Partnership
for Peace (PFP) at the Istanbul Summit:
Dead
on Arrival or Revival?
Jeffrey
Simon
Institute
for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Partnership for Peace (PFP) is
ten years old. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004 when NATO has enlarged again, ten
of the original two-dozen PFP partners will have ascended to full Alliance
membership. Their exit from the partnership marks the end of an era, and raises
questions about the program’s future. Has PFP run its course or does it have a future?
Genesis and Evolution of PFP
After a “security earthquake”
shook Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s, NATO
created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November 1991 to bring
former adversaries together to talk and to begin multilateral cooperation, not partnership. The emerging political
dialogue helped Central and East European politicians to better understand that
defense requirements incorporated the principles of political democracy; they
slowly began to comprehend that defense encompassed more than just the
military, but also included civil emergency planning and broader security
issues.
Partnership for Peace has
undergone enormous change since it was launched at the Brussels NATO Summit in
January of 1994. The original program was initially launched to deal with
aspirants for membership in an Alliance
that was not yet ready to accept new
allies. Though many aspirants initially saw PFP as a “policy for postponement,”
it did move them beyond dialogue into practical partnership with the Alliance.
PFP developed a framework and process; it established the norm that partners
should be security “contributors” and marked a shift from purely multilateral
dialogue to bilateral (partner and Alliance)
relationships.
Continued partner pressure for membership led NATO to initiate a Study on NATO Enlargement that was
approved and briefed to aspirants in September 1995.
Within six months of launching
PFP, there were roughly two-dozen partners in the program, to include most of
the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.
And since the former Soviet
Union had been in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, when the
USSR
disintegrated the successor states were retained in the NACC. (One reason for
their inclusion was the fact that four of the successor states—Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan—possessed
nuclear weapons. Another was to keep the Central Asian successor states looking
west.) Initially, roughly a dozen partners participated in the Partnership
Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium
to coordinate and plan military exercises for search and rescue, humanitarian
assistance, and peacekeeping operations. When PARP’s first cycle took place
between January and June 1995 fourteen partners participated. The PCC’s
terms of reference expanded to include “peace enforcement operations” after the
December 1995 Dayton Accords and NATO’s decision to allow partners to deploy
peacekeepers in the Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) and
follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR).
After enhanced dialogues
during April-October 1996, the July 1997 Madrid Summit issued invitations to Poland,
Hungary, and
the Czech Republic
to join the Alliance. It also
“enhanced” PFP to be more relevant and operational by introducing a second PARP
cycle that launched interoperability objectives (I.O.s) that were designed to
identify specific measures required for partners’ forces to operate with
allies. The Madrid
Summit also marked the introduction of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) that replaced the NACC, and the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent
Joint Council (PJC) and NATO-Ukraine Commission to keep Russia
and Ukraine
engaged in the partnership.
By the April 1999 Washington
Summit, Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic
had already joined an Alliance that was
now heavily engaged in a bombing campaign of Serbia.
In the follow-on Kosovo Force (KFOR), sixteen PFP partners contributed to the
operation, in
addition to NATO’s three new allies. The Summit also approved the new Alliance
Strategic Concept, which for the first time mentioned PFP (paragraph 35) as an
Alliance activity, launched a
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to improve operability among Alliance
forces, and where applicable, between Alliance and partner forces in non-Article 5 operations through an
operational capabilities concept (OCC) and Partnership Goals. It also approved
a third PARP cycle that further enhanced partner force planning procedures to
make them more closely resemble the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). The 1999 Summit
also introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as a practical manifestation
of NATO’s “Open Door” (Article 10) policy. The MAP
Annual National Plans (ANPs) generated by the nine aspirant
partners would allow each to set its own objectives and targets on preparations
for possible future membership.
PFP’s Challenges after 11
September 2001 and the Prague
Summit
NATO’s first post-September 11th challenge
involves defense capabilities. In response to the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center
and Pentagon, the U.S.
increased defense expenditures by $48 billion (a sum equal to the entire U.K.
defense budget), while most NATO allies’ budgets have remained unchanged. The
gap would only increase. If we were to assess the DCI’s progress since the
accession of NATO’s three new members Poland,
Hungary, and
the Czech Republic
on 12 March 1999 and after
the events of 11 September 2001,
we would have to conclude that in 2004 the capabilities gap has become wider
than it has ever been.
