A Framework for Developing Niche Capabilities Using Security Cooperation:

Case Study of the “Prague 7” and South Caucasus/Central Asia Partners

Dr. Jennifer D.P. Moroney

RAND Corporation

Prepared for seminar entitled: “Developing and Deploying NATO’s Forces for the 21^st Century”

29 January 2004

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not reflect those of the RAND Corporation, the US Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Given the intensifying demands on the US and NATO to promote stability and security outside of the immediate European area, consideration is being given to the ability of NATO allies and non-allied Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries to contribute to NATO and coalition operations. Some fundamental questions to consider in this regard are: what capabilities are in the highest demand? What new roles might the new NATO allies and non-allied partners take on? What, if any, gap filling capabilities do these countries possess? What is the most effective way to improve the capabilities of these countries through US security cooperation, NATO/PfP training activities, or other bilateral programs offered by key NATO allies? If it is determined that a particular capability would not necessarily provide a net contribution to a coalition operation, to what extent should resources be allocated toward building that capability? In other words, there may be other potential net benefits to consider, such as improving interoperability with the Alliance or spurring internal military reform efforts, particularly with the less capable partners.

This paper will explore the capabilities of two rather distinct groups of countries—the “Prague 7”[1] (on the high end) and Eurasian partner countries in the South Caucasus[2] and Central Asia[3] (on the low end)—relative to the needs of ongoing NATO and coalition operations. A conceptual framework will be presented for thinking about niche capabilities/role specialization in a multilateral context with a wide range of coalition partners with varying capabilities. Policy options will be suggested for focusing US and NATO security cooperation resources toward building these capabilities, where appropriate. Prior to discussing the individual capabilities of these countries, it would useful to first define the term “niche capability” as a starting point.

Conceptualizing “niche capabilities”

Concisely, niche capabilities should generally be thought of in terms of being high-demand, low-density assets that are technologically advanced, deployable, interoperable, sustainable and ready to move quickly to wherever they might be needed. Examples include, but are not limited to, nuclear, chemical, biological (NBC) response units, explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams, and military police units. Specialized capabilities provided by NATO allies and non-allied partners could potentially improve the cost effectiveness of NATO and coalition operations[4], reduce the burden on core NATO allies, particularly the US and UK, and ultimately, increase the legitimacy of the coalition itself.[5]

A capabilities-based approach to NATO allies and partner countries has mostly post-9/11 roots. In months preceding the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, NATO allies, particularly the US, paid great interest to the capabilities offered by the seven aspirant countries under consideration, which appeared to help their individual cases for membership. For example, for operations in Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia offered NBC defense and consequence management units; Estonia offered EOD teams; Lithuania and Latvia backfilled US and Allied forces in KFOR and SFOR to free them up for operations in Afghanistan; and several countries offered Special Forces as well as medical assets of various kinds.[6]

Defense specialists have pointed out that while smaller countries likely to enter the alliance do not have “360-degree militaries,” many are capable of contributing niche capabilities. “In this day and age, the alliance is not looking to add on large numbers of brigades and divisions and the like,” said one senior defense official. “What these aspirants do bring is niche capabilities that will potentially be very valuable in the full spectrum of operations.”[7]

Lessons learned from recent major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and subsequent stability and support operations have pointed to specific capabilities that appear to be in short supply. These sought after or desired capabilities include, among others, military police/law enforcement, infantry forces and peacekeepers, explosive ordinance units, emergency medical, linguists, and NBC detection and decontamination teams.[8]

European and Eurasian partner countries have wide-ranging capabilities, some of which are in high demand and some of which are not, and all of which require additional resources from the West to build and sustain. This factor provides a useful starting point for defining what should and what should not be considered a ‘niche capability’. The litmus test should, at a minimum, consist of the following questions:

· Is the capability currently in high demand by NATO and its key allies?[9]

· What is the level of readiness of the capability? Is it deployable, self-sustainable for a considerable amount of time, and for the most part, interoperable with NATO (in terms of understanding of doctrine, level of training, types of equipment used, ability to communicate, etc.)?

· How long has the capability been in existence, and is the partner country allocating its own national resources toward developing and sustaining the capability?

