The Perry Process in the DPRK

Changsu KIM

Prepared for presentation at the 22^nd NDU Pacific Symposium, Hilton Hawaiian Village, 26-28 March 2001.  The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the ROK MND, KIDA or other agencies

Major Events Leading to the Perry Process

In the early 1990s when the Cold War was coming to an end on the European front, the Korean peninsula remained at the top of PACOM’s list of potential flashpoints.  Suspicious nuclear programs and extensive missile programs of the DPRK (North Korea) posed serious military threats not only to South Korea but also Japan and the United States.  The asymmetric threats of the rogue state complicated the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia, and the alleged nuclear and missile connections between North Korea and other countries demonstrated the growing complexity and magnitude of the proliferation of WMDs in the Asia-Pacific.  In particular, as a dangerous missile network grew among rogue states, North Korea was believed to be at the center of proliferation ripples.[i]  It was probably one of the world’s most cynical proliferators, willing to sell missiles and secrets to anyone who pays.

It was against this backdrop the United States enhanced its effort to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear programs and later missile programs.  The former resulted in the Geneva Agreed Framework in October 1994 and the latter the Perry Report or the Perry Process in September 1999.  The Agreed Framework helped defuse the escalating crisis caused by North Korea’s clandestine nuclear programs at Yongbyon, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear programs in return for the provision of two LWRs and heavy fuel oil and the normalization of its relations with the U.S.  The Perry Process, on the other hand, was the outcome of close consultations of Dr. William Perry, senior North Korea policy coordinator, and his team with their counterparts in the ROK and Japan over the renewed threat of the Taepodong-I missile test-fired over Japan on August 31, 1998.  These two major milestones in the US-DPRK relations were ironically centered on the WMD threat of a small totalitarian country against the only remaining super power in the post Cold-War period.

The possibility of North Korea’s imminent collapse, implosion or explosion, along with its soft-landing was widely and hotly debated after the death of Kim Il Sung.  The U.S., in close consultation with the ROK and Japan, was readying for contingencies on the Korean peninsula.  The policy coordination of these three countries produced the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and various bilateral and trilateral security cooperative activities that followed.  The new trilateral security cooperation even gave an impression that the three democracies were heading for a “virtual alliance.”[ii]

To survive this gravest challenge ever, the Pyongyang regime resorted once again to the threat of use of force and employed various brinkmanship tactics in its negotiations with Washington and Seoul.  North Korea, undergoing acute economic difficulties and food and energy shortages, used its missile capability as a bargaining chip to secure its political and economic security.  Similar to a series of month-long negotiations that had been held over almost 18 months in 1993 and 1994 to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program, Washington and Pyongyang this time engaged themselves in a serious of missile talks to freeze the research, production, testing, deployment and export of the missiles of the impoverished and yet militarily strong country.

Despite all the efforts of the outside world to help them stand on their own feet by providing food and economic aids, many believed, Pyongyang would not give up its nuclear and missile programs.  Many in South Korea and the United States voiced their skepticism about the sincerity of Pyongyang’s missile negotiations with Washington.  Indeed, lack of transparency and predictability about the Kim Jong Il regime defied any conventional wisdom in international relations and negotiating patterns, thus making WMD negotiations very difficult to predict.

In fact, the United States has held many rounds of negotiations with North Korea through a number of channels, in close policy coordination with the Republic of Korea and Japan.  At the Berlin missile talks in September 1999, for example, suspension of its Taepodong-2 the U.S. and DPRK agreed to lift some economic sanctions against Pyongyang in return for Pyongyang’s missile program.  And, as was revealed in the Perry Report,[iii] the US would make efforts for a gradual normalization of its relations with the long-hostile, rogue state of North Korea.  On its part, South Korea was actively supporting various projects of cooperation and aid toward North Korea in the civilian sectors while waiting with patience a similar progress in the political sector as well.  The consistent engagement policy of Seoul and Washington with North Korea resulted in active exchanges and cooperation culminating at the first North-South Korean summit in June 2000.

This paper has thus begun with a brief review of the major events that led to the Perry Process of the Clinton administration.  In the following chapters it will discuss the proliferation of North Korean WMDs; assess the Perry Process in North Korea as a means of multilateral security cooperation; examine the roles and contributions of other neighboring countries in Northeast Asia; and then discuss the recent North-South Korean negotiations after the June 2000 summit in Pyongyang and whether the mood has changed since the Perry Process started.  Toward the end, this paper I will explain why negotiations as the Perry Process might be an acceptable model in future Asia-Pacific disputes.

