UNTAC and INTERFET - A Comparative Analysis

Brigadier Steve Ayling – Australian Defence Force

Ms Sarah Guise – Australian Department of Defence

There has been a trend towards an increase in the number of coalition operations undertaken since the end of the Cold War. Whatever the reasons for this, it is clear that multi-national coalitions will continue to be required to restore international peace and security on behalf of the international community in the future. It is likely that in many cases this requirement will be met by the creation of ad-hoc coalitions that are formed on a temporary basis to undertake a specific operation, and at short notice. These ad-hoc coalitions will invariably include military contingents from nations who only have membership of the United Nations in common, and do not have the benefit of permanent security relationships. The question is what is the best model for forming these ad-hoc coalitions and conducting successful coalition operations?

This paper examines the UN model for conducting coalition operations by comparing and contrasting UNTAC and INTERFET, concluding that this model appears to be the most appropriate for future low intensity peace-keeping and peace-enforcement requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. The examination takes a strategic level view of the ways and means that can guide future ad-hoc coalitions, and is based on the fact that both UNTAC and INTERFET military coalitions were relatively successful and involved many participants from nations from both within, and external to, the Asia Pacific region. It is also important to recognise that experience in ad-hoc coalitions is increasing and consequently expertise continues to evolve and improve over time. This paper argues that action can be taken in a manner consistent with the unique strategic context of the Asia Pacific to enhance the readiness of regional nations to participate in coalitions together in the future.

The analysis is structured to evaluate the achievement of the desired outcome of an effective military ad-hoc coalition, able to operate in an integrated military, diplomatic, political and economic environment with a robust media presence. Firstly, an appreciation of the Asia Pacific strategic context that will influence ad-hoc coalitions is given, secondly an assessment of the UNTAC and INTERFET coalitions from a strategic viewpoint and lastly to reflect these considerations in lessons that can apply to the components of a coalition campaign. These considerations support a SWOT type approach to strategic planning where strengths and weaknesses are reflected in the achievements and lessons learned from these operations, and the opportunities and threats are reflected in the evolving strategic context.

The comparative analysis reflects the personal experience of both authors. Brigadier Steve Ayling served as the Australian Contingent Commander for both UNAMIC and UNTAC in 1992, and more recently served as Director General INTERFET Branch in Headquarters Australian Defence Force created to support the creation of the INTERFET coalition in 1999. Ms Sarah Guise managed international military aspects within INTERFET Branch and more recently has contributed to the development of coalition operations doctrine for the Australian Defence Force.

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT– CONSTANTS, TRENDS AND SHIFTS

The similarities and differences in the strategic context that influenced both UNTAC and INTERFET can be expressed in terms of constants, trends and shifts. Constants are those features that endure over time, were common to both operations, and are likely to remain characteristic of the Asia Pacific Region for future operations. Trends are those aspects that change continuously over time and demonstrate evolution and improvement in national expertise from UNTAC to INTERFET and into the future. Shifts are those influences that can vary according to the particular circumstances.

Constants

The major constant that influenced both UNTAC and INTERFET is the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region. This region encompasses a large number of countries, all different to each other in terms of economic development, social structures, political systems, religion and culture. Despite the globalisation influences of the information revolution and increasingly liberalised international trade, the region will remain diverse. This diversity is characterised by a wide range of national goals and aspirations, and a determination for national independence. While countries of the region have a shared interest in regional security, our approaches to achieving it are as diverse as our nations. The Asia-Pacific region stands in stark contrast to Western Europe, where historical, economic, social and political influences and directions have converged to be compatible enough to have allowed the formation of the European Union and the deployment of NATO based coalitions within that region.

Another constant is the importance of the UN as a unifying influence in the region and the equal respect that is afforded to all nations through membership of the General Assembly. The extent of participation in both UNTAC and INTERFET by regional countries highlights their preference to act with the authority of the UN through the means of a UN Security Council Resolution. As members of the UN, each has agreed to abide by the UN Charter and accept the UN as a legitimate authority for use of military force in international affairs. Support of the UN allows each country to safeguard their own security but places desirable constraints on the use of force in the internal affairs of other states. As a result, the common interest of regional nations in security can coexist with the diversity of other interests and political motivations.

