NATO AND AFGHANISTAN:

WILL ISAF BE ITS BELLWETHER OR ITS ALBATROS?

Colonel (Ret.) J. Michael Snell

When he was the Secretary General, George Robertson continually reminded the members of NATO that the Alliance could not fail in Afghanistan. Earlier this month, following a briefing by the Acting UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, the new NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer reiterated the Alliance’s commitment to Afghanistan, saying said that it remains “the number 1 priority for the Alliance”.

The question remains, however, whether the Alliance can succeed in Afghanistan. Perhaps the best that NATO can hope is that it will not fail. I would argue that there are two primary challenges facing the Alliance if it is not to fail. One is political and it centres on the will of the international community, sparked by NATO leadership, to develop a long-term campaign strategy for the future of Afghanistan. The second is a military one and focuses on the capacity of the Alliance to provide the necessary force generation for NATO to succeed in both the short- and long-term.

It is important to recall the events that led to the decision which resulted in NATO taking over command and coordination of ISAF on 11 August 2003. As the NATO backgrounder on ISAF states, perhaps somewhat understates, “the agreement on 16 April 2003 to significantly expand NATO’s support to the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, paved the way for NATO's first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area”. You will recall that, in October 2002, the NAC approved a request from Germany and the Netherlands for NATO support in helping them to prepare to take over command of the ISAF mission. In particular, they requested NATO assistance in the areas of Force Generation, Intelligence, Co-ordination and Information Sharing, and Communications.

Canada was an enthusiastic supporter of both the initial decision by NATO to support the German-Dutch leadership of ISAF and of the later decision for the Alliance to assume command and coordination of the operation. Prior to announcing in February 2002 that Canada would be willing to provide a battle group and a brigade headquarters to ISAF for a period of one year, starting late summer 2003, the then-Minister of National Defence, John McCallum, had first discussed such a possibility with his German counterpart in Berlin during a visit in mid-November 2003. From that time, Canada, for a variety of reasons, became a strong supporter of a leadership role for NATO in ISAF. Although pleased with the April 2003 decision, we were caught a bit flat-footed. We had anticipated that, given other events, it would likely be early in 2004 before NATO allies would be able to agree on this.

Notwithstanding this, the implications of the April 2003 NAC decision were quickly recognized. The mantra in Ottawa became: “The good news is that NATO has taken the lead in ISAF; the bad news is that NATO has taken the lead in ISAF”. We intuitively understood that NATO would be in Afghanistan for the long haul. What we failed collectively to recognize was that no one was taking the lead in Afghanistan as a whole. As we began to tentatively determine Canadian national strategic objectives, it slowly became clear that the Bonn Agreement only went so far. In this respect, it is becoming increasingly clear that what is needed is a wide-ranging and comprehensive international campaign plan for Afghanistan. Here, NATO has a clear role to play, with the NAC furnishing the impetus for such a plan.

In Canada, much has been made of our 3D approach to Afghanistan – defence, diplomacy and development. Clearly, an international campaign plan that brought together all of the actors involved in Afghanistan would be consistent with the Canadian 3D approach. Nevertheless, there is a role that nations by themselves must take in bringing the actors together. I would suggest that this might be fruitfully done within the forum of the NAC.

The second challenge is the issue of force generation. Minister McCallum highlighted this in a December 2003 speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. He underlined the lack of incentives for NATO members and partners to participate in ISAF. Let me quote a key passage from this speech:

For example, we still do not know who will take over from the Canadian Forces after we have completed our one-year commitment at the end of August 2004. This should not be the case. As an alliance, we should already have the next two or three ISAF rotations identified and lined up or at the very least in the final phases of planning. The countries that will provide the ISAF commander should also be identified well in advance to allow time to properly prepare for the task. Only by doing this can NATO ensure that those of its members committing troops to Afghanistan will be able to bring them home when and as planned.

For that to happen, other countries must be ready and willing to relieve them. The absence of such a commitment now serves as a disincentive for other nations to volunteer. And those already on the ground have been forced to extend their stay, essentially having to pay extra for having committed themselves.

While we know commitments for the NATO Response Force well into 2006, we still do not know who will replace the Canadian contingent when it leaves in the summer of 2004. This makes no sense. Many here will be well aware of the difficult process of providing an operational headquarters for ISAF. The current NATO force generation system for ISAF is not working. There is no incentive to step forward if you have no idea of your replacement. Have we reached the point where good behaviour (i.e. volunteering) will be punished and bad behaviour rewarded? Hopefully not.

These, then, are the two major challenges facing NATO and ISAF as seen from parts of Ottawa. There are, to be sure, a number of other challenges. A listing of these would vary depending on the source. Of immediate concern is the expansion of ISAF – both its area(s) of operations and its tasks. Harmonization of efforts is another concern. This is especially true in terms of efforts being undertaken by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). With an increasing number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in play, the issue of reconstruction versus the perception of bombing and continued fighting will need to be addressed. There are more.

Is there a future for NATO? This is question that could be well tested by the ability of the Alliance to succeed in Afghanistan. ISAF is only the first step. Recently, I was asked during a seminar in Kyiv whether there would be a NATO in the future that the Ukrainians would want to join. This was indeed a very pointed question for official government to government talks. My reply was that they should watch how NATO handles the situation in Afghanistan, especially the ISAF operation. It would be wise for all of us who believe in the Alliance to do so as well.