But in the aftermath of 9/11 NATO committed itself to a
broader functional and wider geographic area of engagement! After invoking
Article 5 on 12 September 2001,
NATO AWACS flew over the United States
while its naval forces operated in the eastern Mediterranean.
The NAC began to “plan” operations in and around Afghanistan,
and PFP demonstrated its utility in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. At its first meeting after the 9/11 attacks, the EAPC
Defense Ministers on 19 December 2001
reaffirmed their determination to exploit PFP to increase cooperation and
capabilities against terrorism. Consistent with NATO’s realization that it must
place greater emphasis on meeting the challenges of asymmetric warfare, the
EAPC adopted an Action Plan 2002-2004 and the Civil Emergency Action Plan
regarding possible chemical, biological, or radiological attacks, approved the
new (fourth cycle) PARP Ministerial Guidance 2001, and welcomed Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, who now followed Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia to PARP bringing
its membership to 19.
Although the International Security Force Operations in
Afghanistan (ISAF) commenced in January 2002, NATO agreed to assume command on 16 April 2003 with participation of
many allies and six PFP partners. In
addition, in CENTCOM’s Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) many NATO allies (to
include two new ones—Poland
and the Czech Republic)
and six PFP partners rendered
substantial assistance. Finally, with the employment of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) after Saddam Hussein had been toppled and post-war governance became an
issue, NATO provided intelligence and logistical support assistance to the
Polish-led multinational division that
comprised many (to include the three new) allies and eleven invitees and
partners.
Also, it would not be beyond imagination that NATO might assume command at some point in the future. In sum, NATO
allies and partners are likely to be engaged in the area for years to come.
The November 2002 Prague Summit approved
the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), NATO Response Force (NRF) and new
Command Structure, and invited seven MAP partners to become allies in 2004.
While the PCC and NRF are designed to correct the capabilities “imbalance,”
they differ from the DCI in that it has a narrower focus on new missions and
prepares a small, but select number of forces for them. Its centerpiece is the
creation of a small NATO Response Force with high tech capabilities for
expeditionary missions that would also allow NATO’s European allies to
contribute small niche units (e.g.,
police, engineering, de-mining, chemical decontamination, alpine, and special
forces) with secure communications, ample readiness, and be capable to deploy,
sustain, and operate with U.S. forces through the entire conflict spectrum. If
implemented, this would provide a more constructive burden-sharing arrangement
for NATO in the post-September 11 risk environment.
The Prague Summit also endorsed the military Concept for
Defense Against Terrorism that (in paragraph 4.d) calls for “improved intelligence
sharing and crisis response arrangements…[and
commitment with partners] to fully
implement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan…against possible
attacks by…chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents.”
The Prague Summit’s Defense Against Terrorism Concept and membership invitation to seven
MAP partners—Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia,
Slovakia, Slovenia,
Romania, and Bulgaria—provide
a serious challenge to the partnership’s future. The EAPC’s adoption of the
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) on 22 November 2002 commits partners to:
- intensify political consultations and information
sharing on armaments and civil emergency planning;
- enhance preparedness for combating terrorism by
security sector reforms and force planning, air defense and air traffic
management, and armaments and logistics cooperation;
- impede support for terrorist groups by enhancing
exchange of banking information and improving border controls of arms
ranging from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to small arms and light
weapons,
- enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence
management of WMD-related terrorism and civil emergency planning, and
- provide assistance to
partners’ efforts against terrorism through the Political Military
Steering Committee (PMSC) Clearing House mechanism and creation of a PFP
Trust Fund.
Although the Partnership
Action Plan Against Terrorism has not yet achieved very much, it does
establish a framework upon which one can build necessary functions.
In effect, PFP programs need
to be revamped and revived to deal with NATO’s broader functional and wider
geographic challenge. Perceived new target areas for PFP’s revival include the
need to ensure that interior ministries, police, and border guards are
effective. A revived partnership also now needs to improve its intelligence
cooperation to include sharing of interior (police and border control) and
finance (banking) information. Finally, PFP’s budget and functions need to be
reexamined and updated to support future counter terrorist operations to
include the counter-proliferation efforts and missile defense systems outlined
in the PAP-T.
Added to this broader
functional and wider geographic challenge, NATO’s invitation to seven MAP
partners will mean that in 2004--for the first time since PFP’s inception in
1994--there will be more NATO allies (26) struggling with the transformation of
their own armed forces and security sector institutions, and with integrating
into the Alliance, than the 20 remaining partners (including the special cases
of Russia and Ukraine) who are even far weaker institutionally and have more
diverse interests and broader needs. In sum, if PFP is not seriously revived at
Istanbul, it will be dead on
arrival.
