NATO and the Challenges of Global Security
William L. Nash 

            As the 1st Armored Division and associated corps-support units prepared to leave Bosnia in the fall of 1996, senior leaders gathered to discuss some of the lessons learned. We were about to finish our involvement in Operation Joint Endeavor, NATO’s first year as the Implementation Force (IFOR) for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The leaders wanted to reflect on our experience, to be ready to tell our bosses and their bosses what the major factors of our successful mission were, and to recommend how future operations could profit from what we learned. We were all proud of our eighteen months of preparation for, and execution of, a very demanding operation to enforce the military terms of the Dayton Peace Accord. As members of NATO’s first-ever operational deployment of ground forces in "harm’s way," we were eager to record our experiences.

            As one might expect, we had many thoughts: the value of a warfighter’s posture as you keep the peace; the advantage of our army’s leadership development programs when confronted with more than a year’s worth of new and unusual challenges, seemingly every day; and, of course, how much we owed success to our "cold, tired, dirty, magnificent soldiers." But we also realized that we owed our success to an organization that we had been a part of during our entire careers, and to a new program within that organization that quickly proved to be successful in the mud of Bosnia. Created to counter the specter of World War III and reshaped to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era when peace had a chance in a war-ravaged country, NATO worked and Partnership for Peace made it better.

            NATO "worked" for many reasons. The thousands of peacetime exercises paid off. The sweat of training was, once again, worth the price to avoid blood. And from this crucible of training activity was born a generation of leaders who knew their profession, worked as one team, and were determined to succeed. The commanders and staffs of Allied Command Europe’s Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)—the ground force component for Operation Joint Endeavor—were from top to bottom the best collection of leaders and professional soldiers I have ever known. Our commander, then Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker of the British army, was the epitome of professional skill.

            Added to the reservoir of skill and experience was NATO’s initiative of 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Stepping through what was once the Iron Curtain, NATO had embraced the former Warsaw Pact armies with the same vigor and purpose that had guided the Alliance throughout the Cold War, thereby sustaining peace, stability, and security in Europe. Suddenly we were conducting exercises in Poland, Hungary, Russia, and many other locations we never imagined. In October 1995, in the midst of preparations for the Bosnia mission, the 1st Armored Division conducted a PfP exercise that was hosted by the Czech Republic and that involved seventeen nations. It was the single most helpful training event in preparing us for our multinational effort in the Balkans. The division leaders and staff elements were able to develop the skills and procedures that allowed synergy to develop, instead of the confusion that could have resulted with so many new players added to the team. Multinational synergy was a certain key to our future operations.

            To achieve our maximum capability in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Walker rightly identified cohesion as the center of gravity for the ARRC forces charged to enforce the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. To be protected at all costs, a military force’s center of gravity is essential to that force’s success and viability. So to identify cohesion as our center of gravity was to manifest the very essence of a military alliance in the conduct of a difficult mission; it was an act of strategic genius. We were not to allow separate national agendas to interfere with ARRC operations: we were to be consistent, even-handed, and determined, but most of all we were to be as one with common intent throughout our area of operations.

            Equally important was the recognition that the strategic objectives for the Bosnia operation were, in priority, (1) to manifest the role of NATO and its partners as the basis for security in Europe, and (2) to help create the conditions within Bosnia and the Balkan region for peace to take root. To these two objectives—and second only to the importance of NATO solidarity—U.S. forces added the imperative of using the Bosnia operation as a proving ground for the potential of U.S.–Russian strategic cooperation.

            Initiated by the November 1995 agreement between Secretary of Defense William Perry and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, Russian forces-a most professional airborne brigade-were placed under the tactical control of an American armored division for the first time in history. Missions and operational control came from the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, through his Russian deputy. But the proof of our ability to operate together came in the day-to-day activities of tactical operations in the field. This partnership worked because (1) our nations had common strategic objectives; (2) we were professional soldiers fulfilling our nations’ missions; (3) after fifty years of studying each other, we were very knowledgeable about each other; and (4) frankly, we did not get too much help from Washington or Moscow. Our leaders gave us a job to do and, for the most part, left us alone to do it—a lesson that should perhaps be heeded more often.

            Clearly much has changed since 1996: 9/11 and the ensuing, ongoing U.S.-led war on terror; NATO’s invocation of Article V; the expansion of NATO’s activities to Afghanistan; the expansion of NATO itself, with the addition of seven more countries in 2004; and, of course, the contentious U.S./U.K.–led war in Iraq, to name just a few. Add to this the increasing prevalence of unconventional threats—including terrorism, nuclear and chemical proliferation, religious fanaticism, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, environmental contamination, hunger, worsening inequality, trafficking in humans, arms, and drugs, and cyberterrorism—and it is evident that the challenges facing NATO today are as complex as any in its history.

