It is a pleasure to be here again. I have always enjoyed attending these
conferences: as a young analyst, it was a thrill to interact with the likes of
Brent Scowcroft, and to get to know other young students of strategy such as Steve
Hadley. Now that I have added weight, lost hair, and served twice in the
Pentagon since those early days, I still find these events to be stimulating,
indeed exciting, and always thought provoking.
I am once again a private businessman, so permit me to go
immediately to my bottom line: of course strategy matters. A country without a strategy is a country
adrift. People may or may not agree with a particular strategy, but such
disagreements do not obviate the need for one.
At times, previous administrations were accused of failing
to have a coherent national security strategy, or for that matter, a coherent
military strategy—the two are not the same, of course. In fact, a more accurate criticism,
particularly in the early post-Cold War period, was that the United
States continued to cling to an outmoded
grand strategy, which drove an obsolescent military strategy; neither had
fundamentally changed since the aftermath of the Second World War.
Both strategies were built upon three key pillars. The first
was a web of alliances around the world that supported large-scale forward
deployments in Europe and East Asia.
The second was the expectation that American forces would likely confront two
major conflicts simultaneously, and that in the case of both of those
conflicts, not only would the enemy have to be repelled, but it would be
necessary to dismantle his entire governing structure. This model was of
course, derived from America’s
World War II experience with Germany
and Japan.
Finally, the third pillar was that of mutual assured
destruction (MAD). This was a more recent pillar, one that developed after the Soviet
Union emerged as a sufficiently capable nuclear power as to render
massive retaliation a meaningless concept. Nevertheless, MAD, as it came to be
called, was a legacy of the McNamara era—and as such, endured for over three
decades.
It was only with the election of President Bush in 2000, and
the publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review and then the National Security
Strategy, that the United States
seriously altered each of those three pillars. Moreover, it added two others: a
focus on homeland security and defense, and a major new approach to the
employment of Special Forces.
Before I discuss how each of these pillars was altered,
however, it is important to note what was not changed—namely, the determination
to take pre-emptive action against an enemy that was preparing to strike the United
States.
It is true that many observers, both in the United
States and abroad, argued that this
“pre-emptive strategy” not only was new, but was the most blatant divergence
from previous American strategy. In fact, the United
States had always reserved for itself the
right to a first strike.
America
had consistently refused attempts to get it to commit itself formally to “no
first use” of nuclear weapons, in part because the first use of those weapons
was a cornerstone of its strategic deterrent against a conventional attack in Europe.
Moreover, the United States
had often taken pre-emptive military action even when its own forces could
hardly be said to be at serious risk: from Lebanon
in 1958 to Panama
in 1989, and many times in between, the United
States deployed its forces for reasons other
than a direct attack on its troops.
What the national security strategy did was to make explicit
what had previously been implicit. Perhaps that in itself was a change of
strategy, or at least of declarative strategy. Yet that change was motivated by
factors that also contributed to other major changes in American strategy, to
which I will now turn.
Forward Posture,
Allies, and Coalitions
Since the end of the Second World War, and as a legacy of
that war, the United States
maintained large concentrations of forces in Western Europe,
notably Germany,
and in East Asia. East Asian forces were primarily
maritime, with significant land forces in Japan.
In the aftermath of the Korean War, the United
States retained the Eighth Army on the Peninsula.
These forces represented not only a deterrent against
aggression by the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of
China, and North
Korea, but also served as a symbol of America’s
commitment to her nato and East
Asian allies. NATO, ANZUS, Japan,
Philippines and
Thailand formed
the bedrock of America’s
alliance structure for five decades, even though, in practice, those alliances
were not always mobilized to support American interests. Indeed, NATO in
particular was often driven by major disputes, whether over nuclear forces in Europe,
or America’s
policies in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the threat
from the communist world, coupled with the military presence that allowed some
countries to limit their defense spending even in the face of that threat,
provided the glue that held the alliances together for more than five decades.
The war to liberate Kuwait,
the first major international conflict after the Cold War ended, provided some
models for a new approach to American grand strategy, as well as for its
alliance strategy in particular. The United
States did not call upon NATO to support its
prosecution of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Instead, it mobilized
an ad hoc coalition of allies, some of which were treaty allies, many of
which were not, but all of which were concerned about the long term political,
military and economic implications of Saddam Hussein’s aggressive expansionism.
