Deter, Dissuade, Deny, Defend (D⁴) …

Strategic Capabilities for the 21^st Century

September 21 and 22, 1999

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Key Symposium Observations: 

The National Defense University’s 1999 Joint Operations Symposium “Deter, Dissuade, Deny, Defend (D⁴ ) … Strategic Capabilities for the 21^st Century” was held in Washington, D.C. on September 21 and 22, 1999. 

The Symposium's purpose was: 

-         to bring attention to issues surrounding the evolving offense-defense mix, the intelligence revolution, and new diplomatic challenges that face the United States with regard to our strategic capabilities; 

-         to launch a series of meetings and studies in FY 2000, sponsored by INSS/NDU, examining the issues related to deterrence, dissuasion and defense in the 21^st Century;  

-         to examine the current and future role of the United States Strategic Command to fulfill strategic mission requirements for the next 20 years; and  

-         to help the Department of Defense think about near term and longer term capabilities and changes in strategic deterrence, dissuasion, denial and defense missions from offensive, defensive, intelligence and diplomatic perspectives. 

Keynote speeches and panels were organized around the four perspective areas:  offense, defense, intelligence, and diplomatic and arms control contributions to Deterrence, Dissuasion, Denial and Defense (D⁴). 

The following general observations were offered: 

• The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose the greatest threat to global stability and security, and the greatest challenge to strategic deterrence.  There was general agreement amongst the participants that this was the overriding concern.

• The United States and her allies need a broader framework of strategic thought, one that goes beyond deterrence (or redefines deterrence), one that maintains continuity with the past, but also one that’s flexible enough to respond to future threats and challenges. 

• The United States needs to integrate doctrinally her thinking about offense, transition, and defense, and do so across the spectrum of conflict.  During the Cold War, the U.S. and her allies were mired in a mutually assured destruction/deterrence mindset.  She compartmented our thinking about offense and defense, and strategic and tactical.  And at the time a missile defense system was too overwhelming.  Today missile defense is within reach, and the U.S. needs to reintegrate her thinking about offense and defense. 

• The U.S. needs to more clearly identify the centers of gravity of  asymmetrical threats and determine how to hold them convincingly at risk.  If she can’t do that, her deterrence will be hollow.

• Because of the diversity and uncertainty of the threats, she need forces which are capabilities-based and effects-based, rather than purely threat-based.

• She must maintain strategic stability in the face of changing unpredictable challenges to her vital national security interests.  There is wisdom to maintaining the continuity of a credible, stable deterrent, while allowing a broader application of our deterrent capabilities to emerging threats.  In this sense the journey is more important than the destination.

There was general agreement on:

Deeply buried targets.  We need a capability to hold at risk deeply buried targets.  Weapons in our current inventory are not ideally suited to address this problem.  In the absence of such weapons, an adversary may take risks he wouldn’t otherwise take, because he feels he’s invulnerable.

Missile defenses.  The United States needs to field national and theater missile defenses.

And we haven’t done enough with our allies in the area of theater missile defenses for either the tactical warfight, or especially for defending allied territory, and need to do so.

Risk management.  We need to think more about distribution of risk amongst our strategic capabilities, including offensive forces, defensive forces, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts, not just in arms control but in our bilateral and multilateral relationships with powers, great and small. 

Preemption and Counterproliferation.  Several speakers advocated the development and employment of preemptive and counterproliferation capabilities.

There were significant disagreements on:

Strategic ambiguity versus certainty.  This was an area of controversy for several panels.  Some felt that preserving ambiguity as to what our response might be to an adversary’s actions were important to give our adversary pause, to think all options are open, and secondly not lock in our leadership to specific actions and/or responses.  On the other hand, we’re pressured by others for lower numbers of nuclear weapons, and “no first use” commitments. 

• Others suggested that strategic certainty was a better deterrent, because the adversary you’re trying to affect, needs to have a clear idea of what will not happen for good behavior, and what will happen for bad behavior.    
• One pointed out that the United States has provided legally binding assurances that we will not use nuclear weapons on them, unless they attack the United States with nuclear weapons, or in alliance with a country that is using nuclear weapons.
• Another panelist was convinced that the United States would not use nuclear weapons in any situation short of a direct nuclear threat to the U.S., and therefore their use as a deterrent was useless in any lesser situation.

All WMD are the same, versus nuclear weapons are different.  Some suggested that all weapons of mass destruction be treated the same.  Others felt that nuclear weapons had such an overwhelmingly destructive power, that they were categorically different from biological or chemical weapons, and therefore should be treated differently.  Also, the United States has a self-professed need for nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

Fielding missile defense systems.  The Administration believes it knows what national and theater missile defense systems it intends to field, and that that part of the debate is over.  On the other hand, more than one speaker suggested that the United States has no coherent policy on missile defenses, and specific plans are in abeyance.  Others believe that the missile defense architecture under consideration, a ground-based architecture, has as its foundation the political desire to maintain the ABM treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability.  And that if the ABM Treaty did not exist, we would not be pursuing the types of defenses.  We need more effective and more affordable ballistic missile defense systems, which are space-based and sea-based.

Deterrence works versus deterrence doesn’t work.  Is it too uncertain to depend upon?  Is it a strategy of weakness, as was suggested by one speaker?  Others felt strongly that deterrence, particularly as part of an overall, integrated, and coherent strategy does work.  The answer lies in whether the adversary is willing to be deterred?

Elimination of nuclear weapons.  One speaker suggested that our nuclear arsenal was becoming less of a strategic asset, and more of a strategic liability.  Some speakers suggested that elimination of nuclear weapons should be our ultimate goal, and short of eliminating them altogether, we should reduce them to the lowest levels possible, to a   “core deterrent” level.  One speaker suggested that nuclear weapons no longer serve as a deterrent, because we wouldn’t use them, short of a direct attack with nuclear weapons on the United States.  Others believed that nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent, and we need to keep them in the inventory, modernize and test them.

Arms control is harmful at worst and irrelevant at best.  One speaker argued that arms control is an artifact of the Cold War.  Arms control agreement result in the U.S. abiding by it, thus limiting its own developmental capabilities, but have little impact on the other parties to the agreement.  Pursuing an arms control agenda also promotes an adversarial relationship with Russia, and is perpetuating a conflict in which Russia will be the loser. Another speaker suggested that the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is, and must remain, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  He pointed to the successful establishment of nuclear free zones in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.  He also advocated reducing the political value of nuclear weapons.

There were significant suggestions in the following areas:

• By any measure, our strategic capabilities, offensive forces, defensive forces, intelligence and diplomacy must be credible, capable and relevant.  We need to invest aggressively in sustaining and improving these assets.
• Weapons systems need to be capabilities-based and effects-based.  They have to be able to perform according to their specifications.
• Weapons systems need to be developed to meet evolving threats.
• We need to ask the big questions first.  What are our objectives?  What strategic capabilities do we need in the coming decades?  Then we should ask questions about capabilities, force structures and alignments, offensive and defensive weapons systems, command and control, and reporting relationships of our forces and systems.  And how do we distribute risk to maximize the effectiveness of our assets in an uncertain and evolving environment?
• Strategic warning is largely dependent upon our intelligence infrastructure.  Information is also increasingly available from diplomatic, political, and commercial sources.  We need to leverage our collection, analysis and processing capabilities to increase their penetration and effectiveness.  Perhaps we need new mental constructs, new approaches, better communications, and better organization of the intelligence community, to assure ourselves not only of better warning, but to guide our decision-making processes as they relate to our strategic forces and our relationships with the world community.  

The following areas may merit significant further research, discussion, and/or resolution: 

-            Offensive roles for information operations

-            Strategic ambiguity versus certainty on use of nuclear weapons

-           Missile defense systems which are feasible, effective, and affordable

-            Unilateral versus cooperative development of missile defenses

-           What extended defenses do we need, and how do we proceed?

-           Does deterrence work?  Perhaps we should ask our adversaries?

-           Do nuclear weapons deter biological and/or chemical weapons?

-           What preemptive and/counterproliferation capabilities do we need to develop?

-           How do we maximize our intelligence collection and analysis capabilities?

Deter, Dissuade, Deny, Defend (  D⁴) …

Strategic Capabilities for the 21^st Century

September 21 and 22, 1999

FULL REPORT

The National Defense University’s 1999 Joint Operations Symposium “Deter, Dissuade, Deny, Defend (  D⁴) … Strategic Capabilities for the 21^st Century” was held in Washington, D.C. on September 21 and 22, 1999.

Its purpose was:

-         to bring attention to issues surrounding the evolving offense-defense mix, the intelligence revolution, and new diplomatic challenges that face the United States with regard to our strategic capabilities;

-         to launch a series of meetings and studies in FY 2000, sponsored by INSS/NDU, examining the issues related to deterrence, dissuasion and defense in the 21^st Century;  

-         to examine the current and future role of the United States Strategic Command to fulfill strategic mission requirements for the next 20 years; and

-         to help the Department of Defense think about near term and longer term capabilities and changes in strategic deterrence, dissuasion, denial and defense missions from offensive, defensive, intelligence and diplomatic perspectives.

Background:

During the Cold War, our deterrent strategy was based on a series of symmetrical relationships and arrangements, in a bipolar framework.  Reciprocity was fundamental in that vocabulary of arms control.  Over time with a degree of certainty and predictability, a set of rules of engagement, albeit unwritten, emerged. 

Following the end of the Cold War, we witnessed a steep decline in the importance of nuclear forces, and strategic deterrence.  However, the nuclear detonations in India and Pakistan have served as a wake-up call.  It was a clear signal that nuclear weapons will continue to play a strong role in the international security environment. 

Nuclear weapons will remain indispensable to our national security interests, as a hedge against uncertainty, as a guarantee of our security commitment to our allies, and hopefully as a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing weapons of mass destruction of their own.

Today, however, given the unprecedented asymmetries of a profoundly changed multi-polar world, the predictable world we once knew, has been replaced by a world of uncertainty without any well-defined rules of engagement.

Strategic capabilities for the 21^st Century.  We are at a crossroads.  This nation has a genuine need for a broader, more comprehensive framework for deterrence and arms control.  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose the greatest threat to global stability and security, and the greatest challenge to strategic deterrence.  The issue may not be whether weapons of mass destruction will be used against the west by a rogue nation or transnational actor, but rather where and when.

