2001 European Symposium
Transatlantic Security Relationships:
The Next Four Years

May 22-23, 2001

Executive Summary  

Purpose:  to stimulate dialogue about how the Bush Administration can best work with Europe, and develop some recommendations for the Bush Administration and for our European partners in four key issue areas affecting the transatlantic agenda today:  missile defense, European defense and security policy, the Balkans, and expansion of NATO and the European Union. 

Challenges:  (1) Discuss next steps in the missile defense process; (2) Discuss what lessons we have learned in the Balkans, and how the U.S. and Europe should adjust our goals to advance peace and deal with future conflicts in the region; (3) discuss the future of European security and defense policy, as it relates to the Balkans and other regional contingencies and crises; and (4) discuss the implications of NATO and EU enlargement.  

The Symposia staff prepared a series of question/issues to assist the panels in focusing their discussion, and these are included as part of the introduction to each panel.   

NDU’s non-attribution policy precludes attributing particular statements to individual participants.  The summary does attempt to portray the views expressed by panelists and by the audience as accurately as possible, given the non-attribution constraints.  It is also true that individual views do not necessarily represent the policies of the institutions they might otherwise represent, and therefore the questions and responses reflect individual, and not institutional responses.  This allows for a free exchange of policy positions, ideas, criticisms, reservations, etc., from a variety of viewpoints, on all of the issues discussed during the Symposium. 

Panel 1:  “The Impact of Missile Defense and Other Arms Control Issues on Transatlantic Ties” 

 Questions/issues suggested:   

A U.S. Perspective -- Can Washington enlist European support/acquiescence to U.S. development and deployment of missile defense?  How does size/scope of system and whether this is done in contest of ABM Treaty or some other informal understandings with Russia and China effect impact on the Alliance?  What extent of European participation in various options for TMD or NMD?  Could other developments in Iran/Iraq affect this calculation? 

A European Perspective – Are European views shifting from opposition to some kind of accommodations?  Is European advocacy of preservation and expansion of arms control regimes such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention essential or will the Europeans accept informal regimes as a substitute?  Discuss the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty as a “cornerstone” of strategic stability and European security, and suggest what the impact of cancellations might be on European attitudes.  Discuss the implications of outright European opposition to US Missile Defense. 

A Russian Perspective – Discuss Russian responses to an ABM Treaty termination.  Elaborate on possible Russian interests in other informal assurances.  Describe Russian approaches to a European missile defense.  Discuss the impact of a US Missile Defense system on the transatlantic link. 

Panel Highlights 

The Bush Administration argues for missile defense in the context of challenges and opportunities, one key challenge being the proliferation of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction, and a key opportunity to improve our relationship with Russia, and believes the concept of deterrence ties these two together.  The U.S. argues that having missile defense will devalue potential adversary(s) missile force, contributing to its non-proliferation objective, deter them from launching missiles at the U.S. and/or the West, and also permit the U.S. and its allies to intervene in regional conflicts, undeterred by the threat of adversaries employing missiles against us.   

A new concept of deterrence is warranted to address a wide variety of potential opponents and scenarios.  It is not a one size fits all policy, and must be applicable to new, emerging threats.  Deterrence requires a mix of offensive and defensive forces.  By defensive, the U.S. means limited but effective missile defenses to deny potential adversaries the ability to threaten or to use ballistic missiles against the U.S. and its allies, and permitting the United States, and any coalition partners, to bring to bear superior conventional forces to a potential conflict.  In order to do so, we need to move beyond the Cold War relationship built on mistrust, mutual vulnerability, and a nuclear balance of terror, or mutual assured destruction.  In order to do so, we need to 

The U.S. is concerned about how its new policy will affect U.S.-Russia relations, believing that Russia is no longer an enemy, and indicates a desire to reach out to Russia, reconsider the ABM Treaty, remove the nuclear dimension from the U.S.-Russian relationship and develop a new foundation for improving strategic stability and security.   

U.S. missile defense plans are evolving, but plan to address a full spectrum of threats, from short-range to longer-range systems with trans-continental ranges.  The objective is limited defenses against handfuls of these longer-range missiles.  They would protect deployed forces abroad, and populations and territory of the U.S. and our Allies.  A broad   research and development program would identify a number of capabilities for land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based systems, and no specific architecture has been identified.  It would provide near-term capabilities to meet near-term threats, and then evolve the system as the threats evolve.  It calls for a layered defense, able to take multiple shots at an incoming missile, shooting it in the boost phase as it’s rising from the earth, intercepting it in the mid-course phase outside the atmosphere, and then again when it’s coming back into the atmosphere, in the terminal phase.  The costs to the U.S. or to our allies of building such a missile defense system were not discussed. 

The reception in Europe and Russia of such a missile defense system is at best mixed.  The most common arguments against are:  (1) it will upset the strategic balance; (2) trigger a new arms race; (3) flawed threat analysis puts a huge emphasis on the threat coming from a small country like North Korea;  (4) U.S. is looking for technological solutions where political solutions might be better; (5) the status and future of the technology is unproven; (6) negative impact on arms control diplomacy, especially on the NPT regime; (7) missile defense may be offset by unconventional means of employing weapons of mass destruction; (8) this is another case of U.S. unilateralism; (9) it is part of a U.S. strategy of technological superiority; and (10) it might create different zones of security.   

Emissaries dispatched by the Bush Administration to Europe have had an impact in ameliorating concerns, but there remains a huge amount of skepticism in most European capitals, requiring ongoing extensive and intensive consultation with our European allies, not only on specific systems but on evolving a new strategic paradigm, including new thinking about deterrence and arms control.  There is also a very strong concern in Europe that the U.S. is abandoning multilateralism in favor of a unilateral approach to arms control and strategic affairs. 

The Russians would agree that mutual assured destruction has outlived its usefulness, and is a poor basis on which to build new U.S.-Russian relations.  However, missile defense could undermine rather than strengthen strategic stability.  One speaker suggested that unilateral American action could be interpreted by Russia and China as a common strategic threat, which would be bad for the U.S., for Russia, and for everyone.  And the greatest threat to international stability comes not from rogue states, but from U.S. unilateral action.  Missile defense means that the U.S. no longer sees arms control as the foundation of its security, and the U.S. intends to win against any opponent with precision-guided munitions and information technology.  And in building a global fortress America, the U.S. runs the risk of uniting the rest of the world against it.   

Russia suggests a transition period during which mechanisms for consultation, dialogue, and parallel decision-making are worked out, resulting in a mutual security treaty.           

Questions and Answers: 

A rich variety of questions were posed to the panelists.  Among them were:  Why has missile defense become politically important when it is still an unproven technologically?  How can the U.S. expect support from European and/or Russian before much is known about system(s) scope, architecture or cost?  We need a transition period, and consultation on broader framework of security and stability prior to canceling the ABM & related treaties.  How does investment in missile defense relate to other aspects of investment in cooperative engagement?  Missile defense is now being justified as an intervention tool in regional conflicts, and as a tool for international management, which has all sorts of implications for the international system.  A U.S. policy of being “free to attack while being free from attack” may be more destabilizing than stabilizing in the international system. 

While many participants would agree that mutual assured destruction is a relic of the Cold War, and needs replacement with new strategic security arrangements, there was concern that the U.S. approach to missile defense may actually lead to greater instability. Unproven technologies, unknown costs, and unbalanced risk assessments, were troubling concerns for many.  They felt the U.S. needed to embark on cooperative consultation efforts, and a transition period to address a broad array of policy implications for a new security strategy before going too far down the road in deploying a missile defense system, and suggested a multilateral, inclusive approach, bringing together Europe, Russia, and other players in the process. 

Panel II:  “European Security and Defense Policy” 

The following questions/issues were posed to the panel for their deliberation.  

