The
Challenges of China:
Michael
Wesley
School
of Political Science
University
of New South Wales
Australia
A rapid worsening of Sino-Australian
relations in 1996 provided the new Coalition government – elected in March of
that year – with a clear practical demonstration of the importance of China to
Australia. Chinese irritation with Australia, already roused by the awarding of
the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney rather than Beijing, increased in March 1996,
when an Australian government statement expressed support for US intervention
in the Taiwan Straits crisis. In June 1996, Chinese Minister for Trade Wu Yi
expressed “strong concern” over the sudden decision to discontinue Australia’s
Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF) aid program. China was one of
several Asian nations with joint projects that were jeopardized by the DIFF
cancellation.[1] Australian
concerns, voiced over the fate of democracy and human rights in post-handover
Hong Kong, and China’s July 1996 nuclear test on the eve of a testing
moratorium, further increased Chinese annoyance.[2]
Annoyance became anger in August, when an editorial in the People’s Daily denounced the “strengthening” of the Australia-US
alliance as a part of a coordinated campaign, which included the earlier
renegotiation of the US-Japan alliance, to contain China: “From this we can see
that the United States is really thinking about using these two ‘anchors’ as the
claws of a crab.”[3]
Simultaneously, a Foreign Ministry statement accused Australia of breaching the
“one China policy” in approving an unofficial visit by Primary Industries
Minister John Anderson to Taiwan.[4]
Later in August, Defence Minister Ian McLachlan suggested Chinese actions
during the Taiwan Straits crisis, its claims in the South China Sea, and its
“newly assertive international posture” were destabilizing to the region.[5]
In September, Prime Minister John Howard met with the visiting Dalai Lama, despite
Chinese threats that such a meeting would jeopardize bilateral relations.[6]
While none of these incidents in
isolation would have ordinarily upset bilateral relations, their occurrence
together in the space of several months plunged Sino-Australian relations to
their lowest point since the Tiananmen incident in 1989. As China cancelled
official visits to Australia and attacks on Australia became common in the
official Chinese media, Australian leaders came face-to-face with the
consequences of soured relations with China. The business community raised
concerns over the future of flourishing bilateral trade. The Chinese-Australian
community and Asianist scholars questioned the government’s commitment to the
Asian region. Australian foreign policy makers pondered the added difficulties
that an openly-hostile China would add to Australia’s already-delicate regional
diplomacy. The strategic community considered the additional defence measures
that would be required if China became an enemy. Countries in Southeast Asia
questioned whether the worsening of Australia’s relations with China
represented a shift in its regional policy, entailing altered relations with
them also. United States President Clinton, embroiled in his own bilateral
frictions with China, urged the Australian government to mend relations with
China during his November 1996 visit to Australia.
The lessons of 1996 were profound
for Australia’s foreign policy makers. The Foreign and Trade Policy White
Paper, released in September 1997, listed China as one of Australia’s
“foremost” bilateral relationships, alongside the United States, Japan, and
Indonesia. The Sino-Australian relationship would be based on hardheaded
pragmatism:
China will
remain one of Australia’s key relationships. The Government’s approach to China
will be based on shared interests and mutual respect. These principles provide
the basis for a realistic framework for the conduct of the relationship, and
offer the best prospects to maximize shared economic interests, advance Australia’s
political and strategic interests, and manage differences in a sensible and
practical way.[7]
The
Australian Strategic Policy White Paper of December 1997 continued:
Clearly, the
development of policies which serve our national interests while acknowledging
China’s political, economic, and military growth will continue to be a major
priority for Australia. Our policies and actions will seek to show China that
the strategic outcomes we seek are consistent with China developing a key role
on regional political, economic, and security issues commensurate with its
legitimate claims as an emerging major power. The best way we can do that is to
encourage more high-level dialogue and contact between China’s policy makers
and our own to build better mutual understanding of each other’s positions.[8]
These statements, providing a policy
framework for the bilateral relationship, are ubiquitous in the foreign policy
establishment’s statements on Sino-Australian relations: from Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) briefings, to speeches by the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Minister.[9]
According to both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the bilateral
policy framework has delivered to Australia “a more productive, realistic, and
sustainable relationship with China than at any time since the resumption of
diplomatic relations in the seventies.”[10]
The policy framework gives the impression of a unified view among Australian
policy makers on the future of China, how this will affect the Asia Pacific
region, and how Australia should respond. Closer analysis reveals, however,
that no such unified view exists. In this paper, I outline three different
visions of China’s future held by Australian policy makers and academics: as a
player in an “accelerating status quo” in the Asia Pacific; as a crucial
participant in an increasingly integrated Asia Pacific community; and as a
great power in an imminent balance of power. While these tend to agree on
China’s objectives – the need to become a unified, internally stable great
power - they differ on China’s ability to achieve these objectives, how China
will affect the region, and their resulting prescriptions for managing
Australia’s bilateral relations with China and the United States. The different
visions are not always mutually exclusive, nor do individual policy makers and
academics always subscribe to the same vision. Each vision tends to rise to
prominence when called forth by different events in the region.
