Teerawat Putamanonda
NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION
The impact of
the end of the Cold War has been witnessed by the growth of multi-polarity in
the Asia –Pacific region. The reduction
of Cold War tensions has allowed a greater freedom of action in the conduct of
regional diplomacy. Among other things,
the end of the Cold War has created a strategic environment which has become
less predictable and more subject to rapid change than it was during the Cold
War. The superpowers have reduced their military presence in the Asia-Pacific
with the United States maintaining about 100,000 troops in the region. The former Soviet Union has all but
withdrawn from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and has vastly reduced the operational
activities of its Pacific Fleet. Among
other key players in the region, Japan, India and the People’s Republic of
China are now perceived by their neighbors as seeking a greater role in
regional security.[1]
China, in particular, with its growing
economic and military power has been perceived at times as a source of concern
to world peace and security, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. It seems that the changing strategic
environment in China has been more dynamic than some analysts expected. It is not certain at this stage of effects
the economic and military development in China will have on the stability of
the Asia-Pacific region. There are a lot of questions waiting to be answered
when one looks over the Great Wall of China.
There are two existing schools of thought on assessment of
China’s strategic situation, those who believe that China will be a stabilizing
force for regional security in the future and those who see the opposite taking
shape.[2]
It is this paper's intention to enhance understanding of the
impact of China’s growing economic and military power toward Asia-Pacific
regional security. This paper focuses
specifically on the impact of China on Thailand as well as regional security as
a whole. In doing this, China’s goals
and objectives are first discussed, followed by analysis of China's ability to
accomplish those goals and objectives.
Thirdly, this paper will point out the impact of contemporary China on
Thailand’s economic, security and foreign policy. Lastly, China’s direction in the new millennium and its
affects on Thailand’s long-term policy will also be discussed.
The issue of
China seeking hegemony is still widely debated among strategic thinkers,
particularly in the West. Although the
Chinese Government has sought to assure the Asia-Pacific region and the world
that “China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it do so in the future even
when it is economically developed”[3], some scholars point out that the rise of
China is likely to undermine peace and security in the region. Nevertheless, there has been substantial
sympathy for China’s position within its surrounding sub-regions. For example, Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew, the Dean of Southeast Asian statesmen said after Beijing lost its bid
to host the 2000 Olympic Games, “America and Britain succeeded in cutting China
down to size…. The apparent reason was ‘human rights’. The real reason was political, to show
Western political clout”. Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad displays a similar view. “The US is saying we are threatened by
China,” he says “But I don’t see the threat from China as being any worse than
the threat from the US”. Anna Dominique
Coseteng, a Philippine senator, said that although the Chinese “have been
around the Philippines for 3000 years, [they] have not shown any signs of
wanting to control governments policies or interfere in our affairs”. Korean scholar Sang Joon Kim assures that it
is “highly unlikely that China will use its power and resources to support an
aggressive or expansionist policy.” [4]
Whatever the
case may be, China’s desire to assume the status of a great power in the future
is apparent. Therefore, in order to
clearly envisage China’s national agendas and objectives, it is helpful to
categorize these goals and objectives into intermediate, medium and
long-term. Given the Chinese perception
of time, a period of 50 years can pass before its aspiration to be great power
is realized. There are bound to be
numerous strategic steps taken by the Chinese to guarantee a smooth path to
glory. These are in essence its
immediate and medium term objectives.
