The new administration will have to find a strategy for pursuing military transformation. Even before doing so, it will need a clear definition of that overused and abused term. It will also need to clarify its stance on the hypothesis—still only a hypothesis—that a contemporary revolution in military affairs is within reach. And it will need to do so within a policy environment still characterized by various constraints.
As I see it, those facts argue for a modernization and innovation agenda characterized by well-chosen and relatively modest initiatives, rather than transformation in any literal and radical sense. My fellow panel members may challenge that assertion. But I will begin by laying out several arguments that substantiate my view in favor of patience and selective innovation, with a focus on R&D, experimentation, and selective modernization rather than a rush to transform the basic building blocks and equipment inventories of the U.S. armed forces.
BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS
In
this period of fiscal surplus, the need for further belt-tightening at the
Pentagon is not obvious. Why not keep
the two-Desert Storm capability and existing weapons modernization plans, while
simply adding on additional forces and programs as needed to make
transformation possible? The reason is
simple: there is not enough money to go
around. Just to preserve existing
forces and weapons modernization agendas would require an annual real defense
spending increase of 10 percent or more.
But neither presidential candidate promised increasing annual defense
spending by more than 3 percent.
The main
driver of the projected need to increase defense spending is the procurement
account. As is well known, the defense
budget plan requires annual procurement spending to increase substantially for
two main reasons. First, the 1990s
“procurement holiday” must end, since Reagan-era equipment is starting to wear
out quickly. Second, the Pentagon
intends to replace existing weapons with expensive systems such as the F-22 and
V-22 aircraft—not to mention joint strike and F/A-18 E/F fighters, improved
attack helicopters, submarines, and so forth.
It is not essential that the Pentagon purchase such expensive weapons in
the numbers planned. However, it is
essential that it purchase more hardware to replace aging systems in the years
ahead. The Pentagon appears to hope
that increasing the procurement budget to about $70 billion a year, from its
2001 level of about $60 billion, will suffice to pay the anticipated
bills. But neutral watchdogs like the
Congressional Budget Office estimate steady-state price tags of $80 billion to
$90 billion for the future force—if not even higher (in constant 2001 dollars).[1]
Meanwhile,
other Pentagon budget demands are likely to hold relatively steady, or go up
somewhat, under existing plans. Since
personnel cuts are essentially complete, personnel spending will stay the same,
or go up modestly, relative to the inflation rate. While some hope to reap large savings by privatization and
outsourcing as well as base closures, particularly in operations and
maintenance accounts, any savings are more likely to be modest in size. Activities such as health care, equipment
maintenance, and base cleanup continue to exert upward pressure on the O&M
budget; real growth of at least one percent per person per year is likely in
the decade ahead, and perhaps twice as much or even more.[2] All in all, that implies the need for at
least an additional $10 billion in annual funding by 2010.
Meanwhile,
the planned real reductions in spending on research, development, test, and
evaluation are already being questioned as unwise—and would not save much money
in any event.
The
bottom line is that real defense spending will likely have to grow by at least
$30 billion in the decade ahead to sustain the current force and planned
modernization agenda (in other words, spending on the “050” budget category
will have to increase from the 2000/2001 levels of around $290 billion to $320
billion or more).
With
an available surplus nearing $2 trillion projected for the 2001-2010 period
(not counting surpluses in the social security and medicare trust funds), that
may not seem an inordinate defense spending increase, since it would probably
total only about 20 percent to 25 percent of available funds. However, expecting the Pentagon to receive
$300 billion to $500 billion in additional funding over the next decade is a
highly optimistic attitude for defense planners to take. Out of the $1.8 trillion projected surplus
(not counting the surpluses in the social security and Medicare trust funds),
$600 million would be needed essentially to preserve levels of domestic
services that already exist today, and to allow real domestic discretionary
spending to grow as fast as the population does (rather than just keep up with
inflation). Since many domestic discretionary
programs—for transportation, educational and environmental programs, prisons,
immigration, and so on—are linked either to the size of the population or the
size of the economy, that is a prudent assumption to make. Efforts to shore up the long-term fiscal
health of entitlement programs, given high priority by both political parties
and presidential candidates, are likely to require at least $500 billion over
the next decade, according to an estimate by the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities.[3] And some $400 billion of the projected
surplus is in pension reserves for government employees. The same logic that fences off the social
security surplus should presumably fence off those reserves too.[4]
That
leaves only a few hundred billion dollars over the ten-year period for
remaining efforts, including tax cuts, prescription-drug benefits for the
elderly, new educational initiatives, and other priorities of the two
presidential candidates. Only a modest
fraction is likely to be made available to the Pentagon.