European Perspectives -- Should the U.S. be concerned about the ESDP Post Nice Summit?  What changed on the command arrangements?  What roles were created beyond regional peacekeeping for ESDP?  In the long run, what role is expected for NATO as the ESDP develops?  How can EU decision making be more transparent and avoid a EU block in NATO?   

U.S. Perspectives -- NATO should remain locus of defense planning.  Concern over outcomes at Nice.  The 3 D’s Approach.  What kind of capabilities should ESDP develop and how can DCI and ESDP Helsinki Headline Goals be meshed?  How can EU decision making be more transparent and avoid a EU Block in NATO?  Discuss the importance of keeping NATO consultations vital to US interests.  Explain US position of why non-EU states should have the right to participate in EU defense decisions. 

Alternate Solutions -- Give European allies more visibility bilaterally through NATO.  Make the EU responsible for maintaining links to NATO.  Coordinate bilaterally and multi-laterally with non-EU, NATO, and PFP members.  Advocate new EU force structures available to NATO that give incentives for improvements in areas of key capability.  Support constructive duplication. Set a positive agenda in NATO of issues central to U.S. security.  Ensure NATO’s primacy by making it the place the EU must come for US discussions of crises and decisions on assistance to EU operations. 

Panel Highlights 

Europeans want the U.S. to be involved in European security, and want the U.S. to participate in crisis management operations in Europe.  In crises necessitating a military response, Europe would prefer that the United States participate, and in such cases they will be NATO-led.  However, in situation when the United States chooses not to be engaged, there has to be an alternative.  It’s not healthy for the EU and the Europeans to be dependent upon the United States every time a problem comes up that necessitates a crisis response.  It’s not in the interest of Europe, nor in the interest of the United States.  

ESDP is a part of European integration, but is not a European army, has no mutual or collective defense guarantees, and no standing forces.  The ESDP should be seen as a complement to NATO, and provides a framework for close and continuous working relationships with NATO, by generating more capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management, compatible with and available to NATO, and adds both military and civilian perspectives. The EU has developed over the years a vast number of instruments to deal with security broadly, including trade instruments, humanitarian assistance, language and human rights training, training for border guards, and other activities.   

ESDP has established a Political and Security Committee (PSC), and a Military Committee, and are in the process of staffing them.  They have an exercise policy and program, are working on crisis management procedures, and have established a permanent link between the EU and NATO, creating strong and permanent institutional relations in matters of security and crisis management. The first meeting of the EU and NATO at the Ministerial level will take place in a week in Budapest.   

On the military capabilities included in the Headline Goals, the EU is identifying shortcomings and developing strategic capabilities, leading to a new capability commitment conference in November.  A review mechanism is being developed that will allow for a continuous planning and review process, ensuring that capabilities are compatible, coherent, and mutually reinforcing with NATO.   

The development of police capabilities has been a priority.  The EU aims to be able to deploy by 2003 up to 5,000 police officers on international missions, of which 1,000 should be deployed within 30 days, and intends to develop capabilities in the areas of legal and civil administration, civil protection, and so forth.   

The “Berlin Plus Package” addressing assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities, and other assets, remains to be sorted out.  If next week in Budapest, the NAC delivers on the consensus issue of assured access to NATO assets by the EU-led peace support operations, we will have come a long way from early 1990’s ideas for a European-led combined joint task force (CJTF).  One issue then was whether access to NATO assets was to be case-by-case, semi-automatic, or fully automatic, a deadlock largely broken by the evolution of ESDP.  Eventually, separable, but not separate forces will probably come true, especially if you consider the forces that have so far been pledged.   

The European Rapid Reaction Force is essentially all double-hatted forces, especially the officer leadership, where NATO and the EU share resources, and non-NATO officers are liaison officers to and familiar with the NATO structures.  The implementation of the ESDP in conjunction with NATO looks increasingly as a potentially sound game where everybody wins.  With the U.S. streamlining its forces, and focusing on other theaters, the fact that Europeans are willing and possibly able to deliver on capabilities and to take more responsibility in the European theater, will resolve itself to the common advantage.   

It is easier for most Europeans to deliver on capabilities if made in the name of a European project.  Even with a difficult domestic environment, European countries are moving in the right direction.  ESDP is about both capabilities and about European integration.  It is precisely because it is also about integration, that we are able to partially deliver on capabilities.  The amount of support that our citizens give to ESDP and to common defense policies is huge, compared to any other common policy EU policy.  The EU will increase defense spending, streamline and divert resources from some areas to others, and invest jointly in strategic capabilities.  No single EU member state has the financial and other resources to do that on its own.  No taxation without representation.  If Europe delivers, they will expect their viewpoint will be taken into consideration.      

Post St. Malo, the European sense was that the Americans would embrace ESDP because it was about increasing European military capabilities  -- what Washington’s been asking for.  When the post-Cologne announcement came it was met with a great deal of concern by the U.S. because it thought that we were building a European military pillar inside NATO, i.e., ESDI, agreed to in the April 1999 NATO Summit, then the EU went off and did something different in Cologne.  Part of the issue, too, was that the EU is not well understood in Washington.  Most Americans look at the EU, as principally an economic organization, and the idea of the EU taking on a defense role, seemed brand new. 

The U.S. would oppose an ESDP that would duplicate NATO capabilities and assets, and that would de-couple Europe from the U.S.  The U.S. concerned about the institutional integrity of NATO, and the possibility that this initiative could undermine NATO.  The Pentagon’s initial reaction, however, was that if it led to enhanced European military capabilities, that was good.  Today, however, there is  increasing skepticism about what the Europeans are doing, because of the potential for duplicating institutional structures without increasing capabilities.     

The EU, at its Nice Summit was quite clear about its three goals in its relationship with NATO.  It wanted assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities; presumed access to pre-identified assets and capabilities; and identification of a series of command actions, that would be made available to the EU.  Now, will there be agreement by Budapest, or by the NAC in June?   

Both Europeans and the Americans need to think about the division of labor that seems to be growing.  Neither the U.S. nor the Europeans are saying that we should go our separate ways, however, there is the potential tension between DCI and the Headline Goals.  At one level they are complementary; the Headline Goals are a sub-set of DCI.  But, the U.S. is concerned that if the Europeans decide that the Headline Goal is their goal, and do not put resources into some of the high-tech capabilities that the DCI calls for, that we’ll have a divergence of capabilities that would make it very difficult for the Europeans and Americans to participate in high-end military operations.   

Another issue is how much of its military resources the U.S. wants to put into the Balkans kind of peacekeeping missions, and shouldn’t we really be worrying about the Persian Gulf and Asia operations?  Some Europeans, on the other hand, are saying, “Look what we in Europe can really contribute to are these peacekeeping missions.  The Headline Goals are clearly focused on that type of contingency.  And that could leave you at a place where we really do have a division of labor. And while some would argue that that’s appropriate, in domestic political terms, that’s not tenable in the United States.   

When Congress voted on NATO enlargement they attached the “Kyl Amendment”, clearly saying that the Europeans need to support U.S.-led operations that are distant from Europe, that combat terrorism and WMD proliferation, and protect access to resources.  There is strong sentiment in Congress that the Europeans need to develop lighter, more mobile forces that are able to join U.S. forces in high intensity conflicts distant from NATO Europe. 

The EU and NATO have both learned from Bosnia, and are working better together in Kosovo, and in Macedonia, as well. The future of the EU is not in building a super-state, but will have both inter-governmental and community aspects, with some countries pushing for closer integration than others.  The U.S. will remain Europe’s most important partner, and has a stake in the EU’s future.  We should escape from the rhetoric about “the ESDP being a dagger pointed at the heart of NATO.”  The EU is not in the business of weakening NATO, but in constructing a Europe which is more able to deal with the brush fires in its own backyard, and which is a more credible and capable partner for the United States in dealing with the security problems throughout the world.   