To understand
China’s long term goal of being a great power is to understand how Chinese
people and their leaders perceive themselves, past and present. Based on the shear size of the country and
population, geographical location, and 3000 years of illustrated history, the
past glory of being the Middle Kingdom and center of civilization has never
been far from their minds. Humiliations
suffered at hands of the colonial powers and the Japanese in the past are
constantly used to drive contemporary Chinese nationalism and the desire for a
strong China.[5]
But
history alone is not enough. Modern growth of the Chinese economy and other
national powers has convinced Chinese leaders that attaining the status of a
great power is within reach, provided present momentum can be maintained and
proper steps are taken. Apart from the
goal of a world-class economy, another key to being the new center of gravity
and a power to be reckoned with is a modernized military. China is moving quickly to upgrade its ability
to influence events in its periphery, particularly around the adjacent oceans
to the East and Southeast. Of late,
China has been busy with the introduction of new, locally built warships, such
as 7000-ton destroyer currently under construction.[6] In addition, more sophisticated vessels
with new generation armaments are being acquired from Russia, such as the two
Sovrenmenny-class destroyers equipped with modern anti-ship missile systems
which China signed a contract in November in 1997, the first having been delivered in February 2000. Moreover, China has reportedly begun an
aircraft carrier program with the aim to be fully operational by the year
2005. It also has the option of
converting the two existing mothballed carriers bought from Ukraine and Russia,
the Varyag and the Minsk, from civilian to military use.[7]
In
the medium term, it is of paramount importance for China’s leaders to resolve
what is perceived to be its ‘sovereignty’ and territorial integrity
issues. The return of Hong Kong and Macao
has been seen as a success story for China to showcase that ‘one country-two
system’ concept can work.[8] Clearly, the next priority will be
Taiwan. In addressing the Chinese
audience during the Lunar New Year Speech in February 2000, Prime Minister Zhu
Rongji said “now that Hong Kong and Macao have returned to China, the main
issue for the Chinese people is the sacred mission to resolve the Taiwan issue
and completely reunite the motherland.”[9]
But the medium
to long term objective of peacefully bringing Taiwan into the fold is not going
to be easy to achieve. While there have
been some positive trends to show the desire to keep tension under control from
both sides, there is also a new sense of urgency for China to make progress on
the unification front. The deployment
of missiles across the Strait has put pressure on the United States to consider
providing Taiwan with suitable defense, including theater missile defense
systems (TMD). Given what Chinese
leaders consider to be challenges to the ‘One China Policy’ such as the recent
statement made by outgoing President Lee Teng-hui on ‘state to state ‘
relations between two sides, China continues to keep its ‘use of force’ option
open.[10] Although it is unrealistic to visualize
such a scenario as China lacks the capability to project force in a sustained
manner, there is always a danger of miscalculation as well as China using the
Taiwan issue to vent off domestic pressure.
Another issue
of sovereignty for China is the territorial dispute in the South China
Sea. In the medium to long term, China
will remain unyielding over the claim of sole sovereignty based on historical
records. The potential for oil and gas deposits underneath the seas around
Sparely and Paracel Islands is another important reason for all claimants,
China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan to expedite the
process to find a peaceful solution.
While China has demonstrayed its willingness to discuss a joint
development scheme and defer the sovereignty question for a later date, it
insists on only bilateral negotiation with each claimant on the issue.[11] Meanwhile, China uses several means to
assure its neighbors as well as other claimants of its peaceful intention. During the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC)
of the Asean annual Ministerial Meeting in Brunei in 1995, Mr. Qian Qichen, the
Chinese Foreign Minister, agreed that all disputes should be settled on the
basis of 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and that China
would not interfere with maritime navigation in the area. However, he insisted that the sovereignty
question was indisputable.[12]
Overlapping claims in the Spratley Island
group is explosive in nature even among ASEAN claimants without Chinese
involvement. The potential for armed
conflict has alarmed ASEAN enough to propose a
‘ Regional Code of Conduct on the South China Sea’ to be discussed and
adopted if possible during the East Asia (ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea)Informal
Summit Meeting in Manila in November 1999. Despite of this Regional Code of Conduct
has been delayed for further
discussion by senior Chinese officials.[13]Although China has since come up with its
own version of the ‘Code of Conduct’ in the South China Sea, demonstration of
sovereignty by building permanent structures on the disputed atolls in the
area, such as Mischief Island, is likely to create anxiety and concern for
stability of the whole region. As for
Chinese leaders, the priority to resolve the sovereignty issue remains low for
the immediate future despite it being an internationally contentious issue.
It is uncertain, however, that resolving the South China Sea dispute
will stay on the back burner once Taiwan is reunited with the mainland.
To be able to
accomplish the long –term goal of elevating itself to the status of great power
and solving the sovereignty issues along the way, China needs to create and
maintain an environment that is peaceful and stable. According to China’s White Paper, the issue of peace and stability
seems to have acquired supreme importance.
It is seen as a prerequisite and a time-buying scheme for China required
to realize Deng Xiaoping’s four modernizations.