A New Istanbul Strategic Vision
for PFP’s Revival
Clearly the Istanbul Summit
agenda requires a new strategic vision for PFP. The Istanbul Summit will mark
ten years since the inception of Partnership for Peace. Ten partners will have
joined the Alliance while the
European security landscape has witnessed the creation and emergence of many
sub-regional partnerships and regional groupings that have contributed
substantially to providing greater transparency, building confidence, and
enhancing stability and security. But the post-9/11 challenges require the
Istanbul Summit to revive Partnership for Peace in order to deliver on its
commitment to a wider geographic area and broader functional engagement.
But for NATO to succeed in
reviving PFP at the Istanbul Summit, the program will need to be tailored to
the needs of NATO’s remaining twenty partners and two PFP aspirants
(Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina) who fall
into the following eight distinct groups with very diverse needs, interests,
and capacities:
·
Five “advanced” partners—Finland,
Sweden, Ireland,
Austria, and Switzerland—with
no interest yet in joining the Alliance.
·
The three MAP partners—Albania,
Macedonia, and Croatia—who
do aspire to membership and for whom NATO must keep its Open Door
“credible.”
·
Ukraine,
who claims to be an aspirant with an “Action Plan,” and aspires to join the
MAP.
·
Russia,
who does not aspire to membership but maintains a special relationship in the
NATO-Russia Council established in May 2002.
·
Two relatively inactive partners--Moldova
and Belarus.
·
Three Caucasus partners—Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and
Georgia,
·
Five Central Asia
partners—Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan;
and
·
Two Balkan PFP aspirants—Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Serbia-Montenegro.
“Advanced” Partners.
All of the five “advanced”
partners (except Switzerland)
are already in the EU and remain outside formal NATO membership by choice. Their
increased participation in PFP in recent years primarily focused on the Balkans
and serves as an example of partnership participation as being important in its
own right, and not necessarily being
a route to membership. The five “advanced” partners (along with NATO members)
should be encouraged to establish a “buddy” system (as Sweden
and Finland
have already done with the Baltic states)
with Caucasian and Central Asian partners (similar to what Lithuania
has been doing with Georgia).
This may not be easy, as the “advanced” partners have been and remain more
active in “local” Baltic and Balkan peace support operations that have been
inexorably shifting to the EU. For example, Austria,
Finland, and Sweden
participated in Bosnia-IFOR, to be joined later by Ireland
in SFOR. All five participate in KFOR. Hence, it
will be a challenge to keep the “advanced” partners engaged in NATO’s wider geographic
interest. One way might be to make preparation of NATO exercises in the Caucasus
and Central Asia more flexible and allow the non-aligned
partners to take a greater part in their planning, and encourage their security
sector expertise in a “revived” PFP.
Balkan Stability and Security—Enlargement,
MAP, and PFP Aspirants.
NATO enlargement, the MAP
process, and PFP have played, and continue to play a very important, but under
appreciated role in enhancing Balkan stability and security. Slovenian, Bulgarian,
and Romanian membership in NATO forms a stable security foundation. The MAP (as
long as Article 10 remains credible) keeps Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia
positively engaged in activities consistent with NATO principles; and the
incentive of joining PFP keeps Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina
productively focused. Their continued successful engagement has become
increasingly important in light of the transfer of NATO’s operation “Allied
Harmony” in Macedonia
to the EU (“Concordia”), and will become even more important after the likely
transfer of NATO’s SFOR to the EU in the future.
If PFP were to become moribund
and were to lose credibility, Balkan security will be severely undermined. With
this in mind, NATO should establish more precise goals that need to be achieved
in order to keep its “open door” credible for the three remaining MAP members.
This is likely to become an issue for Albania
and Macedonia,
who have been in PFP for almost a decade and whose patience may wear thin. If NATO
is unprepared to offer membership soon, it needs to establish the prospect of it. NATO might consider some
version of a “regatta” to maintain Article 10 credibility for the remaining MAP
partners. While the “regatta” concept
was rejected for the 2002 Prague Summit invitees, because many politicians
claimed that accession is ultimately a political issue (which it is), at the
Istanbul Summit Albania and Macedonia will have been in PFP for a decade and
have had five years of MAP and ANP experience. By the June 2004 Istanbul
Summit, NATO should have developed a “regatta” strategy to link Balkan MAP
partner accession to the completion of specific well-defined NATO “acquis”
built into the MAP ANPs and with a notional time horizon of roughly
five-to-eight years.