Questions and Answers:   

The discussion focused on ESDP and the Balkans experience, interoperability and burden sharing, and U.S. perceptions on these issues.  One speaker suggested that ESDP grew out of our collective Balkans experience, that the U.S. got involved in Bosnia only after UNPROFOR failed; and the U.S. desire to wage a limited war with limited means (and ruling out, at least initially, the use of ground forces), had a profound affect on European thinking about its collective military requirements, and the potential for being able to operate without the U.S. in some contingencies.  ESDP is not and will not be a virtual exercise.  It will continue to be shaped by collective practical experience in conflict management. 

U.S. and European perceptions, and priorities may be different, but interoperability is required throughout the conflict spectrum.  Employing NATO standards will facilitate interoperability, and EU assets are essentially NATO assets.  Europe is already shouldering three-quarters of the manpower and financial requirements in the Balkans; burden sharing and responsibility sharing are working.  One suggested that “low-end” peacekeeping is in many ways more dangerous and more difficult than “high-end” conflict.  Peace implementation requires a sustained commitment of specialized military and civil implementation skills.  So, both the U.S./NATO and the EU have much in common, can and should work harder toward common ends.  

The Administration is having some difficulty in figuring out the right balance between responsibility sharing and sharing decision-making.  Its unique power position in the world makes its decisions appear unilateral.  In spite of the tension and acrimony however, everyone would agree that the U.S. and Europe are one another’s best allies.

Panel III:  “The Balkans and Future Transatlantic Responses – What Kind of Durable Peace?” 

Questions/Issues for Consideration:  

Future European security thinking will be dominated by the Balkans experience.  What impact has the Balkans experience had on transatlantic ties?  Is United States participation a choice or a necessity?  Discuss the impact and scope of future U.S. involvement/effort in the Balkans.  Can a common allied implementation strategy – can it be achieved?  Can Europe deliver required military capabilities?  Is EU, OSCE, or NATO paramilitary force the long-term solution to keeping the peace in the Balkans?  Why?  Why not?  Is new burden sharing possible?  Can Europe manage regional peace implementation without the United States?  What objectives does the EU have in the Balkans (as they refer to CFSP, and ESDP)?  How are these objectives similar and different from NATO and U.S. objectives?  If NATO should withdraw from the Balkans, would the EU deal with the Balkans as they do now, or would it be different?  What new concepts of burden sharing are required to keep the peace?  How much of what kind of military presence is enough?  Is there European consensus on how to implement peace in Kosovo?  If so, what is it?  If not, why not and what should it be?  Propose a long-term strategy to create tolerant democratic societies in the Balkans.  What civil and economic mandates should be proposed for Bosnia and Kosovo? 

Panel Highlights 

The Croat and Serb nationalists still pose serious problems in Bosnia, and dissolution of Yugoslavia continues.  Podgorica and Pristina have achieved a large measure de-facto independence from Belgrade in the past few years, but the status of Montenegro and Kosovo remains unresolved.  Pristina, Tirana, and Skopje are all embroiled in the issue of Greater Albania to greater or lesser degrees.  Nevertheless, democratic processes are proving be an antidote to violence.   

The foci of current potential conflict are Podgorica and Skopje.  Pro-independence forces in Podgorica have enough votes to call and perhaps win a referendum, but not enough to make the referendum legally valid or to implement an independence decision.  Both pro- and anti-independence forces in Montenegro and Serbia have made it clear that they will refrain from violence and seek their ends through constitutional means.  A negotiated solution is possible and desirable, but will require a stronger dialogue, not only between Belgrade and Podgorica, but also among Montenegrins.  The main international concern should not be the outcome, but rather the process.  If the process is peaceful and negotiated, there is no outcome that will set a negative precedent for Bosnia or Kosovo.   

In Skopje, the situation is tense and polarized due to Albanian extremist attacks, which are within a whisker of precipitating conflict among ordinary citizens.  The formation of a broad government coalition that includes all the major political parties is a step in the right direction.  But President Trajkovski is in a race:  can he produce results in the political negotiation before the guerrillas are successful in tearing the country apart?  The U.S. Government, as well as our European Allies have wisely awakened to the need to give him ample support.  The Europeans, with Solana as point man, have made a good start, but have neglected too much the security dimension.  The guerrillas are not going to disappear because a new government is formed.  We are going to have to build enormous pressure to force them to withdraw.  Macedonia poses real risks to regional stability.  Its collapse would dramatically undermine U.S. interests in Europe and beyond. 

When Croatian President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan took office less that a year and a half ago, Zagreb was a troublemaker in Bosnia and a scourge to the Croatian Serbs.  Today, Zagreb is a good neighbor of Bosnia and has begun to make amends for its treatment of its Serb citizens.  Last weekend’s municipal elections failed to obliterate the remainders of the Tudjman regime, and progress on refugee returns may continue to be difficult.  But the direction is nevertheless clear. 

Inside Bosnia, the remarkable turnaround in Zagreb has made deprived Croat nationalists of support.  Their efforts to undermine the Dayton agreements and Bosnian sovereignty are the death throes of a criminal/extremist enterprise.  The Croat rebellion has inspired nationalists in Republika Srpska to renew violent resistance to multi-ethnic Bosnia with riots in Banja Luka and Trebinje.  This must be taken seriously.   

In Sarajevo, there are at last non-nationalist governments of the Croat/Bosniac Federation and of the Bosnian state.  The central government should be strengthened, but with sensitivity to the need for strong local governments.  The Bosnian “entities”, the two nationalist-dominated halves of the country, the former warring parties, should be weakened and their capacity to interfere with refugee returns should be eliminated. 

Progress in Bosnia requires greater cooperation from Belgrade, where change is real, but slow.  Important steps have been taken:  the arrest of Milosevic, careful handling of the Albanian extremists in southern Serbia, cut-off of payments to the Bosnian Serb Army, beginnings of an attack on corruption and the arrest of some people accused of war crimes in Kosovo.  People in Belgrade are no longer afraid, but large parts of the old regime remain in place.  Police and judiciary are unreformed.  President Kostunica appears more comfortable governing with the support of an unreformed Army than with the support of Zoran Djindjic, a reforming, but unpopular prime minister of Serbia.   

Serbian nationalism today is taking less virulent forms, but segments of the leadership and population continue to blame everyone but themselves for the suffering of the past 10 years and some even harbor lingering dreams of a Greater Serbia.  The West moved too quickly to disarm itself diplomatically vis-à-vis Yugoslavia.  We now have little leverage. 

Albania has made major progress since the collapse of early 1997.  Democratic institutions there are far from consolidated, but they are strengthening.  Economic growth is strong.  Parliamentary elections are being prepared.  And there is hope that the major opposition party will not only participate, but accept the results.  And all but a few people in Albania recognize that Greater Albania is a myth, one not worth pursuing. 

While last fall’s municipal election in Kosovo have been an important step forward, major improvement there requires a Kosovo-wide governing structure with democratic legitimacy.  Elections this fall will not be too soon.  Only by having democratically elected representatives who can be held accountable will Kosovo begin to become a more normal place.  And only by participating in those elections can Serbs and other minorities assert their rights and ensure their reintegration into Kosovo.   

The Kosovo elections will be won by Albanian parties committed to independence.  But no change in the status of Kosovo is possible without a new UN Security Council resolution.  Kosovo’s status depends ultimately on reaching an accommodation between Belgrade and Pristina.  Whatever Kosovo’s ultimate status, it will need good relationships with Serbia for security and economic reasons.  Chasing Serbs from their homes and mistreating other minorities will make it more difficult to reach such an accommodation. 