The
presidential campaigns themselves have made the same point rather explicitly,
and precisely. In describing how they
would spend the non-social security surplus, the Bush and Gore campaigns
respectively allocate about $45 billion and $80 billion for defense over the
next decade—or roughly $5 billion a year more under Bush and $9 billion a year
more under Gore, above what will be needed to keep up with inflation. Additional defense spending ranked ninth on
Gore’s list of priorities and seventh on Bush’s.[5] Of course, these are only preliminary
figures; effective lobbying from the military services and pro-defense
officials in the Congress could lead to more generous allocations once a new
president is inaugurated. But that is an
optimistic viewpoint from the point of view of a defense supporter. Moreover, even if allocations doubled or
tripled, they would remain insufficient to sustain the existing force while
also following the Pentagon’s existing weapons modernization agenda.
When
all is said and done, the Department of Defense is highly unlikely to see
anything close to half a trillion dollars in additional real funding over the
next decade. It will do well to receive
10 percent, or around $200 billion, of the projected ten-year surplus. That requires some serious thinking about
how to protect U.S. national security in less expensive ways than the Pentagon
now plans.
GEOSTRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS
It has become common for believers in a contemporary RMA and advocates of transformation to argue for a scaling back of the U.S. role in the world to allow the Pentagon to devote more human and budgetary resources to innovation. However, their arguments about how the United States might do so are generally rather shallow and unconvincing. In reality, modifying the current two-war framework and policy of overseas engagement, while possible at a certain level, will take considerable time and effort—and yield only limited economies as measured in dollars and manpower resources in the process. That is not an argument against new policies, only a cautionary note about how much we can really expect to benefit from them for purposes of expediting transformation.
My recent Joint Forces Quarterly article proposes an alternative two-war concept, developing what might be termed a “1 ½ MTW plus Bosnia/IFOR” or “Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia/IFOR” force posture. Here, I will instead focus on the other main type of geostrategic constraint limiting U.S. force planners: the basing and deployment of American forces abroad.
Many U.S. forces overseas today anchor the U.S. commitment to NATO. Keeping 65,000 American military personnel in Germany may seem nonessential, but it is also inexpensive, since Berlin contributes financially to the modest additional burden of keeping U.S. troops on its own soil. They are also deployed with their families. The same can be said of most of the U.S. forces in Japan—that is, the 25,000 or so who are not Marines on Okinawa. The situation is similar for the more than 10,000 uniformed personnel in Italy, a comparable number in the United Kingdom, and another 10,000 or so distributed among a range of other NATO members.[6] Of the total 250,000 troops away from home, therefore, at least half have a fairly good quality of life.
What about people deployed away from home base and families? Republicans commonly noted that the Clinton administration deployed forces to a new mission every nine weeks, or about 6 missions a year. However, the Cold War average was actually slightly greater than that—not even including combat deployments in Vietnam or Korea.[7] Moreover, most of the Clinton administration missions were short and involved only modest numbers of people. In dollar terms, costs have not been particularly onerous, averaging about $3 billion a year, or 1 percent of the defense budget.[8]
Longer missions generally took place only in regions of considerable importance to the United States. At the end of the Clinton administration, significant numbers of U.S. forces were deployed away from home in six places: Korea, Okinawa, the waters of the Western Pacific, the waters of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans. Of the six deployments, five predated Clinton’s tenure in office. Even the sixth, the presence in the Balkans, was a commitment that Republicans contributed to creating: in December 1992, President George Bush issued his famous “Christmas warning” to Slobodan Milosevic, promising an American military response if Serbs used violence against the Kosovo Albanians.
So the Clinton/Gore presidency did not use the military significantly more than its predecessors, frequently deploy U.S. forces to regions of peripheral importance for the United States, or spend a great deal of money on new missions. Most of the partisan sniping on the subject of deployments has been unfair.