In fact, in the context of the Asia-Pacific
region, China has set forth three basic objectives, China’s own stability and prosperity,
lasting peace and tranquility in the surrounding region, and dialogue and
cooperation on the basis mutual respect and equality.[14] Swaran Singh, a noted analyst of Chinese politics sees the
promotion of a peaceful environment by China as a result of de-activation of
its old strategies of keeping forces ready to face any hegemonic wars by
superpowers.[15] However, it is logical that for China to develop the robust
economy and high caliber military necessary to pave the way to becoming a great
power, time is needed.
For the
immediate future, China has shown positive signs to becoming valuable player in
the region. China’s leaders view the
post cold war strategic environment as an opportunity to disengage from
ideological conflict and improve its position in the international political
system. With East Asian countries no
longer locked in the rigid alignments based on the US- Soviet Union
confrontation, China is now free to portray the image of a responsible regional
power, ready to be engaged in all respects and levels. The integration of China into the region
will help lessen some regional countries’ fears that previously existed.
This is not to say that China has no
intermediate objective of trying to have influence in its periphery whenever
the opportunity arises. Myanmar is a
case in point. The shifting of China’s
attention from its northern approach at the end of the confrontation with
former Soviet Union to the southern gateways has coincided with Yangoon’s
isolation and sanctions from the West in1988 after the suppression of a student
uprising. The two countries share over
2000 kilometers of common border. With
the desire to open up the western-southwestern interior of the country, Myanmar
offers the opportunity for China to establish a trade route and strategic
corridor to the Indian Ocean. The
Chinese venture into Myanmar has been particularly beneficial to the economy of
China’s land-locked region like Yunan.
The consumer market in Myanmar is presently flooded with inexpensive
Chinese goods. Northern Myanmar has all the signs of a strong Chinese
presence including the use of Chinese money, and the presenc of Chinese traders
and visitors. Cross-border trade has
gone up sharply in recent years. High
level visits from both sides have
become routine.
China has also
become a major arms supplier to Myanmar’s Armed Forces. Since the sanctions from the West went into
effect in 1988, Myanmar has been dependent on China to upgrade its operational
capability and to modernize its Armed Forces.
In the three purchasing contracts signed in 1989, 1994 and1998, the
Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s Armed Forces) have reportedly acquired more than 1.4
billion dollars worth of military equipment from China to meet their
requirement to expand to the target size of 500,000. Chinese technicians have
reportedly worked in
Myanmar to build
facilities for defense
industry, airfields, naval
bases, and maritime
surveillance posts. Large numbers of Tatmadaw soldiers have
been trained by
PLA personnel both
in Myanmar itself
and in China.
The deepening
of Sino – Myanmar relations
has given a
marked strategic advantage
over another potential
Asian power, India.
For China, having
Myanmar in its
camp offers a
safe buffer on
its southwest periphery.
More importantly, the
access to the Indian Ocean as a trade route can
further the development of China’s interior
and help stimulate the economy
of land-locked portion of the country, such as the Yunan region which already
has a robust economy. The spread of
prosperity pockets to the hinterland will help Chinese leaders keep social
pressure under control.
How capable are they of getting there ?
Long term assessment of China’s
future is no means precise. One could
make long term predictions in both pro and con directions. This paper is no exception, and thus China’s
potential to become a great power is described from both ends of the
scale. Vehicles which create the
opportunity for China to emerge as a great power are its superior economic
performance and military modernization.
How well Chinese leaders overcome constraints on these two factors is
likely to determine their success toward the long term objective.
Since Deng Xiaoping’s announcement
of China’s four modernization program in the late 1970s, China has put a great
deal of effort into bringing about economic reform and creating an avenue to
the outside world. With the exception
of the last couples of years after the economic crisis, China has had the
world’s fastest growing economy. Even
the most pessimistic of analysts believe that China is likely to grow at the
rate of at least 5 percent per year, which means the gross domestic product
could double every 12 years.[16]
With an understanding of economic interdependence, China has chosen to
integrate into the world economic system, no matter how uncomfortable it is,
and to adapt its economic processes to international practices and
standards. China’s determination is
witnessed by its effort to enter into the World Trade Organization (WTO),
membership of which will guarantee China a larger volume of trade and
investment. In this respect it seems
China is sailing smoothly and should have a world-class economy in the long
term.