What does all this mean for the United States?  It means that perseverance in the right direction brings result.  While no one can be happy so long as Serbs are mistreated in Kosovo, or extremist rebellion threatens Macedonia and Bosnia, the situation is dramatically improved from 10 years ago.  We are now dealing with a “two percent” problem of bad actors, not national leaderships, supported by a large part of the population, bent on war.  Concerted action by Europe and the United States, with many other countries pitching in, is slowly consolidating support for democracy, free markets and protection of human rights as the shared goals of most people in the Balkans. 

The U.S. and our European partners need to learn how better to defeat extremists and strengthen moderates.  We did badly to rely heavily on Milosevic and Tudjman after Dayton, and we do badly when we fail to react vigorously to their political heirs inside Bosnia.  We could do better in preventing men, money, and arms from reaching Albanian extremists in Macedonia and Kosovo, where they constitute a threat to U.S. soldiers and to the sovereignty of Macedonia.  The Administration has not moved aggressively enough to end support flowing from the U.S. to the guerrillas in Macedonia, and the international community has been timid in protecting itself from extremists in Bosnia.   

Essential to any effort to defeat extremists is establishment of the rule of law.  The security problems we still face all involve criminal as well as political elements.  Once the ethnic problems of the Balkans are long gone and forgotten, organized crime and trafficking of all sorts will remain.  The U.S. needs to refocus a major portion of its assistance efforts to support police and independent judiciaries.  The rule of law should be part of a broader effort to establish stronger states in the Balkans.  Even without ethnic problems, Macedonia would have difficulties, because it is a weak state, like Albania, which suffered massive refugee outflows and internal violence without any ethnic tension.   

The U.S. will not be stuck in the Balkans forever.  The essential question is this:  “What conditions need to be fulfilled in order to allow the Europeans to take over the military role in Bosnia?”  There is no military threat in Bosnia today that European troops cannot handle.  Residual U.S. capabilities may be needed for the foreseeable future, but at some point Europe should be able to take over the rest of the military function in Bosnia as part of its effort to develop its own capabilities.  The NATO deployment to Bosnia in 1995 saved the Alliance.  A European force there could save the European pillar. 

The main reason for U.S. troops to remain is to reassure both Europeans and Bosnians that the U.S. is not disengaging.  Discussions of withdrawal send a signal that encourages extremists and undermines moderates throughout the region.  A more unified civilian implementation structure with strong U.S. participation would help.  The next stage of NATO’s life in Bosnia is to be known as “DFOR.” and should stand not only for “deterrent force”, but also for “democracy force.”  Whatever its composition, its objectives should include support to the establishment of self-sustaining democratic institutions, which are essential to an exit strategy that does not precipitate a new war. 

In Kosovo, only the U.S. has the credibility with both Albanians and Serbs to ensure that the European-led force is able to stay on top of the situation.  It will be some time before democratic institutions there are strong enough to counter criminality, ethnic hatred and political extremism.  The U.S. needs to stay, and to improve its effectiveness in cracking down on extremists of all ethnic groups. 

The U.S. has invested more than $20 billion in Balkans peace efforts.  Europeans have spent much more.  Now is not the time to write off our investment, not when we’re close to its paying dividends.  We need to stay the course, and finish what we started.   

The Balkans have been a laboratory for post-Cold War European security over the last decade, and we’ve learned a number of important lessons in the process.  Prior to the mid-90’s we practiced burden-shedding, not burden-sharing; we engaged in a division of labor, not shared responsibility.  The results were disastrous in the Balkans, and in terms of Alliance relationships.  This was eventually recognized on both sides of the Atlantic.  The decision to move together toward Dayton, to a more robust effort to address the problems in the Balkans in a common and coordinated fashion was a major improvement.  Even then Dayton was rather rough.  We weren’t used to dealing institutionally NATO with the EU, or the United States with Europe, in these kinds of circumstances.  None of us had a lot of experience in peace implementation, and peace operations.  

Implementing Dayton, we created a flawed model for post-conflict implementation.  We emphasized NATO as the sole institution capable of dealing with the situation, and under-emphasized the civil aspects of implementation, and the civilian structure, which in the end is NATO’s ticket out.  The U.S. consciously sought to weaken civilian implementation, something it now regrets.  And we ended up with a civilian implementation structure that was badly divided.  There are essentially three separate organizations doing civilian implementation.  The OSCE does elections and democracy, the High Representative does the development of government structures, and the UN does police and security.  Nobody is in charge of economic development. 

In the pre-Kosovo crisis we made more use of the Contact Group, a vehicle giving both Russia and the European Union a role in the diplomacy.  The Europeans took the lead in the Rambouillet Conference, and produced the result most people had intended for it.  One difference between Dayton and Rambouillet is that we did the bombing before we did Dayton, and did the bombing after we did Rambouillet.  Without the use of force you were not going to get a successful result in either of these endeavors.  Rambouillet  created a basis for international solidarity in sustaining the bombing campaign, which in turn produced the peace.  Interactions between NATO and the European Union during the Kosovo crisis were remarkable, but not much remarked upon.  The EU became, along with NATO, an interchangeable vehicle for enunciating Western policy, influencing Western opinion toward the war, and for establishing the conflict termination goals.  Ultimately the EU, not NATO, actually sat down with Milosevic, along with a Russian representative, and brought about the peace, while the actual terms were negotiated in a G8 context, in which the EU and also the United States were represented.  This was a fascinating experience in real world transatlantic NATO-EU collaboration. 

In post-Kosovo the US and its allies put in place a peace implementation framework that set up a single structure for civil implementation, on a hierarchical basis, and includes all of the relevant organizations, with clear leadership.  Secondly, unlike Bosnia where said that international police there would have no guns, arms, executive authority, or arrest authority, in Kosovo we reversed that.  There are 5,000 international police, a 1,000 of them are actually gendarmerie-type units of organized, heavily armed riot control police, who operate on UN authority, and are a useful alternative in lower-end conflict, and potential conflict situations to KFOR.  In the post-Kosovo era, NATO and the EU have collaborated very closely.  And we’re seeing the same thing in Macedonia, where Solana and Robertson sort of go down there as a tag-team, visit together, go to meetings together.  And they demonstrate by being together, that the international community is approaching the crisis in a unified way. 

While all of this has been going on, there has been a parallel discussion within NATO and within the EU about development of structures for European security and defense, and the structures between NATO and the EU to facilitate their collaboration.  These discussions have been a lot harder than the discussions we’ve had on the real problems of the Balkans and war and peace in Kosovo.   

The Washington Summit in April 1999 should be known for two things.  First, the major NATO leaders decided to that they had better begin planning for the possible use of ground troops in Kosovo.  They did that quietly and quickly, once they realized that the air campaign might not succeed in time.  Second, it issued a long communiqué establishing a set of guidelines and documents to cover the future development of NATO-EU cooperation as the EU developed its defense capacity.  The latter was much more difficult to negotiate, and took more time.   

ESDP shouldn’t be oversold.  Can Europe develop a capacity to intervene, project force, conduct peace operations on its own?  Yes. However, because it’s a coalition of 4 or 5 equal-sized countries, and a dozen other smaller ones. The decision-making will be much slower, and the capacity to surge force is much lower than it will be with a U.S. led coalition.   

One danger of the ESDP is not that NATO and the EU are going to get into a competition, but quite the contrary.  The real danger is that they will engage in an “Alphonse-Gaston” routine, in which each of them will urge the other to take on some particular responsibility.  It’s reasonable for the Europeans to want to create an option for themselves to act in circumstances in which the United States chooses not to act.  On the other hand, by creating an option for themselves they create an option for the U.S. not to act in circumstances where it might be in U.S. interest to act. 