By focusing on the specialized or critical niche capabilities that partner countries bring to the table, a new framework emerges in terms of planning for coalition operations, especially in the way in which capabilities-building security cooperation (e.g., training and equipment) is provided on a bilateral and multilateral basis. More broadly, niche capabilities could prove an important bargaining chip for less capable countries that could even impact the way in which international relations is conducted at the highest political level. For example, if a coalition operation requires water purification or jungle-capable light infantry, and only a limited number of partners have that capability, they become more important, and are thus, empowered.[10] In the context of the war on terrorism, the logic would be that countries that have both pledged support to the coalition in the war on terrorism and possess needed HD/LD capabilities should be given priority in terms of resource allocation, specialized training, and modernized equipment. As such, niche capabilities thus become an important mechanism by which to focus US and NATO capabilities-building security cooperation resources.

I. What capabilities might the “Prague 7” and Central Asia and the South Caucasus partners bring to NATO or coalition operations?

The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), announced at the 2002 NATO Summit, encourages NATO members and the new invitees to focus efforts on developing niche capabilities and work toward filling existing gaps in combat support and combat service support including precision weapons, airlift, air-to-air refueling, information superiority (i.e., intelligence gathering), and chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear defense (CBRN).[11] The PCC is a departure from 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative, which identified areas for improvement, by specifying a short list of requirements and steps to address them.

Smaller, less influential countries in Europe and Eurasia that do not necessarily have global interests are more likely to want to specialize where they have existing experience—be it peacekeeping, law enforcement, emergency medical, NBC detection/decontamination, demining, engineering, or some other indigenous capability. Particularly in Eurasia, the acute lack of resources and near complete dependence on outside support for reforms lends credence to the specialization option because these countries simply cannot afford to reform their entire defense and military structures all at once. Moreover, the desire to improve their international standing and “showcase” a particular capability in a multilateral context is also an important consideration, especially for small states. Likewise, this argument assumes that core allies—namely the UK and Australia, as well as other key NATO allies such as Italy, Germany and France—are less likely to pursue the specialization option in their military capabilities, simply because they have global interests that warrant a wide set of indigenous or organic capabilities.

But for the new NATO invitees and especially for the remainder of the PfP partners in Eurasia, it is important that capabilities stood up or augmented have a dual-use—or capabilities that would be useful both at home and abroad. For example, it would not make much sense for Armenia to develop an air transport logistics capability because this type of capability would not necessarily have any direct benefit to Armenia’s security situation on a domestic level. However, if Armenia were to develop a demining or EOD capability, this would be useful both at home and potentially, abroad in multilateral operation.

“Prague 7” Capabilities

According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense, JD Crouch, “(the US) is asking these 7 invitees to make difficult decisions regarding defense reform, involving increased defense spending and tough choices on personnel reductions and base closures. (The US) will work closely with the invitees throughout the accession process and beyond, to accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche capabilities enabling them to become contributors to transatlantic security.”[12] The following is an overview of the various ground, air, and sea forces that the seven new invitees have either provided to NATO or coalition operations, or could provide in the immediate future. This list, as well as the one which follows on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, is non-exhaustive and admittedly subjective, and was compiled from data provided in interviews conducted by the author with OSD, Joint Staff, State Department, EUCOM, CENTCOM and select in-country officials from July 2003 to January 2004, as well as CENTCOM Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) coalition websites.[13] It should be noted that all seven countries offered use of airspace, base and refueling for US warplanes.

Bulgaria:

· Provided a 40-person NBC defense and consequence management unit to ISAF in Kabul;[14]

· Prepared to, but did not deploy a light infantry unit and offered 150 person team to OIF;

Estonia:

· Sent two explosive detection dog teams for airbase operations to Afghanistan;[15]

· Has a military police capability that has not been deployed;

Latvia:

· Backfilled NATO troops in SFOR and KFOR to free them up for ISAF combating terrorism operations;

Lithuania:

· Backfilled NATO troops in SFOR and KFOR to free them up for ISAF combating terrorism operations;

· Deployed 40 Special Forces (mountain-warfare trained), divers and minesweepers to ISAF;

· Provided doctors to the Czech medical unit in ISAF;[16]

· Deployed four medical personnel with trauma and orthopedic surgery specialties to Umm Qasr, where they are integrated in the deployed Spanish Field Hospital;

· Deployed eight logistics officers (with specialization in air cargo handling) and 10 members of the Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) to Kuwait;

Romania:

· Provided peacekeepers as part of the Security Force in Afghanistan;

· Sent a mechanized infantry battalion, the "Red Scorpions," to Afghanistan to combat al-Qaida in OEF;[17]

· Offered medical personnel, airlift and SOF mountain warfare capabilities to ISAF;

· Deployed a 70-person NBC defense and consequence management unit to Kuwait[18] and maintains additional units on a 'prepare to deploy' order;

· Could contribute military police;

Slovakia:

· Offered a Special Forces regiment (mountain warfare capabilities), engineering unit, and a mobile field hospital to ISAF;

· Deployed a 69-person NBC defense and consequence management company (specializing in chemical warfare) to Kuwait;

· Contributed 69 military police to OIF;

Slovenia:

· Deployed de-mining experts to assist NATO operations in the Balkans;[19]

· Expressed an interest in mentoring in the area of NCO training.