We must find a way of sustaining deterrence.  Our deterrence capabilities can erode quickly, and our strategic defense infrastructure can perish, if it’s not properly nurtured and maintained.  So today, we need a broader framework of strategic thought, one that goes beyond deterrence, one that maintains continuity with the past, but also one that’s flexible enough to respond to future threats and challenges. 

We also need a careful, prudent reassessment of the relationships between deterrence and arms control, that relationship that so codified the nature and relationship of our classic Cold War deterrence.  Arms control will continue to be an important means to maintaining the peace, and promoting cooperation between former Cold War adversaries, but it also needs to adapt and become more flexible to enhance the deterrence, dissuasion, denial and defense of those unpredictable threats of the future. 

A stewardship of nuclear forces since the end of World War II has significantly shaped the geopolitical landscape, and had a great restraining influence on the great powers of the world from engaging in those costly global wars that defined the first 50 years of this century.  But as we look ahead, as our nuclear forces will play a critical, but diminished role in the future, it’s become increasingly clear that this nation must pursue a flexible nuclear deterrent strategy and arms control regime.

Mutual vulnerability, and the threat of massive retaliation, must be integrated with other measures, including strategies of compellance, reassurance, dissuasion, and denial.  Our strategy needs to coherently integrate political, economic, and military incentives, as well as penalties.

Strategic defenses.  The ABM treaty remains the most significant obstacle to deployment of a national missile defense system, and is considered by many to be a Cold War relic, negotiated under circumstances which are far different than today’s situation. 

In a multi-polar world of greater uncertainty and more diverse threats, some form of strategic defense is both appropriate and inevitable.  But, it should be part of a coherent deterrent policy that takes into consideration not just the threat, but also cost effectiveness and operational effectiveness of the defensive system, and the impact of its deployment upon our allies and potential adversaries, and arms control agreements.

Russia is not really immune from the dangers of proliferation.  She's surrounded by them.  And therefore, a collaborative approach of shared early warning, modification of the ABM treaty, and a broader, multi-national missile defense might be in both our mutual national interests. 

As we face a world of more diverse and less predictable threats, we also need to more clearly identify the center of gravity of those asymmetrical threats, and determine how to hold them convincingly at risk.  If we can’t do that, our deterrence will be hollow.  The Cold War nuclear arsenal that we have inherited was never designed nor intended to address some of the proliferation threats we may now face.  We need to think about how we adapt our existing capabilities to be credible against these new threats.  Because of the diversity and uncertainty of the threats, we need forces which are capabilities-based and effects-based, rather than purely threat-based.  Every player from the military and intelligence communities to our inter-agency partners needs to work together to find answers to some tough, provocative questions.

We must maintain strategic stability in the face of changing unpredictable challenges to our vital national security interests.  We can see the wisdom of maintaining the continuity of a credible, stable deterrent, while allowing a broader application of our deterrent capabilities to emerging threats.  We can see the importance of maintaining plans that are every bit as flexible, adaptive, and responsive to as the capabilities they support. 

However, we really need to encourage a vision for strategic deterrence.  The conference provides a good opportunity to continue the debate and dialogue, to help our national security policy makers to craft a coherent 21^st century deterrence architecture, a roadmap to evolve and adapt our national security policy, our force structures, and our postures.  We need to counter the realities of proliferation, proliferation of asymmetrical threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the proliferation of deep underground military facilities.  And at the same time, we need to promote a greater awareness of the opportunity and needs for a more balanced relationship among the 4 Ds (deter, dissuade, deny, and defend), in a profoundly changing world.   

Panel I:  Offensive Contributions to  D⁴.  The panel was asked to address the following questions:  “Do nuclear weapons have a clear role in deterring chemical and biological warfare?”  “Is modernization of the stockpile inconsistent with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, or is modernization essential to prevent us from being self-deterred, to prevent our deterrence from becoming hollow?”  “What is the potential of information operations (IO)?”  “Can those IO capabilities be used to complement our strategic forces?”  “If we have the capabilities to destroy a nation’s financial networks through IO, wouldn’t that be a strategic non-lethal weapon, and could that capability be used to deter or dissuade?”  “Could we enhance our deterrent strategy by giving others selected visibility into our IO capabilities, or do really risk losing those capabilities by doing so?”

Four panelists addressed the subject of offensive contributions to  D⁴ in presentations on:  sizing the deterrent, nuclear forces policy in the Clinton Administration, regional strategies and strategic capabilities, and strategic capabilities for the 21^st Century as more then the Triad. 

There was agreement that nuclear weapons have a clear role in deterring nuclear weapons, perhaps less clear in deterring biological or chemical weapons.  They felt that some modernization of the stockpile was essential to meet the evolving threat.  They also felt that weapons modifications and/or development of precision munitions which could minimize collateral damage and be effective against specific target sets was necessary, and would add to our offensive deterrence capabilities.  And although the subject of information operations was addressed only in general terms by the panel, its members would probably agree that this is an area which needs greater attention, development, and exploitation as part of our strategic offensive capability.

There was general agreement that deterrence, as we knew it in the Cold War, worked.  They also agreed that nuclear weapons had a deterrent role in today’s world, and for the foreseeable future.  One speaker said that deterrence is the most important strategy ever articulated by the United States, and that it continues to be so. Its purpose is to convince other nations that acts of aggression will have unacceptable risks to them in the form of swift and assured retaliation for those acts, so much so that the act will not take place in the first place.  And in its present form, deterrence has a single purpose, that is, to prevent war, to deter the enemy from acts of aggression.  Another speaker asked the question, “What will the U.S. seek to deter?  He said we’re facing a thousand snakes, in the form of regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats, and wild cards equipped with increasingly advanced weapons and the means of their delivery, and with few or no rules of war, or that we recognize as rules of war.  He also asked whether our currently programmed forces meet our deterrent needs.  And he answered both questions with, “So long as the future looks like that past, we’re ready.

These two approaches framed the debate on offensive contributions to  D⁴.  The panelists agreed that as a strategy, deterrence is not static, It must be adapted to conditions as they change, and if done well, will anticipate changes that are likely to occur.  One speaker highlighted the importance of a systems view in examining strategic deterrence as a roadmap for the future, and introduced the concept of nuclear forces as restorative forces, in a dynamic equilibrium.  That is, as a deterrent, they could help de-escalate a crisis. 

In a later presentation on intelligence, we were reminded that deterrence works if, and only if, the adversary or potential adversary wants to be deterred.  This raises the bar on deterrence as a strategy.  It implies knowing, or being able to anticipate an adversary’s capabilities and intentions (discussed by the intelligence panel), being able to identify the adversary’s centers of gravity, and determine how to hold him convincingly at risk, and having the capabilities and willingness to employ them, offensively and defensively, to ensure compliance with U.S. strategic objectives.

So, deterrence works.  However, deterrence today is different than what we knew it to be during the Cold War.  An effective deterrence strategy has to be more comprehensive, and draws on a wide range of resources and capabilities, including political and diplomatic, economic, intelligence, technology, and military assets.

Deterrence across the continuum.  In developing a deterrence strategy, one should try to anticipate everything from low level or emerging crises, in which you might need political, economic, or diplomatic efforts only, all the way up to insensate (unlimited and sustained) or all-out war. 

Role of the Analyst.  The job of the analyst and planner is a much more difficult and complicated job than that of the decision-maker when an actual crisis unfolds.  When you’re trying to examine complex issues, the analyst needs to look at all the possibilities and options.  He has to suspend disbelief and incredulity, when attempting to think about major crises, emergencies, and wars that are not yet understood in any sort of specifics.  The decision-maker is not nearly so handicapped when an actual situation arises, and can often deal with a simple and limited number of options right away.  But the decisions should build on the work of the analyst and planner, who must look at all of the options that are available. 

Ambiguity versus certainty.  This was an area of controversy on several panels.  One panelist suggested that preserving ambiguity as to what our response might be to an adversary’s actions were important, for two reasons, one to give our adversary pause, and two, not lock in our leadership to specific actions and/or responses.  Another suggested that while Saddam Hussein was thought to be an irrational thinker, when he was told by the National Command Authority that he would pay dearly if he considered the use of WMD, he backed down.  The offensive panel was in general agreement that we need to keep our options open, and at least be willing to consider the use of nuclear weapons.  There was more discussion of this issue in the panel on diplomacy and arms control.

Restorative forces.  Our strategy, should be to take this concept of deterrence (restoring forces, restorative forces), and apply them across the full spectrum of conflict, to develop a systems solution that is equally robust, no matter what the condition. We should attempt by design, to integrate all of our military preparations and planning into a cohesive strategy to effectively deal with any contingency, at any stage of escalation.

Target driven strategy.  In reviewing our deterrence strategy during the Cold War, one speaker described a “target driven strategy” consisting of four principal categories of targets:  strategic nuclear forces, leadership, other military targets, and war supporting industries.  The idea was to hold at risk the greatest percentage of each in each category.  Overlaying that was a value system of limiting damage to the United States and never to intentionally target civilians.  The speaker suggested that in sizing the deterrent in the new environment, we have to look not only at Russian targets, but also, against a wider spectrum of WMD targets.  We have to try and deter at all levels the simplest set of targeting categories, which at the starting point might be WMD forces, leadership, other military targets, war supporting industries, and WMD production and storage sites.

Deterrence as a strategy or process?  One speaker summed up by saying that deterrence is not a strategy, but a process, a process with inputs and outputs.  Depending upon what we're willing to put into the process will determine to some extent what we should expect out of it.  Developing a targeting strategy and forces to support that strategy is a creative art.  The greater mental juxtaposition that we can take of all the forces, the more potent will be our deterrence.  Deterrence will never be static, but will dynamically change over time.  The full integration of all U.S. forces into their operational strategy will deal with any level of sophistication of conflict, is needed and imminently possible.

Nuclear forces policy.  One speaker addressed the nuclear forces policy of the Clinton Administration.  He told us that the Administration has reaffirmed that nuclear weapons will continue as a vital hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to our allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Shared early warning initiative.  The Administration is also working on a “shared early warning initiative” with Russia.  Absent nuclear testing, we’re working on a program to assure the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile, a joint program with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the weapons laboratories.