A third constant is the difficulty of forming an effective ad-hoc coalition that balances national characteristics and requirements with the demands of the campaign plan prepared by the nominated force commander. Coalition building is a demanding task and conducting coalition operations requires patience, negotiation, trust and confidence together with guaranteed source of finance and specialised military resources. This constant provides both the strength of an ad-hoc coalition in terms of the national diversity that underpins its creation, and a weakness in terms of vulnerability in the force structure and inherent capabilities. As will be discussed under lessons learnt, a lot can be done to facilitate this process, but it nevertheless remains complex and challenging.

Trends

There has been an important trend towards an increased willingness to participate in UN operations. Nations are becoming more willing to get involved in international efforts to restore peace and security, and given the evidence of UNTAC and INTERFET are prepared to participate either within or outside the region. There are several factors influencing this, including awareness that there is diplomatic and political kudos to be gained by participating in international coalitions, particularly to assist in situations with a humanitarian slant. The increasing prevalence of the media, making domestic audiences increasingly aware of the world problems and who is doing what to address them aid this. Participation will however necessarily include strict caveats on the type and tasks that can be undertaken by the respective national contingents.

Secondly, there is a trend towards an increased maturity in the conduct of UN operations. This includes the consideration of national reasons behind the decision to participate and subsequently the capacity to operate effectively within an ad-hoc coalition. As more UN operations are conducted and nations continue to contribute to them, they gaining more experience at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The countries of the Asia-Pacific region have gained significant experience in coalition operations, and in particular in operating with each other.

Thirdly, another trend is an increased willingness on the part of the UN Security Council to authorise peace enforcement operations that include the use of force by military coalitions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This largely due to adverse experiences in operations such as Rwanda, and the acceptance that the more restrictive peace keeping operations under Chapter VI have limited opportunities to achieve mission goals. It is understandable that the credibility and viability of the coalition depends on the safety of contingent personnel and their ability to restore adequate security for the other components of the mission to succeed. The member states of the UN have recognised this and generally support and encourage the United Nation Security Council in their increased willingness to authorise the use of force. This aspect was evident in the willingness to participate in INTERFET under a Chapter VII based rules of engagement.

Shifts

The shifts in the strategic context present the greatest threats to the achievement of an effective ad-hoc coalition. It must be accepted that circumstances in which operations occur will vary continuously and will tend to be unique for each situation. Examples include the reasons for conflict erupting, the intensity and scope of the conflict; the likelihood of a successful outcome within a reasonable timeframe and the longer-term consequences of participation.

The level of danger is a good example of the different circumstances surrounding UNTAC and INTERFET. In Cambodia, despite a Chapter VI based resolution the risks to contingent personnel were high in an environment characterised by a fragile balance of power between equally heavily armed factions, a history of violence, and a high prevalence of land mines. In East Timor, with a Chapter VII based resolution the danger levels were lower, characterised by poorly armed and trained militias who were happy to target helpless civilians but were easily countered by the professional military forces in the INTERFET coalition.

Another example of shifts in strategic context is the difference is the speed at which the situations in Cambodia and East Timor deteriorated into violence, resulting in a difference in how rapidly military forces were required to respond. In Cambodia, the situation was more protracted and allowed the negotiation of a peace agreement over time. In East Timor, the safety of the local population was being seriously threatened requiring immediate action.

Although there is a trend towards an increased willingness to participate in coalition operations, the shifts in diplomatic and political opinion will influence decisions as to whether to participate in a coalition. Participation cannot be taken for granted and nations will assess their involvement in operations on a case-by-case basis. Australia for example has a set of criteria against which it will assess participation in peacekeeping operations in the new Defence White Paper. The conditions that influence the decision include:

· The nature and extent of Australia’s interests, including strategic, political, humanitarian and alliance issues;

· Whether the mission has a clear mandate, goals and end-point;

· Whether the mission’s goals are achievable in all the circumstances and with the resources available;

· The extent of international support for the mission;

· The cost of participation, including the effect on the ADF’s capacity to perform other tasks;

· Training and other benefits to the ADF;

· The risks to personnel involved; and

· Consequences for Australia’s wider interests and international relationships.

