Context

The United States believes that peace with security should be the normal circumstance for mankind's existence on earth and, therefore, believes that it must develop strategies to maintain the peace. To support those strategies, we must also develop and maintain military capabilities appropriate to whatever circumstances arise in a constantly changing world.

Perhaps the most important strategy we have ever articulated is that of deterrence—to convince other nations that acts of aggression will pose unacceptable risks to them in the form of assured, significant retaliation by U.S. forces. This deterrent strategy has been generalized to a very high level, to the point that the U.S. deterrent forces now fulfill a single universal purpose—to prevent wars.

I believe we must reject alternative formulations of deterrence that would, for example, suggest that our nuclear weapons forces should exist only for the purpose of deterring nuclear attacks. All of our past operational plans were designed to rapidly reestablish a stable deterrence as quickly as possible if the peace were ever broken by conflict. Such should be our policy goal for the future. Our entire force structure—from the forces needed to deal with the simplest conflicts or terrorist attacks all the way up to the forces for global thermonuclear force projection—should have the single purpose of maintaining peace with security for the U.S. and our allies.

The strategy of deterrence is a venerable historical concept, but one that was taken to even greater levels of importance by the U.S. during the Cold War. During the Cold War we developed a fairly clear idea of what our deterrence strategy should be. We knew exactly what was the greatest threat to peace: we desired that Soviet imperialism must remain in check—in particular, that any expansionist aims on their part should be discouraged in clear and understandable ways. We placed a high priority on preventing war in central Europe, mindful of the enormous toll of lives that had been amassed in both of the previous world wars.

We developed a fair understanding of how deterrence might work to maintain the peace in such an atmosphere of conflicting interests and agendas: we were able to develop a list of those assets on which the Soviet military leadership placed the highest value, and we developed an array of [nuclear and other] military forces to hold those assets at risk. Many have suggested that the U.S. deterrent strategy should have been retired with the end of the Cold War, but doubtless these sentiments are derived from a more limited view of what deterrence had meant in the past. I believe that the concept of deterrence is quite robust and is, at its heart, capable of sufficient complexity to be adapted as the preferred national and military strategy for whatever the future holds.

In his seminal work On Escalation, Herman Kahn first developed the concept of escalation ladders, which he intended as an analyst's tool to stretch the mind and stir the imagination in examining the course of potential conflicts—from low level crises to all-out wars. He noted that the job of analysts and planners is much more complicated than that of the actual decision-maker in any unfolding crisis. When trying to examine such issues in the abstract, the analyst needs to examine many more possibilities and options, to say nothing of the need to suspend disbelief and incredulity when attempting to think about major crises, emergencies, and wars that are not yet understood or felt in specifics. Kahn remarks that "the decision-maker is not so handicapped…in dealing with special purposes and specific situations," and may be able to "deal with a simple and limited number of options." Thus, "the decision-maker may, in a crisis, be able to invent or work out easily and quickly what seems in normal times to be hypothetical, complex, or otherwise difficult to the scholar or layman."

Kahn's treatment of the abstract conflict spectrum led to the development of a generalized escalation ladder with 44 rungs—from an emerging crisis (in which political, economic, or diplomatic gestures are the appropriate response) all the way up to Insensate (unlimited, sustained) War. Our deterrence strategy for the future should be thought of as the appropriate steps the U.S. should take at any position on such an escalation spectrum in order to prevent war or, if fighting should break out, to be able to restore a stable peace at the lowest level of conflict.

For any real or emerging conflict in which the U.S. becomes engaged, the fact of the U.S. powerful arsenal of nuclear weapons cannot be dismissed from the thinking of the potential adversary, nor in my mind should it ever be so. In the escalation metaphor of Herman Kahn, we should approach each policy, strategy, or tactical decision only in the context of seeking a "system solution" for the entire spectrum of possible future events. The existence of U.S. strategic or theater nuclear forces and highly capable conventional forces should give potential adversaries pause, and it is appropriate that we preserve ambiguity as to just what our response would be. For example, those who would suggest that the U.S. should never attempt to deter (with its nuclear weapons) the use or threatened use of biological or chemical weapons (weapons that we have eschewed by treaty) ought to have to prove that the use of such weapons could be deterred without resorting to nuclear use. Note that, as Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, said, "Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction against the United States or its allies must first consider the consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response would be, but it would be overwhelming and devastating." Similarly, rather than make declarations that a nuclear response is called for if biological or chemical weapons are used, it is important not to attempt to lock future U.S. leaders into positions that would limit their freedom of action to effectively deal with the actual crises that emerge.