Sustainment.  In order to ensure sustainment of our nuclear forces, the Administration is also developing a nuclear mission management plan, which in the long run will provide a roadmap for DoD to examine its near and long-term capabilities and plans to support nuclear missions.  It will include readiness, modernization, support forces and infrastructure, and most importantly its human resources.

Long-term viability.  The Administration is working on ensuring long-term viability of research and development, the industrial base, and manufacturing infrastructure, and systems acquisition effort.  We’re replacing aging components, and designing to meet future needs; monitoring health of strategic systems to ensure survivability and effectiveness against threats, and the need for life extension programs.

Theater nuclear forces.  The Administration will maintain support for dual-capable aircraft in Europe with both conventional and nuclear roles, and needs to address nuclear capabilities for follow-on’s to F15s and F16s, and sustainment of the nuclear variant of the Tomahawk land attack missile.

Command and control is the fourth element of Triad. We still require a robust survival and effective command and control systems for early warning, attack assessments, and force direction in support of existing nuclear employment plans and associated contingencies.  We should not expect, nor does it logically follow, that savings derived from reduced forces will be matched, even in relative terms, from savings in the cost of nuclear command and control.  Redundancy is critical, because the relevant nuclear effects have never been fully verified.  And finally, quality in people is the most important ingredient to sustain a nuclear deterrent.

Regional strategies and strategic capabilities.  One speaker suggested that nuclear weapons have less importance today than at any time in this century, and that conventional dominance is our game today.  Even with that however, we’re more insecure than ever, especially when we talk about non-state actors and rogue nations, or asymmetric approaches on a global scale.  The enemy is not so clearly defined today.  We have proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with Pakistan, India, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the most obvious threats today.

Avoiding casualties.  For any type of military commitment, there are higher expectations, more so than ever, in terms of casualties.  We don’t take as many risks.  We prefer in smaller scale conflicts, not to put our folks at risk as we were committed to in the past.

Smaller structure and less advocacy.  Our commitment of resources to our strategic force structure is smaller than it has been in the past, and proportionately there’s less senior level advocacy and involvement than there was.

Deterrence from a regional perspective.    When we talk about deterrence, the Cold War style deterrence is not as effective in a regional perspective, as it had been in the past.

Strategic challenges are weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.  The challenges at the strategic level faced by the regional CINCs are weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.  Once the non-state actors and rogue nations have gained access to them, what do we need to do?  How do we deter? 

Preemptive strikes.  We need to consider pre-emptive strikes, if need be.  We need to consider how we’re going to punish the perpetrators if they use weapons of mass destruction.  We need to think more about intelligence, and how we leverage the intelligence infrastructure to support deterrence, maybe preemptively with nuclear or conventional options, go after and strike the potential perpetrators.  And again punish them in the end.

Deeply buried targets.  How do we hold some of the hard and deeply buried targets at risk?  Many of our nuclear weapons are not ideally suited for that, some are.  There may be a need to derive certain additional weapons to meet those requirements, for some of the hard to get, hard and deeply buried targets.  We’re working on advance conventional munitions, to address this shortfall, but may need a nuclear option, as well.

Better policy support for regional CINCs.  We need better integration of our national policy in supporting the challenges faced by the regional CINCs.  Today our policies are more geared toward the national and global level.  From that perspective, it’s more Russian-centric than it has been before.  Our vision of deterrence still relies on overwhelming retaliation.  It’s based on numbers, on awareness of capabilities, on the fear of the destructive capabilities of those weapons.

Nuclear deterrence for WMD.  From a regional perspective, nuclear weapons came into play (during the Gulf War), and paid a big dividend, by not only having the capability, but sending the message that we were willing to use them preemptively or in retaliation. 

Deterring less “rational” adversaries.  Today the CINCs face those that are less rationale in thought, rogue states and non-state actors.  The CINCs’ approaches to deterrence, in terms of first-use, or in retaliation, how is that backed up by our national policy?  That is a gap we have to close. CINCs plan extensively with the help of STRATCOM, in looking at options, at target sets, at comparing the capabilities that we have to offer, and considering at what time it is appropriate to use the weapons.  They recognize that deterrence had a great strength during the Cold War, but it paid dividends, and was well worth the commitment on our nation’s part.  But still, the policy piece, in terms of deterrence on a regional level, there seems to be a gap there.  We need to ramp up the visibility, involvement, and advocacy of weapons from a theater perspective, to ensure that we can derive the same benefits from deterrence as we did during the Cold War.

Intelligence and warning.  Intelligence and warning at regional levels is challenging, more so than at the national level, particularly with rogue nations and non-state actors.  Part of the solution to this challenge may be the use of federated intelligence support, and virtual strike planning centers, where out-of-theater assets are employed in real-time to assist local commanders in planning, target selection and other support.

STRATCOM’s suite of strategic capabilities.   STRATCOM is focusing on the development of a suite of capabilities from concepts to hardware that transcends the Triad.  One speaker believed that regional stability is the key to much of our national strategic security.  It’s no longer enough to plan for a war with a major competitor, but to define and plan options that deal with a broader continuum of concerns, the asymmetric challenge.  Need to figure out how to deter an adversary who has no return address, or worse, addresses that cross traditional nation state boundaries.

The Triad and more.  The speaker advocated a need to look at force mixes in the Triad and beyond.  He recommended we examine capability force structures beyond the numbers, to a mixture of conventional, information operations, nuclear tools, etc.  We have no capability-based, universally tailorable, deep- target weapons. Governments are encourage to take risks when they believe their war making facilities are invulnerable to the planners and capabilities of their enemies.   He asked, “Are there new systems or concepts to which we can turn in the future to perform the deterrent mission, e.g., technologies, information warfare, computer supported technologies and methodologies, advanced kinetics, etc.?

Prevent war rather than prevail in war.  One speaker suggested that this is our ultimate goal, and he challenged us to work collectively on charting a future course, choosing the right security path to the future.  He suggested that the task is at least two-fold:  One, to fully and accurately be able to recognize and measure our adversaries, and to predict their intentions and capabilities.  And two (as a step function in a strategy-to-task, risk management fashion), to formulate the correct policies and strategy, that result in selecting the right technologies and acquiring the right capabilities to deter, dissuade, or deny, and/or defend against enemy aims, and harmful intentions or actions, no matter where they fall on the continuum.

Russian-centric deterrence.  Panelists believed that our deterrence policy remains Russian-centric, because Russia maintains the largest capability to destroy the U.S.  And there is uncertainty as to what may evolve in Russia.  They also believed that China remains a threat, and that in the future rogue states will pose a significant threat.

Weapons development.  The panel pondered the question on weapons capabilities.  Do we have right weapons to deter; if not do we have the right weapons to hold their key value structures at risk?  They advocated the development of precise weapons with low collateral damage in increase the credibility of deterrence to these threats.

Homeland versus theater defenses.  In response to a question about distinguishing between homeland and theater weapons, they believed the distinction is blurred due to increasing capacities of potential adversaries.  Longer range ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction are today strategic, operational and tactical.  We need to think of every strategic weapon in a theater context, and we need to think of this as a common element in our deterrence.  In addition, what starts as a tactical event can become a strategic one in minutes or hours, due to the “CNN effect”, that is real-time coverage of theater events.

Nuclear weapons off the table.  One questioner suggested that an adversary could take nuclear weapons off the table by assuring the United States that it had no intention of attacking our core national security interests in our homeland or in the theater.  The panel’s response was, “Our adversaries don’t get to decide, we do.”

Another question raised the issue of the lack of resources to prosecute either one or two major theater war scenarios.  Downsizing, recruiting problems, budget cuts, and the high operations tempo today of both active and reserve forces, has already overly committed our military forces.  The response was that the crucial issue was to have a capabilities-based force structure.  The issue then is, how you manage risk.  Return

In summary, deterrence from an offensive military perspective means that your military forces must be credible, capable and relevant. 

Panel II:  Contributions of the Intelligence Community to  D⁴.  The panel was asked to address the following questions:  “Are intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities stretched too thin to avoid strategic surprise?”  Can they provide adequate indications and warnings?”  “And, if they do, will the policy makers and decision makers, be smart enough to act upon it?”  Do we know enough about the terrorist threat to use our nuclear capabilities to deter terrorists?”  “How do you deter a non-state actor who has no return address?”  How do you deter someone whose reward is in the afterlife?”  “Are intelligence resources focused on the right threats?”  “Is the greater danger of proliferation one of nuclear weapons, or of raw nuclear materials, or scientists with nuclear warhead design knowledge?”

This area was addressed by a keynote speaker and four panelists, who addressed strategic intelligence capabilities and needs into the 21^st Century, strategic warning and deterrence, foreign missile development and ballistic missile threats to the United States through 2015, shaping the forces:  the challenge for national reconnaissance, and intelligence, a view from Capital Hill.  The consensus was that indeed the surveillance, reconnaissance, and particularly the downstream analysis and processing of intelligence are stretched.  There was also agreement that intelligence has become more challenging from the perspective that penetration is more difficult.  Sources and methods that worked in the past have been compromised.  And that we no longer have an information monopoly, that our adversaries have access to high tech information systems, as well.

Deterrence is psychological.  As was highlighted earlier in the report, in introducing one of the speakers addressing the intelligence aspects of  D⁴, with the exception of “defend”, “deter, dissuade, and deny”, are all very psychological.  Intelligence assists you to have some understanding of what your opponent thinks about you and of the actions you’re going to take if you’re going to deter, deny, or dissuade.  You have to have information on the targets.  You also have to have an idea of what effect you will have if you hit your target, upon the people whom you want to influence.  Deterrence may or may not work, depending upon whether people wish to be deterred.  So the challenge is assisting them in reaching that conclusion.

Intelligence overview.  One speaker made the following observations:  One, the threat environment can be characterized by diverse, complex issues, and shifting priorities, presenting a tougher environment for both collection and analysis.  Two, the revolution in information technology and telecommunications has fundamentally transformed the world, intelligence services and their environment, and the customer’s access to and use of information. Three, the intelligence business fundamentally relies on the talent, and expertise of its workforce.  Intelligence today needs specialized expertise in many disciplines, and from both the private and public sectors.