Lastly, an effective coalition will depend on the availability of financial support for the cost of the operation. Ad hoc coalitions do not have guaranteed UN funding, and will depend on the contribution of funding from other nations for the mission. However this is assisted by conducting the mission under UN auspices with the authority of a UN mandate and by the participation of wide range of countries representing the international community. Nations are prepared in some cases to make a self-funded contribution (such as Australia did for UNAMIC and INTERFET), but will require funding from the UN in other circumstances (such as Australia did for UNTAC and is currently placed in UNTAET). A source of funding is required to meet the significant costs of deployment, logistic and medical support and compensation for death and injury. It is probable that reliance on self-funded contributions will not be enough to create a viable coalition that is diplomatically acceptable.

ANALYSIS OF UNTAC AND INTERFET

The major success of both operations was that an effective coalition was created for both the UNTAC and INTERFET missions, albeit over different timelines. It is worth noting the difference in the time taken to build the coalition up to full effectiveness. INTERFET was highly successful in rapidly forming an effective coalition. The UN authorised an international force three days after the agreement by the Indonesian government to allow an international force into East Timor, and INTERFET commenced deployment five days after the approval of UN Resolution 1264. However it was largely possible because a nation – Australia – was willing and able to organise and lead a coalition immediately and other nations from both within the region, and outside were willing and able to join in relatively quick time. Although considerable negotiation was still required to encourage nations to join INTERFET, confidence in the Australian leadership, commitment to early resolution of an unacceptable situation in East Timor and availability of both self-funded and Relief Trust Fund supported nations proved to be the keys to success.

UNTAC unfolded over a much longer period, and was preceded by extensive negotiation with the Cambodian factions and the deployment of the UNAMIC advance mission to confirm that the circumstances remained stable. This robust UN process for peacekeeping was successful, and clearly suited the coalition participants by allowing a long period to consider whether to deploy or not, and if so, what would the contribution be. While an effective coalition was achieved, there was a time lag in building the coalition up to full effectiveness. This reflects the relative inexperience in large-scale peacekeeping operations at the time of UNTAC.

A second success of both operations was the extensive regional and global participation in both coalitions. This demonstrates that the involvement of a wide range of nations in addressing international security issues is successful and desirable. Such broad global participation is particularly important in the Asia-Pacific region as regional nations may not have the full range of capabilities required to mount a successful coalition operation.

Participants in the UNTAC military and civilian police components were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei, Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

Participants in the INTERFET military coalition were: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States.

It is worthy to note the nations who participates in both coalitions, and those who used these operations to make their first ever contribution.

Both coalitions were successful in securing adequate funding. The source of funding is different - UNTAC was a UN funded mission and INTERFET was a mixture of self-funded nations and those supported by the UN Relief Trust Fund. The Relief Trust Fund, funded with extremely generous contributions from Japan was a major factor in the decision of many nations to participate in the coalition. Funding availability was a major consideration in the strategic level negotiations completed with nations who were considering participation in INTERFET. The Australian Government undertook to meet in-country logistic costs for those nations who were to be funded by the Trust Fund and seek separate reimbursement after the fund was functioning in order to encourage early deployment. The Australian Government also agreed to underwrite the death and disability compensation provisions for these nations as the aspect had not been included in the terms of reference for the Trust Fund.

Both coalitions succeeded in providing a secure environment for the further restoration and development of Cambodia and East Timor. UNTAC included other components responsible for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the host nations in terms of infrastructure development, humanitarian assistance and the conduct of elections, formation of new administrations and so forth. INTERFET was replaced by UNTAET that had these wider responsibilities. The ‘nation building’ responsibilities that include the critical restoration of the rule of law of military coalitions is a significant point that can confound a purely military planning approach to operations, and leads to fear of ‘mission creep’ and excessive risk minimisation tactics.