Proliferation of North Korean WMDs

Even after the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994, Pyongyang seems to have made continued efforts to advance its nuclear weapons program.  The huge underground tunnel at Kumchang-ri was found to have no nuclear-related facility, for example, but suspicion long lingered over this and other several sites.  Some analysts in Washington maintained that the suspicious underground facility can be potentially used for later nuclear development and a number of similar underground facilities exist in North Korea today.[iv] Some argued, “there is significant evidence that North Korea is continuing its activities to develop nuclear weapons.”[v] The North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999, which was introduced in May of that year by Rep. Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, was sufficient evidence to the uneasiness some conservative Americans felt with Pyongyang’s WMD threats.  In a similar vein, a report by the US Commission on National Security/21^st Century concluded that “America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on its homeland,” by ballistic missiles and terrorist activities by rogue states and terrorist groups.[vi]

 Also, North Korea’s test firing of the Taepodong-I missile in August 1998 and its threat to test fire the longer-range Taepodong-II missile during the summer of 1999 caused tremendous alarm and concern among the regional powers, especially Japan and the U.S.  The Taepodong I and II were believed to “give North Korea the de facto status of a major regional power, enabling it to threaten targets as far West as Bangladesh, as well as large areas of Eastern Russia and Siberia,” not to mention all of Japan.[vii]  Japan has responded to Pyongyang’s missile threat by making decisions to acquire various weapons and equipment to counter incoming missiles in the wake of revising the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and passing several laws pertaining contingencies in the areas surrounding Japan.  Also, Japan decided to participate in a TMD joint research with the United States.

 Reasons for Pyongyang’s seemingly unyielding WMD programs may well include an overall inferiority complex vis-à-vis Seoul, a guarantee for the regime’s survival, vulnerabilities in the face of robust U.S. alliances with the ROK and Japan, and the desperate need to earn foreign currency.  The death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and the perennial economic difficulties and severe shortages of food, oil, and foreign currency have unquestionably reinforced their inferiority complex.  More importantly, the formidable deterrence by the ROK-US combined forces and the changing military balance increasingly in favor of the ROK armed forces have led North Korea to look for some other means of its own defense and survival.  These, among others, are probably the reasons why Pyongyang has continued its nuclear and missile programs and employed brinkmanship tactics in its negotiations with Washington and Seoul.  Put differently, as a means to complement its perceived weaknesses and to guarantee its regime’s survival, the North has over the years continued its WMD programs even in the face of severe economic difficulties.

Despite the efforts of the neighboring countries to control Pyongyang’s WMDs, many North Korea analysts and watchers believe, the current regime in Pyongyang would not abandon what it believes the cheapest and surest guarantor of its survival, that is, nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.[viii]  And even if Washington can guarantee the regime’s survival, Pyongyang would not easily abandon or alter its strategy given the internal politics and inefficiency of the totalitarian regime.  It is for this reason that some analysts still believe that the North Korean regime will eventually collapse, which in turn will makes it strongly oppose to any external moves that appear to threaten its own regime.[ix] Here is a vicious circle of a perceived weakness, fear of an eventual collapse and greater efforts to expedite WMD programs.

 Export of ballistic missiles has been an important source of hard foreign currencies for a persistent North Korea.  Its export of missiles to rogue states in the Middle East and Pakistan has been widely known.  The suspicious nuclear and ballistic missile deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad, for example, shows how much Pyongyang has tried to acquire nuclear weapons capability and while at the same time how much it has tried to export its missiles to earn much-needed foreign currency.  North Korea has been so deeply involved in missile deals in the world arms market that the United States has come to treat the development, production, deployment and export of North Korean missiles separately.  The missile game and the nuclear game Pyongyang has been enjoying may last longer than was initially thought.  And Pyongyang has been so deeply involved in these WMD businesses that it would find it extremely difficult to abandon the valuable negotiating card.  This has been the problem that the United States, Japan and South Korea have taken into account in their efforts to reconcile and normalize their relations with North Korea, thus bringing an end to the last vestige of the Cold War.

Assessment of the Perry Process

The Perry Report and Process best represented the Clinton Administration’s continued effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of WMDs on the world scene.  The strategy of preventive defense proved quite successful in dealing with nuclear missiles in the Republics of the former Soviet Union.  Similarly, the focus of the Perry Process was to freeze missile activities of Pyongyang and pave the way to normalizing relations with North Korea.  Drs. Perry and Carter undoubtedly tried to apply this proven strategy of a three-phased preventive defense to the North Korean case.[x] According to Dr. Perry, there were also three clear guidelines for any new strategy, which has been the case with North Korea as well.