Doubtless the future will be far more complex than the past, but the U.S. deterrent strategy must be made the equal of that more complex world. We should attempt to integrate, by design, all of our military preparations and planning into a cohesive strategy to effectively deal with any contingency, at any stage of escalation. We must, in turn, take special care to be sure that our strategies are backed up by forces that are equally robust—survivable against the most aggressive attacks, even surprise attacks, and able to inflict either a very selective or a devastating retaliatory attack.

Sizing the Nuclear Forces

To establish the size of the U.S. military forces, and in particular our nuclear weapons forces, both strategic and tactical, we must examine the roles these forces must play and the capabilities required for these roles. Thus our deterrent strategy must be inseparable from our force structure, and vice versa.

During the Cold War, we began with the target base which we intended to hold at risk in the former Soviet Union, and which we believed the Soviet leadership valued most highly. Over time, we settled on four principal categories of targets:

1) strategic nuclear forces

2) leadership

3) other military targets, and

4) war-supporting industries.

Beginning with that identification of targets, a target list of aim points could be established, giving some attention to the priorities within each category of targets. It was important not to spend too many weapons trying to exhaust all of the targets in any single category, but to balance the target base and our ability to hold these at risk with a realistic stockpile of weapons. The target list thus generated would correspond to the minimal number of weapons required. However, from that point there were many other factors that had to be taken into account; most of which raised the number of weapons required, above the minimum number of weapons required to arrive "on target."

First, the choice of basing modes led to considerations of how robust we could make the U.S. weapons against being destroyed if an adversary chose to strike first. This "first-strike survivability" led to the establishment of a triad of forces: basing of our nuclear forces on land, at sea, and in air-carried vehicles. The numbers derived from survivability considerations, in turn, also depended sharply on whether the supposed attack would come "out of the blue" (with little or no warning) or after a more gradual build-up of the crisis. In the latter case, there would be time to generate a maximum number of U.S. nuclear delivery forces and place them "on alert" in more survivable postures.

Once our forces were deployed in a robust mode, the next essential question became an examination of the response time it would take for the U.S. command authority to respond to an attack. Within that framework, tradeoffs must be evaluated between prompt retaliation to any strategic damage caused by an adversary’s attack (e.g., whether we should launch either on attack-warning or while under attack, after some damage to valuable U.S. assets could be discerned) or whether to attempt to "ride out the attack." Actual choices will depend on both the technology available for attack warning and the configuration of forces at a particular time. However, the U.S. has always tried to emphasize the survivability of our nuclear systems and infrastructure necessary to endure a preemptive attack and still be able to respond at overwhelming levels.

Obviously, each of these complex choices—the survivability of each of the basing modes, the degree of fragility of the warning systems, or the spectrum of policy choices for the National Command Authorities—carried with it a corresponding increase (a multiplier) in the size of U.S. forces needed to assure that the adversary's target base would be held at risk.

Over time, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union responded to the U.S. buildup of deterrent forces by attempting to harden their facilities against attacks (through concealment, placing key assets deep underground, or making the asset mobile). These actions on their part required further changes in the U.S. attack plans, sometimes requiring higher yields or more than one weapon to be assigned to certain targets. In the process, the size requirements for U.S. nuclear forces inevitably increased.

