Balancing American Alliance and Chinese Cooperation:

Korea's Emerging Security Challenges

Taeho Kim

Senior China Analyst

Director of Research Cooperation

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)

Nonresidential Research Associate

The Mershon Center

Ohio State University

[ROUGH DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION]

Prepared for presentation at the 2000 Pacific Symposium on "Asian Perspectives on The Challenges of China" hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), U.S. National Defense University, Washington, DC, U.S.A., March 7-8, 2000. The views expressed here are the author's own and do not represent the positions of the KIDA, the Mershon Center, or any other organizations with which the author is affiliated.

The beginning of a much-touted new millenium notwithstanding, some fundamental policy dilemmas inherent in the three-way relationships among the United States, China, and Japan remain unsettled. For one thing, one of the principal foreign-policy challenges for the U.S. throughout the 1990s has been to provide China with a tacit recognition for its rising status and influence and to assuage its deep-seated suspicion that the post-Cold War U.S.-Japan alliance is targeted at China, while at the same time offering security commitment and credibility to Japan by strengthening alliance relationship with the latter.[1]

For another, China's policy conundrum in its relations with the U.S. in the reform era--which became more apparent since Tiananmen--has been that the U.S. remains the most important country in its economic development and foreign policy but, at the same time, poses the greatest threat to continued communist rule in China and to the prospects for reunification with Taiwan.[2]

For still another, while U.S. alliance ties with Japan and Korea (the Republic of Korea) are strong and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future, will they continue to be robust enough to withstand future regional challenges and crises, in which the "China factor" looms largest?

These security uncertainties and policy dilemmas have combined to produce sophisticated and multi-front hedging strategies by all regional states, as a recent increase in high-level diplomatic and military-to-military contacts has amply shown. In particular, how best to cope with the challenges of an ascendant China for regional prosperity and security has occupied a central place in individual states' strategic calculi. Korea is no exception to this overall regional trend.

To assess the security implications of PLA modernization for the Korean Peninsula and for East Asia, this essay first takes stock of the linkage between Sino-American relations and the Korean Peninsula. It then explores the emergence of the China factor in Korea's strategic calculus and the implications of PLA modernization for Korean security. Finally, it addresses the question of a future East Asian strategic configuration, a glimpse of which might wisely guide the policy measures the ROK and the United States can take toward China in the coming years.

To telegraph the major arguments of this essay, in light of sustained discord between the U.S. and China throughout the last decade, their policies and interests over the Korean Peninsula are far more likely to diverge than converge for the coming years, especially when it comes to concrete policy issues and longer-term agendas. This could complicate, rather than benefit, Korea's security planning, as it requires cooperation--or acquiescence at minimum--from both countries in resolving a panoply of salient peninsular issues. In light of the continuing Sino-American competition and their likely diverging interests over the peninsula, therefore, Korea's strategic differentiation in its relations with the U.S. and with China is the most optimal strategic choice, even if it should also continuously and systematically pursue a specific set of confidence-building measures with the latter.

Diverging American and Chinese Interests over the Korean Peninsula

In light of individual regional states' shared perceptions on regional uncertainties, one useful way to assess future East Asian stability is to inquire about the health of Sino-U.S. relations, the two most powerful actors in East Asia as well as on the Korean Peninsula. Ideally, an amicable relationship between the U.S. and China, especially renewed security cooperation, would contribute to regional stability, the attainment of their respective objectives in East Asia, and peninsular stability.

In reality and contrary to the popular belief, however, the prospects for an improved Sino-U.S. relationship remain quite cloudy, if not bleak, for the foreseeable future.[3] Few of their outstanding issues, including the Taiwan issue, human rights, trade, nuclear espionage, and nonproliferation, show signs of early or conclusive resolution. On the contrary, there seem to exist some fundamental differences between the two countries in terms of political systems, social values, and strategic objectives. Given also the ongoing leadership transition and internal political dynamics in Beijing and Washington, compromise on these differences will also be difficult to achieve in the near future.