Capabilities of Central Asia/South Caucasus

Like the Prague 7, NATO and the US (on a bilateral basis) have been working closely with the Central Asia and South Caucasus partners for over a decade in a variety of areas ranging from security sector reform to legal reform to democracy and human rights issues. Because these are threat-driven environments, a large share of the resources has been focused on training forces to deal with their internal security challenges. For example, Uzbekistan and Georgia in particular have received US Special Forces training to deal with the immediate terrorist security threats in their ungoverned territories. Moreover, millions of dollars have been devoted to improving the external border security situation, providing both training and equipment to front line border officials.[20]

Perhaps as a direct result of this assistance and the ties that have developed, in the aftermath of 9/11, these countries offered up everything from overflight and basing and refueling access, to valuable capabilities such as NBC detection and decontamination response units, peacekeepers, special forces, intelligence, engineering capabilities, and other needed assets in support of OEF, OIF, and the broader war on terrorism. Below is a list of the assistance offered as well as capabilities that could be developed with additional resources from the West:

Armenia:

· Has a nascent demining capability, medical specialists, intelligence sharing and limited overflight;

Azerbaijan:

· Has close air support (with Azerbaijani fighter jets), intelligence sharing and overflight, peacekeepers;

Georgia:

· Offered intelligence sharing, overflight, and Special Forces;

· Sent 70 elite troops, doctors and mine-clearing experts who were sent to Baghdad in August;

· Will send 500 more troops (from Georgia Train and Equip program) by summer 2004;[21]

Kazakhstan:

· Offered intelligence sharing, overflight, NBC response, and engineering (25-person demining team);

· Creating a deployable air mobility infantry and peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) and maintenance capability;[22]

· Has US-trained Special Forces that specialize in mountain warfare;

· Developing a military police capability;

Kyrgyzstan:

· Offered intelligence sharing, basing and overflight, peacekeepers;

Tajikistan:

· Offered limited intelligence sharing, overflight;

Turkmenistan:

· Has a competent consequence management/disaster preparedness capability (including emergency medical) which is exercised regularly;[23] 
· Offered limited intelligence sharing, limited overflight;

Uzbekistan:

· Has US-trained Special Forces that specialize in mountain warfare;

· Is establishing a disaster management capability (regional firefighting academy);[24]

· Offered intelligence sharing, basing and overflight.

II. How should NATO members and partners view niche capabilities?

As discussed above, most of the Prague 7 countries, especially Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia, really do have capabilities that currently or could in the near-term provide a net contribution to NATO and coalition operations. Some of the noteworthy contributions include Special Forces, NBC defense and consequence management, EOD teams, logistics specialists, and general infantry. This outlook is consistent with the provisions of the PCC and general role specialization movement within the NATO alliance. However, unlike the Prague 7 countries, the South Caucasus and Central Asia PfP partners are much further behind and thus not likely to make a net contribution to a NATO or coalition operation. There is no carrot of NATO membership being offered to them for their coalition contribution. Moreover, they do not possess any gap-filling capabilities, are at a low level of readiness, are unable to deploy their capabilities and devote national resources toward developing/sustaining their capabilities. In short, they do not pass the niche capabilities litmus test discussed above.

Nevertheless, there may be other net benefits from helping these countries to build niche capabilities. For the South Caucasus and Central Asia, security cooperation is primarily used as a way to “socialize” them—to expose promising military leaders and other diplomats to western ideals and practices that in turn facilitate “interoperability of the minds” rather than on a technical level. These leaders are exposed to lessons on US and NATO doctrine, take part in discussions on defense and military reform and professionalization of the various security services, and are trained, on a selective basis, to root out terrorism from their vast, ungoverned territories—all in an effort to seize an opportunity to build better partners for the West in the future.