PFP programs should be
coordinated with EU assistance to security sector reforms to tackle the new
security threats outlined in the EAPC Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T). Also PFP needs to be linked to
the successful sub-regional Southeast European Defense Minister (SEDM) process
(which should also be broadened to include interior and intelligence
functions), the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to combat
trans-border crime, and the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in the Balkans.
If this proves difficult in the
Balkans (as it likely will beyond), then PFP’s mandate, consistent with the
Prague Summit’s Action Plan Against Terrorism, ought to be broadened to include Partnership Goals with police
activities as it already has been with border guards. The objective here is to
improve interagency coordination and cooperation within and among Balkan
states.
This could be accomplished
within the annual Southeast European Defense Ministers (SEDM) meetings that
began in 1996,
and have succeeded in enhancing transparency and building cooperation and
security in Southeastern Europe. In 1999 the SEDM
approved the creation of the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) that
comprises a 25,000-troop force that can be assembled as needed by the brigade’s
commanders. Though the SEEBRIG has not yet deployed, there is speculation that
it might deploy to Bosnia
sometime in the future.
But it is now time to build
further upon SEDM’s successes to deal with the new risk environment consistent
with NATO guidance. SEDM should be broadened
to include civil emergency planning and interior and intelligence ministers to
become an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence
Ministerial (SEDIIM). The “new” SEDIIM should be encouraged to further
coordinate its work with the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) which
broadened its activities in October 2000 to combat trans-border crime involving
trafficking of drugs and weapons, prostitution, and money laundering. Since Moldova
is in SECI and Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina are PFP aspirants, they
should all become SEDM observers, with the goal of their ultimate membership in
the broadened SEDIIM process.
In sum, Balkan stability can
be maintained and security further enhanced by fine-tuning the PFP and MAP
process to keep the program credible and members and aspirants engaged,
coupling PFP PGs to a broadened functional SEDIIM and SECI with a more
inclusive participation by initially extending observer status to Moldova,
Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Caucasian Partners.
The Black Sea
has acquired increased strategic importance since NATO has assumed command in
Afghanistan ISAF in August 2003 and assisted the Polish-led division in Iraq.
Coupled with the fact that NATO is now actively engaged out-of-area beyond the
Balkans in the greater Black Sea region, and that all
the Black Sea defense ministers have never met together, it is time to apply
Central European and Balkan “lessons” to the greater Black Sea
region. The first step to stabilize the region is to build understanding
through discussion of security risks, and then to build greater regional
cooperation through implementation of military activities in support of a
transparent agenda.
The Balkan’s SEDM (and
potential SEDIIM), SECI, and SEEBRIG can serve as models to further expand to
the greater Black Sea littoral beyond merely the formation of a Black Sea Force
(BLACKSEAFOR) that was established in April 2001 among the six Black Sea states for
search and rescue humanitarian operations, clearing sea mines, protecting the
environment, and promoting good will visits. One can envision the creation of a
Black Sea Task Force to deal not only with civil emergency contingencies such
as the earthquakes that perennially strike the region and potential CBR after
effects, but also to interdict the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans
across the greater Black Sea region, especially with the participation of
Ukraine, the Russian Fleet, and the Caucasus. Here, too, since the continued
engagement of Ukraine
in PFP is important, the Istanbul Summit might consider commencing intensified
dialogues with Ukraine
as a pre-requisite to joining the MAP, assuming Ukraine’s
presidential elections are held in accordance with OSCE standards and adhere to
Ukrainian constitutional procedures.
The Central and East European
experience since the “security earthquake” of the late 1980s also provides
numerous successful examples of combined peacekeeping and/or civil-emergency
units that should be explored for possible adaptation to improve inter-state
relations in the greater Black Sea region. These include
Romania-Hungary military contacts to improve otherwise cool political relations
in the early 1990s, the continued deployment of the Czech-Slovak battalion in
UNPROFOR and UNCHRO during and after the January 1993 “Velvet divorce,” the
Polish-Ukraine Battalion in Kosovo (and now Iraq), the Baltic Battalion in
nurturing regional cooperation, and SEEBRIG in the Balkans. Adapting some of
these experiences as models for application within the Caucasus and with NATO’s
three new Black Sea allies (after 2004) and partners and other willing NATO
allies (coupled with a U.S. Black Sea presence), under a revived PFP can go a
long way in advancing greater Black Sea cooperation and stability, and advance
NATO’s security interests.