Since Tiananmen and accentuating last year, there has been a widespread, ongoing discussion among Chinese strategists and scholars over how best to assess a series of "adverse currents" in China's external security environment and what kinds of policy options China can take to cope with them, singly or collectively. One of the few emerging consensus among Chinese strategies--at least discernible to the outside analyst--has been that U.S. global "hegemonic" behavior is the fons et origo of the threat to "world peace" (read: China's interests).

U.S. global "hegemonic" behavior, some Chinese leaders and strategists seemed to have already concluded, clashes directly with China's national interests (e.g., economic priority, reunification with Taiwan, and continued CCP rule) and its strategic visions (e.g., multipolarity, "anti-hegemonism," "anti-power politics," and Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). In particular, U.S. regional "hegemonic" behavior in East Asia--the locus of Chinese diplomatic and economic activity--including the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and their joint development of TMD, and, most seriously, its continued weapon sales to Taiwan, both reinforces and reflects U.S. "hegemonic" posture around the globe.[4]

The depth of Beijing's fear of an America-dominated world has been manifested in such newly-minted code words as "new hegemonism," "the Asian edition of NATO," "a global intervention mechanism," "Asian Kosovo," and "the next Serbia."[5] Particularly worrisome to the Chinese leadership is any possible connection between the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and the Taiwan question, running the whole gamut of the controversies over the scope of regional contingencies in "areas surrounding Japan," TMD, and Taipei's overall relations with Washington and Tokyo. In a litchi nutshell, China finds the prospects of a rearmed Japan unnerving and a Taiwan armed with TMD unacceptable. The U.S. is the key link.[6]

Viewed in this light, the Korean Peninsula also occupies a central place in their crowded bilateral and regional agendas. Notwithstanding the long list of their outstanding disputes at both bilateral and regional levels as noted above, on the other hand, China and the U.S. have time and again argued--at the official and declaratory level, at least--that they share a set of common interests over the Korean Peninsula--namely peninsular stability, North-South Korean dialogue, and peaceful reunification.

In light of their vast differences in strategic visions, political systems, social values, and strategic objectives, let alone their diverging interests over bilateral and regional issues, it is far more logical and--I would argue--more empirically valid to make a case that the U.S. and China will likely remain divergent over peninsular issues as well. Beneath the façade of the "strategic constructive relationship," moreover, their interests could be significantly in conflict with one another when confronted with some concrete issues and longer-term agendas. Prominent examples include, but are not limited to, a North Korean contingency, future status of the USFK, the question of WMDs in North Korea, and military capability and strategic orientation of a unified Korea.

To repeat, the U.S. commitment to Korean defense and unification remains strong and is highly likely to remain so in the future. But as perhaps their divergent perceptions of and policies towards a series of recent North Korean crises best illustrate, the ROK and the U.S. governments need to coordinate their policy toward North Korea more tightly and coherently than has been the case. For example, the continuing emphasis on the concept of "soft landing"--which is not a policy--may retard the consequences of an economically-crippled North Korea, but it by no means constitute a viable, long-term strategy for either alliance maintenance or regional security. On the contrary, as long as this concept persists, both the ROK and the U.S. will not only be subject to various domestic criticisms, primarily for being "soft" on North Korea's brinkmanship, but their policy toward North Korea will also remain adrift as a consequence. This does not augur well for the long-term development of the ROK-U.S. alliance, especially if they have to prepare for the day when they "run out of enemies."[7] It is these kinds of specific policy issues and longer-term questions that Korea needs to take into consideration in formulating its strategic plan for its future security environment.

The China Factor in the Korean Strategic Calculus

Fundamental to understanding the importance of the China factor in the South Korean calculus are China's geographical proximity to the Korean Peninsula, its continuing influence on North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), Beijing's growing bilateral ties with South Korea, and China's strained relations with the United States. Furthermore, China is certain to remain a major player in Korean affairs, including in the Korean unification process. While each subject requires a lengthy treatment of its own, this section will only provide a brief overview of Sino-South Korean relations leading to their normalization in 1992 and China's place in South Korea's diplomatic and security calculus in the post-Cold War period.