On the other hand, academics in some
quarters question China’s economic success, saying that China has the
potential, but it does have a significant influence on global economy.[17] In
addition, China’s economic figures, such as gross domestic product and foreign
direct investment, are not as impressive as reported. With a rapidly growing economy, it is very likely that China will
have domestic problems of its own to deal with. These problems stem from
the economic–reform process itself which causes decentralization of economic
decision making, inequalities in wealth between the richer coastal provinces
and poorer inland regions, rising inflation, staggering budget deficits,
environmental pollution, failure of tax system, corruption of all types in urban
society, etc. Another factor which
constrains China’s progress towards becoming a world–class economy is economic
interdependence between Beijing and foreign trade partners. In the early stages of economic reforms
until 1980s, the hinterland’s economy was larger than that of
the coastal regions. Later on,
as the coastal regions’ economy surged and surpassed that of the hinterland, the coastal regions Iinked into special economic zones outside China’s formal borders. These special economic zones are linked to
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. This
economic interdependence gives a negotiating or bargaining power to the foreign
trading partners. This power is derived
from the fact that the trading partners are essential for the growth of the
economic zones and the growth of the economic zones is essential for the growth
of China generally. Without this
economic growth, the legitimacy of the Communist Party in Beijing is at risk.
Military modernization is the second
vehicle by which China can realize its great power status. Looking from the positive side of the scale
with successful economic growth China should have the resources to fulfill its
defense modernization. Over the past
fifteen years, the Chinese military industrial system has introduced a variety
of new weapon systems and equipment drawing upon Soviet, and more recently
western technologies. Since the break
up of the Soviet Union, China has attracted a large number of Russian and other
CIS scientists and technicians to its defense industry. With highly qualified defense scientists and
attractive salaries, Beijing is bound to have a very strong foundation for
advancement of its defense technologies. In addition to the former Soviet Union
scientists and technicians, the
Russians seem to have no reluctance to sell
modern weapons and
equipment to the Chinese at
bargain prices. TU-22 M Back
fire bombers, SU – 27 Flanker fighters, RD–33 jet engines
(which power the MIG–29 Fulcrum), S–300
air – defense missiles and
Kilo – class conventional
submarines are among
modern equipment and
platforms the Chinese
have obtained or plan to
obtain as part of its
defense modernization.[18]
The
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has steadily been enhancing its
power projection capability which is essential for great power status.
Consequently, priorities in PLA defense modernization are given to the
PLA Navy and PLA Air Force. To enhance
its power projection capability, the PLA Navy has created a significant naval
infantry force and introduced new classes of resupply, amphibious assault and
intelligence gathering ships. The PLA
has also imported an impressive list of western systems to bring some vessels
up to international standards. Of
particular note are co-production of the PR/SEMT Pielstick marine diesel
engine, the SRBOC Mark 33 chaff dispenser, Mark 32 and PRC/Honeywell Mark 46
mod 2 anti-submarine warfare(ASW) torpedoes, Sea Cretonne surface-to-air
missile(SAM), General Electric LM-2500 naval gas turbine engine, and the Z-9A
helicopter. The PLA Navy‘s introduction of new technologies has significantly
modernized its Luhu-class destroyers, Liangwei-class air defense frigates and
large patrol craft.[19]
An aircraft carrier with complete
line of escort and auxiliary ships, a carrier battle group, is a long-term goal
of the PLA Navy. Although the goal is
prohibitively expensive, at the moment the PLA Navy has a well-planned program
to reach its goal, including the purchase of a used aircraft carrier as a
“training aid”. The PLA Air Force is
trying to realize power-projection capability enhancement by improvement of its
command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) systems, introduction of
in-flight refueling maritime surveillance and airborne-early-warning technologies,
as well as the purchase of Tu-22M Backfire bombers. Beijing’s determination and commitment in forging its own great
power defense forces are reflected in the Chinese Defense Minister’s remark:
“whatever the advanced foreign armies already have, we will require, whatever
they do not have, we will also acquire.”[20]
However, looking from the negative
end of the scale, despite the impressive military build-up and modernization
mentioned above, most of the PLA’s weaponry is still obsolete by western
standards and its power projection is still impotent. The PLA Navy is at best a green-water navy. Standards of efficiency and combat readiness
vary greatly for PLA weaponry. The
operational capabilities of the Chinese submarine fleet are limited to a
green-water role and a long-term goal in acquiring an aircraft carrier may be
hampered by the very high cost and complex logistic support requirements. With respect to the Chinese air and maritime powers, the bulk of China’s
fighters and bombers are upgraded versions of 1950 s and 1960 s vintage Soviet
aircraft. In addition, the number of
advanced fighters the PLA Air Force has recently purchased is relatively small
compared to those of China’s neighbors.[21]
Along the path to fulfillment of its
long-term objective, China will likely face competition from its peers in Asia:
those includes Japan, India and Russia.
