Developing and Deploying NATO Forces for the 21st Century

Remarks at an NDU Seminar at Fort McNair on 29 January 2004

General Klaus Naumann (Ret.)

Former Chairman, NATO Military Committee and

Former Chief of Staff, German Federal Armed Forces

NATO took some truly excellent and indeed remarkable decisions at the Prague Summit, decisions which, if implemented, would enable NATO to respond adequately to the risks and challenges which the immediate future will most probably bring. But as so often in NATO’s history there is a wide gap between decisions and implementation. It may be a little too early to sound the alarm bell since the year 2003 was to some extent really ruined by the deep divide between the NATO nations over Iraq, the futile and timid steps of some EU countries to achieve some autonomy for independent European operations and the American lack of interest in a NATO which refuses to become a tool box. On the other hand some progress was made and it should be noted: The new command structure is about to be finalized and the NATO Response Force (NRF) was established. One has to note with sincere appreciation as well that ACT is working hard to make the allied military understand that transformation has to begin in the minds of today’s and tomorrows military leaders. They must understand that the ongoing and the following Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) may well lead to a shift in strategic paradigms: We may soon see the end of a strategy which aimed at imposing our will on an adversary through destruction and neutralization of its military as well as its other instruments of power. The future may allow modern military to paralyze a country and its military without destruction of its assets and its infrastructure. As this future may begin as early as, say, 2020 NATO as well as its nations should pay heed to such a possibility in their force planning and they should thoroughly review their procurement plans since equipment which will enter service during this decade may still be in service around 2050.

The next aspect which has to be taken into account is the missions NATO forces will have to accomplish since the missions determine structure, equipment and training.

Most probably it will no longer be the traditional war between states but wars against enemies who quite often might be non-state actors who either took control of a failing state or who operate from the territory of a state by launching terrorist attacks, by using WMD or by waging cyber war against NATO countries. Future armed conflicts might also be armed interventions to prevent a serious deterioration of the situation in a region of the world. The range of such scenarios is wide, ranging from the prevention of genocide to pre-emptive attack in cases in which enemy attacks are imminent.

NATO’s strategic aim in such situations should be to meet the risks there where their origin is in order to keep the risks at a distance from the NATO Treaty Area (NTA). The line NATO should adopt is one of a pro-active defense.

This means that NATO will need forces which can be deployed at rather short notice to virtually any place in the world, which can fight in high intensity conflicts and win through its dominant battlefield awareness in conjunction with precise and effective long range engagement capabilities. But as interventions requires the preparedness to see a crisis through until self-sustained stability will be achieved in the theatre of intervention NATO forces need sustainability, focused logistics and forces which will be able to suppress extended resistance and which can contribute to nation building as well. Hence, future forces will probably consist of three categories: Intervention forces, something one could call a constabulary force which can do everything from occupation to nation building, and defense forces which are capable of protecting the NTA. No nation in NATO but the US can afford to develop and maintain such an all encompassing force structure as an autonomous national force but most NATO nations should structure their forces along this basic pattern. The most severe problem which most of the Non –US-nations will face is how to acquire the DBA and the broadband data processing capabilities to be followed by the necessity of providing focused logistics and long range precision strike. In my view there is but one way out: NATO has to consider the establishment of NATO owned and operated (NO&O) assets and capabilities following either the AWACS model which would be the perfect model for an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), a model by the way which is feasible and implementable today since the needed assets such as JSTARS are available on the shelf. A second best solution could be to encourage the Non-US-allies to acquire and operate multinational owned and to operate these assets which are fully interoperable with similar US national assets as a NATO force which would be augmented in a crisis by US assets chopped to NATO thus forming a NATO component force. Both models are applicable for all forces which are generally referred to as force multipliers and enabling forces respectively. Obviously it means a dramatic change of NATO’s force planning procedures to take such approaches but I believe that such a change is urgently needed. Should NATO fail to embark on such or similar approaches then forces such as the NRF will remain 20^th century forces which would operate while being blind and deaf since they would not avail themselves of what technology can offer. No doubt, such approaches that the US will review its attitude towards technology transfer and, more importantly, its view of alliances. Should the view of the US Government be that the US does need allies but no alliances then you can forget everything I said so far since such a line will transform NATO into an empty shell and it will render its forces to an ever growing interoperability gap?

Are there any chances that such an attitude will prevail in this town?

I still believe that those in the US who believe in internationalism will prevail. I am convinced that the US will upon reflection have an interest that NATO is more than a group of nations which develop niche capabilities from which the US can chose and pick and form coalitions of the willing. Should the Europeans see that the US is prepared to look at NATO as its option of choice, to use it and to consult with allies before decisions are taken then they will understand that they have to pay a price as well, that they have to modernize their forces and that they have to implement the PCC. The recent decisions taken by the German MoD which are by no means budget cuts as the media wrongly reported underpin my point. They focus on the transformation of a substantial part of the German Armed Forces into a high readiness, NCW capable intervention force. Should in addition all NATO nations be willing to have a debate at the forthcoming Istanbul Summit on where NATO’s main emphasis should be in the future and should they agree, as logic so compellingly dictates, that NATO’s “Schwerpunkt” should be the stabilization of the Greater Middle East, this vast arc of turmoil stretching from Morocco through the Levant and the Middle East proper Central and Southwest Asia then NATO can and indeed should go one step further: It should task ACO to assume control of all military operations in this area. Simultaneously the NMA should be tasked to develop force requirements which would serve nations as a guideline for their national force planning and which would enable NATO to implement such a strategy which while being based on the ability to defend the NTA seeks to stabilize the Greater Middle East. You may counter my optimism that then at the latest the NATO nations will return to their usual pattern of agreeing to Summit decisions while being firmly intent not to implement them. However, I am not so sure whether they will take this line this time. Most NATO nations understand that action to heal the rift may be the last chance to save a happy marriage which most in the world saw as the anchor of global stability and they understand as well that the implementation of the PCC might be the best medicine to repair the damage done. Nations might therefore be willing to consider some modest mid to long term increase of their defense spending for which 2% of the national GNP to be reached by the year 2010 at the latest might well be an appropriate guideline.

If such steps or similar ones were taken NATO would gain the capabilities needed in order of being the option of choice in crisis management for both the Europeans and the North Americans.

I would be remiss, however, did I not point at another imbalance: NATO’s military adaptation will probably succeed in transforming the NATO forces so that they can meet the requirements of the 21^st century but NATO’s political procedures appear to lag behind. I do not argue in favor of giving up the consensus rule since such a move could well destroy NATO. I argue in favor of a procedural adaptation which would enable politicians to be as fast in decision-taking as a NCW capable force will be in executing political decisions. It would really be a tragedy if achieved DBA and through it the decisive qualitative edge making NATO forces second to none but lost the advantage due to clumsy Cold War political decision taking.

I will stop here to stay in my time limit but I hope that I was able to stimulate some questions and, more importantly, some innovative thinking. I look forward to the Q&A period.