For most of the Cold War, relations between China and South Korea were locked in mutual hostility and suspicion. The Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the bipolar configuration of the world's power structure, and China's continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union for influence over the Korean Peninsula made Chinese-ROK relations a negligible factor for a full three decades after the cessation of hostilities on the peninsula. As China recognized North Korea as the only Korean state on the peninsula, there were no contacts between South Korea and China until the late 1970s.

Toward the end of the late 1970s, however, two major developments presaged major changes in China's traditional stance toward the peninsula. One was China's adoption of its reform and open-door policy in 1978, the time when unofficial and indirect trade between China and South Korea began, albeit slowly. During the early to mid-1980s, China gradually but unmistakably pursued a de facto "two-Korea" policy, which included cultural, academic, and sports contacts with South Korea. The other principal development was the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the mid- and late 1980s, which undercut the rationale behind their rivalry over North Korea.

By 1988, the growth of the still-unofficial but substantial ties between China and South Korea had become unmistakable. Indirect trade between the two countries exceeded $3 billion; China participated in Seoul's 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics; and the ROK government announced a major diplomatic initiative known as "Northern Diplomacy" or nordpolitik. Northern Diplomacy, in particular, was aimed at creating a condition favorable for Korea's peaceful unification through improved ties with then-socialist countries. Beginning with Hungary in January 1989, South Korea established diplomatic relations with all East European states, the Soviet Union (September 1990) and China (August 1992).

From Beijing's point of view, the domestic economic imperative was the primary factor motivating its decision to normalize relations with South Korea. The passing of the Cold War not only enhanced the value of economic ties with South Korea, but entailed the end of Sino-Soviet/Russian rivalry over North Korea. Another important motive was to expand China's diplomatic influence in the region in the aftermath of China's post-Tiananmen isolation by consolidating ties with its neighbors such as South Korea, a major U.S. ally in Asia.

To the ROK government, normalizing relations with China was a diplomatic tour de force. First and foremost, Sino-South Korean normalization helped culminate its Northern Diplomacy and symbolized South Korea's victory in its decade-long diplomatic competition with North Korea. Furthermore, the ROK hoped to bring China's influence on North Korea to bear in facilitating North-South Korean dialogue, opening up the North Korean society, and restraining North Korea's provocative actions against South Korea. Less immediate but still important considerations were the economic and political benefits that flowed from strengthened relations with China.

Sino-South Korean relations have expanded rapidly on most fronts. Bilateral trade reached $6.4 billion in 1992, the year diplomatic relations were established. Their bilateral trade for the past three years recorded $23.7 billion, $18.4 billion, and $20.2 billion,[8] respectively--making them each other's third largest trading partner. Over half a million people visit the other country annually, and the round-trip passenger airlines fly over the Yellow Sea about 100 times per week. By the end of 1998 over 1,500 Korean companies operated in China, and the registered, long-term Korean residents exceeded 35,000, including 12,000 students.

Growing economic and social ties are further buttressed by an increase in investment, tourism, and sea/air routes. To help consolidate these growing economic and political ties, the three most senior Chinese officials (i.e. Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Hu Jintao) visited Seoul. These remarkable developments between the two nations over the past few years have resulted in a shift of the South Korean public's perception of China to that of a benign, pragmatic economic partner.

Regarding the Korean perception of China and the U.S.-ROK alliance a recent series of perceptual studies, conducted throughout Korea among the public, the media, and policy elite, has indicated that the Korean public’s view remains "somewhat critical" toward the U.S. and "fairly friendly" toward China, whereas policy elite airs the opposite view--that is, "somewhat critical" toward China and "fairly friendly" toward the United States.[9] The media proclivities are divided between the "progressive" (pro-China) and the "conservative" (pro-American) newspapers, even if the majority of all major Korean newspapers are critical of U.S. trade policy toward Korea. Interestingly enough, younger Koreans, who are most vocal about U.S. policy toward Korea, have fairly consistently supported the continued presence of the USFK for security and other practical reasons. A vast majority of the Korean public and elite, on the other hand, have responded that China's influence over peninsular affairs would grow in the future and that Korea's military-to-military exchanges and cooperation with China should be expanded.