Both military coalitions were less successful in the rate of transition from military security to police security for law and order. It was evident in UNTAC that it was far more difficult to create an effective international police coalition than it was for a military coalition. This resulted in a major change in role for the military component from one of disarming and demobilising the armed Cambodian factions, to providing security for the conduct of the elections. INTERFET did not have a civilian police component, and had to undertake responsibilities to sustain law and order after the threat from the militia had been contained. The capacity to transition effectively from military to civilian control of the situation is a major aspect for the future. The United Kingdom concept of ‘pushing from the rear’ to create the circumstances in which the military component of a UN mission can be replaced by civilian means (such as communications, logistics and medical support) is of critical importance in the strategic level management of ad-hoc coalitions. Measures are required to manage the trend towards increasing involvement of the UN in international affairs extending well beyond military coalitions to include many other economic, political and humanitarian initiatives. With the increase in intra-state conflict leading to the collapse of effective government, the UN is increasingly involved in transitional governing arrangements.

A final success worth mentioning is the momentum created with the success of each mission. Success is cumulative and the experience flows into contributing to the success of subsequent missions. Hence the success of UNTAC contributed to the success of INTERFET, which in turn is contributing to the success of UNTAET. The experience gained over time had made each successive operation better than those before it. Many Asia-Pacific nations have participated in these operations, increasing their own national experience of operations in a multi-national context.

The analysis in this section demonstrates that while UNTAC was a UN sponsored coalition, run and led by the UN, and INTERFET was a UN sanctioned coalition, run and led by Australia under UN authority, both were very successful. This indicates that both forms of coalition possible under the UN model can be successful in the Asia-Pacific region. As discuss in the first paragraph of this section, the main distinction between the two types of coalition was the speed at which they were able to build up to the force structure of a fully effective coalition. This distinction may influence which type of coalition is more appropriate in any given future situation.

FUTURE AD-HOC COALITIONS

There have been a large number of lessons learned from UNTAC and INTERFET that can be better incorporated in planning. The desired outcome is a situation where a robust coalition force can be created that can reach full capacity in minimum time frame, and with sufficient capability to achieve the mission objective. Unlike the NATO situation, the Asia Pacific region includes a number of individual military forces without a common doctrinal framework or mandated training and interoperability standards. The UNTAC and INTERFET operations demonstrated that this is not a major impediment to the conduct of relatively successful operations. The challenge is to create an acceptable means to address selected strategic level lessons in peacetime, and provide an awareness of the operational and tactical level lessons that can only be effectively resolved in a specific coalition situation

The approach used within the Australian Defence Force to consider the strategic level coalition building lessons learned form INTERFET may be suitable for this purpose. It can provide the means to sort the various lessons of the past and to identify those that can be addressed now, and those that are best left to those planning future ad-hoc coalitions. The model was developed to address the requirements of future warfare by the Office of the RMA within the Defence Headquarters and introduces seven components of warfare concepts that integrate to define a campaign strategy. Using these categories it is possible to identify where major deficiencies exist that can be addressed either by individual regional nations or in a corporate way by those nations who have cooperated together in previous operations and may do so in the future.

The warfare concept categories are:

· Command And Control;

· Intelligence, Surveillance And Reconnaissance;

· Tailored Effects;

· Force Projection;

· Force Protection;

· Force Sustainment

· Force Generation.

The approach provides a way in which the constants, trends and shifts of the unique strategic context in the Asia Pacific region and be merged with the components of future ad-hoc coalition campaigns. It can identify the ways of achieving the objective of an effective coalition and the means through training, doctrine and policy to improve the ability to operate in coalition in these areas. The key is for regional nations that can anticipate operating in coalition together in the future to prepare them for this eventuality. The basic premise is that the more negotiating that is done in advance and the more understandings reached beforehand, the easier it will be to conduct a coalition operation. Those things that take time, things that are common to all coalition operations or can be identified as necessary sufficiently far in advance can be addressed. This will leave those things that vary or that are not be easily predicted to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The web of bilateral relationships that exists in the Asia-Pacific region provides and effective means for achieving this goal.