US policy in the Balkans is not self-determination, or immutability of borders.  US policies essentially revolve around keeping faith with the undertakings we made at Dayton and those that ended the Kosovo War.  At Dayton we set up a less than perfect structure for inter-ethnic relations in a single state, and we need to implement that, to make it work for the people of Bosnia and for those outside of Bosnia who are willing to work with us to make those arrangements work.  It doesn’t mean they can’t be improved, but it means we’re not going to walk away from them.  In UN Resolution1244 ending the Kosovo conflict, we set up the process in which Kosovo is to go through a stage of international administration, to a stage of local self-government, and eventually to a final status determination, with the recognition that a final status determination is not possible until attitudes in Serbia and in Kosovo had matured to the point where they are able to accommodate some solution.  That hasn’t happened yet, and won’t for some time.   

The US and its allies need to keep faith with the countries of the region that’ve all been promised that ultimately, they can become full members in the key Western institutions, NATO and the European Union.  Our policies in the region are focused on sustaining the enlargement process in NATO, and the European Union.  And we must also keep faith with allies.  Only a common effort in the region will mold this intractable environment, drawing down forces on a collaborative basis through NATO as a common process, and recognizing “that we went in together, that we will come out together.”  We haven’t created the capacity on the civil side to take over peace enforcement activities in any significant way, and it’s going to continue to be difficult. 

We have learned some lessons.  Kosovo showed a great deal more collaboration and good sense on the two sides of the Atlantic, than the rather horrifying experiences in Bosnia.  The emergence of democratic governments in Croatia and in Serbia is quite important.  The situation in Belgrade is far from consolidated, but there is a government there, with whom we can and should work.  The emergence of a reform minded government in Croatia is one with whom we can move towards closer collaboration and cooperation with the European Union.  Both are key and without them going right, nothing will go right.   

Other states in the region have less clear prospects, and that that remains true of Bosnia.  Bosnia is not really yet, a self-generating country.  It is divided into two awkward parts, and getting cooperation across the inter-entity boundary is still a problematic issue.  Bosnia is not a failed-state, nor is it yet a self-generating one.  It needs a continuing international presence.  One of the difficulties is how you wean the local community from international dependence.  If too soon, you destroy the prospects for self-generation; if you stay around after people can look after their own affairs, you create a dependence mentality.  We can streamline and reduce the numbers, but will need to remain there for some time to come. 

The continuing turbulence in Kosovo and the very fragile state in Macedonia are frightening.  If things go wrong in Macedonia we may have a failed state.  Macedonia could do real damage to everything else that has been achieved.  When we went into Bosnia, we had in mind that if we didn’t manage to contain conflict in the northern Balkans and the mid-Balkans, they were sure to spread to the southern Balkans, and the southern Balkans were a much greater tinderbox than the north.   

The Balkans were a profound shock to the European system.  The European Union is still a work in progress, and up until the debacle in the Balkans, the EU was still pursuing a largely declaratory common foreign and security policy, but it had never been asked to bear any weight.  The Balkans changed the landscape completely.  It forced us into doing a number of things, for one, to take a common line.  It has had a huge effect on bringing about the acceptance among Europeans that a single policy, genuinely pursued by all of us is key to any kind of success.   

It has made the Europeans understand that you don’t conduct a foreign policy that will be taken seriously in the rest of the world unless you are able to threaten the use of force, and be taken seriously for it.  ESDP, in terms of a Headline Force of 60,000, is not going to be ready to affect the situation in the Balkans.  However, European forces in the future under ESDP, can credibly be forces that are expected to take on peacekeeping, perhaps not peace enforcement in high-end conflict situations, but peacekeeping, yes.  In areas where it is very clear that there is a transatlantic interest the   U.S. needs to play a role, otherwise it won’t be credible.  There are real limitations to what the Europeans can do by themselves.  On the other hand, let us not underestimate the importance of getting credibility and confidence on the part of the Europeans to make a foreign policy pro-actively, particularly in the area of crisis prevention.     

In the longer run, what is the Balkans future?  And will they become part of the EU?  The European Union itself has to undergo change and reform in order to take in other countries, a difficult process.  One has to be realistic about further enlargements.  But the EU has instruments short of membership that constitute great benefit to countries lying on the edge of the union.  These need to be developed:  the close customs union, aid, and access to training, rights of consultation, rights of cooperation, rights of close meetings, extensive technical and other exchange.  Those features also tend to act as guarantors of good behavior.  They are powerful levers, over time, of getting countries to understand the limits of democratic behavior on the European continent.  Actual membership may not be as critical as close relations with the European Union. 

In the development of the ESDP, the US will undoubtedly have considerable arguments about distribution of the cost, which is an issue that is not being tackled at all.  There is a danger that those who already make a serious military effort by European standards will be invited to make a more serious military effort, whereas those who don’t make much of an effort, will try to get away with not doing very much more.  Having said that, it’s something that the U.S. should actually support.  The days are gone when the Europeans as a whole are going to be willing to be persuaded to make a further effort on the defense front within the framework of existing structures.  It may be regrettable that Europeans are not willing to do that in the name of NATO, but most Europeans are not.  It is not sensible for American policy to try to discourage ESDP’s formation.  The U.S. should support it on its own terms, rather than pouring on a certain amount of skepticism and negative comment on the effort.  Because, at the end of the day, it ought to be part of the U.S strategy for the Balkans. 

Questions and Answers:  

Several key issues were addressed.  Among them were: US/NATO and the EU/ESDP institutional evolution, “in-together/out-together” and continuing role of U.S. in Balkans, ultimate success or failure of ethnic cleansing, role and composition of a “democracy force”, usefulness of the Stability Pact, and continuing influence of Russia, China and the Islamic world on the Balkans and surrounding areas for U.S. policy. 

Is there a middle ground for the U.S. between being completely passive with respect to the development of institutions, but not jamming the Europeans?  Is there a risk of incoherence with respect to future choices on peacemaking, who leads, who follows, and who is our contact from the NATO perspective?  The invention of the political-military committee is going to become an important part of the decision-making machinery. It is the natural interlocutor on these issues with non-EU NATO Allies, and will become a focal point of our transatlantic dialogue, and also of the EU’s own machinery.   

How important is the “in-together, out-together” policy toward future crisis interventions?  Is it based on an underlying mistrust?  The issue is not whether you should do it together, but whether it needs to be done, and what forces are necessary to do it.  We started with 60,000 in Bosnia, and it’s down to 18,000 now and further reductions are on the table.  You can’t have a seat at the diplomatic table if you’re not represented on the ground, because you’re not sharing the responsibilities, nor the physical and political risks of exposing your forces to the consequences of your political actions.  The Europeans believe that the United States has unique weight in the diplomacy of the region by virtue of its military presence.  And if the diplomacy were robbed of the weight of American military presence, it would be less likely to achieve the transformation necessary to allow the complete withdrawal of military forces. 

Do we end up with states that are politically stable, but where ethnic cleansing carries the day?  In Bosnia refugees are returning at an increasing rate.  The risk there is not in having a failed state because the international presence there will prevent that.  The risk is having an artificially crippled state, which never succeeds in self-generation.  Macedonia is more serious.  A failed state there does not necessarily mean an ethnic state, but perpetual turmoil, lack of authority, and a state of lawlessness and banditry, and it can destabilize its neighbors.  There is no way of creating ethnic states in the Balkans that doesn’t guarantee future wars.  No one has put forward a concrete proposal that doesn’t lead to a series of irredentist actions that would destabilize the situation totally. 