After close consultation and policy coordination with these two allies, the Perry Report recommended three approaches to normalizing relations with North Korea: (1) In the near–term, create the right environment: The DPRK should forgo its missile launches, the U.S. should ease some appropriated sanctions, and the ROK and Japan should take their own steps in the positive direction; (2) In the medium- to longer-term, receive credible and verifiable assurances that North Korea has ended its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile programs; (3) In the long-term, work with North Korea, the ROK and Japan to end the vestiges of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. Put in a nutshell, the Perry Process has been a comprehensive and integrated approach to the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile-related programs, adopting the MTCR, threat containment and coercive deterrence.[xi]

   Overall, the Perry Process has been a great success.  First of all, the Perry Process has obviously proven quite successful in freezing Pyongyang’s missile programs.  Pyongyang has thus far shown no sign of resuming missile launches and been cooperative in restraining from missile sales.  And US-DPRK missiles talks have made some progress.[xii]

        Second, it fully reflected the intents and wishes of President Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy toward North Korea.  It has actually supported Seoul’s policy of consistent reconciliation and cooperation with Pyongyang.  It also considered the positions of North Korea in its dialogue with the South.  With the Perry Process firmly in place, therefore, the North Korean leadership appeared to have chosen to improve their relations with the South in earnest.  The historic summit of June 2000 and subsequent talks and meetings at various levels owe partly to the Perry Process.

 Third, the Perry Process has been a success in promoting active consultation and coordination among the United States, the ROK and Japan, unlike the Geneva Agreed Framework where the ROK remained arguably isolated.[xiii]  The trilateral coordination was one of the key policy recommendations of the Perry Report.  They included appointment of a senior official of ambassadorial rank to coordinate policy on the DPRK, close policy coordination through what has become known as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), exploring with Congress ways to create an sustainable, bipartisan, long-term outlook toward the North Korean problem, and preparations for the DPRK provocation such as the launch of a long-range missile.  Most analysts did not fail to point out that one of the important contributions of the Perry Process has been “to effectively strengthen alliance coordination with Japan and South Korea through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG).”[xiv]

Fourth, the Perry Report proved successful because it proposed two alternative tracks.  The first track was the improvement of fundamental relations with the U.S., Japan and the ROK, while the second track is, if the first one fails, to fall back to containment.[xv]  This two-track approach was needed to persuade and win the support of the Republican Congress that opposed further compensations for Pyongyang’s wrongdoings.  To the hardliners who concluded North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat had actually increased over the five years since the Geneva Agreed Framework of October 1994, Pyongyang’s gambling was not a right choice.  Pyongyang may have some gains in the near term, but it would suffer a longer-term loss of the opportunity of a timely normalization of its relations with Washington.  After all, maintaining military deterrence against North Korea has formed the basis of U.S. engagement policy toward North Korea.

 And finally, the Perry Report and Process did not assume that the North Korean government would change in the near future, either collapse or reform.  Rather, it recommended the U.S. should pursue normalization of relations with North Korea with special emphasis on freezing the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs.  This assumption has facilitated the consistent engagement policy toward North Korea, which in turn has promoted reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas.  Any big changes in the North including a sudden collapse or reform are hard to expect in the near future.  Many analysts share the view that normalizing relations with the North will probably be a long, protracted process that requires considerable amount of time and patience.

Roles and Contributions of Other Regional Powers

Overall, the role and contributions of other regional powers to the Perry Process were not great.  Other than being cooperative and understanding to Dr. Perry visions and explanations, these regional powers did not actively engaged themselves in the making of the Perry Process.

Japan’s roles and contributions to the Perry Process were somewhat different from those of other regional powers.  Its perceptions of North Korean threat have differed especially from those of the ROK and U.S.  In fact, Japan showed very sensitive responses to North Korea’s missile threat since the launch of the Taepodong-I missile in August 1998.  Ironically, the missile launch provided Japan with good justification for its weapons modernization.  The North Korean threat replacing the Soviet threat provided Japan with the rationale for its expanded military role.  It has been increasingly involved in discussions and negotiations with the U.S. over theater missile defense (TMD) and officially decided to participate in a joint research.  Also, it has upgraded its military means to monitor the incoming missiles from North Korea.  And ambitious plans to acquire sophisticated weapon systems have caused great alarm to its neighboring countries, particularly China.

  For several years Japan has been extensively involved in policy coordination with the U.S. and ROK in dealing with North Korean WMD threat and contingencies in the Korean peninsula.  But it has shown some reservations about the US-DPRK missile talks in Berlin and the Perry Report.  They believe that North Korean missile threat has not subsided and they have to defend themselves with their own means.

 Japan is expected to continue to expand its security roles in the years to come.  As can be seen in the new joint security declaration with the U.S. in April 1996, Japan has chosen to expand its global partnership with the U.S. into East Asia.  It will certainly hope to play many additional roles in a low profile, mindful of negative reactions from the neighboring countries.  Japan in the process is likely to expand security cooperation with these countries to alleviate their concerns and worries.