In the so-called "military exchanges and cooperation" field between the two countries, there have been more frequent, more regular, and higher-level visits in recent years.[10] In August 1999, in particular, Korean Defense Minister Cho, Seong-Tae made a visit to China to attend the first-ever ROK-PRC Defense Ministerial Talks with his counterpart, General Chi Haotian, who in turn made a reciprocal visit in January 2000, which made him the highest-ranking Chinese officer to visit Seoul in the history of Sino-South Korean military relations.

For the early years after the normalization in August 1992, on the other hand, it soon became clear to several observers of Sino-South Korean relations including this author that the two specific sets of goals of Korea's China policy--i.e., one set for facilitating inter-Korean relations and the other for improving bilateral ties with China per se--remained largely independent of one another. Moreover, most Korean observers concluded that there were no appreciable outcomes in its political or security relations with North Korea or with China. In light of the remarkable and more balanced developments in their economic, diplomatic, and military ties in recent years, however, they are advised to update their and my earlier assessment and to focus on the longer-term consequences of a close Sino-South Korean relationship in the context of the three-way ties among the U.S., China, and Korea.

These changing strategic environment reflects South Korea's continued concerns about the security challenges posed by North Korea, but now in the context of increased uncertainties in the future American and Chinese roles on the peninsular and in the region. It is against this backdrop that the implication of China's military modernization for Korea and for the region should be assessed.

Implications of PLA Modernization for Korean Security

Before discussing the implications of China's military potential, it is important to note that it is not China's defense modernization per se, but its actual and perceived capability to project power along and beyond borders that has a direct bearing on achieving its foreign policy goals and arouses concerns over its capability and intention to destabilize regional security. It should also be acknowledged that an adequate assessment of China’s power projection capability goes beyond the examination of conventional "bean counting" and calls for an analysis that is as comprehensive and detailed as possible regarding its various capabilities such as long-distance operations, C³I, air- and sea-lift, missile defense, logistics, and joint and combined operations. As this is done capably elsewhere,[11] the following analysis briefly surveys the PLA's ongoing efforts in the area.

Power projection capability can be defined as a relative military capability to launch and sustain combined combat operations for a reasonably long distance and period. By this rigorous definition, China currently and for the next decade or more lacks critical capabilities in projecting force over a long distance. Even in conventional categories such as weaponry, the PLA's inventory is roughly 10 to 20 years behind that of advanced Western militaries.

On the other hand, the PLA today has gradually but considerably improved its fighting capability over some fifteen years through its across-the-board defense modernization program such as command and control structure, organization, weapons systems, education and training. Since 1990, in particular, it began procuring new weapons domestically and advanced systems from abroad, most notably from Russia. On balance, however, the PLA remains an antiquated force, even compared with many militaries of its neighbors, let alone its advanced Western counterparts. Occasional improvements in the PLA’s naval and air capability make their way into newspaper headlines in China and elsewhere, but they are not integrated to an overall fighting capability and mostly reflect the stated goals rather than actual qualitative changes.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) has held a priority in defense modernization since the early 1980s, as China's reform and open-door policy has significantly elevated the importance of protecting China's maritime interests in overall national development and security planning. The PLAN's capability to conduct and sustain long-distance operations is quite limited, however. Among the 18 destroyers and 35 frigates it currently operates, approximately ten of them are judged to be relatively modernized.

They are, however, deprived of effective defense systems and electronic

countermeasures. For example, the Luhu and the Jiangwei are indigenously-designed second-generation vessels, which are better equipped than their predecessors in terms of engines, command and control, and armament. They are, however, reportedly lack several sophisticated equipment such as electronic support measures (ESM), electronic countermeasures (ECM), and air defense systems, which might expose them to enemy attack in sustained, high-sea missions.