But leaving aside the partisan issues, the next president nonetheless faces a major problem. Missions abroad have clearly been hard on the uniformed personnel of the U.S. military over the last decade, and it is not going to be easy to end them. With somewhat more than 100,000 deployed continuously, nearly 8 percent of all U.S. military personnel are away from families and normal basing at any given time. That is up from the latter years of the Cold War, when the fraction was around 6 percent—130,000 to 140,000 personnel out of a total force of 2.2 million.
Today’s 8 percent figure may not sound large. But there are two reasons why it is quite significant. First, of the 1.38 million active-duty troops, only about 810,000 personnel make up the services’ force structures.[9] Most deployments involve those 810,000, meaning that more than 10 percent are generally deployed at a time. Second, many other demands on U.S. military personnel—most notably, training—take them away from home base as well. On balance, the typical soldier, sailor, airman/woman, or Marine is away from home at least 15 to 20 percent of the time as a result. If that is the average, many exceed it.
Alas, there are few easy answers about how to reduce these demands. U.S. interests in Persian Gulf oil, and in maintaining stability and impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in that region as well as Northeast Asia, make it difficult to contemplate American military disengagement from those regions. Few in the U.S. foreign policy and defense debate would dispute these conclusions.
U.S. commitments in the Balkans do strike some as a distraction from the military’s main missions. But the alternative to engagement in the 1990s was to stand by and tolerate horrific civil conflict, the worst in Europe since the end of World War II, including many genocidal acts of violence. That policy of disengagement was in effect both attempted and then abandoned by the Bush administration in 1992 and 1993, when it first kept the United States out of the war in Bosnia but then, as noted above, pledged U.S. military involvement in the event of a conflict in Kosovo during the waning days of the Bush presidency. President Clinton got off to no better a start, not finding a solution to the Bosnian civil war for more than two years. But finally, the United States and its NATO allies found their footing on violence in the Balkans.[10] From that point in 1995 on, the death toll from violence in that region was limited to about 10,000, including the Kosovo war—in contrast to the loss of 100,000 or more people in the three preceding years.[11] There may be ways to reduce the U.S. presence in Bosnia, now a relatively stable if still-divided country, in the next year or two. But that total presence numbers no more than 6,000, or less than 20 percent of the SFOR total there. If cut in half, it would reduce overall U.S. overseas deployments—but by no more than 3 percent.
In short, even though U.S. military interests make it advisable to reduce strains on troops, American strategic interests make it hard to pull back from engagement abroad. And the usual, politically popular proposals—ending American defense commitments in the Balkans or taking more troops home from Germany or Japan—are either undesirable or unlikely to offer much relief.
At some future date, the U.S. Persian Gulf presence might be reduced. The no-fly-zone operation over Iraq, which clearly does little to weaken Saddam’s grip on his own country, might be ended, particularly if the Iraqi dictator agrees to a resumption of arms inspections in his country. The United States would still want to keep fighter aircraft in the Persian Gulf region and Turkey to deter Iraqi moves against its neighbors, but their numbers could be reduced and their mission redefined. It may also be possible to hand off some of this mission to bombers based in Europe or Diego Garcia, with substantial numbers of autonomous all-weather homing munitions prestationed near Iraq, once such munitions (such as the sensor fused weapon) complete their development cycles and become widely available. However, the time does not appear ripe for such a change in policy at present.
Prospects for reducing U.S. troop commitments are better in two other cases—on Okinawa, for the case of the Marine Corps, and in the Mediterranean for the case of the Navy. The Marines on Okinawa impose a difficult burden on the U.S.-Japan alliance because of the amount of that island’s territory they utilize. They are not so readily deployable from that location as to make their forward location of great military importance. Alternatives using more prepositioning of equipment could compensate for a major cutback in their presence on the island. Finally, maintaining the presence imposes a burden on the Marine Corps itself, since most Marines on the island are deployed there rather than being based permanently. In the Mediterranean, the end of the U.S.-Soviet competition and availability of land bases throughout much of the region have greatly diminished the need for a quasi-continuous carrier presence now. There can be downsides to trying to maintain continuous presence in fact; witness last year’s air war against Serbia, which began with no carrier in combat range since it had been moved to the Persian Gulf ten days prior to the beginning of hostilities (to maintain a normal peacetime operational schedule)—in violation, it might be noted, of several classic rules of deterrence. The Navy could focus on theaters where land bases are less dependable and potential conflict scenarios more ominous, notably the Persian Gulf and parts of the Western Pacific.