 Can you suggest a “democracy” force that would have something more than police, armed or disarmed, and something less than combat military units, a military police-type entity, and where do they come from?  A European Headline Goal of 60,000 including 5,000 international police for civilian crisis management sounds like the right kind of force, but the mission is conflict prevention and crisis management, not long-term baby-sitting, or whatever.  Where are they to come from, and what should be the U.S. contribution to such a democracy force?  As you get to the later stages of a peacekeeping operation, it presumes that a number of the law and order functions have already been transferred to the locals, and if you’re still doing basic law and order that you haven’t got very far.  If a local police force is in operation, and the local law is respectful enough to enforce, it may still need some backup from an international constabulary force that is not visible every day.  It stands behind the administration, and it ensures that the local administration will actually be fair and non-violent.  It requires a very sophisticated form of military training.  One of the main features is to be in very close contact with the local population.  It’s not that they’re invisible, they are out doing things that make them part of the community, and which creates confidence between them and the locals.  At the same time, when asked to solve a problem, their function is to find the right official to do it.  They may be standing behind him, but he’s the one who does it.  It’s a guarantee function, and a transfer of authority, keeping the authority with the locals.  Individual policemen are too expensive, and don’t carry the organizational infrastructure needed to do the job.  In the end it’s probably going to be done by soldiers, but it is a constabulary function, and the U.S. needs to decide that it actually needs these kinds of soldiers too. 

What is the assessment of the Stability Pact, and where is going in the future?  While the main instrument for channeling Southeast Europe in desirable directions is the prospect for NATO and EU membership, an interim status or institution can assist in re-shaping their societies.  The virtue of the Stability Pact is that it is led by the United States and Europe together; it’s not a purely European or purely Atlantic institution.  It clearly was an important symbolic instrument in bringing about the democratization in Yugoslavia.

One thing, which is quite important, in wanting to become the preferred partner of NATO or the EU, is that you have to cooperate with your neighbor.  Having good relations with the EU, and having awful relationships with your neighbor is not the name of the game.   

In light of larger geo-strategic implications for Southeastern Europe, what do we need to think about in terms of longer-range strategic objectives with Russia, and China in the Balkans?  The Russians have lost influence in the Balkans over the last couple of years by reason of their association with Milosevic, their indecisiveness when it was clear that that regime was collapsing, and the general mistrust that’s an aftermath of the Warsaw Pact.  Their influence is not negligible, however, and Russian influence has been helpful in their role as members of KFOR and SFOR.  They are very significant troop contributors, and their troops generally are doing a good job.  The Chinese influence, particularly now that Milosevic is gone, is negligible in the region.  

Panel IV:  “NATO and European Union Enlargement” 

Questions/Issues for Consideration:   

Will NATO enlargement strengthen or weaken the transatlantic link (through EU-NATO cooperation or competition)?  Predict the future of NATO and its political and military role in fostering European security, and fostering U.S. national interests in the region.  Is expansion of NATO in the best interest of the U.S.?  Europe?  Why?  Why not?  Will NATO itself be strengthened or weakened by enlargement in terms of her military capacity and/or political stabilizing role?  Will enlargement impact the future of PFP and the MAP?  Assuming enlargement, what criteria should be adhered to for future enlargement of both NATO and the EU?  Who are the candidates and why or why not should they be considered?  Should NATO enlargement proceed ahead of EU enlargement?

 Panel Highlights 

Politicians, opinion makers, and journalists have been asking whether NATO has arrived at a turning point, or whether we should be rethinking the transatlantic partnership from the beginning.  Every time someone predicts the imminent decline of NATO, it proves to be false, and exaggerated.  NATO is still alive and doing rather well after five decades. 

The NATO enlargement process, seen from this perspective, is much more than a cross-transatlantic fight.  It is a glue.  It represents one of the two powerful institutions willing and able to make Europe more free and more European than ever.  Whether NATO and the EU are actually working in tandem to achieve these noble goals is questionable.  But it can not be disputed that objectively their work represent two sides of the same coin.   

NATO was the first of the key Western institutions to successfully adapt to the changing realities of the post-Cold War era.  By bringing about the first round of enlargement in 1999, NATO has adequately addressed the most recent emerging challenges.  NATO’s decisions regarding the gradual opening toward Central Europe constitutes a clear signal regarding the selection of systemic reforms.  The idealistic perspective of membership in NATO was often a key factor in bringing about domestic changes in applicant countries, and encouragement for addressing problems with their neighbors like ethnic and minority problems.  Bringing in three new members of Central Europe into NATO not only increased the stability of the entire sub-region, but also created a unique source of hope for those who were not included in the first round.  The EU has yet to prove that its strategy to build a wider Europe is successful.  NATO’s strategy has been the major force stimulating and shaping the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe to date. 

Poland strongly supports the second round of NATO enlargement.  It wants to be surrounded by allies as Germany did a few years ago.  Without continuing the enlargement process NATO will not be able to maintain its primary role in guaranteeing European security.  Open door policies and principles are important for stability across Europe.  Support in Western Europe for a second round of enlargement is weak now, and Russia will oppose it.  And there are no clear leaders among the applicant countries.   

NATO’s enlargement will be an important step forward in an unfinished job of NATO’s adaptation, and Europe’s transformation started in 1989.  The momentum of the enlargement process must be maintained.  The development of Partnership for Peace, and MAP (Membership Action Program) cannot substitute for NATO enlargement.  The meeting in Prague will define the Alliance role in building a new Europe.  NATO will either continue to enlarge, or it will gradually lose its relevance to the EU if it brings in new members and solidifies its security and defense policies, beginning in 2004.   

From the U.S. perspective, enlargement should be seen as a way to develop and to consolidate the success in Central and Eastern Europe of which America was so much a part.  Enlargement in 2002 should lead to yet another enlargement over the first decade of the 21^st Century leading to a NATO in 2010 to 2015 comparable to the number of members to the EU.  It is too early and inadvisable to tell where the future boundaries of NATO should be drawn.  Future membership of Russia and Ukraine remains today as unpredictable as their own futures.  By extending the enlargement process indefinitely, NATO will stay politically active in shaping Europe, and in its complementary function to the EU.     

NATO enlargement, if done right, will strengthen the Alliance.  New countries in Central and Eastern Europe are still believers in NATO’s future.  They want NATO to stay strong at a time when some Europeans and Americans see it as a worn out institution that should be replaced gradually by new mechanisms, linking the EU institutions.  NATO must actively function in European security, and that is what NATO enlargement is all about. 

NATO enlargement is one of the unifying features between the Alliance and Europe.  It is a visionary aspect of what the United States and Europe can do.  The enlargement of NATO is a certification of a positive, constructive American presence in Europe, and it fulfills the vision of “a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”  Essentially the United States and the Western European countries were successful in the post World War II period of using its institutions to bring together countries that had lived in conflict with each other for many years, and it can work in Central and Eastern Europe, as well.   

The Alliance is not just a political alliance, as important as that is for the political development, and also the value development of Europe, it is also a military alliance.  The military alliance requires a rigorous analysis of what contributions countries that come into the Alliance bring with them.  This was seriously debated in the last round, and will be seriously debated this time, as well.  Whether it’s peacekeeping or peacemaking in the Balkans, or the credible ability to threaten or to use force, you need to take in countries that provide some sort of a contribution.  That’s why it is so important that countries make the effort to reform or build up their militaries.  But just because you make it into the Alliance doesn’t mean that we’re going to stop badgering you.  If you think we were tough on you before you got into the Alliance, wait until you get in.  The capabilities argument, the pressure that the United States puts on its European Allies, to meet their commitments, and to meet military requirements for the future, is enormous.  And a lot of countries in the Alliance are not meeting the same kinds of rigorous standards that we are trying to place on candidates for the Alliance. 

One of the truly innovative features that came out of the last round was the Membership Action Plan, combining a standardized set of criteria with information from the candidate countries themselves, on progress they are making in meeting specific goals.

It is important for countries to set realistic goals, and then work hard to achieve them.  We should not lose sight of the military requirement, and we will continue to press aspirants to meet them.  The MAP process gives you a base upon which to make a determination on the political level whether or not to take in these countries.