Similarly, the PLAN's submarine force remains seriously outmoded, despite its full inventory of over 100 submarines. It is not known how many of them are actually operational at any time, but they seem increasingly likely to spend longer maintenance hours at the docks. To the Chinese aging submarine fleet, the Russian Kilos would be a significant addition. Two export-version Type-877EKM and the other two, the more advanced Type-636, Kilos were delivered to China by the end of 1998.

Overall, the PLAN's vessels are mostly outdated and lack anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine defense system as well as modern radar and electronic equipment. Furthermore, the PLAN has not yet conducted long-distance naval exercises, and its RAS (replenishment at sea) capability is believed to be rudimentary. Given also the lack of an effective air cover, the PLAN’s vessels will remain dangerously exposed to the enemy's air and surface attack if they operate far from shore.[12]

The long list of advanced systems and technologies the PLAN has recently purchased or has shown considerable interest, including the Sovremenny guided-missile destroyer (the Hangzhou in Chinese), the A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft, airborne radar systems, and anti-ship cruise missile technologies, indicates that PLA leaders understand full well the glaring deficiencies in the application of its naval power.[13] The PLAN is doubtless committed to develop and acquire high-tech naval systems and technologies, but a considerable amount of time and resources need to be brought to bear in its fruition.

The quantitative superiority of its submarine force remains a concern to other nations, but its noise will make them vulnerable to detection by a variety of anti-submarine capabilities. The current limitations in the PLAN's naval weapons systems and electronic equipment, naval airpower, and RAS capability, let alone no carrier force, would deprive it of an effective long-distance operational capability for many years to come.

Despite the PLA Air Force's (PLAAF) huge inventory of over 5,000 different types of aircraft, the PLAAF is the least modernized service, especially compared with its counterparts in neighboring countries. Including the 3,000 J-6s, the Chinese version of the Soviet MiG-19s, virtually all of its domestically-manufactured combat aircraft are based on 1950s- and 1960s-vintage technologies.

PLA leaders are well aware that airpower plays a crucial role in modern warfare and that the air force is the most technologically-oriented service in the armed forces. But China's relatively backward aviation industry has long failed to meet the PLAAF's requirements. Intermittent contacts with selected Western aircraft manufacturers in the 1970s and the 1980s produced no breakthroughs in either upgrading the existing inventory or developing a new generation of fighter aircraft.

On the other hand, the current PLA strategy of "local wars under high-technology conditions" requires rapid mobility and effective fire power for contingencies along and beyond the border areas. The PLAAF has obviously been ill-equipped to meet the new challenges. It is thus the gap between the doctrinal requirements and the existing aircraft inventory that has sharpened the sense of urgency among the PLA top brass. For this reason, air force modernization received a top priority in Chinese defense modernization and foreign weapons acquisitions, especially those from Russia.

While China has been in the process of acquiring several different types of modern combat aircraft for a long period of time, of particular importance is the J-10 (XJ-10) and the Su-27. Recent reports indicate that the prototype of the J-10 has been developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation with Israeli assistance and the first flight test would be made soon.[14] But the details of the J-10 program and the Israeli involvement are largely shrouded in secrecy, partly because of Israel's transfer of aircraft subsystems and technologies.[15] In addition to the 26 Su-27s acquired in 1992, China secured an additional 22 Su-27s in 1996 with an agreement to license-produce the Su-27s in China.

In order to build a modern air force, moreover, it is also necessary for the PLAAF to acquire a wide array of advanced capabilities that could multiply the effectiveness of air operations. Included in the categories are various C³I, airborne early warning, surveillance, mid-air refueling capabilities. While these assets remain China's top priority in preparing for high-tech warfare, it would take many years to acquire and field such force multipliers.