One vision held by Australian policy
makers and academics on the future of China in the region can be termed an
“Accelerating Status Quo”. This vision agrees on one point with the other two:
that China, along with the other states of the Western Pacific, seeks greater
wealth, power, and internal stability. What it disagrees on is the ability of
China to achieve equal status with the other great powers. This skepticism
comes in two forms. One cluster of opinion suspects that China’s rise to great
power status will be interrupted by the serious internal problems it faces:
corruption, unemployment, political instability.[11]
The other cluster argues that even if China does become wealthy, internally
stable, and powerful, the nature of power has changed in such a way that China
will not be able to assail the lead in power possessed by the United States.
The US will continue to lengthen its lead over China due to the information and
technology revolutions, which have placed American power in a different
strategic league, due to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).[12]
The common conclusion arrived at by both of these schools of thought is that
the continuing predominance of American power, and its estimated 25-year lead
in military technology over its closest Western Pacific competitors, will see
the present security structure persist in the Asia Pacific for the majority of
the twenty-first century. That all of the states of the region – China, the US,
Japan, and the ASEAN states – will continue to advance in wealth and power will
see the situation “accelerate”, but not in any way alter the status quo in the
form of the current hierarchy of power. Neither will these changes change the
basic “hub and spokes” structure of bilateral security relationships of Asia
Pacific states with the US.
Another vision of China in the
region can be termed the “Emerging Asia Pacific Community”. Agreeing that China
and other Western Pacific states want wealth, power, and internal stability,
this perspective argues that their pursuit of these goals will alter the nature
of their societies and the regional order. Analysts point to the growing
interdependence and the continued economic dynamism of the Asia Pacific,
despite the Asian crisis, as the most direct route to attaining wealth and power.
The incentives are for these states to foster these interdependent links –
through regimes promoting trade liberalization, regional stability, and greater
understanding.[13] Asia
Pacific institutions – APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Post Ministerial
Conference – will all gain in strength, resources and effectiveness. These
interdependencies and the regimes that foster them are judged to be ultimately
more important than the occasional tensions and conflicts that flare up in the
region. In fact, broader and more regular contact will breed a sense of
regional common feeling and mutual identification that will see such disputes
become less and less common.[14]
Furthermore, greater openness and contact will eventually alter Asia Pacific
states’ domestic structures, bringing greater liberalism and democracy. Newly
democratic “Asian tiger economies” like South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines,
and perhaps Indonesia provide evidence that economic liberalism brings
political liberalism. From the point of view of this Vision, then, China will
integrate further into a strengthening set of Asia Pacific regimes as it
pursues wealth, power, and stability, and in the process become more open,
liberal, and less inclined to pursue interests opposed to other regional countries.
The third vision of China in the
region sees the inevitable emergence of a Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific.
According to Defence Minister John Moore, China will be “probably the
second-biggest power” in the world.[15]
Particularly China, Japan, Russia, and India are bent on gaining on the United
States in power; such is the imperative in balancing predominant American power
in the region that they are likely to single-mindedly devote themselves to this
goal, and achieve it. The regional power race is also likely to be provided by
rivalry between China, India, and a Japan increasingly unsure about the US
security commitment. The Asia Pacific region is likely to see a full economic
recovery from the effects of the Asian crisis, but to be plagued by both old
and new tensions, rivalries, and instability. A five-power balance may not
emerge initially. Analysts see moves such as the December 1999 signing of the
Sino-Russian communiqué urging all nations to join a “balanced, multipolar
world order” as evidence of an increasing willingness of former rivals to join
together in balancing US power.[16]
New regional institutions will form around the new imperative to balance power.[17]
There will be little prospect of reconciling the competing powers; permanent
friendships will be superseded by permanent interests. The imperative of all
states in the Asia Pacific will be to ensure that open conflict does not break
out between these states, four of which have nuclear arsenals. In this Vision,
China will be one of the great powers in an Asia Pacific Balance of Power.[18]
Each vision of China’s future
entails a specific prediction about how China will affect the Asia Pacific
region in the future. The accelerating status quo is essentially a Vision of a
frustrated, and perhaps increasingly desperate China using its regional
diplomacy to try to leverage its power in relation to the US. The region will
continue to be plagued by Sino-US rivalry, as well as other rivalries, all
comprising an unresolved “uni-multipolar” structure of both attraction to and
competition with the US.[19]
Under an accelerating status quo, the Taiwan issue is unlikely to be resolved
despite China’s persistent efforts to seek unification. Taiwan, on the other
hand, is likely to act increasingly confidently if it sees the relative US lead
undiminished and the US commitment to Taiwan’s security continues.[20]
The more pessimistic opinion of China’s potential foresees domestic problems in
China creating further instability in the region, possibly through massive
refugee flows.[21] Regional
instability will be increased if recovery from the Asian crisis is not
complete. Continuing economic fluctuations will create domestic turmoil,
particularly in ethnically-mixed Asian states with governments with weak