Both the war and the successful American effort to have others contribute to
covering its costs demonstrated that ad hoc coalitions were an important
supplement to formal alliances, and indeed, could serve in place of such
alliances in a variety of circumstances. That coalitions could serve this
purpose did not imply that alliances were meaningless or useless. Rather the
1991 coalition demonstrated that alliances were not a necessary condition for
the successful conduct of an American-led multinational military effort, and
that the American attachment to, and reliance upon, all members of those
alliances—as opposed to the alliances as a whole—might not be as imperative as
it had been during the Cold War. Put bluntly, if a NATO member felt that it did
not want to support American policy outside NATO, the United States no longer
felt compelled to cater to that country’s interests to the extent that it had
during the Cold War, in effect burying whatever differences existed outside the
context of the long-standing confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Operation Desert
Storm also highlighted the importance of establishing a more diversified
American presence outside the Western European and East Asian theaters. To be
sure, America
had long deployed some forces to the Gulf, both naval forces headquartered in Bahrain,
and some units in Saudi Arabia.
Part of the Gulf War’s legacy, however, was a large land and air force build-up
on the Arabian Peninsula, both to deter any future
aggression and to maintain the southern no-fly zone over Iraq,
termed Operation Southern Watch. Even as the United
States increased its Middle East
presence, it began to reduce its presence in Western Europe.
That shift presaged a much larger change that took place about a decade later,
and that itself will soon be overshadowed by a new deployment posture
reflecting America’s
recognition that its forces must be as flexible and responsive as possible, and
require a structure of host facilities that enhances capability. That structure
currently is being developed: it reflects America’s
need to confront international terrorism in a variety of locales, and seeks to
avoid excessive dependence on a particular set of sprawling base structures.
The new posture demonstrates that infrastructure and logistics are as important
as weapons in promoting strategic flexibility. That is a lesson that has not
necessarily been intuitive to strategic decision makers, even if planners
understood it well.
Fighting on Two Fronts
That the United States
has long pursued a strategy geared to fighting on two major fronts should come
as no surprise. World War II only underscored geography’s legacy to the
American strategic equation. As a two-ocean nation it is only natural that we
should be concerned about a two front war of some kind. Nevertheless, as the
Cold War waned, the retention of that strategy—recast in the mid-1990s as one
of fighting two major regional contingencies—became increasingly questionable.
It appeared as if the United States simply seemed more comfortable looking
backward, that is, planning to fight and win two wars in which it had once
fought, namely, Korea and Iraq.
Yet it was clear by the end of the 1990s that there were
other potential adversaries to consider, all of which might or might not prompt
military action simultaneously with ongoing wars that might have already broken
out in Korea
and Iraq. Both China
and Iran sprang
immediately to mind as major military adversaries. There was in addition the
classic “unforeseen contingency” to consider—the war for which no one had
really prepared but which actually was fought.
Such unforeseen wars could be large-scale or of a lesser
intensity. Indeed, the two contingencies that constituted the crux of the “two
Major Regional Conflict (MRC) strategy” had themselves been unforeseen in their
time. The 1950 North Korean attack on the South came as a complete surprise to
the Truman Administration. Likewise, few in the Bush Administration anticipated
that Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait
and prompt the massive military response that was Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm.
Nor has America’s
record been much better with respect to anticipating small-scale contingencies. No one had predicted the operations that took
place in Grenada
(1983), Panama
(1989) or Kosovo (1999). Nor did anyone predict that the United
States would find itself enmeshed in a war
in Afghanistan
within a year of the Bush Administration’s taking office.
The two-MRC strategy not only constrained thinking about the
threats the United States
faced; it also hampered innovative transformation of its military capability.
If two MRC’s were the primary strategic planning construct, the need for a more
flexible, responsive force was more difficult to justify. On the other hand, a
capabilities-based approach, that was not scenario dependent, called for
versatility, and responsiveness, which in turn demanded maximal use of
innovative technologies that enhanced situational awareness, promoted logistic
flexibility, and called for joint operations. Such approaches also reduced the
overall demand for personnel, and shifted many warfighting burdens, such as
operating UAV’s, from “tooth” to “tail,” thereby rendering that classic
distinction much less meaningful than in the past.
