MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA A PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE

Multilateral Approaches To Security Issues In South Asia A Pakistani Perspective

Dr Maqbool A. Bhatty, Ambassador (Ret)

INTRODUCTION:

South Asia has been subject to tensions between states ever since it gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947. These tensions have been most acute between India and Pakistan, the two states that emerged as a result of the partition of the British Indian Empire in the teeth of India’s opposition. The two countries have fought three wars, and as a result of the last one in 1971, East Pakistan emerged as an independent Bangladesh with Indian help.

The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir poisons relations between the two countries. According to the basis on which the sub-continent was partitioned, the princely states were to join either India or Pakistan on the basis of the religious orientation of their population. The Indian forces occupied Kashmir, which is overwhelmingly Muslim, in October 1947, and a conflict between the two countries had resulted. India took the matter to the UN and the Security Council passed two resolutions, calling for a settlement on the basis of the will of the people, to be ascertained through a plebiscite. Though a cease-fire has existed, and a UN force patrols the Cease-fire Line, later named Line of Control (LoC), the situation along the LoC has remained extremely tense, specially since 1989, when the people of Kashmir launched a movement to get rid of Indian occupation.

The two countries, which were known to have acquired nuclear weapons technology, went overtly nuclear when India carried out nuclear tests in May 1998, and Pakistan followed suit. Since then, the threat of a conflict between them carries the risk of turning nuclear. In 1999, prior to his visit to the region, President Clinton called South Asia the “most dangerous place in the world." The management of nuclear capability in an environment of confrontation, and the overall issue of non-proliferation constitutes the second security challenge for the region, after the dispute over Kashmir.

The confrontation and conflict between India and Pakistan is exacerbated by the Indian ambition to establish its hegemony over the whole South Asian region. Indeed, the asymmetry that exists between India and its smaller neighbours lies at the heart of the insecurity felt by the smaller countries, most of which have disputes with an India that is three times bigger than all of them put together. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was set up in 1985, has failed to facilitate meaningful cooperation or progress in one of the most impoverished regions of the world, owing to the tensions, and lack of trust and confidence between the countries of the region.

SOUTH ASIA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

The phase of decolonization in the world after the Second World War nearly started with South Asia, the Philippines being the one country that won its independence earlier, in 1946. Having inherited a well-organized system of administration, and having been groomed to take over political power in a gradual transfer of responsibility during the first four decades of the 20th century by the British rulers, the region appeared to be well placed to forge ahead in economic and social development. However, the ambition of the largest country, India, to exercise hegemony unleashed tensions that produced conflict and confrontation, especially between the two largest countries of the region, namely India and Pakistan. Expectations that were voiced by western development economists in the 1960s that South Asia might “take off “ towards the 1980s were not fulfilled because, in the meantime, the region experienced two conflicts, and also got engaged in an arms race. As India proceeded to develop a nuclear capability, both to exercise hegemony in its region, and to acquire the status of a great power, Pakistan felt compelled to follow suit, not for reasons of status but for those of security.

The Cold War had its counterpart in the region when Pakistan joined the western pacts while India responded by developing a strategic link to the Soviet Union. The last major proxy conflict between the two superpowers in Afghanistan in the 1980s saw Pakistan function as a “frontline state” against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. India, which tended to be defensive of the Soviet action on account of its close links with Moscow, received generous Soviet support to build up its war machine, to counter the arms aid Pakistan received from the US during the Reagan years.

Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India responded to Moscow’s desire that it should exert military pressure on Pakistan for its role in assisting the Afghans against the Soviet occupation. It may be recalled that in the 1970’s, after her success in the 1971 conflict against Pakistan that resulted in its dismemberment, Mrs. Gandhi proclaimed a policy that came to be known as the Indira Doctrine, along the lines of the Monroe Doctrine of the US. She began to insist that foreign countries that wanted to enter into a relationship with any country in South Asia must pay heed to New Delhi’s interests and sensitivities. In other words India took upon itself the role of the leading power in South Asia without whose clearance the smaller countries of the subcontinent could not interact with the rest of the world. Pakistan was one country that refused to accept this exercise of hegemony, so that apart from the unresolved issue of Kashmir, this stance of Islamabad became a cause for tension between the to countries.

The end of the Cold War followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, shortly afterwards, with the US emerging as the victor. Though Pakistan had contributed materially to the Soviet discomfiture in Afghanistan, the western perceptions underwent a paradigm shift. With the communist threat from Moscow eliminated, the new potential threat in its place was identified as coming from the rise of fundamentalism in the Islamic world, as evident from trends visible in Iran and some Arab countries. From being a close ally of the US in the Cold War years, Pakistan became a victim of sanctions, arising out of Washington’s non-proliferation concerns, that had been kept in abeyance while Islamabad coordinated the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Once that was out of the way, the Pressler Law took effect from October 1990, after President Bush indirectly confirmed that Pakistan was following a nuclear programme with military dimensions. The fact that India was not subjected to similar pressures over its nuclear programme reflected the new concerns in the US over acquisition of sophisticated military technology by Islamic countries.