The U.S. also set in place a value system to deter aggression by ensuring that Soviet targets were held at risk, whatever the attack scenario. It placed a high priority on limiting damage to the U.S. or Soviet populations if deterrence should fail. One principle the U.S. considered throughout the Cold War and embraced strongly in the latter half of that period is the undesirability of ever explicitly targeting non-combatants and civilians, with either nuclear or conventional weapons. Targeting or killing civilians who have little or no voice in the policies and military ambitions of their nations’ leaders makes little sense and has ethical/moral drawbacks for a U.S. strategy.

Finally, the U.S. found it important to hold a small stockpile of weapons in reserve for whatever contingency might arise in the aftermath of a bipolar nuclear exchange, such as aggression by other nations who might decide to take advantage of a post-war situation.

The result of all of the above factors led to a total size for U.S. deployed nuclear forces of more than 10,000 warheads on launchers during the latter stages of the Cold War. There were additional numbers of weapons beyond that in order to deal with a variety of logistical and operational needs, e.g. spares for replacing those weapons taken off alert for necessary maintenance or repair, or for submarines put in to port for extended overhauls. On the Soviet side, the stockpile numbers were substantially greater and were derived on a different basis, including the choice to use nuclear warheads for both air defense and ballistic missile defense systems, for which the U.S. had no corresponding capability.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has continually reduced the numbers within its deterrent force—unilaterally, through Presidentially declared reductions or, e.g., as CIS nations no longer were viewed as potential adversaries, and bilaterally, through the various Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START) agreements. Similarly, the inheritor states of the Soviet Union, primarily Russia, have reduced substantially the total on that side as well.

The progress of nuclear arms reductions have reduced force levels by more than 80 percent for nuclear weapons for strategic launchers, and by nearly 90 percent overall from their Cold War levels. For the START III talks the U.S. agreed (in the Helsinki Accords) to a framework of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic weapons (on launchers) but those talks have been held up awaiting Russian ratification of the previous START II agreement. [Note the extent of continuing reductions is still quite significant—between 30 and 40 percent further reduction in START III over the START II levels.

Sizing the Deterrent: Looking Past Russia

President Clinton in the most recent National Security Strategy, October 1998, stated that the United States will "maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces, and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile." Although to some, these words might sound too reminiscent of Cold War thinking, it is my belief that this strategy represents a sound and desirable strategy for the U.S. for the enduring future, Within the context I cited earlier, the U.S. should attempt to integrate all of its forces and strategies to deter major threats to peace and security along the full spectrum of potential escalation for any conflict that may arise.

Although we doubtless live in a far less threatening world than during the Cold War, there is also little doubt that the world is changing and will continue to change. George Will recently suggested that perhaps in thirty years, historians might well refer to the present period as the Inter-War Period. Certainly we must never take peace for granted. In the emerging world, there are still some remnants of the threats we faced during the Cold War years. Realistically, only two nations have the capabilities to inflict major damage to the U.S. if they chose to attack with their nuclear forces—Russia and China. The likelihood of their doing so is quite low today because Russia is making efforts to become a stable democracy with a market economy, while China is engaged with the U.S. in diversified trade and is embracing goals of expanded world trade and positive international relations. Whether or not these very promising directions continue, there is little doubt that, should there be a revanchist Russia or should China turn from its present course by seeking to become a more potent military power in its region, the present U.S. deterrent forces will be adequate for some time to come.

But there is a wider spectrum of threats and uncertainties emerging in other corners of the world. In 1998 the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. (commonly called the Rumsfeld Commission, after its Chairman) concluded that many nations are cooperating in efforts to proliferate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means of their delivery through medium- and long-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

George Robertson, British Minister of Defense (and soon to be the NATO Secretary General) remarked that the fall of the Soviet Union has produced a "Bonfire of the Certainties" and that on those ashes is coming "a host of new and less manageable threats to tease and challenge us." How best to deal with these new challenges is not at all clear.

Throughout the period of the Cold War, the U.S. was not unaware that new threats were growing, such as North Korea's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. However, we felt secure in the beliefs that: (1) the core of our deterrent approach to prevent active military conflicts remained relevant to cap any such new "problems;" and (2) with the rather high level of nuclear armaments in our arsenal, the U.S. was confident that these lower threats could be handled as "lesser included cases" within the existing deterrent (nuclear weapons and the full spectrum of advanced conventional forces). With the significant reductions in arms we have already achieved, and the potential for further reductions over time, the question arises as to whether the U.S. should designate a portion of its nuclear forces specifically for use in deterring lower level threats than the strategic deterrence.