The two-MRC approach also appeared to limit strategic
flexibility by fostering the notion that every conflict could only end with
regime change. A more nimble, less scenario-driven approach recognized
something less than regime change as an acceptable outcome (as was Desert
Storm). At the same time, it allowed for presidential decisions to be made
regarding regime change in the context of the emerging contingency—as was the
case with respect to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
Finally, the fixation on two contingencies, both of them
overseas, drew attention away from the growing threat to the American homeland,
represented not only by the ballistic missile threat, but also by that of
international terrorism. The Quadrennial Defense Review’s pre-publication draft
in 2001 accounted for this relatively new development.
Moving Beyond MAD
Despite Ronald Reagan’s launching of the Strategic Defense
Initiative in 1983, the long-standing American commitment to Mutual Assured
Destruction, and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), undermined any
serious progress in the realm of missile defense. The Bush Administration’s
recasting of the strategic triad from one based on three types of offensive
strategic nuclear systems to one that incorporated both strategic and
conventional weapons as well as both offensive and defensive systems marked a
major departure for America’s
grand strategy. That this change also represented a radically different
approach to relations with Russia
was not initially understood by many observers, especially in Europe.
Yet Russia
accepted, albeit somewhat begrudgingly, the termination of the treaty and
missile defense in all its aspects has proceeded apace. Parenthetically,
Russian flexibility was not limited to the abrogation of the ABM treaty; few
would have predicted that Russia
would tolerate NATO membership for the Baltic States.
That it has done so testifies to the new strategic relationship that has
emerged between Washington and Moscow,
and that was anticipated when abrogation of the ABM treaty was first publicly
mooted.
Two More Pillars:
Homeland Security and the Employment of Special Forces
I have already mentioned the new focus on homeland security
that was adumbrated by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Of course, the
events of 9/11 ensured that henceforth homeland security would be a major
component of American strategy. In turn that meant a new role for the military
in protecting the American homeland, a role that extended beyond missile
defense. It also called for new roles for reserve units.
Special Operations Forces (SOF), on the other hand, were
always an element of American force posture. Nevertheless, until 2001, they
were merely an adjunct to the general-purpose forces, commanding little in the
way of resources and often less respect. Operation Enduring Freedom confirmed,
and Iraqi Freedom reconfirmed, the strategic change in American thinking about
SOF. No longer adjunct, Special Operations Forces were to be a major factor in
future contingencies, precisely because they embodied flexibility,
responsiveness and carefully targeted firepower. No longer merely a supporting force, the
Special Operations Forces are now a supported force, playing a critical role
alongside the four major military services within a joint operations framework.
Implications for
Policy, Planning, Force Structure, Programs and Budgets
It should be clear that all of the foregoing changes in
strategy have had a major impact on the implementation of our policies, as well
as on the planning, programming, force structure and program/budget decisions
of the first Bush Administration. They
will have a similar impact in the second administration that is almost upon us.
A new forward posture has already called forth an entirely
new approach to army force structure and to forward naval deployments and
training. As noted, the Department will reposition its forces overseas, in
concert with the Base Realignment and Closure process, and is in the midst of
negotiating agreements with many states that will permit a new overseas
facilities support structure. The focus on capabilities-based planning and
flexible, responsive forces has led to a major transformation of our defense
posture that affects everything from training and experimentation, to a new
array of weapons systems such as UAVs and SSGNs, and to the communications and networking that
supports their effectiveness. The movement to a new triad has led to the
deployment of anti-ballistic missiles at Fort Greeley,
Alaska, and will result in major additional
expenditures for land and sea-based missile defense, coupled with a terrestrial
and space-based support structure. Homeland security will continue to require
additional resourcing, as will Special Operations Forces.
Does Strategy Matter?
I trust that by now you can understand how I reached my
bottom-line that strategy matters. Without a coherent strategy, the United
States simply would not be able to face the
rash of changes in world affairs that have taken place since 9/11. Certainly,
the events since that horrible day have prompted more modifications of our
strategy. In general, however, those
events have vindicated changes that were already made and were being hotly
challenged by those still clinging to old ways of thinking.
Strategic planning is not prophecy, and strategies can well
be proved wrong and often are. Nevertheless, the act of thinking ahead, of
thinking creatively, of outlining goals and adapting capabilities to them, and
of adding or shedding military and other capabilities in light of those goals,
is still the best way to enable the United
States to respond effectively to future
international threats however, wherever and whenever they may arise. On the
other hand, without strategic creativity, without a constant process of
re-evaluating strategy in light of new factors on the international scene, the United
States would continually find itself
burdened with serious mismatches between the military capabilities it required
and those it possessed. That is a burden we simply cannot afford to bear.