In addition to inter-state
cooperation, U.S.
policy can also help improve Black Sea cooperation and
stability. The likely new U.S.
presence in Bulgaria
and Romania can
be leveraged to improve interoperability through development of joint training
and joint logistics facilities and in building a joint expeditionary Black Sea
Task Force. Coupled with Romania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey--now NATO’s three Black Sea
allies with a rich experience in SEDM and SEEBRIG--the U.S.
presence could be beneficial in fostering wider Black Sea
cooperation under a revived PFP program.
Although all three Caucasus
partners were 1994 signatories of PFP, their
participation has varied considerably, and only recently become more prominent.
This has been particularly evident with PARP, which remains the core of
transparent defense planning, accountability, and democratic oversight of the
military and provides the foundation to enhance sub-regional cooperation. After
9/11, all three Caucasus partners joined the PARP.
Though Armenia
participates in PFP, NATO remains controversial for it because of unresolved
problems with Turkey
and Azerbaijan.
Armenia has close
relations with Greece,
Romania, and Bulgaria
and remains very close to Russia.
An original signatory of the 15 May 1992 Tashkent CIS Collective Security
Treaty with Russia,
Armenia is the
only Caucasus state to renew its commitment for another
five years on 2 April 1999.
While Azerbaijan
and Georgia
signed the CIS treaty in September and December 1993 respectively, they
withdrew from it in April 1999. Azerbaijan
feels insecure due to its conflict with Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabakh and problems with terrorism, drugs, crime, and human
trafficking. Azerbaijan
cooperates with the U.S.
in counter-terrorism and participates in KFOR, Afghanistan,
and Iraq.
Georgia
participates in KFOR and Black Sea regional cooperation,
wants NATO to play a role in solving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts
on Georgian soil, and in September 2002 its parliament adopted a resolution
claiming the goal of NATO membership. The U.S.
has assisted the Georgian armed forces through the Train and Equip program and
in establishing control over the Pankisi Gorge near the border with Russia.
The U.S.
has greater influence among Caucasian (and Central Asian) partners than NATO
(and EU) structures per se because
NATO has been more hampered by what it can offer in terms of assistance. But this
can change if the NATO Security
Investment Program (NSIP) was more directly focused on the region and the PFP
Trust Fund was made more robust. NATO needs to make sure that the NATO Trust
Fund becomes more than just a rhetorical commitment. (Here one is reminded of
the June 1993 Athens NAC ministerial where the United
States committed $500,000 to expanded NACC
activities conditional upon other allies making commitments. Since the other
allies did not respond, the initiative was dead on arrival.) Hopefully the PFP
Trust Fund, which has allocated $4.2 million to destroy anti-personnel mines in
Albania, Ukraine,
Moldova, and
disposing of missile stockpiles in Georgia,
will be expanded.
The NSIP is a much larger
program with a NAC annual budget of over $600 million ($681 million in 2004) to cover
installations and facilities dealing with communications and information
systems, radar, military headquarters, airfields, fuel pipelines and storage,
harbors, and navigational aids. NSIP funds have also been used to cover
eligible requirements for the NATO-led SFOR, KFOR and ISAF peace support
operations to include repair to airfields, rail, and roads. Since
NATO has assumed the lead in Afghanistan ISAF in August 2003, NSIP funds now ought to be eligible for the ISAF
operation and be applied to the broader Black Sea region
to augment NATO air, road, and rail support. The Istanbul Summit should make
NSIP funds eligible to improve facilities in PFP countries in direct support of
ISAF (and after Iraq?)
and authorize the new SecGen to restructure the NATO International Staff yet
again to consolidate PFP in one directorate, perhaps
headed by its own Assistant Secretary General. This would symbolize the Alliance’s
commitment to a revived PFP, and highlight the program’s renewed importance in
fulfilling NATO’s wider geographic and broader functional commitments.