While it may not be possible in the future to "stretch" the deterrent in order to handle the complete spectrum of security threats, I believe there is much of the past strategy for deterring conflict that will be transferable to the emerging world, with its potential for a proliferation of adversaries. The four category targeting approach (see above) is likely valid for establishing a baseline of what the militaries in these nations might value most. These four categories might well be generalized for such cases to include: WMD forces, leadership, other military targets, war-supporting industries, and WMD production and storage sites. The targeting of leadership should not result in our attempting to track key leaders at all times in order to allow their targeting (a likely impossible task), but inclusion of the leadership should bolster deterrence through the realization by these leaders that the U.S. allows no sanctuary for those who would wage wars.

It will also be important to examine other potential targeting priorities through in-depth studies of the cultures of each potential adversary state. Such investigations are of the type which can benefit most from intelligence analysts working on the ground within these countries, to develop alternatives for what is valued by the leaders. There is certainly not a theorem or even a suggestion that the four traditional target categories are a complete set, nor that there are not acceptable substitutes if, for whatever reason, the primary targets should be out of reach.

If the U.S. ever has to face such conflicts, or the potential for such conflicts, the Herman Kahn escalation ladder approach (discussed earlier) will still provide an excellent planning framework for analysts and military planners. It will be necessary, however, to give far more attention to understanding the characteristics, possibilities, and responses to deal with more of the lower levels of conflict in such escalation ladders. Potential new adversaries are very unlikely to want to confront the U.S. in conflicts that would inevitably involve escalating the conflict through higher levels of these "ladders," as these nations would all too quickly run out of rungs.

Thus we should recognize that the greatest utility of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the hands of smaller states, when confronting the U.S., might be as an asymmetric response to U.S. advanced conventional weapons and our inevitable air superiority. Use, or threatened use of such weapons, while never sufficient to "win the game" in such a contest with the U.S., might be adequate to trump the U.S. and achieve more limited objectives—like having the U.S. decide not to intervene in a regional dispute in which they intended to engage. Thus it will be important for the U.S. to examine the full range of possibilities available to us to deal effectively with the lower rungs of conflict ladders, and to learn better how to integrate the full spectrum of our military strengths—from better use of conventional weaponry to deal with WMD targets to selectively being able to "stretch downward" the shadow of our nuclear forces to deter aggressive acts at lower levels.

The issue as to whether our nuclear forces (developed to meet Cold War purposes) are in any sense appropriate to carry out other deterrence missions is not at all apparent. Clearly MIRVed missiles with high-yield warheads are not likely to have any use but might tend to self-deter the U.S. from taking any action if their use were the only choice. A review of our nuclear weapons arsenal, particularly the preservation of more theater (or non-strategic) weapons will be of greater importance in the coming decade. Thus for the longer-term future a more diverse arsenal of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, is desirable in order to credibly deter conflicts.

Application of "population withholds" (as was discussed above) will gain even higher priority in the new types of conflicts envisioned, i.e., less than major war, which we are more likely to face in the ensuing years. Such policies also serve to convince military leaders that the configuration of U.S. forces is such that we might be quite ready to employ them, confident in our ability to prevent or limit civilian casualties, thereby raising the effectiveness of our overall strategy of deterring conflicts from ever beginning or, once started, from moving ahead.

Summary and Conclusion

Rather than eschewing the strategy of deterrence for the post-Cold War period, the U.S. would be well served to embrace a more generalized version of deterrence for dealing with an uncertain future. A full integration of all U.S. forces into our operational strategy, ready to deal effectively with any level of escalation of conflict, is needed and appears to be imminently possible. Development of this more generalized deterrent to war would be of great benefit to the United States (as the sole superpower), our allies, and the world community of all people who value peace and security above aggression.

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