legitimacy. There is a potential for an “arc of instability” to form to the
north and east of Australia, stretching from Burma and Cambodia through
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, with New Zealand becoming ever less significant
as a strategic force in the region.[22]
The Asia Pacific Community Vision
has a much more benign prediction how China will affect the region. China’s
decision during the Asian crisis not to devalue its currency demonstrated its
commitment to the return of economic stability and growth to the region.[23]
Figures already show that the region is well on its way to a full recovery, and
before long will be leading the world in economic growth.[24]
In this context, regional institutions will be strengthened and made more
effective; institutional innovations are already being mooted with this purpose
in mind.[25]
China’s growing interest in and commitment to regional institutions will
continue.[26]
Interdependence and regime membership will increasingly define China’s
relationship with the Asia Pacific region. These forces will also begin to
transform China and the Asia Pacific. Economic openness will be followed by
political liberalization and the “demand for new institutions, social welfare
structures, and a more predictable legal framework.”[27]
Generational change in leaderships will bring new political values into the
government of China and others.[28]
As interdependence breeds a sense of regional community, structures of
sovereignty and rivalry will begin to be mitigated. This may eventually
contribute to the resolution of the region’s most serious ongoing tensions,
between China and Taiwan, on the Korean peninsula, and in the South China Sea.
The Balance of Power Vision sees
China’s rise to power exerting a profound influence on the region. Security
calculations of regional states, until now determined by American strategic
predominance, will need to be reviewed in relation to a new centre of power
emerging.[29] Thailand
and Malaysia have already dabbled in developing closer relations with China as
they become uncertain about their ties to the United States.[30]
For its part, China will seek allies to balance the coalition of US allies in
the region: this has been the motive of its refusal to devalue its currency
during the crisis, and its campaign to improve relations with Southeast Asian
states.[31]
For the most part, China’s regional strategy will be driven by its overriding
rivalry with the US, leading it to seek accommodation with former great power
rivals: Russia, India, possibly Japan. Asia Pacific states will have more
options if their relations with the US become strained. On the other hand, the
new imperative for the smaller states of the region will be to avoid being
trampled in the course of great power competition. They will need to manage
their relations with the great powers in such a way as to avoid being
“chainganged” by a larger ally into a conflict not of their making. They will
also have an interest in maintaining stability and peace between the great
powers in order to escape the devastating effect of what may possibly be a
nuclear conflict. Regional tension spots such as Taiwan and the Korean
Peninsula, will become possible conflict detonators, and are likely to attract
great attention within the region.
The different visions also call
forth different imperatives in how Australia relates to the Asia Pacific
region. If an accelerating status quo develops, Australia’s overriding
objective will be to maintain its security alliance and close relationship with
the United States. To these ends, the Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper
states that
A key objective
of the Government will be to strengthen further the relationship between
Australia and the United States by expanding the already close links that exist
at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. The Government will be
looking, in particular, to broaden its dialogue with the United States on Asia
Pacific issues, and to encourage it to accord sustained high-level policy
attention to the region.[32]
The East Timor
crisis, in which Australia appealed to the US to lead the international
peacekeeping force into the devastated province but was politely rebuffed,
introduced another element into these calculations. Echoes of the Nixon
doctrine were audible in the US commitment to provide logistical support but
not troops, urging Australia to take the lead. This led to the now-infamous
interview given by the Australian Prime Minister and its characterization as
the “Howard doctrine”, in which Prime Minister John Howard suggested that
Australia could take the lead in stabilizing regional turmoil while US forces
played the role of a “lender of last resort” in security terms. In an
accelerating status quo, Australia could be an agent of US security policy in
low-level security situations:
[The East Timor
operation, led by Australia] has done a lot to cement Australia’s place in the
region. We have been seen by countries, not only in the region but around the world,
as being able to do something that probably no other country could do; because
of the special characteristics we have; because we occupy that special place –
we are a European, Western civilization with strong links to North America, but
here we are in Asia.[33]
The Prime
Minister has since retracted support for the “Howard doctrine” in the face of
political ridicule and media criticism.[34]
Elements of the intent behind the Howard doctrine can, however, still be heard
in statements of elements of the military and foreign policy establishments.[35]
A Vision of an Asia Pacific
community requires Australian policy to focus on participating in and the
strengthening of regional multilateral institutions:
Active
participation in APEC and other regional institutions demonstrates Australia’s
recognition that its future is inextricably linked to the future of the Asia
Pacific region. It reflects the Government’s commitment to being closely
involved – from the inside – in shaping the region’s future.[36]
Those regional
states that are not yet members of these institutions and important global
institutions should be included as soon as possible. Furthermore, it is
important that the great powers abide by the rules and norms of these
institutions, thereby protecting the interests of smaller regional players like
Australia.