Global coverage.  Today, global coverage means the responsibility to assess a wide range of complex threats throughout the world, each on its own merit.  Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, and regional conflicts of all sorts, as well as political, social, and economic problems in failed states, etc., are also potential threats.

Past and future are colliding.  We live in a moment when the past and the future are colliding. There is increased availability of sophisticated technology.  We’re losing our monopoly on the information game.  Our adversaries also have improved access to information and technology.  The ease and speed in which it can be applied by those hostile to the United States is incredible.  Terrorists, insurgents, and others who have hundreds of years of history fueling their causes, now use laptop computers, sophisticated encryption, and weaponry that their predecessors could not even imagine. 

Role of intelligence.  Part of the role of intelligence is to use information and strategic warning to protect U.S. interests, and ensure the country’s security.  In addition to military and security affairs, trade, investment, and technology issues increasingly shape the international agenda, and challenge our understanding of how the world works, and what we must do to secure a strong U.S. role. 

WMD proliferation.  The key national security challenges are:  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increasing the vulnerability of the U.S. to threats from states and non-state actors, and whose weapons arsenals will be dramatically smaller, less reliable, and less accurate.  The proliferation of non-state actors, including ethnic, tribal and religious groups, criminal and terrorist gangs, and even powerful individuals, such as Osama Bin Laden, who are independent of state financial or technical support.

Russia in turmoil.  Russia is already in the throes of a succession struggle.  The success or failure of economic reforms and integration into world economy is yet to be told, and there is popular frustration with economic reforms.  Endemic corruption and organized crime could pave way for authoritarian rule.  Russia not only poses a direct threat, but its proliferation activities are perhaps even more of a threat.  Depending on how things go, Russia could prove to be a spoiler, a destabilizer, or a stabilizer.

China.  China will continue to develop capabilities to strike the United States.  It poses a threat through its aggressive efforts to acquire weapons technologies.  It will prove to be a formidable economic competitor.  And its political conflict with Taiwan represents a potentially serious source of military conflict.

North Korea.  The North Korean regime is bankrupt.  It relies on international assistance to feed its people, and its economic situation continues to deteriorate.  We should anticipate a sharpening of rhetoric about their right to develop missiles and test missiles, and they are likely to sell missiles and technology to others.

Middle East.  The Middle East has multiple problems.  It is experiencing the second highest population growth rate in the world behind Africa, which means it has a young and restive population.  We’re on the brink of succession changes in several countries, and have already seen leadership changes in Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain, which have gone unchallenged.  We could see power struggles in some of the upcoming leadership changes, or we could see progressive reform.  The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and with its other neighbors is ongoing, but remains a source of frustration and conflict.  Islam is being used as a tool of political extremism in many areas.

Iran.  There is an intellectual and political struggle between students yearning for increased press and social freedoms versus the conservative protectors of their Islamic revolution.  It is an ongoing struggle, and no one knows yet how it will turn out.

Globalization of world economy.  On balance economic globalization will be a force for stability.

Openness versus secrecy.  We must safeguard sensitive information, sources and methods, while increasingly sharing information with regional CINCs and others.  Providing unclassified reports on our intelligence findings helps decision-makers make better-informed decisions, keeps the public better informed, and undercuts those who would leak sensitive information.  We need collectors and analysts who’re steeped in the cultures of the world, and who can explain in a cultural context the motivations and intentions of those in whom we have a strategic interest.

Warning.  One speaker suggested that there are four basic building blocks to success or to failed warning.  They are time, balance, penetration, and the combination of people and institutions. 

Time.  The best warning in the world fails if it doesn’t get to the people charged with taking action, in time for them to take action. 

Balance.  You need balance between capabilities and intentions.  Sometimes an enemy’s intentions are not commensurate with his capabilities, and vice versa.  You can’t just look at one or the other.

Penetration.  You need to penetrate the adversary in both depth and breadth.  Penetrating only the leadership, or only the operators, won’t give you the full picture.

People and institutions.  People must be honest, and have high levels of integrity, courage, and objectivity.  Honesty includes not ignoring uncomfortable truths.  Integrity.  It’s much easier to convince someone that they’re right than they’re wrong.  The burden of proof is on the analyst to tell you what they don’t know.  There’s also a burden on the customer to challenge the information provided, and then to stand for answers which may be uncomfortable.  Intelligence institutions have to insulate themselves against the loss of objectivity by ensuring there are contrarians in the organization.  They cannot just recruit them, they must cultivate and nurture them, insisting that they provide advice that doesn’t jive with the common stream.  They make enemies and must be protected.  Most people want to be proven right, and not wrong.    You pay for what you get.  You have to pay for it.  You don’t want intelligence provided by the lowest bidder, the one who takes short cuts in any of these areas, in the collection, and particularly in the analyses.

Robust intelligence.  We need a more robust, capable, in-depth intelligence community, motivated to take risk, to penetrate the right targets, gain the right access, and arm our national leaders with the right information about their adversaries’ intentions and capabilities.  Adversaries need to be singled out and penetrated in breadth and depth.  The information needs to be funneled back through a system that checks and rechecks, challenges everything, and then provides it as rough and hard as it might be, to the political and military decision makers, to do with it as they will.  That’s the essence of good warning.

Continuous improvements in collection and analysis.  If you’re standing still, everybody’s gaining on you.  You need to continually improve your most advanced collection systems across the board.  The corrosive effect of having many of our sources and methods compromised over the years is to slowly degrade our ability to understand what’s happening.

Forecasting the ballistic missile threat.  Forecasting the missile development and ballistic missile threat to the U.S. through 2015 is an inexact science at best.  The threats are unknowable in much specificity.  However, the better our forecasting, the better our planning for deterrence and defense.  The threats will be less capable (fewer in number, shorter range, and less accurate than the Soviets, for example), but they are threatening in different ways.  Acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with a weapon of mass destruction will enable weaker countries to deter, constrain, and harm the United States.  The missiles need not be deployed in large numbers.  Countries might judge they could threaten the U.S. with only a few missiles.  They need not be accurate or reliable, because their strategic value is derived primarily from the threat of use, not from the near certain outcome of such use.  In many ways, such weapons are strategic tools of deterrence and coercive diplomacy aimed at the United States and our allies. 

Wake-up call.  The progress of countries toward acquiring longer-range ballistic missiles has been dramatically demonstrated over the past 18 months.  North Korea’s Taepo Dong-1 launch, flight tests by Pakistan and Iran of 1,300 km range Ghauri and Shahab-3 missiles, India’s flight test of its 2,000 km range Agni II missile, and China’s first flight test of its 8,000 km range DF-31 mobile ICBM indicate their commitment they have to develop these weapon systems.  These countries, and likely Iraq, as well, will remain the main ballistic missile threat through 2015, as well.

Foreign assistance.  Foreign assistance by these countries to others interested in developing or purchasing ballistic missiles is significant.  Several countries are capable of using forward-based ships or other platforms to launch short-range and medium-range land attack cruise missiles against the United States.  In addition to reaching the continental U.S., these countries and others, plus non-state actors, terrorist and extremist groups will pose significant threats to U.S. and other western military forces deployed to various theaters.

Warning focus.  With respect to imagery, the main focus of warning during the Cold War was strategic warning at the highest levels of government.  In today’s environment the customer focus has broadened to include real-time information to a greater variety of users.  Regional CINCs, the diplomatic community, non-government organizations, scientific, public and commercial interest, all need detailed and global information.  The intelligence community no longer has a monopoly on imagery, but competes with the commercial world.  It’s goal today is to provide current, relevant and detailed information to its prime customers (which they can’t get through commercial sources), across the full spectrum of peace, crisis and conflict, and to invest in meeting tomorrow’s challenges.

Lack of centralized management of the intelligence community, and chronic shortcomings in analysis.  One speaker suggested that two fundamental shortcomings in our intelligence capabilities were lack of centralized management of the intelligence community, and the chronic imbalance between collection and downstream processing, analysis, and dissemination.  On the other hand, he felt that the product of the clandestine collector was better today than ten years ago.  However because of severe resource constraints, they’re too narrowly focused for today’s ever more complicated and dynamic environment. Return

Panel III:  Contributions of Defense Community to  D⁴.  The panel was asked to address the following questions: “Is a national missile defense affordable and technologically feasible?”  “Can the defense ever stay abreast of the offense?”  “And if so, how do you properly integrate offense and defense?”  “Does our intent to field a national missile defense with a focused regional footprint destabilize our relationship with Russia?”  “And if we deploy a national missile defense as a component of a sound denial and defense strategy, what implications does that have for our allies and ‘extended deterrence’?”  Won’t they rightly expect ‘extended defense’, as well?” 

The defensive contributions to  D⁴ were addressed by a keynote speech on U.S. defense policy and missile defense; and by panelists addressing national and theater missile defenses as components of a new strategic deterrent; the limits of defense; regional operations, defenses and deterrence; and allies and defense.  The questions raised above, were generally addressed by the panel members, as highlighted below.  However, given the lack of unanimity in their presentations, however, suggests some areas for further study and debate.

Asymmetric threat.  Ballistic missile defense is now part of U.S. defense posture, which it wasn’t ten years ago, when we thought nonproliferation was the answer.  Today, rogues are the threat.  Missiles and missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction are a rogue enemy’s weapon of choice, and constitutes the classic asymmetric threat.

Fielding missile defenses.  The U.S. has a pretty good idea of the programs and systems it plans to field, and will need to maintain a mix of offensive and defensive systems for the indefinite future.   We will need flexible, capable, survivable strategic nuclear forces to deter the major nuclear powers should their leadership go wrong, and forward deployed, sub-strategic nuclear forces, together with overwhelming conventional capability, with force multipliers of strategic and tactical intelligence.

Theater missile defenses.  In the area of shortcomings, we haven’t done enough with our allies in the area of theater missile defenses for the tactical warfight, but especially in defending allied territory. The eastern most states of the NATO Alliance are today within range of rogue missiles.  NATO overall was in a state of denial on the ballistic missile threat, and the first time that Iran or Iraq demonstrates missiles with ranges capable of hitting North Central Europe, then the Allies will rush to us for help.  Europe needs a national missile defense, and the U.S. needs radars and other sensors on allied soil to develop our own national missile defense.

