching Albanian extremists in Macedonia and Kosovo, where they constitute a threat to US soldiers and to the sovereignty of Macedonia. I fail to understand why the administration has not moved more aggressively to end support flowing from the US to the guerillas in Macedonia, and why the international community has been timid in protecting itself from extremists in Bosnia. We should be using whatever legal means are available to end recruitment of people and raising of money for those who are using violence against the Macedonia. It is appalling how a few people are being allowed to disrupt major international efforts.

Essential to any effort to defeat extremists is establishment of the rule of law. The security problems we still face all involve criminal as well as political elements. Once the ethnic problems of the Balkans are long gone and forgotten, I expect organized crime and trafficking of all sorts to remain. The US should, in my view, refocus a major portion of its assistance efforts to support police and independent judiciaries. This is work we do well--we just haven't done enough of it.

The rule of law should be part of a broader effort to establish stronger states in the Balkans. Even without ethnic problems, Macedonia would have difficulties because it is a weak state--like Albania, which suffered massive refugee outflows and internal violence without any ethnic tension. Building up the states of the region should primarily be a European responsibility, since it is essential for their future relationships with the EU. The EU should also be working on border regimes for the Balkans that will ease intra-ethnic communication while blocking criminal activity.

What about US troops? Are they stuck in the Balkans forever? I think not. The last boots to leave Bosnia will be European ones. The essential question is this: "what conditions need to be fulfilled in order to allow the Europeans to take over the military role in Bosnia?" The doctrine of European fecklessness and US superiority, so popular in recent years in the State Department, is wrong. European forces have repeatedly demonstrated their capacities--witness the British in Bosnia or the Germans in Kosovo, not to mention the Italians in the 1990s in Albania.

There is no military threat in Bosnia today that European troops cannot handle. What the Europeans lack is credibility, stemming from doubts about their commitment, unity of command and common purpose. Residual US capabilities may be needed for the foreseeable future, but at some point Europe should be able to take over the rest of the military function in Bosnia as part of its effort to develop its own capabilities. Done within the NATO command structure, this could serve as a model for the future.

The NATO deployment to Bosnia in 1995 saved the Alliance; a European force there could save the European pillar.

The main reason for US troops to remain is to reassure both Europeans and Bosnians that the US is not disengaging. Even discussion of withdrawal sends a signal that encourages extremists and undermines moderates throughout the region. But it should be possible to signal American commitment in other ways. A more unified civilian implementation

structure with strong US participation would help. The next stage of NATO's life in Bosnia is to be known as D-for. I would suggest that this stand not only for "deterrent force" but for "democracy force." Whatever its composition, its objectives should include support to the establishment of self-sustaining democratic institutions, which are essential to an exit strategy that does not precipitate a new war.

In Kosovo, only the US has the credibility with both Albanians and Serbs to ensure that the European-led force is able to stay on top of the situation. It will be some time before democratic institutions there are strong enough to counter criminality, political extremism and ethnic hatred. The US needs to stay, and to improve its effectiveness in cracking down on extremists of all ethnic groups.

Let me conclude: the United States has invested more than $20 billion in Balkans peace efforts. The Europeans have spent much more. Now is not the time to write off that investment. Never before have we been closer to its paying dividends. Some of my colleagues mock my position as advocating "one last push." I prefer to see it as staying the course and finishing what we started.