Until then, in a future air campaign that involves the modern air force of China's neighbors, the PLAAF's outmoded aircraft will be severely tested. Even worse, the PLAAF's combat readiness is also known to suffer from insufficient flying hours, lack of combined operations, and limited repair and ground logistics support.[16] The prospect that the PLAAF could significantly improve its airpower by the year 2010--even with the Russian technological assistance--is not bright. In the meantime, if it attempts to overwhelm a rival air force with the large number of its aircraft in the context of some regional militaries, the rival's aircraft loss could well be severe.

The PLA Ground Force is the world's largest at 1.8 million, after the 1985-87 reduction of one million in the overall PLA manpower, and is being further reduced as a result of a half million drawdown plan. Its weapons inventory, while diverse in kind and huge in size, is outmoded and obsolescent. For this reason alone, the modernization of the ground force has been very selective and has received the lowest funding priority among the three services of the PLA. Chinese leaders have apparently concluded that the current size and armament of its ground force are adequate to meet any land attack and that prospects for land attack are slim for the foreseeable future.

In particular, amicable Sino-Russian relations, coupled with rapprochement with Vietnam and India, have allowed Chinese leaders to reduce substantially the number of ground troops, and the budget savings accruing from the troop reductions can be diverted to other areas, including better living standards for PLA soldiers, operation and maintenance of the select RRUs, and the development or purchase of modern weapon systems. In this regard, there seems to be an unmistakable linkage between troop reduction and the acquisition of modern weapon systems.[17]

In sum, a combination of financial, operational, and organizational constraints will force the PLA Ground Force to remain a huge defensive army in the foreseeable future. But, the PLA military strategy of "limited local warfare," embodied in the strategic shift at the 1985 CMC meeting also emphasizes the offensive operations in limited regional conflicts as well.

Most Western PLA specialists concur that China’s nuclear force of approximately 300 deployed nuclear warheads is primarily dedicated to a strategy of minimum deterrence, which means that no potential enemy would launch a nuclear strike against China without suffering retaliation. Since the end of the Cold War China has reconfigured some nuclear-tipped intermediate-range missiles to conventional missions, apparently to boost its role in regional contingencies.

Yet there is little indication that the role of nuclear weapons in overall Chinese security has declined in the Post-Cold War era. The Chinese have instead vigorously pursued the nuclear modernization program to improve the survivability, reliability, and safety of its nuclear arsenal in conjunction with its conventional military modernization. China’s ongoing major nuclear and missile modernization programs,[18] which predate the post-Cold War, is evident in all three components of its triad.

China's future improvement in its nuclear capability would reinforce nuclear weapon’s minimum deterrent value and may even facilitate the burgeoning nuclear doctrinal shift to "limited deterrence."[19] As long as China aims at achieving the technological sophistication of its nuclear arsenal to the level of advanced Western nations, it may not only be reluctant to join the international arms control and disarmament processes but want to retain as much as possible the military value of its

nuclear and missile programs, which would compensate for its lack of airpower.

For the foreseeable future the chance of nuclear threat to China is extremely low. But its nuclear and missile capability provides China with international status and prestige to which China as a major power should be entitled. Thus, China’s nuclear and missile modernization will continue to be a source of concern for international nonproliferation and arms-control efforts and regional security. In particular, the psychological impact of China’s nuclear and missile capability is more likely to fall on its neighbors than on extraregional powers. China also remains strongly opposed to the neighboring countries’ deployment of missile or strategic defense systems, which could dilute the military value of its nuclear and missile capability.

On balance, the PLA's power projection capability will take at least a decade or more to materialize. Although the current military strategy emphasizes the continued development of this capability, it would take a long mental leap to equate China's growing military capability with its intention to resolve by force outstanding issues with its neighbors.

China Versus U.S.-Japan-Korea: A Future Strategic Configuration in East Asia?