There is a question on bringing in a larger number of countries, at what point do you cross the threshold in NATO, at which the diffusion of decision-making authority actually undermines the institution?  Unlike the EU, where it’s very serious problem, given the way the decision-making has to be done with weighted voting, at NATO it is very clear:  one state, one vote, and decisions are based on clear security issues.  NATO is a consensus-building organization, and you have clear decisions to make.  And these values are what tie the countries together.  The way NATO operates, we can manage increased numbers.  If you look at NATO’s decision-making capability when it went from 16 to 19, and then a few weeks later we went to war, the decision-making capability of the Alliance in that structure worked.   

The United States sees EU enlargement is a wonderful thing, but would like to see it begin.  If we’re going to have an institutional approach to bringing all of these countries together, and if we get these processes started and coordinated, than neither of them will conflict with each other.  They will help each other.   

What do you do about the Baltic States?  It is a key issue here in Washington, and the key issue in Moscow.  Our policy is that geography should be no limitation on your ability to join, your performance should determines whether you can join or not, and the ability of a country to deal with its neighbors today is an indication of how they will deal with their neighbors in the future.  The Baltics all get high marks on that.  In addition, no country has a veto over NATO enlargement.  We decide that as members of NATO.   

Both NATO and EU enlargement processes are designed to be complementary.  Both of them contribute to security and stability in Europe.  NATO enlargement increases military security and stability in Europe; EU enlargement increases non-military security and stability in Europe.  That leads of course to the question of whether it is in the interests of the Alliance and the EU to have identical memberships in their organizations?  One shouldn’t make it compulsory.  Leave it to each candidate country to which organization it wants to belong.   

If you look at the motivations of countries in Central and Eastern Europe in joining the Alliance, it is very clear that they want to be more secure, because they feel somewhat insecure vis-à-vis a close neighbor, which from their point of view is not as predictable as they want him to be.  Or, to put it another way, Russia is not boring enough for them.  And they want to become a member of NATO where the U.S. has the leading role.  Only the U.S. provides the security they are looking for.  And whether European countries like it or not, the U.S. as the leading member of the Alliance is the prime organization for Central and Eastern European countries to seek membership.   

The intra-Alliance function of providing transparency in NATO has all but been forgotten.  This function is at the very heart of the success of the Alliance.  Only because of transparency, has it been possible to develop enough confidence and trust between NATO members, and to diffuse tension, which may have occasionally come into existence.  This is of utmost importance.   And the fact that candidates for NATO membership are already trying to eliminate problems among themselves or with NATO members.  This is an indication that they do not want to burden this intra-Alliance function.  The key word here de-nationalization of security and defense policies, because by transferring a part of your sovereignty to NATO, you lay the basis for this transparency and trust, which we have been enjoying for more than five decades.   

It is too simplistic to say that Russia is strictly against any NATO enlargement.  They have mild objection in the case of some countries, stronger objection in others.  We should work quietly with those in Russia who are not against NATO enlargement. 

Whatever decision we make in the next year in Prague, we should think about the next steps.  What comes after the second round of enlargement?  What kind of NATO do we want to have in the future?  What kind of internal changes do we have to make in order to make sure that an Alliance, which is functioning on the basis of consensus, is in the future as efficient as it has been in the past?  The discussion should not only center on the nine current candidate countries, but also on the implications of any further enlargement, but also what it means for any further steps that might be in a third round of enlargement?  Nobody knows.  If you look back ten years, nobody would have dared to think in the early 90’s that today we would have a permanent joint council with Russia, nor an information office in Moscow, nor a KFOR operation in Kosovo with Russian participation.  One should not exclude any option for the future, and in not excluding any option, we should weigh the possible consequences of any decisions for the second round of enlargement.    

Questions and Answers:  

Issues addressed included the prognosis for future European borders and the possible inclusion of Russia, the impact of the Schengen Agreement, whether the existence of NATO has retarded Europe’s defense development, if enlargement expectation have been oversold, whether MAP or political criteria would determine accession decisions, and how changing threat perceptions by the U.S. would be perceived in Europe. 

What are the future borders of Europe likely to look like?  It is really a question of the boundaries of institutional Europe, NATO and the EU.  It would be premature and unwise to forecast the future of institutional Europe.  The magnet of Europe plays such an important role, that to take this magnet away would be detrimental to the European landscape, and to the creation of a wider Europe.  It may be that some countries in Europe will belong to some set of European institutions, but not to other sets, some may be partly in and partly out.  There will be a degree of transparency without rigid divisions between institutional arrangements.  All in all, it’s good to open the prospects of European institutional integration for all European countries, defined in a larger sense, that want to seriously ponder and contemplate such a future for themselves.   

Russia hasn’t specifically excluded the possibility of joining NATO.  NATO hasn’t seriously considered it, and is probably not ready to do so at the moment.  However, neither one is probably ready to do so.  Both the U.S. and Europe would rather see Russia integrated with Europe, and to develop in such a way that it could be considered for membership at some future time.  

How will adoption and implementation of the Schengen Agreement affect access to the EU, by Poland and others?  There are many threats to stability and security.  The growing social and economic disparity between the EU and several of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, like Poland, the Slovak Republic, and the Baltic States represents a major challenge for all of us.  This is a problem that the EU and its aspirants need to work on together.  We will need to develop strategies to address those countries that will not be insiders for the foreseeable future.  But, we don’t want “insiders and outsiders”, with all the ensuing consequences.  And such a division on the economic or social level would not be a good thing for Europe. 

Has NATO and the U.S. dominance in NATO hampered Europe in the formulation of a harmonized defense policy and defense industry, and perhaps independence from U.S. influence?  The U.S. has never viewed our engagement in Europe as being contradictory to what the EU wanted to do, or what the EU and NATO want to do.  To do so would end the Alliance.  On defense trade there have been enormous changes in terms of corporate structures and corporate relationships.  The U.S. has embarked upon a review and revision of its licensing procedures.  Today there is no American system, nor European system.  Every European system has a percentage of American components, and vice versa.  One of the key issues is, “Will our secrets be protected by the Allies?”  Defense trade is another one of those unifying things if we do it right.  If we can protect all of our secrets together, we will come out with the best machinery ever made by mankind.  We’ll do it better together.  This is an opportunity, not a disadvantage. 

NATO doesn’t need one more tank or soldier to deal with any security problem in Europe for the next 10 or 20 years.  What NATO does not know is how to build democracies.  Fledgling democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are contributing that stability that democracy brings to Europe, and constitute a greater contribution than any military contribution that they could possibly make.  It makes no sense to continue to ask these countries to make traditional military contributions, which NATO does not need, and to ignore the contribution they can make.  In order to make them feel a part of the NATO military establishment, they should be asked to contribute military police, transportation, hospital support, peacekeeping personnel, and similar non-combat related roles.  

The reality is that we should accelerate the pace of enlargement, and consolidate the zone of democracy.  From a military point of view it is not absolutely necessary that each country make enormous contributions.  There are indeed other emphases, which need to be addressed and are not in the military realm.  At the same time, there will be a need in the future to deal with crises, and after all non-military options have been exhausted, to make also the use of military means.  And if a country is not in a position to contribute to this crisis management, then it is out.  

One of NATO’s principal strengths is its collective defense.  The Alliance must remain strong in order to function effectively.  If the Alliance allows itself to gradually become impotent and weak, then it loses its effectiveness.  If we bring partners into the Alliance, that really do not contribute to any visible military or defense activity, we would be increasingly importing problems into the Alliance, and doing a disservice to the countries we were bringing in, except for the positive aspects of the programs we have put in place.  