In particular, India as China’s long-time rival, with unresolved
territorial disputes, will certainly use all of its national power to constrain
China from reaching its great-power status.
Japan, although struggling at the moment, is the only Asian great
economic power. Interdependence is all very well, so long as international
trade is growing. Disruption of trade
flow, whatever the cause, could stimulate economic competition and Japan would
not hesitate to put constraints on China’s economic achievement. As far as Russia is concerned, although
relations between Moscow and Beijing are very much cooperative at the moment,
there are unresolved bilateral disputes that may become dominant issues in the
future. On the other hand, looking from
a more positive side of the scale, these regional peers of Beijing should place
no constraints on China’s great-power status, provided Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow
and New Deli have consistent threat perceptions of a threat from the west which
portrays unfair trade and interference in internal affairs by means of
democratic values, human rights, global environmental protection, woman and
child labor, etc. In this respect, Asia
would be multi-polar with great powers forming loose associations deterring
threats from the west.[22]
How capable are the Chinese of
addressing “sovereignty” and territorial integrity issues? Beijing’s capacity toward fulfillment of
this medium-term objective depends on the level of accomplishment of its
economic, defense and foreign policies.
How well the Chinese leaders overcome their policy constraints will
determine their success toward their objective. In the medium term, Beijing could not afford to be too
belligerent in terms of sovereignty and territorial issues. As previously stated, economic growth and
stability have been the first priority for Chinese leaders and to accomplish
economic prosperity a peaceful environment conducive to Chinese economic growth
must be assured. How then would the
Chinese solve the Taiwan and the South China Sea issues in its favor? If one looks at Chinese philosophy in the
use of force, the Chinese have long believed the aggressive use of force is the
worst way to achieve political ends and should be used only as a last
resort. This philosophy was espoused by
Sun Tzu, the legendary Chinese strategist.
In achieving strategic objectives, the Chinese have a tendency to pursue
active and creative diplomacy, including China’s economic and commercial links
with other countries as well as using traditional Chinese expertise in the art
of political maneuver. The aggressive use of military force is renounced in
Chinese national policy, however, in practice the tactful application of
military psychological pressure is a genuine characteristic of Chinese
strategic culture. The defensive nature
of this culture is manifested in
China’s refrain on seeking conquest,
except from what China regards as its traditional lands and the fact that China
does not engage in foreign wars, holds no overseas bases and maintains no
forces abroad, apart from a few observers and engineers supporting UN’
peacekeeping effort.
The success of Chinese political
maneuver and tactful application of military psychological pressure toward
Taiwan and in South China Sea need the backing of strong national economic and
military power. Clearly, Beijing must
accomplish a careful balance of its economic, defense and foreign policies on
sovereignty and territorial issues. It
is of no surprise that China has been trying to unite Taiwan through peaceful
negotiation with its two system-one country policy, but does not hesitate to
display the use of force. A similar
concept has been implemented on the Spratleys.
China agrees in principle on solving the South China Sea issues through
peaceful means, but maintains some military presence throughout the
atolls. One major factor affecting
China’s success in resolving the Taiwan and Spratlys issues is the United States
whose interest in Taiwan is related to domestic politics and freedom of
navigation through the South China Sea.
The US as a sole superpower certainly can put heavy constraints on
Chinese success, if the US intends to do so.
In the case of the US, China is playing its cards very carefully,
especially on the Taiwan issue which seems to be the sticking point of China-US
relations. Since solving sovereignty and territorial issues takes time, this
medium term objective could easily be extended to a long-term one. However, one can be assured that Beijing
will not miss any opportunity to unite Taiwan and territories in the South
China Sea when internal politics of Taiwan and regional strategic environment
are favorable to Beijing.[23]
A peaceful and stable environment in
the region is one of China’s intermediate-term objectives which has already
been accomplished to a certain extent.