Significantly, another concern that arose following the end of the Cold War in 1989, which became the Year of Democracy all over the world, was over the outbreak of an indigenous movement for democratic rights in Kashmir. The confrontation over this problem that had resulted in three wars between India and Pakistan became acute once again. As tensions rose between the two neighbours, the US felt particularly concerned, since both countries were known to be nuclear capable, and a military conflict between them could acquire nuclear dimensions. India blamed the uprising in Kashmir on support and incitement from Pakistan, and Indian plans to carry out pre-emptive strikes against alleged training camps for Kashmiri freedom fighters in Azad Kashmir in 1990, created a war scare. The US sent National Security Adviser Robert Gates to warn the governments of India and Pakistan about the danger of a nuclear conflict.

The intensification of the indigenous struggle in Kashmir caused increasing casualties among the Indian security forces. India responded by stepping up its repression by greatly increasing its military and paramilitary forces, which indulged in massive human rights violations. Between 1989 and 2000, some 70,000 Kashmiri freedom fighters were killed, and larger numbers mutilated or incarcerated. Large-scale rapes, burning of houses and villages, as well as desecration of religious places of worship were resorted to in order to strike terror among the rebellious population.[1]

Apart from the bloodshed in Kashmir, the environment within the two countries was also affected adversely. Holding Pakistan responsible for keeping the Kashmiri intifada alive, India responded by using its intelligence agencies to exploit the sectarian and ethnic divides in Pakistan to encourage strife and to incite terrorism within Pakistan. Though efforts were made from time to time by political governments to hold a dialogue, it seldom produced results. An Agreement reached at the Foreign Secretary level in 1989 to resolve the Siachin Issue was not approved by New Delhi. Even though major foreign powers, and the US in particular, tried to encourage bilateral contacts at both the state and NGO level, there was too much mistrust and suspicion to permit any significant progress. In the meantime, an arms race, both in the conventional and nuclear spheres, continued, India justifying it mainly on the basis of the threat from China, while Pakistan felt obliged to maintain a force level commensurate with its security challenge from India.

The nuclear tests carried out by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 were followed by tests by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998, that exacerbated the threat of nuclear conflict, now that both countries had given up the stance based on ambiguity in their nuclear programmes. Though India justified the tests mainly on the basis of the threat from China, it was Pakistan, which felt threatened, in the light of the statements made by the BJP leadership immediately after the Indian tests. Indian Interior Minister L.K. Advani proceeded to issue blunt warnings to Pakistan unless it vacated the part of Kashmir under its control. In a statement on 18 May 1998, he “vowed to end the Pakistan menace” and declared that “a qualitative new stage of India-Pakistan relations has been brought about by the country becoming a nuclear weapon state."[2]Another minister in the Indian Cabinet, M.L.Khurana stated that India was now “fully prepared to fight a fourth war with Pakistan."[3] These and other statements suggesting reunification of the subcontinent led to a strong popular reaction in Pakistan. This, and the relative coolness of the international response to the Indian tests were led to the decision by Pakistan to conduct nuclear blasts of its own on 28 and 30 May, 1998, which had a sobering effect on the situation in the region.

The decision by the BJP government to conduct tests resulted in the undoing of India’s 25-year history of nuclear ambiguity. It proved to be a popular step as evident from an approval rating of 90% in polls after the tests at Pokhran.[4] The decision further demonstrated that as the BJP was handicapped by constraints of domestic politics, it had decided to focus on foreign policy. While the BJP was not the founder of India’s nuclear programme, it had always favoured India becoming an overt nuclear power. It followed up the tests by announcing a nuclear doctrine, and by adopting command and control measures as well as a weaponization programme, all rooted in “grand foreign policy motivation." [5]

THE SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA:

As the foregoing account of the evolution of the security environment to its current level of dangerous tension brings out, the two key security challenges relate to the Kashmir dispute, and the nuclear issue. On Kashmir, there are resolutions of the Security Council, stipulating that the people of the state be enabled to determine their own future, on the choice between joining India or Pakistan. A series of UN representatives, including Sir Owen Dixon from Australia, and Mr. Frank P. Graham from the US, came up with proposals to implement the resolutions, between 1950 and 1958. Pakistan invariably showed its readiness to accept the proposals whereas India came up with objections that had the effect of prolonging the impasse.