The current
government is wary of placing all of Australia’s interests in “grand
constructs” and much more skeptical of multilateralism than its predecessor:
Australia must
be realistic about what the multilateral system can achieve. The twentieth
century has been both the incubator and the graveyard of a long list of
initiatives for international cooperation. In most cases their failure
reflected an inability to recognize that international organizations can only
accomplish what their members states are prepared to enable them to accomplish.
All too often international initiatives have failed to match aspirations with
capability.[37]
At the same time
as elevating “practical bilateralism” to the core of Australia’s foreign
policy, the current Australian government has remained committed to and
interested in multilateral structures, from the UN and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, to forging a link between its own free trade agreement with New
Zealand and the ASEAN Free Trade Area.
A Balance of Power Vision requires
Australia’s diplomacy to be flexible, able to respond quickly to shifts in
power balances. It also needs to be pragmatic, and dedicated to developing
working relationships with all states in the region, which it can subsequently
call on in the context of the evolving balance. “Special relationships” are to
be shunned, as is “emotionalism” in foreign policy. This has been emphasized by
the Australian government, particularly in relation to China: “affirming that
we have a special relationship with China does not improve our policy choices,
it constrains them. It sets up unreal expectations both here and in China,
which cannot always be met. In the end, it only sets us up for a fall.”[38]
Australia’s unthreatening nature and its creativity in foreign policy is seen
to confer on it the advantage of playing the role of a middle power, [39]
helping to mitigate tensions between the great powers: “For Australia, it is
adherence to fundamental values wrapped around a creative and nimble diplomacy
that helps to show the bigger powers the imperative of reaching solutions.”[40]
At the same time, the new instability in the region has led many to question of
Australia’s military preparedness, comparing Australia’s defence spending of
less than 2 per cent of GDP in 1998 unfavorably with the more than 5 per cent
of GDP defence budget of Australia in 1951.[41]
Another view within the balance of power school is that Australia should
prepare for the coming bipolar or multipolar regional system by prioritizing
relations not with the US or China, but with the smaller states of the region,
which are similarly torn between the two and endangered by the prospect of
Sino-American rivalry spilling into open conflict:
Our best
guarantee against being forced to choose [between the US and China] is to give
much greater emphasis to our relations with other countries in East Asia and to
make common cause with them – in our separate bilateral relations and in
larger, multilateral formations. This gives us options and flexibility and some
possibility of working together with other East Asians to help ameliorate the
tensions between Washington and Beijing.[42]
Examining Australia’s policies
toward China in the context of these different Visions helps understand some of
the complexities in Australian foreign policy. Each Vision prompts a
distinctive set of Australian policies towards China. The Vision of an accelerating
status quo in the Asia Pacific, and Australia’s imperative to maintain a close
relationship with the culturally-similar American superpower, is comforting to
those who are convinced that “there will continue to be major differences
between our societies and political structures”,[43]
and that these differences have a major influence on the ability of states to
associate. China policy therefore depends heavily on the state of Sino-American
relations at any given point in time. Australia’s alliance imperative to
support the United States in the Asia Pacific, both rhetorically and
materially, will sometimes entail tension in the Sino-Australian relationship.
However, Australia will continue to have important interests that require a
workable relationship with China; the imperative therefore will be to try to
mitigate conflicts of interest between Australia’s interests with China and its
commitment to the US alliance.[44]
The structures underlying the accelerating status quo are likely to be the RMA
and the proposal for Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in North Asia; Australia
will probably need to subscribe to or support these programs in the future,[45]
while its forces will need to remain interoperable with those of the US and its
Asia Pacific allies.