From the Allies’ perspective, past efforts by the U.S. to develop its own national missile defense system, as well as theater missile defense systems in cooperation with the allies, have been marred by a lack of focus, a comprehensive and coherent policy, poor credibility, false starts, and lack of follow-through.

U.S. lacks credibility with Allies.  The solution is twofold:  The U.S. needs to stick with its own program, that we won’t have credibility with anybody unless we demonstrate that we can carry through a program.  And we haven’t done that yet.  Secondly, we have to be able to demonstrate that the programs we carry through are the programs we initially said we were going to carry through.  If we keep chopping and changing, redefining, scaling down, simply saying some things while Congress says other things, we’re not going to get anywhere with our allies.  The allies are looking to see how serious we are about ourselves.  To the extent that we are, they might begin to take themselves seriously about themselves.  To the extent that we’re not, we’ll be talking about this same subject in 15 years.  If the U.S. goes its own way, the allies would follow.

Case studies and gaming initiatives.  One speaker spoke to a number of case studies and extensive gaming initiatives undertaken by the National Defense University to try to improve our understanding of the deterrent role that our own nuclear weapons can play in today’s security environment.  They’ve drawn five principal conclusions from these efforts:  First, that deterring nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC ) armed regional or rogue adversaries is much more complex, and much more likely to fail than deterrence as we knew it in the past.  Second, that given the growing proliferation threat, both to U.S. forces abroad, as well as to the American homeland, and given the potentially horrendous consequences of a deterrence failure, that deterrence must remain the first line of defense in our national security strategy.  Third, that although not adequate by itself, the threat of retaliation, the threat of punishment, remains central to the deterrence of both the initial use of NBC weapons, as well as follow-on use by rogue states.  Fourth, a number of factors are working to undercut regional deterrence as a concept, and the very utility of thinking about conflicts confined to a foreign theater, e.g., increasingly longer range of foreign ballistic missiles, and the potential of terrorist-type of attacks on U.S. cities.  And fifth, we may be losing our already limited expertise in understanding the complexities of deterrence in today’s world.   Deterrence requires us to pay attention to the changing nature of the threat, that we understand the nature off the deterrent relationship with a variety of potential threats, and not just from a military point of view, but the civilian side of the national security community, commerce, trade, and others.  Further study, gaming, training, and exercises need to be undertaken to further our understanding and  preparation for deterring and/or countering the threat.

Limits of defense.  We find ourselves in a bind today, because we separate our thinking about offense and defense.  To be on the defense, you’re responding and waiting.  And a defensive spirit can weaken you if it’s allowed to dominate.  During the Cold War we led ourselves into an era of assured deterrence, or mutually assured deterrence, codified in law and in arms control agreements.  We also thought at the time, that we couldn’t have an effective ballistic missile defense that would be cost effective at the margins, given the overwhelming numbers of ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons.  Today, it’s feasible to think about a ballistic missile defense, and to integrate our thinking along a continuum of offense – transition – defense.

Distribution of risk.  We need to think about the distribution of risk, amongst our strategic capabilities, our offensive and defensive forces, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts.  Our diplomatic efforts are not just in arms control, but in the manner in which we go about establishing our relationships with great powers, and small. The small powers are emerging with interesting, and heretofore un-thought of economic, political and military capabilities.

Costs of missile defenses.  While one speaker asked the question of whether it was worth spending $40 or $50 billion on ballistic missile defenses over the next decade or so, he suggested that the cost issue should be preceded by a set of different questions, that is, “How serious are those who are pursuing ballistic missile capabilities?  And, So what?  For what purposes are they pursuing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction?  Perhaps it is to increase their strategic autonomy, giving themselves the freedom to act, and imposing upon us the requirement to conform our actions to theirs, rather than the reverse?”

Specific threats.  Iran, as a potential threat to Israel; India; Pakistan with internal political problems which could make it a failed state, and the “North Korea of South Asia”; and Iraq, which has managed to continue an ambitious weapons program despite an intrusive inspection program. 

Confused foreign policy objectives.  He suggested that their ability to do us and others harm is increasing over time, and that we’ve tied ourselves in knots with our nonproliferation policies, extended deterrence with our allies, and how we are going to deal with sanctions regimes.  We’ve gotten ourselves terribly confused with respect to our broad foreign policy objectives, as a consequence of the development of autonomy by regional powers, and confused as well with respect to our military responses to them.  And because we are confused, so our allies, and even our potential adversaries.

ABM Treaty, cornerstone of strategic stability.  The missile defense architecture, the contrived ground-based architecture, is based on the political desire to maintain the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability, that without the ABM Treaty, we wouldn’t be pursuing these types of defenses.  We could have a much more effective and affordable ballistic missile defense, which is sea-based, and space-based.  The defenses we are pursuing are dead-end defenses, and one site in Alaska won’t provide even a minimal defensive posture.  Why spend money on something, which doesn’t provide protection?

Mutual assured destruction.  At the core of the ABM Treaty is the notion of mutually assured destruction.  It’s not a partnership.  And therefore, we’re perpetuating the mutual distrust and suspicion of the Cold War.  And it would seem that we’re more stubborn than the Russians in trying to think through a new relationship.

Passive defenses.  Gas masks, MOPP suits, training to operate in a chemical environment, anthrax vaccinations, training of first responders in responding to massive casualties which are inflicted by biological weapons on the part of an adversary, and other passive defense measures all have deterrent value, as well.

Congressional Perspectives on Strategic Capabilities. 

Islamic fundamentalism.  One of our problems was a cultural clash between Islamic Fundamentalism and western democratic values, and that the two cultures look at the world in fundamentally different ways.  The two cultures were fundamentally different in the way they dealt with resources, as well.

Globalization.  We have a powerful ally in globalization.  Globalization is rapidly transforming our experience and the environment in which we operate.  It is also critical to understanding the whole question of strategic threat, strategic advantage, and what is really occurring in the world.  As our economies become more inter-dependent, it becomes more clearly in the interest of countries to avoid confrontation over issues like proliferation.

National missile defense.  A national missile defense relying on the “Alaska option” is ill advised.  It lacks a “shoot-look-shoot” capability if an attack were launched on the eastern U.S., and a second site was needed in North Dakota. Return

Panel IV:  Diplomacy and Arms Control Contributions to  D⁴.  The panel was asked to address the following questions: “What should be the focus of future arms control initiatives?”  “How do we address the growing asymmetries in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles, the asymmetry in tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons, the asymmetry in warhead production capacity?”  “Should arms control be concerned with the potential impact of agreements on the non-nuclear capability of our strategic forces, such as our long-range bombers or the Navy’s concept of an SSG?”  Is there a point at which lower numbers of nuclear weapons start to become destabilizing?”  Is the START framework, the framework of accounting for strategic launchers, rather than accounting for actual warheads, fatally flawed at some level?”  “If so, how should the arms control approach be transformed?”  “Isn’t a world with nuclear weapons and no major war, better than one with major war and no nuclear weapons?” 

The subject was discussed by a panel of four speakers, with divergent viewpoints both about the problems and the solutions associated with diplomacy and arms control.  They addressed two issues, the need for a new kind of diplomatic effort, and the need for a new model for arms control.

A broad perspective.  The chairman of the panel suggested that the panel look broadly at the topics, and at the importance of integrating dissuasion, denial, diplomacy, development and disarmament.  In addition to the four “Ds”, specified in the conference announcement, he felt that development and disarmament were integral to conceptualizing deterrence and defense from a diplomatic perspective.  He asked the panelists to address themselves to a broader context of dealing with geo-strategic aspects, arms control and disarmament aspects, the political aspects, and in essence, the important role of nuclear deterrence in shaping the international security architecture.  He thought the discussion should include this broader range of issues that have to do with diplomacy, with shaping the future of the world, and the important arms control and disarmament aspects of diplomacy and arms control.

New perspective.  One speaker sought to articulate a new perspective on the diplomatic and military framework for dealing with weapons of mass destruction.  He suggested that the confrontation with the Soviet Union (during the Cold War) had been a direct threat to the United States, not only militarily, but had threatened to isolate us and our values, that it was a political and psychological threat to our core values, and to our basic beliefs about how society should be organized.  He felt that had changed today, and that Russia is more a proliferation threat, than a threat of direct aggression, and that the same is true of China.  There are other nations with historical scores to settle with the United States, at least in their minds, or with regional ambitions that we thwart by our protection of their local opponents, and are developing capabilities to threaten the U.S.  Finally, advances in technology have empowered sub-national groups or individuals, potentially to threaten the U.S. homeland.  Countering this threat needs to be the highest priority in American foreign policy.

He felt we needed to consider weapons of mass destruction together.  Having a policy on nuclear weapons, and other policies vis-à-vis biological or chemical weapons doesn’t make sense, that if we countered nuclear weapons, but failed to counter biological weapons, that we’ve lost.

Changing political realities.  We need to alter the role of weapons of mass destruction in our relations with Russia and China as a first step, to reflect the changing nature of the political relationships between us.  He suggested that the diplomatic and arms control framework, and military posture of mutual assured destruction is out of sync with the political realities of today.

Deterrence, a strategy of weakness.  Deterrence is too uncertain to depend upon.  Deterrence is not something you choose.  It’s a strategy of weakness.  It’s inherently uncertain, because you have to affect the decision of one individual in some future crisis, and you don’t know what he or she sees.  You don’t know what their values are, or whether they are sane or even sober.

Resolve political conflicts.  The best way to prevent proliferation, and reduce threats from weapons of mass destruction, is to resolve political conflicts, which is the source of these kinds of problems.  We need to cooperate better with other nations in intelligence and police work, and develop cooperative measures to safeguard weapons of mass destruction, their components, and delivery systems. 

Preemption and counterproliferation.  We need preemptive capabilities with conventional forces, and counterproliferation strategies.  We need passive defenses, including training for first responders.  And we need to deploy national and theater missile defenses.  And we need to give greater priority to multi-national diplomacy, to further delegitimate, reduce, and eventually eliminate all weapons of mass destruction.

