Next Steps for Homeland Security
by
James Jay Carafano
Based on a panel presentation before the
Meeting Key
Now is hardly the time for complacency—while much has been done
to protect the
Lessons from the Cold
War
The global war against terrorism will likely be a long war. The onset of another long war, the Cold War, offers valuable lessons for thinking about the difficulties of organizing for a protracted conflict.
First, it takes time. History argues for patience. The National Security Act of 1947 created
Second, now is the time to get it right. If there is one
constant in
The struggle against the Soviets offers a case in point. One area where Dwight Eisenhower failed to put his stamp on the American way in the Cold War was how the Pentagon would be organized. In the debates over the 1947 act and again as President, Eisenhower lobbied for more integration of the services. Based on the lessons of World War II, he argued for joint operations, where Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force assets would work closely together. He largely failed to overcome the political opposition and service parochialisms that blocked reforms.
On reflection, Eisenhower concluded glumly, “tradition won.”[1] As a result, fundamental problems in joint operations went unaddressed. As Jim Locher’s excellent history of defense reform pointed out, “the inability of war hero Dwight Eisenhower—with his great prestige and influence in military affairs—to overcome opposition to reform convinced others not to challenge the unyielding alliance between the services and Congress. Although the service-dominated structure repeatedly demonstrated flaws over the next three decades, administrations studied, but did not propose, reforms.”[2] It was not until the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 that Congress addressed its failures of 1947.
The lessons are clear. Expect the process of building national security programs to take time. Expect the process to be imperfect. But learn from your experience – and fix it at the beginning or live with the mistakes for a long time.
Reform #1: Improve Congressional
Oversight
Among the organizational reforms yet be adequately addressed for fighting the global war on terrorism is appropriate congressional oversight of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department is charged with leading the nation in preventing, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks. The Department was created by combining over 22 existing federal agencies and programs. Oversight of these agencies, however, largely remains under the committees which held jurisdiction over their activities before the 9/11 attacks. Congress’s failure to consolidate oversight of the DHS is the single greatest obstacle to creating an efficient and effective department. Whether this goal will be achieved in either chamber of Congress is in serious question.
When calls came to create a DHS, respected congressional and
security policy experts of virtually every political persuasion agreed that an
essential step would be to reform Congress’s committee system and establish
dedicated oversight of the Department, akin to the authority the House and
Senate Armed Services committees hold over the Department of Defense.[3]
But committee chairs have been unwilling to relinquish much of their
jurisdiction over the organizations and activities transferred to DHS and so
have blocked reform.[4]
Congress’s inability to address its homeland security
responsibilities was conspicuously noted in the 9/11 Commission’s final report.
Among the Commission’s priorities for enhancing the nation’s capacity to protect
itself against terrorist threats was a pointed recommendation that both the
House and Senate must establish single committees with complete oversight
responsibility over all matters pertaining to DHS.[5]
The Senate’s response to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation
(S. Res. 445) fell well short of this mark. A committee appointed to examine
the issue recommended renaming the Government Affairs Committee as the
“Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee” and assigning it
jurisdiction over all DHS operations except for the Coast Guard and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This makes little sense. The
range of the Committee’s responsibilities is simply too broad to permit it to
effectively oversee one of the nation’s most critical national security
priorities. Additionally, leaving out TSA and the Coast Guard means that two of
the Department’s most important agencies, along with a significant portion of
the Department’s resources and budget, will be outside the Committee’s purview.
This solution is a product of political compromise. It is not a good faith
effort to provide badly needed reform of the congressional committee system or
address the issues raised by the 9/11 Commission.
In contrast, on
Reform #2: Reorganize
the Department of Homeland Security
The purpose of creating the DHS was to integrate critical homeland security missions in a single department to ensure unity of purpose, coordinated action, and effective integration of key border, transportation, and emergency response operations. The first years of the Department’s operations have revealed both its strengths and flaws in accomplishing these tasks. The weaknesses are significant.[6]
The current organization of DHS must be reformed because it hampers the Secretary of Homeland Security’s ability to lead our nation’s homeland security efforts. The organization is weighed down with bureaucratic layers, is rife with turf warfare, and lacks a structure for strategic thinking and policymaking. Additionally, since its creation, whether one looks at the Department’s capacity to organize and mobilize a response to a catastrophic terrorist attack or at the international dimension of DHS programs, the Department has been slow to overcome the obstacles to becoming an effective 21st century national security instrument.