For those with the Vision of an Asia
Pacific Community, Australian policy towards China should focus on a number of
different imperatives. The first of these is encouraging China’s participation
in, and commitment and adherence to regional and multilateral institutions:
“China must have a place in international institutions and a say in setting the
rules it is expected to abide by. But China’s participation must be on a basis
that will strengthen those institutions.”[46]
Australia has strongly backed China’s bid to become a member of the WTO, and
was an early advocate of including the “three Chinas” – China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan – in APEC.[47]
Institutions and norms are the best way to accommodate China’s unsettling
regional aspirations: Australia actively promoted the adoption of a code of
conduct to regulate the actions of China and its rival claimants to the South
China Sea,[48] and reacted
with disappointment when China rejected the proposed Code.[49]
Second, Australia should build a stronger and more varied bilateral relationship
with China. This has prompted innovations such as the “One and a Half Track”
security talks and the establishment of exchanges with the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) as an extra line of access into the Chinese government.[50]
Such regular contact and socialization is important in fostering empathy
between the two countries: “there is absolutely no substitute for face-to-face
contact in gaining a better understanding of how another country sees the
world.”[51]
Third, Australia’s policy should be dedicated to working with China on issues
where their interests converge: “Australia has worked to build a relationship
which maximizes our mutual economic interests, promotes cooperation on the many
issues of common concern; protects our strategic interests, and is direct about
the differences in values while managing them as productively as possible.”[52]
Finally Australian policy should work to promote positive domestic change
within China in a non-confrontational way. As a consequence, current Australian
policy includes an annual bilateral human rights dialogue, and a human rights
technical assistance program designed to promote civil society and the rule of
law.
An Asia Pacific Balance of Power
entails a number of benefits as well as imperatives for Australia’s China policy.
A number of benefits in finding common cause with China have emerged in recent
years. One was China’s intervention on Australia’s behalf in its attempts to
free jailed aid workers Peter Wallace and Steve Pratt from a Belgrade jail.[53]
Another was the release in September 1999 of imprisoned Chinese-Australian
businessman James Peng from a Shanghai prison. As a permanent member of the
Security Council, China is important to various initiatives Australia may want
to pursue in the United Nations.[54]
Australia has also proved useful to China. A furious China relied partly on
Australian pressure to reverse Papua New Guinea’s decision in July 1999 to
establish full diplomatic relations with Taiwan in exchange for an estimated $
3.8 billion in aid.[55]
Australia has already been able to use its strengthened ties with China to
apply pressure to the US over the troubled issue of Australia US trade.
Visiting Beijing in July 1999, Foreign Minister Downer unfavorably contrasted
the US announcement of its imposition of quotas on lamb imports - a major
Australian export market – with a recent Sino-Australian understanding on
trade: “So, on the one hand [the US is] closing off an important export market
to Australia and on the other hand, on the other side of the Pacific, through
our World Trade Organization negotiations with China, we are getting better
access to a whole range of markets.”[56]
The relationship with China must at all times be pragmatic, and
interests-based, however: “in the past, Australia’s relations with China have
assumed an overly emotional character, with a tendency to succumb to the
excesses of opprobrium or enthusiasm.”[57]
A realistic view
of Australia’s relative importance to China can have real advantages in a
Balance of Power:
Australia will
rarely dominate China’s foreign policy considerations… But this does have
advantages for us. We do not come to the Chinese with the same complicated
political baggage that others have. We do not challenge Beijing in the same
way. We are also not directly embroiled in regional issues like the South China
Sea, where Beijing believes it has core national interests at stake. We can
talk to China about such matters without having our own vested interest called
into challenge and, as a result, are now seen as valuable interlocutors on a
whole series of regional issues.[58]
This advantage
also means that Australia should not adopt a confrontationary stand on human
rights. Here, Australian policy makers are less constrained than their American
counterparts because of the lack of a large and organized China human rights
lobby. Australian public concern tends to peak around issues such as the
Tiananmen incident or the forced abortion under the one-child policy of a
pregnant woman deported from Australia to China.[59]
Australian leaders have adopted the stance that “Shouting at the Chinese about
human rights in public forums is counter-productive”[60]
to allay some of the media and public criticism of their stance of not
confronting China on human rights.[61]
They have also argued that not only does confrontation with China risk
Australia’s trade ties and diplomatic influence, it is pointless given
Australia’s lack of diplomatic weight with China, and it is less effective than
private representations and dialogue.
