2004 Joint Operations Symposium

Meeting Future U.S. Defense Planning Challenges

November 16-17, 2004

Does a national security strategy make a difference in operational planning, training, or procurement?

Has the current defense strategy driven any major defense decisions on defense policy, planning, force structure, program or budgeting decisions?

How successfully does the current defense strategy address the evolving security environment?

What are the key issues that the defense strategy of the next administration must address, and how would you generally expect them to affect defense policy, planning, force structure, program or budgeting decisions?

To What extent should the security concerns and defense capabilities of allies and partners be taken into account in the U.S. national security and defense strategy?

What is the emerging approach within the Pentagon and the Combatant Commanders to capabilities-base planning (CBP)?

What is the role of CBP in defense transformation? How well is it filling that role?

What are the linkages of this planning approach to the defense strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)?

How will we frame the overall requirements and threats?

What refinements to CBP should be considered in the next administration?

What key security concerns/threats does force repositioning address?  What is the appropriate pace and scope for realignment?

How will U.S. global force repositioning affect security cooperation with allies?  What has been their reaction to our proposals?

What are the implications for homeland defense resulting from redeployment of U.S. forces?  What are the implications for the war on terror?

What is the expected impact upon public diplomacy and how will the State Department fill this void in U.S. presence and interaction overseas?

What are the costs?  What are the implications for the BRAC?

What is the role and likely position of the Congress on the Administration's proposal?

There is now a much broader definition of "strategic"  capabilities -- including non-nuclear as well as nuclear offensive (strike forces, air and missile defense, and information operations, all tied together with the necessary command and control and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities.  How best can these strategic capabilities be brought to bear for the purpose of assuring allies and dissuading, deterring, or defeating potential adversaries?

How should we integrate offensive strike and defensive capabilities?  What are the implications for force-sizing or our strategic capabilities?

What are the key issues in planning and integrating strategic capabilities across organizational seams (combatant commands as well as elsewhere in DoD and the U.S. Government)?

Information Operations remain an "invisible" element of our strategic capabilities, what has been achieved towards seamless integration with traditional, kinetic-effect capabilities?

What are the roles for friends and allies?

How do we strike the right balance among direct action, nation-building to "dry up the swamps," and developing networks for intelligence collection?

What is the role of public diplomacy?  What are our expectations of its impact?

Where do we stand on assembling, equipping, and fielding the required force?

How well are we succeeding at bolstering our terrorism defense at the U.S. Borders?

Has the reorganization of agencies and establishment of the Department of Homeland Security put into place the people, processes, and focus to provide the most effective defense?

Dr. Graham T. Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University - The Nexus of WMD and Terrorism - Presentation

Should we implement a "Goldwater-Nichols II" to transform interagency security planning; intelligence collection, assessment, and dissemination; operational cooperation; and civilian and military career paths to foster a more effective national security system? 

How can we improve coordination and collaboration in policy planning and decision-making (i.e., within the Beltway) and in operational execution (i.e., at the regional level)?

How should we reorganize the intelligence community to sustain the war on terrorism?  In what ways might that reorganization hamper intelligence collection, analyses, and operations that support planning for traditional security threats, crisis management efforts, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions?

How has the Department of State approached transformation of its structure to become more flexible and operational, to encourage personnel to become more involved in delivery of programs than in diplomatic representation?  What are the key obstacles to this transformation?

How should we reorganize to sustain the war on terrorism and in what ways might that conflict with traditional security threat planning?