We have proved that enlargement is feasible.  Have the expectations toward further enlargement been placed too high?  And how do you downplay those expectations without undermining the country efforts in the process?  Expectations have been managed quite well.  The MAP helps the countries themselves to assess their own progress.  We are also committed to an open door.  Once you achieve those things that you need in order to become a member, we’ll support you.  In addition, the aspirants themselves have come together and focused not on who is number one, but on why this is important for all of them.  We need to be creative about how we approach Prague in 2002, and look at the longer term implications of our actions on the internal functioning of NATO, the impact on the current aspirants, as well as on those and others later on.   

How much weight will the MAP process take versus the political decision-making processes in the enlargement decisions?  That’s a political decision.  The MAP will play a role.  Doing poorly on the MAP will hurt you, and the final decisions will be resolved through the Alliance consultation process. 

How will U.S. strategic thinking, particularly our increasing preoccupation in the Pacific region, and specifically China, play in Europe?  And should there be a systematic downturn in U.S.-China relations, can you speculate on the likelihood of a significant divergence or convergence of interests and views among our European allies? 

Even if this should happen, a global strategy should want to consolidate what is already secure, safe, and works very well, and transatlantic relationships will remain a more desirable beacon of US.’s security interests.  And if there is another major threat in the making, the U.S. will want to preserve what has been a strategy of over 50 years of transatlantic partnership and dialogue.  

Panel 5:  Summing Up:  A Summary Panel that reflects on what has been said about the transatlantic relationship, and sort out where we might be heading in the next four years. 

The word “crisis” was not used with regard to NATO or the EU.  That’s not to say whether that’s good or bad, because the Alliance seemed to do well when it was constantly in crisis.  Although the tone is certainly not very good in transatlantic relations right now on bananas, missile defense, on the Balkans, or on burden sharing, certainly no one is predicting its demise, and there’s a general sense that the Alliance will find a way through.  That said, there’s an awful lot of freight on the transatlantic rail.  And indeed, some have suggested that the Administration may have to choose between some of its priorities, perhaps between a big push on missile defense, and a big push on enlargement.  Or, given the European reluctance on both of those issues, that there will have to be a lot of hand-holding and maybe some compromises made with regard to the Balkans and ESDP, in order to get some of those other two priorities moved forward.  It’s going to be an interesting period.   

The Administration is clearly open to a discussion and consultation with the Allies and Russia on a cooperative transition.  That said, there is no transatlantic (including Russia) consensus on the nature of the threat.  And, indeed, there are fairly substantial European doubts about the technology, and about what the impact would be if the system were developed.  The concerns were not that it would enhance extended deterrence, as the Administration is arguing, but rather that it might strengthen U.S. unilateralism, and indeed, end up with a certain amount of U.S. isolationism.  However we did hear some interesting ideas about the issue of how do we manage the very difficult question of a cooperative transition as one moves away from the ABM Treaty, and tries to identify some other avenues that will provide assurance to various sides of the transatlantic divide during this period.  In particular, the notion of some kind of a U.S.-Russia mutual security treaty, again stressing security not defense, but some kind of understanding about the cooperative nature of the transition, and how stability might be enhanced during that period.  And finally, there was the notion that perhaps this issue of missile defense could be a productive one for discussions in the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, as a way to involve the Europeans and Russia in some kind of discussion on missile defense issues.   

There are some themes that are fundamentally true about the discussion about the EU building a better security and defense policy, both inside and autonomous of NATO, that we ought to struggle to come to terms with.  A lot of the acrimony, and animosity in the debate right now, is because it is in some ways, “a don’t you love me more than this?” discussion, on both sides of the Atlantic.  The U.S. is saying, “Don’t you love us enough to have us involved in the process?”  And the Europeans are saying, “Don’t you love us enough to give us a little sunshine, and give us some of the credit for what we’re doing?”  That’s not helpful, on either side of the Atlantic.   

The U.S. has a fundamental choice to make on whether we want the problems of a strong Europe or the problems of a weak Europe.  We should really want the problems of a strong and unified Europe.  Some of the painful lessons that Europeans learned about the limitations of their ability to use military force coercively in the Balkans, has made our European Union friends and allies more hesitant than they ought to be about that.  While it’s true that the U.S. spends twice on defense what the Europeans spend, the $160 billion a year that the EU countries spend on defense is not trivial.  They can and should be taking a leadership role and solving problems, and we ought to want them to.  There are going to be plenty of challenges to American interests that we are not going to want to be trying to wrestle control from our closest allies in order to manage them.  We’re going to need, and we ought to want friends and allies who will step forward and solve problems.   

What is also striking about the ESDP debate is how much the U.S. is underestimating what it brings both to managing crises and to managing fights.  We shouldn’t worry that the Europeans are going to shut us out.  The truth is that Europeans are going to almost always want us in any fight they are going to have to fight.  One reason the Europeans are not telling us this is that they are still smarting from a failure of American leadership in our not caring about Europeans, who are carrying risk, are apparently dispensable.  There will be enough difficulty in managing alliances, gathering coalitions of friends and allies to help us advance our interests in the world.  And it’s hard to get other people enthusiastic about fighting for you, or even with you.  Given the breadth of U.S. power in the world, it is going to make it hard for other people to feel useful.  We’re going to have to work a lot harder to make people who are willing to sign up and fight with us, feel appreciated in that process, than we have been doing for quite some time.   

The practical problems of “assured access” are going to be much harder than we are giving them credit for.  It means the U.S. ought to get serious about helping the EU find ways to act without the United States.  Europeans have got to find a way to have intelligence and other assets of their own.  But they are not going to be able to do this in the way that the U.S. does, for the simple reason that European governments are not going to spend the money.  They could, but they are not going to.  So, we need to put our heads together and help Europeans do this.   

The problems of the future may have to do more with buck passing, than competition for leadership of missions.  The European capacity to do enforcement is going to be quite limited.  So the notion that the U.S. will be overlooked and cast aside is a little surreal.  After all that has happened in the last ten years, the notion that either side would opt out fundamentally of any aspect of a large peace effort, whether it’s the diplomatic orchestration, the peace making, peace implementation or peace building, is wrong. 

The U.S. misjudged the difficulties of civil implementation in Bosnia and would do it differently (next time).  Force and diplomacy go hand-in-hand, not only with respect to influencing the people on the ground you want to influence, the warring factions, but also with respect to having a voice in collective decision-making.  In the absence of force, to be able to put some force on the table is going to affect the diplomatic dynamics, as well as the extent to which you are heard in the high councils of NATO or other organizations.  

There was agreement on the current situation on the ground in the region.  The northern tier of the Balkans is generally pretty good and moving in the right direction.  Bosnia is still out of the emergency ward, is convalescing, but may end up in long-term convalescence.  On the other hand, there are probably not military challenges there that could not be met by a European force, perhaps with the U.S. over the horizon.  Macedonia is a huge potential problem if it gets worse.  It is the one part of the former Yugoslavia that connects conflicts within former Yugoslavia to potential conflicts outside of former Yugoslavia, the Albanian minority in northern Greece, for example.  In addition, the point about no “a la carte” implementation on the civilian side didn’t work well in Bosnia, and more unitary chains of command are working better in Kosovo.  A need for a public security strategy involving neither on-the-beat community police, nor soldiers, but constabulary, was pretty well accepted.  Finally, on what constitutes a sustainable peace, remains a difficult question.  Serbia and Croatia look quite different.  to us now than they did a few years ago.  And over time that has to be a tremendous benefit, even if they flow in incremental benefit to greater stability in the region.   

As we move down the road in EU and NATO collaboration and cooperation, particularly in terms of the enlargement processes that are going on in both organizations, as well as on the level of military cooperation, the construction of the political-military committee within the EU seems to be a necessary tool or condition for bringing about some of that cooperation, and may, in fact, give us better clarity on how coordinated if at all, these two processes ought to be.   

On the NATO enlargement process, in isolation, there is a fundamental tension in terms of its military capabilities, vice the political, and political stabilizing role that it plays.