Each Vision also prescribes
different ways to handle Australia’s relations with the US. The accelerating
status quo places Australia-US relations at the centre of Australian foreign
policy; all policy should follow from the prerogatives of the American
alliance. The US presence is vital for Asia Pacific security: “Australia –
along with others in the region – regards [American] strategic engagement as
vital for the stability of Asia. We are committed to providing the political
and practical support to make that possible.”[62]
There are two main policy prescriptions involved in this task. The first is to
ensure that the US remains interested in and engaged in the Asia Pacific
region. Great nervousness is caused by isolationist elements in the US
Congress, which would see the US reduce its security forces in the Western
Pacific, and perhaps also close its markets to Asian exports.[63]
The maintenance of the bilateral alliance, of “highest strategic priority” for
Australia, is crucial for maintaining US engagement: “the US-Australia alliance
has come to be seen by both sides as an important element in the post-Cold War
strategic architecture in the Asia Pacific region, helping to sustain US
strategic engagement in the Western Pacific.”[64] The second policy requirement is to make
sure that the US never loses interest in its alliance with Australia.
Australia, long dependent on alliances with “great and powerful friends”, also
has a visceral fear that its allies will not come to its assistance when it is
attacked.[65] For this
reason, Australia must continually demonstrate its usefulness to the US, in
intelligence sharing, in regional diplomacy, and in maintaining a significant
enough strategic presence to be useful as a coalition partner with US forces in
regional operations.[66]
Australia must also restrain itself from pushing issues of conflict with the
US, such as agricultural trade, which could damage the core security
relationship.
The Asia Pacific community Vision
dictates that the US must be kept committed to and engaged in regional
institutions. For the most part, this is consistent with policies seeking
continued US engagement in the region. It leads Australian policy makers to
stress the achievements of regional organizations such as APEC in order to
maintain US interest in the organization.[67]
On the other hand, it entails harsh criticisms of American policy when this is
seen to be damaging to, or ignoring its obligations under regional
institutions.[68] It also has brought criticism when US policy
towards China and Asia more generally is characterized as “confused”, to the
detriment of the institutions and norms emerging in the Asia Pacific.[69]
A sub-stream of opinion within this Vision suggests it may be easier to
construct more viable regional institutions if the US is left out of them.
Citing ongoing bilateral tensions between the US and both China and Japan, such
opinion proposes a regional organization in the Western Pacific, including
Australia and New Zealand with the ASEAN states, China, South Korea and Japan,
but not the US or Canada.[70]
This arrangement would not be in order to balance against US power and
influence; rather, the US would still be tied into the Asia Pacific region
through other bilateral and institutional structures, as it is with the
European Union.
The balance of power vision creates
greater freedom of maneuver for Australian policy towards the US. The evolution
of different centres of power means that Australian policy would no longer be
tied to the maintenance of one key bilateral relationship, but could balance
differently as its interests were affected by different issues. This would
resolve a central tension in Australian foreign policy: its current
overwhelming reliance on the bilateral security alliance with the US, but its
growing frequency of disagreements with the US on a variety of regional issues,
from trade, to human rights and environmental standards.[71]
If the balance remained loose, the prospect for Australia may be to gravitate
towards states with more complementary interests and views on particular
issues. On the other hand, threatening to gravitate elsewhere could present
Australia with some additional leverage over the US:
We in fact have
more powerful weapons in our hands than we know. Since the end of the Cold War
the strategic alliance with the US has become less important and less central
to our affairs... Would we be brave enough to say to the US: we want your
friendship, we want the strategic alliance to remain but, if you want it to
remain, you also have to treat us as an economic ally rather than as an
economic enemy?[72]
The danger of
the balance of power, however, would be the added risk of being drawn into a
major great power conflict. Such concerns were raised as recently as July 1999,
as China reacted angrily to Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui describing theirs
as “state to state” relations: “If China attacked Taiwan, the United States
would probably support Taiwan. Australia and Japan could be drawn in under the
terms of their defence agreements with the US.”[73]
The purpose of this analysis has not
been to suggest that the Australian foreign policy establishment, academics,
and the media are divided into three cohesive groups of opinion on China and
the region’s future, and its implications for Australian policy. The analysis
itself uses statements made by the same people on different issues and at
different times to illustrate different Visions. The central point of this
analysis has been to argue that a close examination of Australian foreign
policy and the statements of leaders and academics is that in Australia there
is no consensus on the future of China in the region. The three Visions I have
outlined are simplifications of current opinion in Australia, but they do allow
us to collect similar views into the same rubric and explore the implications
of these Visions for Australian policy towards China and the US.
Each Vision is based on a different
prediction of China’s and the region’s future. As events emerge to support or
call into question these predictions, different Visions and their policy
consequences rise to prominence. The Asian crisis, in calling into question the
inevitability and sustainability of the “Asian miracle”, has seen the
accelerating status quo Vision gain currency since 1997. At the same time, the
weak responses of regional institutions to the Asian crisis called into
question the Asia Pacific community Vision and its predictions of a more
institutionalized, norm-governed, stable region. Yet this Vision has gained
strength from China’s decision against devaluing its currency, and the
democratization of a number of western Pacific states. The balance of power
Vision has been given new prominence by the December 1999 Sino-Russian
communiqué and the South Asian nuclear tests.