Because the Central Asia and the South Caucasus partners are operating within a threat-driven security environment, are far behind their central European and western Eurasian neighbors (i.e., Ukraine) in terms of reforms, are not likely to make a net contribution to any coalition operation, and are not potential candidates for NATO membership, the only capabilities that developed in these countries using US and NATO resources should be “dual-use”— such as engineering (e.g., demining, EOD, etc.), emergency medical, civil affairs (e.g., potable water), peacekeeping, public affairs, NBC defense and consequence management, and constabulary forces/MPs. However, the west should avoid the development of capabilities in authoritarian, corrupt, and repressive regimes, particularly in Central Asia, which could be used in ways that were not intended, such as counter-insurgency or stifling political opposition (using, say, law enforcement training from the west). In the longer term, however, it is conceivable that as some of these specialized capabilities develop, they could be deployed beyond their borders to take part in coalition operations, especially stability and support operations, but that should not be the primary purpose of assistance provided.

III. What resources are available and how can the security cooperation activities of the US and other NATO members be used most effectively to strengthen and develop these niche capabilities?

Thus far, this paper has primarily discussed the goals for security cooperation, but has not yet elaborated upon the ways or the tools/resources available to promote US and NATO goals. There are different resources available for working with the new NATO invitees and the PfP countries, and both categories of countries require different strategies. In the US, the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Treasury, and Homeland Security provide capabilities-building assistance to European and Eurasian partner countries in the tens of billions of dollars per annum. These programs range from familiarization and staff/counterpart exchanges to capabilities/capacity-building programs that provide training and equipment. US security cooperation programs typically involve the oversight/execution of several agencies. On the capabilities-building side, key programs include the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program[25]; Foreign Military Financing/Sales (FMF/FMS)[26]; Excess Defense Articles (EDA)[27]; International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Enhanced International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) [28]; the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)[29] program; the CTR Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI)[30]; the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF)[31]; Joint Combined Exercises and Training (JCETs)[32]; and the International Proliferation Prevention (IPP)[33] program, just to name a few. Most of these programs provide both training and equipment as a package deal, although, as discussed below in more detail, there is certainly room for improvement on the part of overseers and implementers in ensuring that the programs provided meet US and partner country needs, address gaps, avoid redundancies, and economize limited resources.[34]

For both the Prague 7 and the Eurasia PfP partners, the Department of Defense has relied to a considerable extent on the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to engage the PfP partners in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. However, joining NATO renders these countries ineligible for this assistance, which in the near term will impact the Prague 7. Currently, the new invitees are being phased out or “graduated” from these programs, and are assumed to have already met a certain capabilities level in order to receive an invitation to join NATO. Moreover, the majority of NATO donor country funds that are collated to support the MAP countries’ reform efforts will also no longer be available for the new invitees.

NATO, on the other hand, engages the Central Asian and South Caucasus partners through the PfP program through a number of workshops and joint exercises that focus on such issues as military professionalization, defense and security sector reform, consequence management/disaster relief, and democratization more broadly. Representatives of the respective partner country political and military establishments, located both at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at SHAPE in Mons, are expected to “operationalize PfP” by directly taking part in the planning and execution of PfP exercises and other activities. However, in practice, partner countries have been less than enthusiastic participants in PfP, and often do not send representatives to Belgium. Indeed, Central Asian Ambassadors to NATO and their staffs do not actively participate in discussions at NATO Headquarters and in military planning discussions at SHAPE.[35]

One reason why NATO has been less successful in drawing Central Asia and South Caucasus partners closer to the West is because NATO advocates a model that is primarily focused on improving regional cooperation. Although this model has been successful in promoting regional cooperation in Eastern Europe, its application to a region in which deep distrust characterizes the state of relations is a continuing challenge. The difficulty is finding the right carrot to extend to these countries, apart from NATO membership. A diversification of activities within the confines of PfP to address the security needs in this region such as improved border security would help to invigorate the partnerships.

In the near term, the following issues and challenges will have to be considered by US and NATO policymakers and program implementers with respect to niche capabilities/role specialization, if indeed security cooperation resources are specifically allocated to these ends:

· Defining what capabilities are considered high priority at any given time;

· Aligning US security cooperation goals and NATO Force Goals to avoid sending mixed messages;

· Developing shorter term objectives to measure progress, as currently assessments are only done just prior to deployment; [36]

· Encouraging niche capabilities without obscuring broader military reform efforts;

· Identifying common skill sets for each desired capability and ensuring common definitions of each capability[37];

· Matching desired capabilities with partner country expertise;

· Incorporating niche concept into existing doctrine (e.g., MAP, PCC, NATO Force Goals, target plans produced by partner, etc.);

· Diversifying the niche capabilities, as many countries want to focus on the same niche (e.g., special forces, emergency medical), which leads to niche assets being turned away from coalition operations[38];

· Integrating the capability into the coalition on a technical level;

· Deploying capabilities out of area; and

· Maintaining the long tail of the capability over time.[39]