Combining significant reductions in the U.S. presence in those two regions with modest eventual cuts in Bosnia, the overall magnitude of U.S. deployments abroad could theoretically be reduced by 25 percent. That would be a big change from today. It would make the pace of deployments per capita comparable to what it might have been under the Bush administration’s base force proposal. But it would still leave U.S. forces heavily engaged abroad, placing real constraints on how many could be quickly tied up in transformation efforts. Moreover, it is unlikely to happen. Even an ambitious new administration will do well to cut back overseas deployments by 10 percent.
TECHNOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL GROUNDS FOR CAUTION
History provides ample grounds for caution about pursuing major defense transformation. Most contemporary RMA enthusiasts make reference to the interwar years and claim that we are in another period of similar potential, promise, and peril today. However, military technology advanced steadily and impressively throughout the twentieth century, including its latter half. Helicopters radically reshaped many battlefield operations after World War II. ICBMs and space-launch vehicles followed. Satellite communications were first used militarily in 1965 in Vietnam, where aircraft-delivered, precision-guided munitions also made their debut in the early 1970s. Air defense and antitank missiles played major roles in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Stealth fighters were designed in the late 1970s.[12] Infrared sensors and night-vision technologies made their debut in this period as well. If these developments could occur absent a decision to embark on a major transformation strategy, do today’s technologies—and associated innovations in organizations and tactics they may permit—really require us to declare that an RMA is underway, and reshape basic defense priorities radically as a result?[13]
History also tells us that radical military transformations only make sense when technology and new concepts and tactics are ripe. At other times, targeted modernizations together with vigorous research, development, and experimentation make more sense. A good analogy is the period of the 1920s, when major military vehicles and systems such as the tank and airplane were not yet ripe for large-scale purchase. In addition, advanced operational concepts such as blitzkrieg and carrier aviation had not yet been fully developed in a manner that could guide hardware acquisition, military organization, or doctrinal development. As such, research, experimentation, and prototyping were the proper elements of a wise innovation and acquisition strategy. In the 1930s, new operational concepts were better understood, technologies better developed, and geostrategic circumstances more foreboding. Under these circumstances, large-scale modernization made sense, and those countries that did not conduct it tended to perform badly in the early phases of World War II. Because most radical RMA proponents cannot clearly specify what a near-term transformation should consist of, I am inclined to liken today’s situation to the 1920s rather than the 1930s.
RMA proponents are certainly right to believe that a successful military must always be changing. But the post-World War II U.S. military has already taken that adage to heart. The status quo in defense circles does not mean standing still; it means taking a balanced approach to modernization that has served the country remarkably well for decades. Indeed it brought on the very technologies displayed in Desert Storm that have given rise to the belief that an RMA may be underway.[14] It is not clear that we need to accelerate the pace of innovation now.
Moreover, radical innovation is not always good. If the wrong ideas are adopted, transforming a force can make it worse. For example, in the world wars, militaries overestimated the likely effects of artillery as well as aerial and battleship bombardment against prepared defensive positions, meaning that their infantry forces proved much more vulnerable than expected when they assaulted enemy lines.[15] Britain's radically new all-tank units were inflexible, making them less successful than Germany's integrated mechanized divisions in World War II. Strategic aerial bombardment did not achieve nearly the results that had been expected of it; airpower was much more effective as close-air support for armored formations in blitzkrieg operations.[16] Later on, the U.S. Army's Pentomic division concept, intended to employ tactical nuclear weapons, was adopted for a time but abandoned in 1961.[17]
But these are only historical arguments, uninformed by the realities of today’s world. What does the current state of technology say about the prospects for an RMA? In fact, one should be somewhat skeptical about the revolution in military affairs hypothesis because many of its key technical underpinnings have not been well established and may not be valid. Proponents of the RMA concept often make passing mention of Moore=s Alaw@--the trend for the number of transistors that can fit on a semiconductor chip to double every eighteen to twenty-four months--and then extrapolate such a radical rate of progress too much different realms of technology. For example, in its 1997 report the National Defense Panel wrote: AThe rapid rate of new and improved technologies--a new cycle about every eighteen months--is a defining characteristic of this era of change and will have an indelible influence on new strategies, operational concepts, and tactics that our military employs.@[18] However, conflating progress in computers with progress in other major areas of technology is unjustified. To the extent RMA believers hinge most of their argument on advances in modern electronics and computers, they are at least proceeding from a solid foundation. When they expect comparably radical progress in land vehicles, ships, aircraft, rockets, explosives, and energy sources--as many do, either explicitly or implicitly--they are probably mistaken, at least in the early years of the 21st century.