After PFP’s launch in 1994,
when it became obvious that necessary resources were lacking, the U.S.
started its Warsaw Initiative with $100 million in annual funding. By the 2004
Istanbul Summit most of the Warsaw Initiative’s key recipients will be members
of the Alliance with the program
achieving enormous success. But the remaining twenty partners, particularly
around the greater Black Sea, in the Caucasus,
and Central Asia, have significantly weaker political, economic, social, and
security and defense institutions than the ten partners who have become full
NATO members. In addition, the challenges that these partners face, consistent
with the post-9/11 broader civil emergency planning and counter terrorism
direction taken by NATO since the Prague Summit, require greater assistance to bring their personnel and institutions closer
to NATO standards. In order to support this effort, at the Istanbul Summit the U.S.
ought to launch a “new” Istanbul Initiative, funded at roughly the same amount
as the current Warsaw Initiative (DOD of $40 million and State Department FMF
of $40 million) to focus on a more sophisticated program stressing the basics.
The DOD share would be used to train and educate civilian and military partner
personnel, assist in developing a rational partner military force that would be
capable of cooperating with its border troops, police, and intelligence
institutions, refine and develop civil emergency planning procedures that will
be interoperable with immediate neighbors, and promote the development of a
Greater Black Sea Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial (GBSDIIM) to
work with NATO and the U.S. The State Department FMF share of Istanbul
Initiative funds should also be used to upgrade air, ground, and sea facilities
and build required infrastructure to support the GBSDIIM and Greater Black Sea
Task Force.
Central Asian Partners.
Four of the five Central Asian
states—Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan—were
among the original signatories of the 15
May 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty with Russia
and Armenia
from the Caucasus. When the protocol extending the
treaty was signed on 2 April 1999
Belarus had
joined, but Uzbekistan
had dropped out of the treaty. Four of the Central Asian states were among the
1994 signatories of PFP; Turkmenistan
on 10 May, Kazakhstan
on 27 May, Kyrgyzstan
on 1 June, and Uzbekistan
on 13 July. Only after 9/11 did Tajikistan
finally join PFP (on 20 February 2002),
and Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan
joined PARP (December 2001, fourth cycle). Although it had been the intention
to extend PFP to the Central Asian successor states to bind them to Western
values, their practice of political democracy has generally deteriorated over
the past decade.
Though none of the Central
Asian partners participated in any of the Balkan operations (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR),
they have supported U.S. and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq;
Uzbekistan in OEF, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan provided airbases and overflights
for U.S. and coalition troops for ISAF, and Kazakhstan supported Poland with
de-mining troops in OIF in Iraq and permitted the overflight and transport of
supplies and U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Increasingly these
activities have irritated the Russians. Hence, encouraging the active
participation of Russia
in a revived PFP and in the Russia-NATO Council will be increasingly important
to reduce the inevitable frictions and build on cooperative relations.
These examples indicate the
increasing importance of PFP to NATO’s ability to meet its wider geographic and
broader functional needs. PFP’s revival, too, provides the necessary foundation
for emphasizing the need for democratic governance,
further building sub-regional political and military cooperation through
broadened PFP exercises focusing on crisis response and disaster relief, and
fostering regional cooperation to counter transnational security threats.
In conclusion, although PFP is challenged by broader
geographic and functional challenges and needs to adapt to the requirements of
a post-9/11 era, PFP must remain true to the enduring values that prompted the
original partnership a decade ago in 1994; that is to promote political
democracy, economic free enterprise, equitable treatment of ethnic minorities,
good neighbor relations, and democratic oversight and effective management of
not just the armed forces, but all
security sector institutions to include the border troops, police, and
intelligence institutions.
Istanbul Initiatives
In order to ensure that PFP is not dead on arrival at
Istanbul, the U.S. and NATO need to respond to the Alliance’s wider geographic
and broader functional concerns and commitments and do the following to ensure
the program’s revival:
- Devise
a PFP strategy to link Balkan MAP partner accession to the completion of
specific NATO “acquis” with a time horizon of roughly five-to-eight years,
and offer intensified dialogues with Ukraine
as prerequisite to joining MAP.
- Consistent
with existing PFP guidance broaden SEDM to include civil emergency
planning and the participation of interior and intelligence ministers to
become an annual SEDIIM, encourage its cooperation with SECI, and promote
the provision of observer status to Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Serbia-Montenegro in the SEDIIM.
- Sponsor
the creation of a Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Black Sea Task
Force to deal with civil emergency contingencies and interdiction
operations, promote a more robust PFP Trust Fund, and direct NSIP funds to
improve the necessary infrastructures and bases in support of NATO-led
operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
- The U.S.
should announce a new Istanbul
Initiative of roughly $100 million to promote basic PFP objectives in the
Balkans, Greater Black Sea region, and Central Asia
through education and training programs in broader security sector reforms
and provide the catalyst for promoting necessary sub-regional cooperation
and institutional development.