            Even in 1999, when a version of this paper was first drafted, it was apparent that the very character of NATO was changing. NATO was founded to counter a very real and dangerous threat to the survival of Western values and to preserve the territorial integrity of member states. It was rightly characterized as a military alliance with a strong political foundation. But as NATO’s emphasis has shifted—from the defense of member territory to the defense of common interests beyond NATO territory (as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan)—then the nature of the Alliance has shifted as well. It has become more and more a political alliance—and an increasingly tenuous one, at that—with a robust (for now) military capability. It is rightly argued that all alliances are inherently political, but the strength of NATO in its first fifty years has always been its single-minded focus of the military defense of NATO territory.

            Given this shift in the nature of the alliance and the evolving nature of threats faced by member states—most of which are not susceptible to purely military solutions—a crucial question is that if the issues confronting NATO in the twenty-first century are political, economic, and social as well as military, is NATO capable of maintaining the organizational cohesion necessary to address those issues? Further, is NATO properly organized and structured operationally to deal with and solve the problems and challenges it faces? There is good reason to be concerned with the answer to both questions.

            The agony and slowness in 1991-95 with which NATO developed the resolve to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina is ample proof of the difficulty in developing consensus and cohesion in peripheral areas. This was also true in Kosovo—where the measures taken were minimal and lacking in comprehensiveness—and is now the case in Afghanistan, where ISAF is undermanned and almost entirely limited to Kabul (which will likely remain the case even if member states accede to Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer’s call for more troops). Now that NATO is taking in seven new member states, what effect will that have on the alliance’s decision process? There is little likelihood that the process will go faster. If we assume a slower pace, what are the prospects for consensus? The answer can only be that it will be more difficult to find common ground between twenty-six than among nineteen. This is not to say that the expansion of NATO is ill-advised; however, concerns that the alliance may become too large for meaningful consensus are real, and mechanisms must therefore be established to enable cohesion and prevent the decisionmaking process from becoming too unwieldy or, conversely, entirely at the mercy of individual member states. Cohesion has been and will continue to be NATO’s center of gravity.

            Throughout NATO’s history, the major organizational concerns have been associated with military structures and associated headquarters arrangements. In the 1990s, adjustments were made to facilitate the evolution and implementation of post–Cold War operations. But if challenges are to be more than military, what necessary organizational adjustments to NATO are needed to deal with the political, economic, and social issues confronting the alliance? How will civil-military coordination in future interventions be conducted? Given the slow build-up and continuing lack of progress in civilian implementation in Bosnia, we certainly do not want to enter another intervention in such a dysfunctional manner as we did in 1995-96. I would judge that the clear requirement for a better way exists, and that the NATO political structure must adapt to these new environments as much as the military structure—maybe more so. This adaptation will have a profound impact on the staffing and role of the office of the secretary-general and the upper echelons of political leadership of NATO.

            Nothing will ensure the continued viability of NATO more than success in the conduct of operations—one reason why the mission in Afghanistan is so crucial. Since 9/11, NATO has been unable to clearly establish and delineate a new role for itself—politically and militarily—in the ongoing war on terror and the changing political and security landscape. In terms of organization, structure, staffing, and training, NATO has been slow to adapt. Civil-military synergy as well as cohesion will be required.

            Two additional factors are of major concern. The issue of Russia continues to be thorny, but the importance of positive relations with Russia cannot be emphasized strongly enough. As one very wise sage has observed, any future world we can imagine at this time is a better one with a cooperative Russia than one with an uncooperative, nuclear-capable Russia.[1] More can be done to facilitate positive and cooperative relations with Russia, and doing so would be to the lasting advantage of the U.S., Europe, and NATO.

            Finally, it must be noted that much of the operational cohesion and teamwork of the first fifty years of NATO came from the professionalism of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the Alliance. That professionalism, in turn, came from a common warfighting ethos that persevered throughout the years. It came from sound leadership and hard soldiering on land, air, and sea. That professional warfighting focus was both the foundation and structure of the military Alliance. The evolution of NATO to tasks other than warfighting has the potential of weakening and, possibly, destroying the very substance that was the core of overwhelming capability. The sky is not falling, but it needs to be watched.

            At the same time, it seems increasingly clear that NATO needs to add some specific capabilities to its toolbox, particularly in the area of post-conflict reconstruction.  NATO has been involved in this area for nearly a decade, but strengthening its capabilities to conduct crucial post-conflict tasks could significantly bolster NATO’s role and relevance in the post–9/11 environment. These tasks include the establishing and maintaining public (vice military) security, taking the lead on demobilization, disarmament, and demining activities, and conducting military training (emphasizing civilian control of the armed forces) along the lines of the Membership Action Plan.   

            The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a unique place in human history. No other coalition has been as successful over as long a period as has NATO. However, for NATO to remain viable in the future, change is a strategic imperative. This change must be measured and well thought through. The process of change may well be as important as any solution that will work another fifty years. After all, cohesion is our center of gravity.

 


[1] Conversation with General (U.S. Army, Retired) John W. Vessey Jr., former chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 December 1998, at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, New York.