None of these “standards of
evidence” are decisive enough to allow one Vision to predominate. For this
reason, Australian pronouncements and policy contain elements and consequences
of all three Visions. Whether the weight of evidence accumulates in favor of
one Vision or all three in the future is likely to determine the policy
responses of Australia. However, at this uncertain time, it is unquestionably
better to have several possible Visions of the future, than for Australia to
have invested all of its confidence, resources, and interests in one, possibly
mistaken, Vision.
NOTES
[1] See Michael Dwyer, “Downer Forced into Backdown”, Australian Financial Review, 25 June 1996
[2] Don Greenlees, “Downer warns China on HK”, Australian, 26 July 1996; Gabrielle Chan, “Downer Condemns Chinese N-Test on Moratorium Eve”, Australian, 30 July 1996
[3] Michael Dwyer, “Australia and Japan are the Claws US Will Use to Entrap Us, Says China”, Australian Financial Review, 8 August 1996
[4] Mark Baker, “China Launches Double Attack”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August 1996
[5] Don Greenlees, “McLachlan Criticises China”, Australian 24 August 1996
[6] D. D. MacNicholl and Don Greenlees, “PM Defies China’s Economic Threats to Greet Dalai Lama”, Australian, 27 September 1996
[7] Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra: National Capital Printing, 1997, p. 63
[8] Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Policy, Canberra: DPUBS, 1997, p. 24
[9] See for example the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Website: http//www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/na/prc
[10] John Howard MP, Prime Minister of Australia, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Geogetown University, Washington DC, 13 July 1999
[11] See for example David Lague, “Dancing With the Dictators”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 September 1999
[12] See for example Paul Dibb, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security”, Singapore: IISS Annual Conference on Security Challenges in the Rising Asia Pacific, 11-14 September 1997
[13] See for example Ross Garnaut, Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalisation: An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the World Trade System, Singapore: ISEAS, 1997
[14] See Gareth Evans, “Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass”, speech to the Asia-Australia Institute, Sydney, 20 March 1995
[15] Quoted in David Lague, “Dancing with the Dictators”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 September 1999
[16] David Lague, “Russia, China in Pact Against West”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 December 1999
[17] For example South Korean President Kim Dae-jung suggested in October 1999 that Southeast Asian nations and the three Northeast Asian nations - the South Korea, the PRC and Japan - establish a new regional mechanism on economic and security cooperation; see Chon Shi-yong, "Kim Calls For Merger of East Asia, ASEAN," The Korea Herald, 23 October 1999
[18] Paul Dibb, David D Hale, and Peter Prince, “The Strategic Implications of Asia’s Economic Crisis”, Survival, 40:2, Summer 1998 suggest that both China and the US have emerged relatively strengthened by the Asian crisis, a factor likely to lead to added competition and balancing urges.
[19] This term was coined by Samuel P Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower” Foreign Affairs, 78:2, March/April 1999.
[20] See Greg Austin (ed) Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 122, Canberra: Australian National University, 1997.
[21] Australian concern over the effects of refugee flows has been heightened in recent months by the rising tide of illegal immigrants and people smuggling operations that have been detected by the Australian customs and immigration service; see Bernard Lagan, “The People Smugglers”, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 1999
[22] Paul Dibb, David D Hale, and Peter Prince, “The Strategic Implications of Asia’s Economic Crisis”, Survival, 40:2, Summer 1998.
[23] Ben Dolven and Lorien Holland, “Softly, softly”, Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 162 no 23 10 June 1999
[24] “ASEAN looks to the new year”, The Economist, v. 349 no 8099 19 December 1998
[25] Michael Wesley, “The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21:1, April 1999
[26] Patrick Walters, “China to Play Key Role in ASEAN Forum”, Australian, 23 July 1996
[27] Howard, Address to Georgetown University, 13 July 1999
[28] Recently, Foreign Minister Downer cited the introduction of elections at the village level in China as evidence of the progress of liberalisation, but warned that much still remained to be done; see The 1999 China Oration, Australia-China Business Council, Sydney, 25 November 1999
[29] Greg Austin, “Apocalyse Next? Will Asia Become the Next Arena For Great Power Conflict?” Asia-Australia Papers, 2, September 1999.