 China was helpful in persuading North Korea to freeze its missile programs.  China has been relatively positive to responses of other neighboring countries to North Korea’s WMDs.  The peace and stability of the Korean peninsula is absolutely necessary for a security environment favorable to its continued economic growth.  It has long maintained a nuclear-free Korea and, regarding Pyongyang’s acquisition of various WMDs, it has basically the same policy.  But it has a different view of the demands of the United States and Japan in their negotiations with North Korea.  In particular, the trilateral security dialogue and cooperation of the US, ROK and Japan over North Korea’s WMDs has been viewed as a pretext for containing China.  The revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and TMD are the cases in point.

As its relations with the U.S. went sour over the Embassy bombing in Yugoslavia earlier this year, China was not hesitant to voice their strong criticism against American imperialism and its manifestations in and around the Korean peninsula.  They criticized TMD between the US and Japan and appeared to try to influence security affairs in the Korean peninsula despite their claims otherwise.

Russia will be more forthcoming in showing their interest in this region.  Once their domestic politics and economy are on the right track, they will quite likely exert their influence in regional affairs, including security issues of the Korean peninsula.  In particular, they will become more active in multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Continuity and Changes in the ROK Behavior

The previous governments in South Korea had successfully deterred military threats from the North and yet had negotiated with Pyongyang to bring peace and reconciliation with little success.  The current ROK government of President Kim Dae-jung has set the objective of its policy toward North Korea on the improvement of relations with the North through peace, reconciliation and cooperation.  It has been making effort to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula and to lay ground for a peaceful unification through peaceful coexistence between the North and South.  Also, it has consistently held on to three principles of its North Korea policy: first, the South will not tolerate any military provocation from the North; second, the South will not harm the North or try to achieve unification by forcibly absorbing the North; and third, the two sides should peacefully co-exist through reconciliation and cooperation, that is, to abide by the North-south Basic Agreement of 1992.  Pursuit of both security and cooperation allows, the ROK government firmly believes, for a peaceful coexistence and peaceful exchanges between the North and South that in turn will help shape favorable conditions for change in the North.  The North Korea policy of the ROK government can be thus summed up in one word, the Engagement Policy or more commonly the "Sunshine Policy."[xvi]

 At least for the next four to five years, as the gap grows between the North and South in their national power, North Korea’s sense of inferiority and crisis will intensify.  North Korea will quite likely continue to stress its survival, deterrence and self-protection while sticking to its same old strategy of communizing the entire peninsula by employing brinkmanship tactics and military means.  This apparently amounts to North Korea’s views of a mutual assured destruction at a reduced level.  It follows, therefore, that for the same period of time South Korea’s defense policy will basically remain the same and should not be much different from what it has been.

 Without doubt major tasks of the ROK-US security system all point to one sublime goal of a peaceful unification of the North and South.  Peaceful unification would be possible on the Korean peninsula only if another war is deterred and prevented, if crises in the North are managed in a rapid and effective way, and if the blessing of the neighboring countries is obtained.  If any of these were missing, the unification process of the North and South would be a difficult one entailing tremendous sacrifice and opportunity cost.  These three aspects of a peaceful unification did exist in the past, but their characteristics and intensity will change as we enter the 21^st century.  The three aspects will probably remain unchanged, but their mix or combination will definitely change.  In other words, the three aspects will carry differing weights and importance if we can conceptually differentiate the process of peaceful unification into three phases, initial, middle, and final.  In the initial phase the deterrence aspect of the alliance system is far more important than the other two, followed by the crisis management aspect and the regional cooperation aspect, respectively.  In the middle phase the deterrence aspect would weaken relative to the other two, which would gain more importance.  But as we enter the final phase of the peaceful unification process, the first two aspects would greatly lose their importance and the third aspect of regional cooperation would gain more prominence.

Conclusion: A Future Model for Multilateral Security Cooperation

The Perry Process, based on close consultation and policy coordination with two allies of the ROK and Japan, has been quite successful in freezing North Korea’s missile programs.  It has been a success on several points.  More than any thing else, it has made great contributions to the reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas and a close trilateral consultation of the U.S., ROK and Japan over the North Korean problem.

 The bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang have expanded to cover close trilateral consultation and policy coordination.  It also has raised the possibility of engaging other regional powers like China and Russia in the anti-proliferation campaign.  Together with the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994, the Perry Process will be long remembered as the major milestones in the US-DPRK relations and North-South Korean relations.  It will serve as a good model for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in Northeast Asia, where national interests of the regional powers diverge greatly and the “habits of dialogue” are still lacking.