Command and Control

Importance of an efficient command structure. Coalition participants will only join a coalition if they respect and have confidence in command structure. Command and control can be based on the widely accepted UN model that has proven successful, but it requires the appointment of a capable and credible coalition commander agreeable to all. Potential coalition participants need to be convinced that the most direct and efficient chain of command has been established, and most importantly that it will be responsive to their national requirements.

Importance of the national commander/ force commander relationship. The assignment of national force elements to the coalition commander under operational control is a key factor. This allows the coalition commander to use national contingents within limits agreed by each nation for the purpose of the mission, but allows each nation to retain ultimate command of their own forces. In a region such as the Asia-Pacific where the diversity of interest and motivation is significant, the use of operational control as opposed to the NATO model of forces being under NATO command is much more appropriate. The use of operational control under the UN model allows the coalition commander to negotiate individually with national component commanders regarding the employment of their forces. This assists nations in achieving their varying political objectives in joining the coalition and allows the coalition commander to address constraints such as varying willingness to accept casualties.

Managing national media requirements. A strategic plan for the management of coalition, national, host nation, UN and NGO agency aspects is a key requirement. International recognition and national prestige are primary considerations for nations planning to participate in a coalition. Appropriate media coverage of all activities, including access to the arrival/ training/ deployment/ operations is required. This can be provided by national media agencies, but must be supported by the coalition leader. National requirements can be met through a flexible approach to the procedures for the accreditation and support to media representatives.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Information sharing is required. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance can be facilitated by the formulation of information sharing agreements between nations. This includes the use of general information to inform the decision to participate in the coalition and during the operation to inform changes in the mission and the circumstances for leaving the coalition. This is a sensitive issue, but will provide particular benefits at the strategic level of command.

Policies for the release of classified material. Interaction in a coalition setting is greatly facilitated between nations that have already negotiated the boundaries on what classified information they are prepared to release to each. In addition, the more countries share information on regional developments as they arise, the better prepared they will be to deal with them should military action become necessary.

Force Projection

Strategic lift for deployment and re-deployment. Few nations have the means to self-deploy on operations and the availability of strategic lift is a major consideration in the timely deployment to join the coalition. Planning and arrangements for strategic lift can be made in advance, with nations considering the circumstances in which would need assistance with strategic lift. Training and exercising together can assist in the development of common procedures for planning and conduct of deployments. There also needs to be a willingness to make national contingent transport assets available at the tactical level for coalition use.

Staged deployment assists in coalition management. The ability during INTERFET to stage contingent deployments through Australia prior to deployment to East Timor allowed forces to concentrate and deploy into the theatre of operations in accordance with the campaign plan. This was more efficient than the direct deployment into Cambodia at the start of the UNTAC operation, where the availability of support directly impacted on the perception of the efficiency of the operation.

Tailored Effects

Acceptance of the Ch 7 UN Charter Force ROE. Establishing acceptance and understanding of the UN rules of engagement for Chapter VI and VII operations among nations and importantly understanding the difference between them can be done in advance. Nations can consider how their national ROE fit with the UN ROE and make sure they are consistent . In particular national policy towards the use of force to protect designated persons and mission essential equipment can be specified in advance.

Force Protection

The likelihood of casualties is a major determinant in participation. Nations are vitally concerned with the risks associated with a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation. It is a key-planning factor and must be negotiated during coalition building planning. National prerogatives need to be respected and accommodated. Risk assessment will influence many aspects of campaign planning including preferences for tactical areas of operation, the scope of national commitments and caveats on the use of forces.