Robust offensive forces for deterrence stands logic on its head.  The current U.S. approach to nuclear issues, with its emphasis on maintaining robust offensive forces for deterrence, and a prohibition on significant defenses, stands logic on its head.  It encourages the deployment of deadly weapons, and prevents the creation of effective means of defending against them.  He felt that our current security policy is a historic aberration, that we deterred because we could not defend.  It wasn’t a choice, but necessity that was the mother of this policy.  Now we have a chance to restore a more coherent balance between offense and defense.  The demise of the Soviet Union, and advances in defensive technologies offer the choice of a new path.  There’s an opportunity to move back to a more logical posture, one which seeks a more stable and secure posture for the U.S., and indeed the world, in which there are fewer weapons of mass destruction, under writing a stable deterrence and effective defensives for ourselves and our interests.  Compellingly, it’s this type of world, which in the distant future perhaps, can lead to the ultimate elimination of all weapons of mass destruction from international policy.

New arms control model.  Another speaker suggested that we do in fact need a new arms control model, if we need arms control at all.  He felt that arms control throughout history has been harmful at worst, and irrelevant at best, that it was a product of the Cold War, an historical aberration, and a response to perceived realities of an intractable political conflict in a nuclear missile age against which there were no defenses.

Arms control assumptions during the Cold War.  He felt there were six assumptions underlying arms control during the Cold War:  an intractable conflict, horrific weapons against which there was no defense, some degree of rationality, a bipolar world, danger of miscalculation, and need and means to somehow stabilize the situation.  Verification became a major issue, founded on this intractable political problem and mistrust.  We looked for a technical solution to a political problem.  Arms control was an attempt to manage the situation.

Arms control is folly.  Arms control is most likely when it’s least needed.  Arms control today is folly, because nuclear weapons, perhaps of new design, will be essential to American security for the foreseeable future.  START talks dominate our agenda with Russia, and it’s doing a lot of damage.  Russia is sinking, politically and economically.  It’s going to be a disaster, and we're talking arms control?  It was suggested that it didn’t make sense to be talking to Russia about reducing the number of warheads to 3,500 by 2007, when we didn’t know what Russia would look like on January 7, 2000.  We need to do something, do it right, and it’s gong to be very difficult.

Quoting from a recent report, on the future of American security, the speaker stated, “Threats to American security will be more diffuse, harder to anticipate, and more difficult to neutralize than ever before.  Deterrence will not work, as it once did.  In many cases, it may not work at all.  It will be a blurring of boundaries between homeland defense and foreign policy, between sovereign states and a plethora of protectorates and autonomous zones, between the post-national loyalties on individual citizens and the pull of loyalties both more local and more global in nature.  The world that lies in store for us in the next 25 years will surely challenge our perceived wisdom about how to protect American interests and advance American values.  In such an environment, the United States needs a sure understanding of its objectives and a coherent strategy to deal with both the dangers and opportunities ahead.”

First principles.  It’s time to reconsider, to get back to first principles.  What is America’s role in the world?  What are our challenges?  If arms control fits in that world, let’s come up with a cogent arms control strategy.  And like the Cold War, don’t be surprised if in the post-Cold War era, it proves to be very difficult.  We’re not going to go around just signing agreements, one a month, because it all of a sudden got easy.  If it’s worth doing, it’s going to be hard.  He offered North Korea and Iraq as recent examples of how hard these efforts are going to be. After relieving North Korea of a number of sanctions which have been on it for 40 years, the North Koreans turned around and said, “By the way, why don’t you take away the rest of the sanctions, sign a peace treaty with us, and get your troops out of South Korea.”  And Iraq rejected, not the American and British plan, but rejected the Russian and French plan, for bringing back inspectors to Iraq, and relieving them of some of the UN sanctions.

Adversarial relationship.  The blind pursuit of the Cold War arms control agenda is not a foundation for anything useful.  Basically, the whole notion of offensive deterrence, crisis stability, SALT, START, it’s an adversarial relationship.  You can talk about building relationships and diplomacy, and the process, and all the other things, but basically you’re talking about the possibility that somebody’s going to shoot nuclear weapons at the other.  Now, in the short term, we may be doing Russia a favor.  We may be perpetuating its super power status, by continuing to talk to about this sort of thing.  But, in the medium term, all we’re doing is perpetuating an open a sore.  We’re perpetuating a conflict in which Russia can only be the loser.  And when Russia becomes an inevitable loser in something like that, you’re going to miss an awful lot of other opportunities, and you’re going to have an awful lot of resentment in Russia.  It’s time for a new model, or maybe no model at all.

Imaginative nonproliferation policy.  Another speaker advocated for a more vigorous and imaginative nonproliferation policy, and that our nuclear arsenal was becoming less of a strategic asset and more of a strategic liability.  He felt that our dominant conventional military power, almost insurmountable advantages in high tech warfare, information dominance, precision guided weaponry, etc., permits us to radically reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons for our own security, and to extend deterrence through conventional means to our allies, as well.  The main threat today, and for the foreseeable future is weapons of mass destruction.

Arms control and disarmament, an indivisible challenge.  The speaker suggested that in this new security environment, it seems to us that arms control and disarmament are no longer separate issues, but are part of an indivisible challenge.  And that challenge is to link continued nuclear arms reduction to the challenge of strengthening international institutions and norms, taboos if you will, against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  He felt that political leadership is needed to drive arms control.  Our failure has been a bipartisan one in failing to jump start progress toward steeper reductions in nuclear arms, and toward more reliable and trustworthy regimes to control the spread of chemical and biological weapons, fissile materials, and all the rest.  This is not the time for incremental steps, but a bold leap.  He thought that U.S. leadership would give us both political leverage and moral leverage, and more active diplomacy was necessary.  The speaker also suggested that we need to develop counter proliferation capabilities, including passive defense, active defense, and limited national and theater missile defenses.

Delegitimizing WMD.  A speaker thought the American public, perhaps the global public, and global civil society would be receptive to bold arms reduction initiatives, that they would support agreements that are verifiable, credible, reciprocal and fair.  With strong U.S. leadership, and a strong constituency among civic and non-government actors, that the effort could become a force for delegitimizing and isolating countries and non-state actors with proliferation ambitions.  He thought that the checks and taboos in place today would continue to erode, and therefore there was little downside to embarking on this new course.

Diplomacy and arms control.  One speaker linked diplomacy and arms control together.  Diplomacy is a means to an end, a means to safeguarding and securing or our national interests and national security.  One form of achievement and in increasing form of failure is the codification of diplomatic initiatives in the form of arms control agreements and treaties.

Good and bad arms control.  The extent to which an arms control agreement is proven an achievement or a failure, is the extent to which it directly safeguards our nation’s interests and security, without imperiling the ability of the United States to undertake other parallel measures to protect itself.  Missing from recent arms control proposals is the explicit, or even implicit, recognition that arms control, when done properly, secures the diplomatic high ground for the United States, unilaterally disarms our opponent, and leaves untouched our ability to wage war, by which I mean both offensive and defensive actions.  Conversely, the worst form of arms control is that which fails to yield diplomatic dividends, that which does not constrain or neutralize the military capabilities against which the agreement is targeted, and yet which because we are a litigious sort, we adhere and we unilaterally experience a net reduction in our security and our capabilities.

Best and worst arms control agreements.  START-II is the best arms control agreement.  It struck at the heart of the Russian’s missile program.  However the Administration has now lost it.  The Ottawa Land Mines Convention was the worst arms control agreement, because it does not constrain our adversaries, but which would have harmed U.S. military capabilities, had we signed it.  The speaker added, that in addition to striking at your enemy’s core military capabilities, without affecting your own, that whatever treaty you conclude, it’s got to be enforceable and enforced.

Treaties have a pernicious effect.  He also suggested that treaties have a pernicious effect on our decision-making processes. When our diplomats are at risk for having to actually go out and chastise another nation, because they’ve violated a legally binding obligation, the standard of evidence gets ratcheted through the roof.  Ironically, it gets harder to pursue these matters with foreign nations when you have a treaty overlaying the issue, than when you don’t.  

Making the world safe through treaties.  One of the problems is that we seem to believe that these weapons conventions are making the world safe against their proliferation.   But when the treaty isn’t verifiable, and/or you’re not committed to a rigorous verification process, it’s worthless.  You can’t make peace through paper. 

Permanent interests.  In a multi-polar world the other major powers must be viewed as potential future adversaries, but also where we may have greater continuity of interests.  Mini-states are controlling the arms control agenda, and we need to evaluate when and where we can cooperate with other states, large or small.

With respect to the biological weapons convention, we need to secure access to sites where suspicious outbreaks of disease have occurred.  But because we are piling on a variety of other confidence building measures, that don’t, transparency measures, that aren’t, and challenge inspections of industry that only breed more suspicion, rather than less.

New arms control model.  The next speaker said that in many respects, the danger of a city being destroyed by a nuclear weapon, is greater today than at any point during the Cold War, except perhaps during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  For that reason, the question, “Is there a need for a new arms control model?”, is fundamentally important to the future of international security. Today’s new, less understood world, is filled with shifting strategic interests, new and more diffuse threats, and uncertainty about the proper means of confronting them, which has produced a new, still evolving model for arms control.  The role of the United States, and that of negotiated U.S.-Russian strategic reductions, remains central to the process.  And they are likely to for the foreseeable future.  But, new actors are playing an increasingly vital role.  Cooperation with responsible, non-government organizations,  “middle power” states, and multi-lateral institutions, are becoming necessary components of U.S. policy making.  How well the United States adjusts to these changes will determine the effectiveness of its arms control and nonproliferation policy. 

Reducing the political value of nuclear weapons.  Reducing the political value of nuclear weapons is necessary because it is a primary driver of nuclear and missile proliferation.  While many argue that nuclear weapons helped to maintain stability, and prevented direct super power conflict during the Cold War, there’s no greater risk to national and international security today, than nuclear weapons falling into the hands of unstable regimes, regional rivals, or non-state actors, such as terrorists, fanatical religious organizations, or militia groups.  If the world is to be more secure and stable in the next century, then nuclear proliferation must be prevented.  The cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is and must remain the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Cooperation with government and non-government organizations.  The new arms control model should be one of cooperation between governments, multi-lateral institutions, and non-government actors.  The establishment of nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia are major accomplishments.  Multi-lateral institutions are growing in importance in this area, including the United Nations First Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Security Council, are particularly important organizations.  Non-government organizations are becoming increasingly important in helping to break down barriers between governments, in promoting transparency, and participating in a variety of multilateral forums. We want to create, to strengthen international institutional restraints.  We should also recognize that they’re just restraints; they are not perfect systems.