Despite its own global pretensions, China remains a regional power in Asia. China's foreign policy and security concerns also revolve around Asia, to which its current and likely future capability to project power is limited, and rarely reach some remote areas of the globe. Thus, the Chinese leadership feels most threatened by events close to its homeland such as those involving Taiwan, Japan, and Korea. In light of China's new anti-American tone and the extent of its involvement in East Asia's potential sources of tension, the U.S., Japan, and Korea are advised to take into consideration Chinese sensitivities in their three-way security cooperation or in their respective bilateral interactions with China.

Probably the most fundamental dilemma China has faced in the post-Cold War era regarding the future direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance is that it wants the alliance neither too tight and strong nor too loose and weak. If too loose, it could eventually lead to Japan's more independent posture in East Asia—a Damocles' sword in Chinese eyes. Too tight an alliance, on the other hand, means China's disadvantageous positions vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan. Throughout the 1990s, however, Chinese strategists have had good reason to worry about the latter.

In terms of future regional stability, what is perhaps more significant as of the late 1990s is whether the two major regional powers will develop a relationship that is either strong and cooperative or weak and confrontational in the years ahead. Of equal importance is the diverse yet uncertain impact of this evolving relationship on the future of East Asian security, particularly in light of the absence of the unifying Soviet threat and a continued U.S. policy dilemma vis-à-vis Japan and China.

Despite their huge and growing stakes in maintaining an amicable relationship, however, China-Japan relations will remain a difficult and often tense process. The persistence of their traditional rivalry and historical distrust over time suggests that they may have more to do with deeply ingrained cultural, historical, and perceptual factors than with the dictates of economic cooperation or shared interest in regional stability that are mutually beneficial.[20] Also underlying their complex but competitive ties are fundamental differences between the two countries in terms of political systems, social values, and strategic objectives in Asia and beyond.

As befits their traditional rivalry for regional influence and as the present-day two most powerful East Asian states, Japan and China have a quite broad range of bilateral concerns with each other. As many scholars have noted, moreover, the enduring dual images of superiority and inferiority permeate in their mutual perceptions to an extent and in ways that official and public perceptions in both countries regarding the other remain different, divergent, and distorted, and that at present there seems to be no strong constituency in either China or Japan to promote lasting friendship and cooperation. In a recent study on Japan's cultural diplomacy toward China, Diana Betzler and Greg Austin have convincingly argued that "the main impulses for official interaction between the two countries [China and Japan] remain outside what might be called the popular imagination."[21]

Regular high-level visits, such as President Jiang Zemin (November 1998) and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo (July 1999), have all emphasized that both countries need for the moment to put aside historical enmities against each other, and their growing trade and investment relationships have largely restrained open criticisms against each other. In particular, their bilateral military diplomacy reached a new level in the 1997-99 period, which included frequent military-to-military contacts, an accord on maritime accident prevention, and future joint drills and port visits. But the point is that their traditional rivalry and historical distrust linger on.[22]

The Taiwan issue is also related to the ongoing debate on Japan's regional security role. At issue is a definitional shift in Japan’s defense contribution from the "defense of the Far East" (Article Six of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty) to the "areas surrounding Japan," as stipulated in the new November 1995 National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO) and reconfirmed in the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the September 1997 Review of the Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (the "new Guideline"). China has always been wary of Japan's expanded regional role, of course, but this time it would like to know whether or not the "situations in areas surrounding Japan" include Taiwan—a controversy recurred during and after the final revision process of the new Guideline in September 1997. Given Chinese and other neighboring nations’ sensitivity on Japan's regional security role, Japan’s official policy on this issue seems to be "not to offer a specific definition," echoing the American position that the scope of the new Guideline is "situational, not geographical."