As stated earlier, this peaceful and stable environment is envisaged as
a time-buying scheme to accomplish China’s medium and long-term
objectives. After the Cold War, China
has launched an unprecedented diplomatic drive to improve ties with other
countries, especially its neighbors with whom China had border disputes. Beijing has adopted a more flexible approach
and agreed with other claimant states on a basic first principle that all
sovereignty and jurisdictional issues be solved without resort to force. China has become an enthusiastic participant
in economic and security fora in the region, namely the APEC and the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF). China’s success in this
intermediate objective can also be seen from Southeast Asian countries efforts
in engaging China, as an association and as an individual country. Indonesia, for example, now sees China as
one of its most important Asian partners whom Jakarta should shore up
cooperation and support. A case in
point is the recent visit of Mr. Wahid, the newly elected Indonesian President,
to China where the President attached substantial
significance to this portion of his
foreign visit program.
With a peaceful and stable
environment around its periphery, China has furthered its intermediate
objective by extending its connection and influence southward. China is gradually expanding its influence
militarily and economically, especially in trade over mainland Southeast Asia.
The economy of northern Vietnam is closely linked to that of China due to cross
border trade. In Myanmar, as mentioned
earlier, Chinese military and economic influence is well established. Development of Chinese economic and defense
ties with Laos seems to follow the same pattern as Myanmar. In southern Laos, China has built roads,
bridges and SIGINT stations. Close defense ties between Thailand and China
developed during the 1980s will carry through into the new millennium. Economically, trade and investment between
the two nations continues to grow with the establishment of a growth quadrangle
linking Thailand, Laos, Southern China and Myanmar. China also has strong
economic linkage with Singapore.
It is important to note, however, that the rise of democracy in Myanmar, when
it occurs, could jeopardize China’s influence and thus could effect Chinese
economic development. This is due to
the fact that Chinese influence in Myanmar mainly results from Yangon’s isolation
and sanctions from the West. The rise
of democracy and the improvement of its human rights record will open up
Myanmar to trade and investment from developed economies, particularly from the
West, and thus Chinese military and economic influence will be reduced. Balancing the Chinese influence in Myanmar via opening up Myanmar
to the outside world has been initiated by admission of Myanmar to ASEAN,
however, improvement in democracy and human rights issues would certainly
accelerate the process. This balance of
influence would be healthy for Myanmar and the Southeast Asia sub-region as a
whole, although Beijing ‘s strategic interests would not be realized in the way
Beijing preferred.
How does
Contemporary China affect
the Economic,Security and Foreign
Policy Goals of
Thailand ?
For
Thailand and most
countries in Southeast
Asia, China looms
ever larger as
an economic powerhouse, a political force,
a military power
and even a
social factor. A
famous Thai statesman and former Prime
Minister, Mr.Anand Panyarachun, once said that
Thailand had no
choice but to
engage China because
China was there.
It is in essence
a factual statement
to indicate that
China’s huge population, land mass, geographic proximity
and ethnic outreach
are always going to
cast shadow over
its neighboring countries.
Although China’s modernization
creates opportunities for further economic
cooperation, it has been noted
that China may
compete with Thailand
for more trade
and investment in
order to sustain
its growth. However, it is also important
to note that
China should not
be portrayed as
a threat to
the region for it
could become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Rather, it
is essential that
China be engaged
in multilateral dialogues,
confidence building arrangements, preventive
diplomacy, and other
forms of security
cooperation in the
region.[24]
Since 1975, Thailand has taken
a very pragmatic approach in
dealing with China
and has established
formal diplomatic relations.
Although there is competition between Thailand and
China in attracting
foreign investment, markets
and trade, the
Thai government believes
it would be
mutually beneficial to
promote economic and
political cooperation.[25]
From all indications, the overall direction
set by Deng Xiaoping’s four
modernizations will be
continued and China
will become, it is not
already, one of
the major players
in the region and in
the international economy.
As a result, China
could pose some
challenges in the
development of Thai
economic policy. For example, there is competition between
Thailand and China
in the world market in
labor intensive, agriculture
products, manufactured goods,
and other items
as both countries
have reached more
or less the
same level of
economic development.