Any overhaul of the Department should include:
Congress and the Administration should develop a comprehensive plan to restructure the Department, including establishing a nonpartisan commission to review the performance of the Department and assess its capacity to fulfill the missions outlined in the Homeland Security Act in the areas of management, missions, authorities, and resources and to report back within six months.
The prospects for such far reaching reform are uncertain.
Much will likely depend on the new leadership of the department and their
commitment to improving the DHS. A new
secretary would likely have to make reform a top priority and actively seek
support from the president and congressional leaders.
Reform #3: Strengthen
the Homeland Security Council
The Homeland Security Council (HSC) was established by presidential directive after the September 11 attacks and later codified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The 9/11 Commission called for folding the HSC into the National Security Council (NSC).
The Senate version of the bill intended to implement the reforms proposed by the Commission (Section 202) called for abolishing the Homeland Security Council and assigning its missions to the NSC. This section was dropped from the final bill. This is probably just as well.
While eventually it would make sense to address the coordination of security issues in a more holistic manner, eliminating what are often artificial distinctions between domestic and overseas security challenges, such an initiative is probably premature. Congress is wrong to interfere with the President's constitutional authority to determine how best to organize his staff. Until programs and policies regarding homeland security become as mature as other aspects of national security, it makes sense for the President to retain a separate dedicated council.[8]
At present the president should focus on strengthening the HSC staff and promoting effective cooperation with the NSC. The ongoing joint HSC/NSC effort to draft a presidential directive on maritime security and develop a national maritime security strategy should serve as a model for other joint efforts. In the long term, perhaps in a few years when homeland security programs and policies are more fully developed, this issue should be revisited.
Reform #4: Improve Intelligence
and Information Sharing
Improving the national capacity to share information and intelligence regarding terrorism has been of one the highest post-9/11 priorities. As stipulated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) was established within the DHS to provide intelligence integration and to merge into one organization the capability to identify and assess future terrorist threats. The IAIP is also responsible for making recommendations about determining the Homeland Security Advisory System threat level and for issuing appropriate alerts and warnings. Since its creation, however, the role of DHS and IAIP in intelligence sharing has been significantly marginalized.
In his January 28, 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush announced the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) as the single source for the collection and analysis of all terrorism intelligence. The TTIC began operation in May 2003 and was designed to close seams in the terrorist threat-related intelligence process and to provide one organization to gather, assess, and disseminate intelligence information. The 9/11 Commission recommended establishing a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) under the head of the intelligence community. The President established the NCTC by executive order and consolidated it with the TTIC. This initiative was later codified in the law implementing the 9/11 Commission reforms.
Although the TTIC and NCTC are important and necessary for sharing information among federal, state, and local agencies, the Homeland Security Act gave the DHS responsibility for intelligence integration. The DHS, however, does not have primary oversight over either organization. The current arrangement leaves no one person or agency in charge of all these related activities, and it makes the DHS little more than an end-user, competing with other agencies for intelligence support. The DHS currently lacks the experience, personnel, and facilities to act as a true domestic intelligence integrator. Without the responsibility, organization, and resources to perform this mission, the DHS is unlikely ever to be able to fulfill its congressional mandate.
Rather than establishing the TTIC as part of the NCTC it should remain an independent interagency organization responsible to the DHS and its operations should be consolidated with the functions of the IAIP, and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which is responsible for consolidating terrorist watch lists. In addition, other intelligence integration centers within DHS, such as the Customs and Border Control’s National Targeting Center (NTC), which identifies high-risk international cargo for inspection, and the Immigration and Customs’ Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) should be integrated into the IAIP. Together, these organizations should form the nucleus of an effective information sharing center under DHS leadership.[9]
Frankly, the prospects for turning back the direction of intelligence and information sharing to meet the intent of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 are not good. In fact, the NCTC and competition from the FBI will further crowd out the DHS role. Much will depend on the appointments of the Director of National Intelligence and the new DHS Secretary and how closely they will work together to revitalize the Department’s place in the intelligence community.