Management of risks with tropical disease and availability of medical inoculations are key determinants. Nations are not necessarily familiar with the risks of disease in the particular area of deployment. This particularly applies to deployments into tropical areas where knowledge of preventative measures including the availability of immunisation stocks for large contingents is critical

Force Sustainment

Coalition logistic support shortfalls must be satisfied. Most nations will not be able to deploy logistically self-contained and will expect that support will be provided. The coalition leader must accept the responsibility to meet any shortfalls in order to ensure that timely deployment and readiness for operations is possible. The demands on the coalition leader will be particularly high in locations where either the local infrastructure or commercial contractors are unable to be used.

Logistic, movements and personnel planning guidelines must be negotiated early. Logistic support can benefit significantly from the prior negotiation of implementing arrangements between nations. These can provide general direction on the level of support required by one nation that is agreed to be provided by another nations, should they operate in coalition together. Amendments will be required for the particular circumstances of an operation. The experience of UNTAC and INTERFET demonstrates that it is time consuming to negotiate these agreements, and can impact on deployment and the build up of the coalition.

Force Generation

Negotiation is required before nations will join a coalition. While some nations will join the coalition and deploy immediately, negotiation is required with most nations. They need to be convinced that planning and execution are of standards acceptable to their national requirements. Detailed planning can be achieved with the early deployment of national planning teams who can address political, military and financial aspects of the proposed operation.

Trust and understanding is the key to coalition building. Trust and understanding is a critical dimension to the success of an ad-hoc coalition. The conduct of common training and development of strategic level doctrine can facilitate this. The value of military personal relationships developed through previous training and operational activities is emphasised. The identification of mutual acquaintances and recognition of military reputation supported the development of trust and understanding. Liaison officers with language skills are important to assist in overcoming language and cultural barriers, particularly important in a region as diverse as the Asia-Pacific.

A successful coalition has many participants providing both large and small contingents. An equal approach needs to be taken to coalition building regardless of a nation’s reasons for participation or the size or characteristics of contingents. All nations come to answer the call of the UN Security Council and the coalition leader merely exercises ‘stewardship’ of the coalition of behalf of the UN. It should be noted that the same staff planning effort is generally required regardless of the contingent size.

Force Preparation Pays Dividends. Contingent training in rules of engagement, customs and culture aspects together with limited language skills are a very positive coalition building activity. During INTERFET this was managed under Australian arrangements in Australia, while in UNTAC it was left to the individual nations to consider the extent that it was required.

CONCLUSION

Given the constants, trends and shifts identified and the analysis of both the ad-hoc coalitions created for UNTAC and INTERFET, is clear that the UN model is successful in achieving the outcome – the formation of an effective military coalition – in the Asia Pacific region. The two types of coalition allow the UN to choose which type will be more appropriate for the situation. Acknowledgment of the lessons learned outlined in the seven warfare concept categories highlight areas where the UN model can be strengthened by both early action, and made more efficient and effective in the future.

It is important to recognise the role that UN played in the efforts to resolve the crises in Cambodia and East Timor within the strategic context of the Asia Pacific region. There was wide acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution as the basis for a commitment to the ad-hoc military coalitions by many nations, and particularly the value of allowing regional countries to be involved to resolve regional issues of concern. The importance of allowing a wide variety of countries from outside the region to act where their interests or conscience direct is of key importance to the diplomatic legitimacy and military strength of the coalition. It is particularly important to allow military capabilities not found within the region to be incorporated in the coalition.

The UN model also allows nations to remain flexible with regard to the participation in coalitions. Up to a certain point, nations are happy to provide assistance with minimal discussion. But there comes a point beyond which nations a will refuse to act without the chance to negotiate the nature of the their participation. The UN model allows nations to make decisions on a case-by-case basis and does not require them to commit to a guaranteed response under any particular circumstances.

The achievements of the UNTAC and INTERFET military coalitions were significant in regional terms. The capacity to respond to future crisis of similar magnitude within the region certainly exists. Consideration of the lessons learned not only leads to an enhanced ability to conduct future ad-hoc coalition operations under the UN model, but also provides a sound basis from which to develop a more permanent regional security arrangement in the future.