In 1998 and 1999 I conducted a survey of various types of military technology, reading extensively in scientific and defense trade journals and interviewing numerous technologists and scientists for their prognostications. My admittedly unprovable conclusions were that only two areas of defense technology—computer hardware and computer software—promised revolutionary breakthroughs in the 2000-2020 period. For the other 26 categories, I forecast high rates of advance for 8, and moderate rates for the remaining 18. Notably, high rates of progress seem likely in chemical sensors, biological sensors, radio communications, laser communications, robotics, radio-frequency weapons, nonlethal weapons, and biological weapons. In most areas of propulsion, projectiles, and platforms, as well as those areas of sensor technology not mentioned above (such as sonar, radar, and magnetic detection devices), breakthroughs will probably be few and far between.[19]
This set of conclusions does not rule out progress. But it does suggest that any RMA will be catalyzed by progress in a certain select set of technologies—not in an across-the-board flurry of major inventions and breakthroughs. It also casts into doubt the prospect for “dominant battlespace knowledge,” standoff low-casualty warfare in urban and forest environments, major military operations conducted intercontinentally, and other ambitious visions of many in the RMA community.
The sum total of these sobering realities, as I see them, means that transformation is neither instantly attainable nor instantly desirable. Funds for rebuilding and reequipping the military are in somewhat short supply. Most military personnel will have to remain focused on engagement and deterrence—“shaping and responding,” in the lexicon of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review—rather than transforming (“preparing). And most military technologies, particularly most vehicles and weapons platforms, are not advancing quickly enough to justify wholesale replacement anytime soon. Rapid transformation agendas, such as the more ambitious and large-scale versions of the Army’s move towards medium-weight brigades, are not necessarily warranted by the state of technology or likely trends in technology in the years ahead.
These conclusions are not incompatible with major efforts to innovate, redress vulnerabilities, and otherwise improve American armed forces. One could even say that transformation will occur, if one wishes (though I prefer not to use the term, given its overtones of radical change). But in that case, transformation of U.S. forces may be best thought of as a long-term process to which we should accustom ourselves, rather than an imminent change we will soon experience.
As Stephen Rosen writes: AThe general lesson for students or advocates of innovation may well be that it is wrong to focus on budgets when trying to understand or promote innovation. Bringing innovations to fruition will often be expensive. Aircraft carriers, fleets of helicopters, and ICBM forces were not cheap. But initiating an innovation and bringing it to the point where it provides a strategically useful option has been accomplished when money was tight...Rather than money, talented military personnel, time, and information have been the key resources for innovation.@[20]
Some individuals feel that the above arguments notwithstanding, the United States really has no choice but to rebuild its equipment inventories and combat units from first principles. They believe that future adversaries will make greater use of sea mines, cruise and ballistic missiles, chemical or biological weapons, and other means to attempt to deny the U.S. military the ability to build up forces and operate from large, fixed infrastructures as in Desert Storm. As a result, they consider major steps to change the way U.S. armed forces deploy and fight to be not only desirable but essential.
However, many of the solutions to these problems may not be in the realm of advanced weaponry. True, long-range strike platforms, missile defenses, short-takeoff aircraft, and other such advanced technologies may be part of the solution. But so might more minesweepers, smaller roll-on/roll-off transport vessels useful in shallow ports, concrete bunkers for deployed aircraft, and other relatively low-tech approaches to hardening and dispersing supplies and infrastructure. The military services already are biased in favor of procuring advanced weaponry at the expense of equally important but less advanced hardware. By emphasizing modernistic and futuristic technology, the most ambitious RMA concepts could reinforce this existing tendency, quite possibly to the nation's detriment.