Verification is no longer sufficient to assure nonproliferation.  Verification is important, but no longer sufficient to assure nonproliferation.  The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) contains negative security assurances (NSAs), formal pledges by nuclear weapons states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states who are parties to the NPT.  These security commitments, implied by the World Court to be legally binding, are important to maintaining non-nuclear states’ confidence in the NPT regime.  Nuclear weapons states should adopt policies that they would, under no circumstances, introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict, that is “no first use.”  And that limiting the role of nuclear weapons to the “core deterrent” would make it more likely that the nuclear weapons states would enter a process of drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Weapons reductions.  He argued that the nuclear weapons states should vigorously pursue nuclear weapons reductions, with the ultimate objective of zero.  In the short term, the United States and Russia should reduce their nuclear arsenals to levels far below those proposed for START-III, perhaps to as low as 1,500 or 1,000 deployed strategic warheads.  The next step would be for the United States and Russia to reach limits on tactical nuclear weapons, which would then make possible a second phase, limiting each side to 1,000 total weapons.  The door would then be open to begin the all-important five-power negotiations, aimed at reaching residual levels of nuclear weapons in the low 100s, for the United States and Russia, even lower for China, France, and the United Kingdom, and zero for India, Pakistan, and Israel, but with their fissile material kept on their territory under IAEA safeguards, so as to permit reconstitution should the agreements break down.   As an essential part of this, the non-nuclear weapons states would all pledge again, their non-nuclear weapons’ status, and agree to joint action against any states that should violate this obligation.  This would be the end point, until the world changes sufficiently to allow negotiation of a complete prohibition on nuclear arms.  If successful, this process would represent the most dramatic and important development regarding the implementation of Article 6 ever accomplished, and would enormously strengthen the NPT regime.  This is the direction that the arms control process must head, if the NPT regime is to survive for the long term, and peace and stability are to be achieved in the 21^st Century. 

Missile defenses shouldn’t derail arms reduction process.  Current efforts in the United States to protect against the increasing risk of ballistic missile attack from rogue states by deploying national missile defenses deserve special attention, as they are intimately linked to this process.  It is important that any U.S. NMD deployment not derail the arms reduction process.  But the Russians, Chinese, and French have already indicated that such a deployment, if done unilaterally, could cause them to enhance their nuclear capabilities, which would be a serious blow against the NPT regime.  If the regime is to be preserved, then some compromise must be found.  A United States decision to seek Russian agreement to incremental modification of the ABM Treaty, to permit a defense against rogue states, in exchange for reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals to 1,500, or even 1,000 deployed warheads, may be that middle ground. 

Cooperative missile defense development.  Recent reports indicate that the Administration is proposing maintaining the current ABM Treaty permitted level of a hundred interceptors at one site, and moving that site from Grand Forks to Alaska.  Offering to conduct future NMD development cooperatively with Russia could also provide defenses against rogue states without undercutting strategic reductions, by helping to alleviate suspicions in Russia, regarding the intended target of a unilateral U.S. NMD deployment, and promoting transparency. 

Transparency and inspection programs.  Strategic reductions, coupled with the development of an extensive and intrusive transparency and inspection regime, on warheads, fissile material, and ballistic missiles, would lay the groundwork for limits on tactical nuclear weapons, as well.  This could lead to a second phase of a 1,000 total weapons, and then ultimately to the five-power negotiations early in the next century, is most important for the long-term health of the NPT regime, and international security. 

Crucial choices.  The international community is at a crucial fork in the road.  One path leads toward a world plagued by wide spread proliferation, which we could try to manage.  But failing this, it would leave the world with peace and stability beyond the reach of all nations.  And the other path, toward reducing the political salience of nuclear weapons, drastically cutting nuclear warheads, and preserving a viable and effective NPT regime for the long-term future, would be a buttress of international peace and stability.

Two points of view.  On the one hand, the point of view seems to be that we continue the framework we had in the past.  We’re on the glideslope that’s going down, we use basically the same criteria we’ve had in the past, and we adopt other things like negative security assurances, codified no first use, as we proceed.  The other point of view appears to be either that we depart entirely from arms control, or alternatively we use arms control as a diplomatic tool to codify superiority where we have it, and not try to achieve stability or equity.

Rules and norms.  Americans want rules and norms, and seek ways to provide others with incentives to abide by those norms and to enforce those norms.  Perhaps arms control isn’t the problem, it’s arms control divorced from a wider policy, a coherent framework.

Minimizing dependence on WMD.  We espouse and believe in humanitarian values.  And any time we have a policy initiative which brings to the fore a dependence on weapons of mass destruction, it leads to political trouble.  There’s no political basis or support for it. Politically, it is difficult for us to use, to rely on, make visible in any way, weapons of mass destruction.  On the other hand, we are very good at using other instruments of power, particularly conventional military forces, relative to any other country in the world.  Given this, you come implicitly to the conclusion that our policies should be to minimize the role of weapons of mass destruction in world politics, and to maximize the ability to use other instruments, to determine international relationships. 

Treaties are to be built upon.  Chemical and biological weapons treaties, even if unenforceable, are in our interest, because we aren’t going to develop and maintain these weapons anyway.  They’re something to build on. We’re better off with a treaty, understanding that some percentage of the world isn’t gong to play.  Accepting something less than perfect is fine, as long as we understand that it hasn’t rid the world of biological or chemical weapons.

Treaties don’t impose meaningful constraints.  We don’t conduct foreign policy by public polling. Treaties, by themselves impose no meaningful constraints on other nations.  We understand that foreign nations, with nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile ambitions, are going to pursue those ambitions no matter what piece of parchment you get them to sign.  And what is the significance of a World Court ruling on nuclear weapons?

All WMD are not the same.  All WMD are not the same, nuclear weapons are different.  The United States has a self-professed need for nuclear weapons to safeguard her national security.  Until the day comes when we decide we don’t need nuclear weapons, we need to be careful not to undercut the safety, security, and the ability to modernize the nuclear deterrent.

“Belligerent reprisal.”  What is this bizarre notion of “belligerent reprisal” being promoted by this Administration?  It’s a response to our lack of honesty about what we did with the Chemical Weapons Convention.  As a result of deciding that we would no longer develop and maintain chemical weapons, we have lost our in-kind deterrent against their use.  Now, without chemical weapons, no longer have a deterrent, but we now have “belligerent reprisal?” 

Deterrence theory demands a clear delineation.  The power you are trying to affect, needs to have a clear idea of what will not happen for good behavior, and what will happen for bad behavior.  And if there’s no clear delineation, then you’ve got a problem. .   Oh, in some circumstances we might actually use nuclear weapons, if such situation merits.  You will?  We have just given people legally binding assurances that we will not use nuclear weapons on them, unless they attack the United States with nuclear weapons, or in alliance with a country that is using nuclear weapons.  That’s what we’ve said.  Now, how does “belligerent reprisal” fit into this?  I think the problem here is a real one.  It’s a perfect example of having walked into something, claiming we were ridding the world of chemical weapons, and then realizing we had no deterrent, and no plan to deal with what we actually had not accomplished.  And that’s the kind of thing we need to look at.   

The United States must remain the world’s only super power.  The only way to look at America’s position in the world, and come to real, honest conclusions about these things, is to decide who you are, what you’re about, and recognize that you are the world’s only super power.  You must be the world’s only super power.  It will be a dark day for the world when you are not the world’s only super power; and you’re trying to figure out how you’re going to handle that.  As long as you’re ashamed of American power, and as long as you want to be counted as just another country, you’re going to keep running into these kinds of things.  And you’re going to have to keep making it up as you go along, and you’re going to keep getting into this tangled web. 

Steep reductions imperil the Triad.  It is impossible to make further reductions in our nuclear weapons program without affecting our core strength, the submarine fleet.  As you go down lower and lower, instead of becoming an incentive for nations not to pursue nuclear weapons, you actually incentivize the pursuit of these weapons.  We are in a new era when missile defenses can and will be the name of the game.

We need nuclear weapons because there are limits to conventional power.  And nuclear weapons are a clear deterrent.

Why countries want nuclear weapons.  Countries pursue nuclear weapons and missiles for a variety of reasons.  Some suggested prestige was the driving force, that nuclear weapons gives them super power status.  Others believe they need nuclear weapons to ensure their own autonomy, so that they can embark on their own geo-strategic objectives without outside interference by the U.S. and/or other nuclear powers.

The U.S. won’t use nuclear weapons.  In my opinion, there is no chance that the United States will ever use nuclear weapons, and break the non-use practice established after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  It just isn’t going to happen.  And this policy of calculated ambiguity isn’t going to work anymore.  The only way to make it work in the future would have to be a direct and explicit nuclear threat.  So there’s not much out there to be deterred by nuclear weapons.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat.  This question of additional countries acquiring nuclear weapons is a much greater threat to our security than people generally admit to.  I think it’s a very serious, considerable, and growing threat, and I think it’s important to move away from policies that were effective and useful during the Cold War, and develop policies that address what appears to be the real world today.  I would certainly agree that limited missile defenses, to deal with rogue states might be a legitimate part of that.  But they should be done in a way that doesn’t make the situation worse.  It will make the situation worse if we do it unilaterally.  If we do it cooperatively, with Russia, and with our European allies, and to some extent with China, they could be beneficial.

Quibbling on further reductions in nuclear weapons.  There was general agreement on missile defenses, and there was almost agreement on the need for a minimum deterrence.  No one said that nuclear weapons have no utility.  We may disagree on the level of what minimum deterrence is.  But where we are disagreeing is the thesis that some of us hold is that further reductions in our nuclear arsenal can be part of a larger comprehensive nonproliferation strategy.  We also agree that proliferation is a major threat, and we need to do more to confront it.  I assume no one here would be against a stronger system of international constraints, and penalties on violators?  Of course, there are always going to be violators; there will always be rogue states; they will always try to acquire WMD, the point here is to make it more difficult, and to reduce the number of them, and to raise the bar.  Make it harder to get fissile material.  Make it harder to get missile technology.  We want them to feel the bite of economic sanctions, and to have an escalating series of penalties and punishments.  So, we’re left to quibble as to whether further reductions in our nuclear arms posture has any relationship to a nonproliferation strategy.  I, of course, think it does.