[30] Michael Vatikiotis, Murray Hiebert, and S. Jayasankaran, “Imperial intrigue”, Far Eastern Economic Review, v. 160 11 September 1997
[31] “East Asia's new faultlines”, The Economist, v. 346 14 March 1998
[32] In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, p. 58
[33] Fred Brenchley, “The Howard Defence Doctrine”, The Bulletin, 28 September 1999, p. 24
[34] Paul Kelly, “Delusions of Grandeur”, Australian, 11 December 1999
[35] At the end of November 1999, Howard in a speech to the Millenium Forum in Sydney said “I don’t think this country has stood taller and stronger in the chanceries of the world than it does at the present time”; a clear signal that the triumphalism derived from the East Timor operation is still alive and well in the thinking of the Prime Minister and foreign policy makers.
[36] In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, p. 45
[37] ibid., p. 47
[38] Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, The 1999 China Oration, Australia-China Business Council, Sydney, 25 November 1999
[39] Michael Wesley and Tony Warren, “Wild Colonial Ploys? Currents of Thought in Australian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2000, p. 19
[40] Bruce Wolpe, “Learning to Stand On Our Own Feet”, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 August 1999
[41] “Time to Take on Defence”, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 1999
[42] Stephen FitzGerald, “How (Not) to Deal With China”, Quadrant, Vol. 41, No. 7-8, July-August 1997, pp. 19-20.
[43] Howard, speech at Georgetown University, 13 July 1999
[44] Stuart Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US? Sydney: Australian Centre for American Studies, 1998
[45] Stephen Lunn, "$10 bn for Defence to Catch Up", The Australian, 1-2 November 1997, quotes Deputy Secretary of Defence Hugh White as predicting that this amount of investment will have to be made in the ADF over the next 10 years if it is to remain compatible with US systems. He also stated that Australia's failure to do this would create a "strategic risk" in the region.
[46] Howard, speech at Georgetown University, 13 July 1999
[47] Michelle Grattan, “PM Backs China’s Trade Bid”, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 September 1999.
[48] Craig Skehan, “Downer Push for Regional Code”, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 July 1999
[49] Joseph Brady, “China Snubs Island Peace Code”, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1999
[50] David Lague, “Canberra Forges New Links with PLA”, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1999
[51] Downer, 1999 China Oration, Australia-China Business Council, Sydney, 25 November 1999
[52] Howard, speech at Georgetown University, 13 July 1999
[53] David Lague, “China to Plead for Aid Pair”, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 1999
[54] China’s refusal to endorse the renewal of the UN mandate for the peacekeeping force in Macedonia because of Macedonia’s recognition of Taiwan provided a recent reminder of this; “China Pressed on Macedonia”, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 1999
[55] Australia’s representations to PNG to cut ties with Taiwan included its warnings that its neighbour’s move added “unwelcome tension” to the region, and would have “negative economic implications” for PNG; see David Lague, “Ties with Taipei Infuriate Beijing”, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 July 1999
[56] Michelle Grattan, “Give Us Action, Not Talk: PM”, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 1999
[57] Downer, 1999 China Oration, Australia-China Business Council, Sydney, 25 November 1999
[58] ibid.
[59] Damien Murphy, “China Forces Asylum Seeker to Abort Baby”, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May 1999
[60] Downer, 1999 China Oration, Australia-China Business Council, Sydney, 25 November 1999
[61] See David Lague, “Downer’s China Syndrome: What Human Rights Abuses?”, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 1999
[62] Howard, speech at Georgetown University, 13 July 1999
[63] Geoff Hiscock, “US View of Asia Dangerous, Says Hawke”, Australian, 7 August 1996
[64] Australia’s Strategic Policy, p. 19
[65] Wesley and Warren, “Wild Colonial Ploys?”, p. 15
[66] Max Walsh, “The Dollars and Sense of Defence”, The Bulletin, 28 September 1999, p. 25
[67] Michael Wesley, “The Politics of Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation in Australia”, Research Paper for the Institute for Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation, February 2000
[68] An example is former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s reference to the US push to include the Russian Federation into APEC as “an act of international vandalism”.
[69] Michelle Grattan, “Stop the Violence, PM Tells Jakarta”, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 July 1999
[70] See for example former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, “Great Power Relations and the Issue of Taiwan in the Asia Pacific”, Asia-Australia Papers, No. 2, September 1999; a variant may also be the original Australian concept for APEC, which envisaged an organisation without members from the eastern Pacific.
[71] Andrew MacIntyre, “Pacific Adrift: Southeast Asia and the US-Australia Relationship”, Pacific Review, Vol. 9 No 4, 1996
[72] Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, "Memo
US: We're an Ally, Not an Enemy", The
Australian, 27 February 1997.
[73] David Lague, “Taiwan’s Swagger Provokes Outburst”, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 1999