In conclusion, the following targeted transformation agenda seems the most sound, affordable, and consistent with prevailing geostrategic circumstances as well as technological constraints:
n robustly support research and development, along the lines of what Governor Bush proposed during the recent presidential campaign,
n expand joint-service experimentation efforts from the level of tens of millions of dollars a year to the level of hundreds of millions annually,
n continue to build defenses against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles,
n harden or otherwise protect weapons systems, bases, major infrastructure, and fielded forces against various threats such as mines and missiles; in many cases, these measures will be more important than sophisticated missile defense,
n resume Cold-War-scale efforts to harden electronics against nuclear-induced electromagnetic pulse and radio-frequency weapons,
n put a smaller fraction of procurement dollars into major platforms and a higher percentage into advanced munitions, sensors, unmanned vehicles and other robotics, communications systems, and reconnaissance capabilities
n continue to improve the nation’s homeland defense capabilities in areas such as biological weapons vaccines and antibiotics
These measures are not cheap. But they should be affordable. Most require expenditures in the hundreds of millions a year rather than the billions, as well as the efforts of thousands of people rather than many tens of thousands. And there is enough room for increasing efficiency in traditional missions, such as maintaining a two-war capability as well as carrying out global engagement activities, to make such measures eminently feasible on human-resource grounds as well.
[1] See Statement of Lane Pierrot, Senior Analyst, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, on Aging Military Equipment, before the Military Procurement Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, February 24, 1999, p. 16.
[2] See Amy Belasco, Paying for Military Readiness and Upkeep: Trends in Operation and Maintenance Spending (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1997), p. 5.
[3] James Horney and Robert Greenstein, “How Much of the Enlarged Surplus is Available for Tax and Program Initiatives?,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C., July 7, 2000; Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update (July 2000).
[4] See Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale, “How Big Is the Prospective Budget Surplus?,” Policy Brief #64, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., September 2000.
[5] Richard W. Stevenson, “Debating Detailed Plans for Hypothetical Money,” New York Times, September 7, 2000, p. A24.
[6] Directorate for Information, Operations, and Reports, “Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area,” Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., December 31, 1999.
[7] See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978), p. 26; and Rowan Scarborough, “Record Deployments Take Toll on Military,” Washington Times, March 28, 2000, p. 6.
[8] Laurinda Zeman, Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1999), p. xii.
[9] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Defense Manpower Requirements Reports,” Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., p. 9.
[10] See Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000).
[11] See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000).
[12]. Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 21.
[13]. Van Creveld, Technology
and War. Trevor Dupuy uses yet
another categorization scheme, different from those of Krepinevich, Van
Creveld, and others, to understand the history of military innovation. He groups all progress since 1800 together
under the title of Athe age of technological change.@ See Trevor N. Dupuy, The
Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Fairfax, Va.: HERO Books, 1984).
[14]. For sound warnings about both dismissing the RMA and
jumping on the bandwagon too enthusiastically, see Colin S. Gray, The American Revolution in Military Affairs:
An Interim Assessment (Camberley, England: Strategic and Cpopmbat Studies
Institute, 1997), pp. 5-7, 33-34; for a reminder that militaries must always be
innovating and changing, see Jonathan Shimshoni, ATechnology, Military
Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship,@ International Security, vol. 15, no. 3
(Winter 1990/91), pp. 213-215.
[15]. John Keegan, The
First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 20; Dan Goure, AIs
There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future?,@ Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1993), p.
185; Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and
Warfare, pp. 218-220, 258-266.
[16]. Robert Pape, Bombing
to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 87-136,
254-313; Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, ABritish Armed Forces, 1918-1939,@
in Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, Military
Effectiveness, vol. II (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
[17]. Stephen Biddle, AAssessing Theories of Future
Warfare,@ Paper Presented to the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1997, pp. 37-38; Andrew J.
Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army
between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1986); John Keegan, A History of
Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), pp. 362-379; Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the
Present (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 193-195; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the
Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 13-18,
37-38.
[18]. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, pp. 7-8.
[19] Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000), pp. 32-105.
[20]. Rosen, Winning
the Next War, p. 252.