Furthermore, industrialized countries like the
US, Japan, and
European Union, major
economic partners of
Thailand, may also
find the trade
and investment opportunities in
China more attractive
than that of
Thailand. Even in
the case of
the newly industrialized economies like Taiwan and
South Korea which
have been investing
in and trading with Thailand,
they may find
the opportunities in
China too tempting
to miss and therefore
switch more attention
in that direction.
This is especially
true in the
case of Taiwan
where geographic proximity, linguistic, and cultural
affinity, as well
as Beijing’s cooperative
policy of encouraging investment
towards its compatriots
have made China
more attractive than
Thailand or the
Southeast Asian region
as a whole.
Thailand’s economic interaction with
China is not limited to trade and investment.
Thailand is also interested in promoting scientific and technological
cooperation. It should be noted
that China has
a relatively strong
scientific and technological research base. Thailand and the rest of ASEAN have signed a
Joint Statement in 1997 which is
designed to build a
partnership of good-neighborliness and
mutual trust between
China and ASEAN.[26]
Significantly, in February 1999 Thailand signed an agreement for the
Plan of Action in the
21st Century
with China. Thus, in many ways, the economic,
scientific, and technological cooperation
between Thailand and China will enhance each other’s economic security, stability
and development.[27]
In
addition, Thailand, like many other
regional countries, has been affected by economic crisis since 1997. Presently, Thailand’s recovery from
the crisis is on
the horizon. Economic growth for the
year 2000 has
been predicted to
be above four
per cent. It is
widely recognized in
Thailand that China’s
decision not to
devalue its currency
has been a
significant and contributing factor to the
recovery.
On
the security policy
side, contemporary China
has been Thailand’s
partner for cooperative
security. Unlike the
cold war period,
security cooperation between the two countries
has extended beyond
high level visit
or exchange personnel
training. China so
far has shown
its willingness to
expand security relations into strategic
partnership. Since Thailand
is one of the
first countries among
ASEAN to establish
diplomatic relations with
China after the
end of Cold War, China
has been interested in using Thailand as
a model to
demonstrate to other
ASEAN members that China can be
a contributing player
for regional peace
and stability. Mr.Li
Peng, Chairman of
the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress,
reiterated, during the
visit to Thailand
in April 1999,
that China desired
to strengthen bilateral
security with Thailand,
including cooperation on
strategic and security
research and exchange
of information in the
field of science
and military technology.
During the recent meeting
of the 5th ASEAN – China
Consultative session in Kunming,
China also expressed its readiness
to work bilaterally
with Thailand and other
members of ASEAN
on security issues.
This has been
seen as the
first time China offered
the option to become the
strategic partner of
regional countries, some
of which still
harbor suspicion of
China’s future roles.
Thailand supports ASEAN’s effort
to integrate China
into regional political – security forum
such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum – ARF. As an assembly of
all major players
in the Asia – Pacific and other
powers from both
rims of the
Pacific, ARF has to be
an effective mechanism
for the resolution
of Asia-Pacific regional
disputes in the
future. Since its
establishment in 1993, ARF
has been regarded
as ASEAN - led organization for cooperative security.
It has the vision
to manage security
question in the
region in three
stages, confidence building,
preventive diplomacy, and
conflict resolution.[28]
Since the first
meeting in Bangkok
in 1994, ARF,
which has now
been expanded to include
21 countries as
member and dialogue partners, has found it difficult to move from
confidence building to
the next stage
of preventive diplomacy.
Although China actively
participates in the
ARF process, its reluctance,
and perhaps the
fear of ARF
becoming too effective
in resolving disputes
that involve China,
has so far hampered the
speed of ARF’s
advance.[29]
This is not
to say that ARF will
always have only
potential but lack
conflict – resolution value. China,
from all indications, is growing more
comfortable with ARF.
The inclusion of
countries such as
Myanmar, Laos and
Cambodia can only
increase China’s influence
in the future ARF’s deliberations. For other regional
countries, ARF proved
its value when
China was forced to defend its actions on
the Mischief Reef
in the South China Sea.[30]
As Thailand prepares
to host the ARF meet
in Bangkok in
May 2000, it
is likely that
dissuasion will start
on preventive diplomacy
as well as
the “Regional Code
of Conduct” which
China may find
itself on defensive
side of both issues.