What we don’t understand in this geopolitical game is that we are the deteree. 

Strategic ambiguity is a dumb policy.  You should have strategic certainty, and perhaps technical ambiguity, keep them guessing on exactly what you’re going to do tomorrow morning.  The bottom line is that for a deterrent to be credible, another nation has to perceive credibly that we might use those weapons.  Return

Summary and Challenges for Follow-up Work

The following general observations were offered:

• The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose the greatest threat to global stability and security, and the greatest challenge to strategic deterrence.  There was general agreement amongst the participants that this was the overriding concern.
• We need a broader framework of strategic thought, one that goes beyond deterrence (or redefines deterrence), one that maintains continuity with the past, but also one that’s flexible enough to respond to future threats and challenges. 
• We need to integrate doctrinally our thinking about offense, transition, and defense, and do so across the spectrum of conflict.  We gave up on this during the Cold War.  We were mired in a mutually assured destruction/deterrence mindset.  We compartmented our thinking about offense and defense, and strategic and tactical.  And at the time a missile defense system was too overwhelming.  Today it is within reach, and we need to reintegrate our thinking about offense and defense. 
• We need to more clearly identify the centers of gravity of those asymmetrical threats, and determine how to hold them convincingly at risk.  If we can’t do that, our deterrence will be hollow.
• Because of the diversity and uncertainty of the threats, we need forces which are capabilities-based and effects-based, rather than purely threat-based.
• We must maintain strategic stability in the face of changing unpredictable challenges to our vital national security interests.  There is wisdom to maintaining the continuity of a credible, stable deterrent, while allowing a broader application of our deterrent capabilities to emerging threats.  In this sense the journey is more important than the destination.

There was general agreement on:

• Deeply buried targets.  We need a capability to hold at risk deeply buried targets.  Weapons in our current inventory are not ideally suited to address this problem.  In the absence of such weapons, an adversary may take risks he wouldn’t otherwise take, because he feels he’s invulnerable.  We’re working on developing advanced conventional munitions to meet this shortfall, but may need nuclear variants, as well.

• Missile defenses.  The United States needs to field national and theater missile defenses. We haven’t done enough with our allies in the area of theater missile defenses for either the tactical warfight, or especially for defending allied territory.

• Risk management.  We need to think more about distribution of risk amongst our strategic capabilities, including offensive forces, defensive forces, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts, not just in arms control but in our bilateral and multilateral relationships with powers, great and small.  As we engage with others we should look for opportunities to further cooperation in many areas.  As our economies become more inter-dependent, it becomes more clearly in the interest of countries to avoid confrontation over issues like proliferation.  More cooperation in intelligence and police work, will not only help the U.S., but will assist countries in addressing their own internal threats.

• Preemption and Counterproliferation.  Several speakers advocated the development and employment of preemptive and counterproliferation capabilities.

There were significant disagreements on:

• Strategic ambiguity versus certainty.  This was an area of controversy on several panels.

• One panelist suggested that preserving ambiguity as to what our response might be to an adversary’s actions were important, for two reasons, one to give our adversary pause, and two, not lock in our leadership to specific actions and/or responses.  On the one hand we don’t want a rogue leader to have any preconceived notions about what we would or would not use.  We want him to think that all options are open.  On the other hand we’re pressured by others for lower numbers of nuclear weapons, and “no first use” commitments.  Ambiguity is our watchword on this.
• Another suggested that when Saddam Hussein was told by the National Command Authority that he would pay dearly if he considered the use of WMD, he backed down.  In that case, an explicit warning worked.
• Others suggested that strategic ambiguity is a dumb policy, that you need strategic certainty, perhaps together with “technical ambiguity”, to keep them guessing on exactly what you’re going to do tomorrow morning.  But for a deterrent to be credible, another nation has to perceive credibly that we might use those weapons. 
• One suggested that deterrence theory demands a clear delineation.  The power you are trying to affect, needs to have a clear idea of what will not happen for good behavior, and what will happen for bad behavior.  And if there’s no clear delineation, then you’ve got a problem.
• One pointed out that the United States has provided legally binding assurances that we will not use nuclear weapons on them, unless they attack the United States with nuclear weapons, or in alliance with a country that is using nuclear weapons.
• Another panelist was convinced that the United States would not use nuclear weapons in any situation short of a direct nuclear threat to the U.S., and therefore their use as a deterrent was useless in any lesser situation.

• All WMD are the same, versus nuclear weapons are different.  Some suggested that all weapons of mass destruction be treated the same.  Others felt that nuclear weapons had such an overwhelmingly destructive power, that they were categorically different from biological or chemical weapons, and therefore should be treated differently.  In addition, the United States has a self-professed need for nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and we need to protect that deterrent.

• Fielding missile defense systems.  The Administration believes it knows what national and theater missile defense systems it intends to field, and that that part of the debate is over.  On the other hand, more than one speaker suggested that the United States has no coherent policy on missile defenses, and specific plans are in abeyance. 

• Others believe that the missile defense architecture under consideration, is a contrived ground-based architecture, and is an architecture which has as its foundation the political desire to maintain the ABM treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability.  That if the ABM Treaty did not exist, we would not be pursuing the types of defenses we are pursuing today.  The defenses we are pursuing are dead-end defenses, and we need more effective and more affordable ballistic missile defense systems, which are space-based and sea-based.  Why should we spend money on systems which provides no protection?
• While there was agreement that we need to focus more attention and effort in developing theater missile defenses, both to protect U.S. and allies in theater and tactical warfights, and to protect allied territory, there was disagreement on where the problems lay, and how to do so.  Some felt that our Allies, and particularly NATO, were in a state of denial regarding the missile threat from rogue states, while others thought that their reluctance was perfectly valid, given the indecision and cost problem experiences by the U.S. to date. 
• Some felt that the U.S. should go ahead on our own, and that the allies would come on-board once they saw our commitment and progress.  Others felt that we should do nothing unilaterally, and that we should work together with the Russians, Chinese, and our other Allies in developing global, national, and theater missile defenses.

• Deterrence works versus deterrence doesn’t work.  Is it too uncertain to depend upon?  Is it a strategy of weakness, as was suggested by one speaker?  Others felt strongly that deterrence, particularly as part of an overall, integrated, and coherent strategy does work.  The answer lies in whether the adversary is willing to be deterred?

• Elimination of nuclear weapons. 

• One speaker suggested that our nuclear arsenal was becoming less of a strategic asset, and more of a strategic liability. 
• Some speakers suggested that elimination of nuclear weapons should be our ultimate goal, that it was time for a bold leap.  The demise of the Soviet Union, and advances in missile defense technologies make this a realistic choice, and new path to pursue.  And that short of eliminating them altogether, we should reduce them to the lowest levels possible, to a   “core deterrent” level, which wasn’t defined. 
• One speaker suggested that nuclear weapons no longer serve as a deterrent, because we wouldn’t use them, short of a direct attack by nuclear weapons on the United States. 
• Another suggested that international multilateral organizations and non-government organizations would work with the United States in de-legitimizing nuclear weapons, and for their abolition.
• Others believed that nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent, and not only do we need to keep them in the inventory, but we need to modernize and test them.

• Arms control is harmful at worst and irrelevant at best.  One speaker argued that arms control is an artifact of the Cold War, that it’s a technical solution to a political problem, and that it’s most likely when least needed.  The result of an arms control agreement is that the U.S. abides by it, thus limiting its own developmental capabilities, but has little or no impact on the other parties to the agreement.  Pursuing an arms control agenda promotes an adversarial relationship with Russia, and is perpetuating a conflict in which Russia will be the loser.

o       One speaker suggested that arms control, when done properly, secures the diplomatic high ground for the United States, unilaterally disarms our opponent, and leaves untouched our ability to wage war.  Conversely, the worst form of arms control is that which fails to yield diplomatic dividends, does not constrain or neutralize the military capabilities against which the agreement is targeted, and because we adhere to it, we experience a net reduction in our security and our capabilities.

o       Another speaker suggested that the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is, and must remain, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  He pointed to the successful establishment of nuclear free zones in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.  He also advocated reducing the political value of nuclear weapons.  And suggested that it was important that any U.S. national missile defense deployment not derail the arms reduction process.

There were significant suggestions in the following areas:

• By any measure, our strategic capabilities, offensive forces, defensive forces, intelligence and diplomacy must be credible, capable and relevant.  We need to invest aggressively in sustaining and improving these assets.
• Weapons systems need to be capabilities-based and effects-based.  They have to be able to perform according to their specifications.
• Weapons systems need to be developed to meet evolving threats.
• We need to ask the big questions first.  What are our objectives?  What strategic capabilities do we need in the coming decades?  Then we should ask questions about capabilities, force structures and alignments, offensive and defensive weapons systems, command and control, and reporting relationships of our forces and systems.  And how do we distribute risk to maximize the effectiveness of our assets in an uncertain and evolving environment?
• Strategic warning is largely dependent upon our intelligence infrastructure.  Information is also increasingly available from diplomatic, political, and commercial sources.  We need to leverage our collection, analysis and processing capabilities to increase their penetration and effectiveness.  Perhaps we need new mental constructs, new approaches, better communications, and better organization of the intelligence community, to assure ourselves not only of better warning, but to guide our decision-making processes as they relate to our strategic forces and our relationships with the world community.  

The following areas may merit significant further research, discussion, and/or resolution: 

-            Offensive roles for information operations

-            Strategic ambiguity versus certainty on use of nuclear weapons

-           Missile defense systems which are feasible, effective, and affordable

-            Unilateral versus cooperative development of missile defenses

-           What extended defenses do we need, and how do we proceed?

-           Does deterrence work?  Perhaps we should ask our adversaries?

-           Do nuclear weapons deter biological and/or chemical weapons?

-           What preemptive and/counterproliferation capabilities do we need to develop?

-           How do we maximize our intelligence collection and analysis capabilities?  

Return to Agenda