It is in this connection that China sees U.S.-Japanese security ties as crucial in restraining Japanese military power and in maintaining the present regional stability. To repeat, that China adamantly opposes the revised Guideline--for its possibility of U.S.-Japan collaboration in a Taiwan crisis and of Japanese militarism--cannot be overemphasized.[23] However, despite the Chinese analysts' pessimistic view of the revised Guideline and U.S. role in post-Cold War East Asia, they are well aware that U.S.-Japanese security relations remain to be the primary linchpin to the current East Asian stability. In addition, the Chinese analysts believe that the disappearance of the common foe and the new dynamics in both American and Japanese domestic politics could lead to a further redefinition of U.S.-Japanese security relations in the years ahead--a step the U.S. and Japan took in early 1998 to meet the requirements of the new Guideline. Thus the so-called "double containment" role of the U.S. forces over Japan's possible unilateral military role is largely seen in the positive light among many Chinese security analysts, even if not without debate. In a litchi nutshell, notwithstanding the remaining regional controversies over the interpretation of the "areas surrounding Japan," the NDPO and the new Guideline have steered Japan’s security role and policy toward a new direction that may enhance common regional security, if guided by prudence.

ROK and U.S. Policies Toward China

The is no doubt that the combined ROK-U.S. deterrence against the possible North Korean attack--now conceived more in terms of a wider spectrum than of the conventional full-scale war--remains the primary defense goal for the foreseeable future. As long as the North Korean military threat persists, any ROK and U.S. efforts to engage China should complement the goal of deterrence. Additionally, the ROK and the U.S. should seek to bring China's influence on North Korea to bear in achieving the three countries' common interests on the peninsula, namely continued peninsular stability, improved North-South Korean relations, and North Korea's economic reform. Mutual understanding among the three countries could not only offer a potential solution to the current stalemate in North-South Korean relations but also create a favorable condition for peaceful unification of Korea.

In reality, however, China's more confrontational posture toward the U.S. and Japan is likely for years to come. In particular, a sustained confrontation between the regional superpower and the global superpower could sharply exacerbate their potential and real differences over a host of peninsular and regional issues. In particular, China's growing influence over and interdependence with Korea amid the continuing rivalry between the U.S. and China could well make untenable the proposition that both countries can jointly cooperate in resolving a plateful of concrete policy issues and longer-term questions on the peninsula. Korea's balancing act between its alliance with the U.S. and its cooperation with China, in short, could well turn out to be the most prominent security challenge in the twenty-first century.

In order to avoid the possibly stark strategic decision, Korea should be able to "walk on two legs"--to paraphrase the Maoist slogan--by maintaining a strong security relationship with the United States, while charting out a long-term, comprehensive strategy toward China, which envisions post-unification relations between itself on the one hand and the U.S. and China on the other.

Korea's economic cooperation, augmented by increased diplomatic and cultural contacts, is essential for the expansion of their bilateral ties. Military-to-military relationships need to be set up as well. Given the current and expected influence of the PLA in China's domestic and external policies, it seems only prudent for the ROK to gradually foster personal ties and eventually institutional relations with the Chinese military. In addition, Korea needs to formulate in due time a panoply of security- and confidence-building measures (SCBMs) specifically designed to address Chinese potential concerns, including a unified Korea's intention to promote friendly relations with China, the creation of a buffer zone in and joint development of Sino-Korean border areas, and the establishment of a three-way security dialogue among China, the United States and unified Korea.

For its part, the U.S. should continue to pursue the strategy of "comprehensive engagement," especially in areas of mutual benefit (e.g., Chinese economic reform and trade). Additionally, U.S. China policy must be firmly linked to its overall Asia policy, carefully weighing the costs and benefits of the former to the latter. Conflict between the two policies would require a strong political will and leadership in official Washington. Finally but not lastly, the U.S. must differentiate national interests from universal values, strategic flexibility from policy reversals, and long-term goals from short-term gains. But if and when the above efforts yield no reciprocity from the Chinese side, the U.S. must consider possible alternatives to the present strategy of comprehensive engagement, with consequences difficult to predict.

All in all, to advance the longer-term goal of a stable and prosperous East Asia not only should the U.S. and East Asian nations recognize China's differing yet often legitimate security requirements, but also make genuine efforts to build confidence with China, which is a time-consuming yet least threatening way to make China more transparent. The paths China and U.S. choose will continue to influence both East Asia's future economic and security trajectories and the individual states' strategic soul-searching.

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