Reform #5: Enhance
Interagency Operations
Clearly the area of interagency cooperation that needs most attention is between the Homeland Security and Defense Departments. Frankly, the relationship between these departments is very immature. The Defense Department’s (DOD) effort to create a doctrinal distinction between “homeland defense” and “homeland security” has served more to create gaps between the two organizations and allowed DOD to narrowly define its role in homeland security.[10]
There are three areas where DOD and DHS should cooperate much more closely.
First, DOD and DHS should work much more closely on developing future capabilities for maritime security, particularly in enhancing maritime domain awareness (MDA) and preparing to confront a range of unconventional threats from small boat attacks to cruise missiles.[11] The prospects for this kind of cooperation are improving. DOD and DHS have established means to jointly consider MDA issues.
The second area where DOD needs to play a larger role is developing the capacity to respond to catastrophic threats, providing forces that are properly organized, trained, and equipped to respond to the worst kinds of terrorist attacks. In this area only scant progress has been made. DOD’s U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has begun to examine scenarios that might define future force requirements for these missions. In addition, the National Guard is undergoing restructuring efforts that will produce some forces that will have a greater utility for homeland security. None of these initiatives, however, appear adequate to address the challenge of catastrophic terrorism.[12]
The third area where more cooperation is called for is the development and acquisition of future technologies that are mutually critical to defense and homeland security. Research suggests there are significant opportunities for collaboration.[13] On the other hand, few initiatives appear underway. Much current cooperation is through the Technical Support Working Group, but these efforts focus on commercial off-the-shelf technologies, not long-term research and development.
DOD is currently drafting its homeland defense strategy. This strategy will likely determine the future course of cooperation between the departments. Further progress will likely be limited until the strategy is published or new guidance is provided in the DOD’s 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Conclusion
The pace of future developments in homeland security will likely be determined more by the scope of future organizational initiatives than the level of homeland security budgets. If the federal government makes strides in improving congressional oversight, reorganizing the DHS, and improving interagency operations, the nation’s capacity to sustain efficient and effective homeland security instruments will continue to grow. That, however, will require concerted leadership.
[1] Alice C. Coles, et al., eds., The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization. (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978), p. 177.
[2] James R.
Locher III, Victory on the
[3] See, for
example, Michael Scardaville, “The New
Congress Must Reform Its Committee Structure to Meet Homeland Security Needs,”
Heritage Backgrounder #1612 (
[4] See, for
example, Don Young, “Facing Security Challenges,” Washington Times (
[5] The Commission’s recommendation is cited at the House Select Homeland Security Committee Web site at http://hsc.house.gov/files/9-11ReportSection13-4.pdf.
[6] See, for
example, Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, “Major Management Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security,” (December 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_05-06_Dec04.pdf.
[7]
Comprehensive recommendations can be found in James Jay Carafano and David
Heyman, “DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,” Heritage Special
Report No.2 (December 2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=72759.
[8] James
Jay Carafano, “The Senate and House
9/11 Reform Bills Both Miss the Mark,” Heritage
Executive Memorandum #946 (
[9] Edwin
Meese, et al., “What a Comprehensive Intelligence Bill Should Contain,”
Heritage Backgrounder #1799 (
[10] James
Jay Carafano, testimony before the House Government Reform Committee,
[11] James
Jay Carafano, testimony before the Senate Committee on Science, Commerce, and
Transportation,
[12] James Jay Carafano, “Citizen-Soldiers and Homeland Security: A Strategic Assessment,” Lexington Institute, (March 2004), http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/CitizenSoldiers.pdf.
[13] See,
for example, Board on Army Science and Technology, Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security, vol. 2. (