When Pakistan joined the western sponsored military pacts in 1954-54, mainly for its national security, the Indian Prime Minister declared that India no longer felt any obligation to implement the UN resolutions, as this step by Pakistan ‘had changed the situation qualitatively”. How the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination could be extinguished by a step taken by Pakistan to safeguard its security that had the sanction of the UN Charter he never explained. During a debate in the Look Sabha in March 1956, he made a statement that, in the light of his clarification at a press conference, he had virtually rejected the idea of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. [6]

India proceeded with measures to make the state an integral part of the Indian Union, and the puppet Constituent Assembly of Kashmir was due to adopt a Constitution in January 1957 that sought to give legal cover to the state’s accession to India. However Pakistan moved the UN Security Council which adopted a resolution on 24 January 1957, reaffirming the previous resolutions that the final disposition of the state would be made by a plebiscite under UN auspices. Over the succeeding years, the Kashmir dispute was the basic source of tension between the two countries. The 1965 War between the two countries resulted from India attacking across the international boundary, after fighting had started inside the disputed state. The Tashkent Declaration of 1966 restored the status quo before the conflict, without addressing the issue of Kashmir. However, the Simla Agreement, signed in1972 between the two countries after the conflict of 1971, stipulated that representatives of the two countries would meet to discuss various outstanding issues, including the final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. [7]

India continued to avoid a substantive discussion of Kashmir and whenever Pakistan made a reference to the dispute in UN meetings, it raised an objection on the ground that political disputes could be discussed only bilaterally under the Simla Agreement. It took the launching of a popular armed struggle by the people of Kashmir to bring the issue alive, forcing India to take cognizance of the problem. However, the most India has offered over the years, to resolve the issue has been to turn the Line of Control into an international border. This was also what New Delhi had offered during six rounds of talks with Pakistan, in 1962-63, in response to Anglo-US efforts to prevent Pakistan from taking advantage of India’s 1962 conflict with China.

The situation created by the nuclear tests of the two countries in May 1998 further rekindled international concern to promote a settlement of the outstanding political issues between the two countries. UN Security Council resolution 1172 passed in June 1998 specifically mentions the Kashmir dispute among issues to be addressed.

The other major security issue in South Asia relates to the management of the nuclear capability of the two countries. There are two basic aspects to be addressed in this regard. One relates to the non-proliferation agenda of the international community, as reflected in demands that both India and Pakistan sign such agreements as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both countries have announced a moratorium on further testing, and their governments are seeking a national consensus on the signing of CTBT. The signing of NPT, which would mean abandonment of the overt military nuclear capability demonstrated in their tests of May1998, relates to more fundamental issues. However, Pakistan has generally supported the UN non-proliferation agenda, and had even offered to sign the NPT in 1968, provided India did so.

The more immediate problem, that relates to both the Kashmir dispute, as well as to the nuclear issue, is one of reducing tensions, and of averting the threat of nuclear conflict, through confidence building measures. This is a subject that also arouses international concerns, and deserves to be analyzed in detail. The role that regional cooperation could play in promoting security will also be carefully examined.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES:

The security paradigm of South Asia underwent a structural change with the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in May 1998.As the two countries entered into a missile race, serious concern was expressed in the world’s strategic circles about the risk of a nuclear holocaust in the region. Though the agreements reached at Lahore in February 1999 as a result of the bus summit between the two Prime Ministers were welcomed, their impact was rapidly dissipated as a result of the Kargil conflict in Kashmir three months later. The shooting down of an unarmed Pakistan Navy plane by the Indian Air Force in August 1999 underlined the need for the restoration of trust and confidence between the two countries. [8]

The history of bilateral relations since independence in 1947 shows that the need for CBMs was felt from the beginning as basic trust and goodwill were lacking. A key ingredient in creating trust is that relations should be based on fairness and recognition of each other’s legitimate rights. Unfortunately, the circumstances in which independence came left a legacy of mistrust and disputes, with India using its superior power to impose solutions not acceptable to the weaker side, namely Pakistan. The three wars that the two countries fought were followed by agreements requiring the addressing of disputes, notably that over Kashmir. However, in the absence of progress in resolving issues, including Kashmir, the CBMs agreed have not been effective in creating mutual trust. Between 1988 and 1998, numerous military and non-military CBMs were agreed, with emphasis on the former to prevent conflict between the armed forces of the two countries that confronted each other in Kashmir and along the international border. However, as religious extremism grew in India, the process was halted, especially after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992.

The intensification of the freedom struggle in Kashmir, and the continuation of hostile propaganda, affected bilateral relations. Within two months of assuming power in March1998, the BJP proceeded to implement its goal of achieving the status of a nuclear power. Though the tests were claimed to be motivated by a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis China, India proceeded to browbeat Pakistan, which felt compelled to demonstrate its nuclear deterrence for its security and survival. The nuclearization of South Asia impelled movement towards CBMs relating to the new dangers of a conflict by accident or misunderstanding that could escalate to a disastrous nuclear exchange. Such CBMs were also encouraged by the major powers, specially the US which entered into a high level dialogue with the governments of the two countries. As pointed out by a distinguished Pakistani analyst, Pakistan and India, “mired in a situation of no war, no peace," could hope to start making the critical and defining transition from conflict-avoidance to confidence building by engaging in a comprehensive normalization process that acknowledges the linkage between nuclear risks reduction, conventional restraint and conflict resolution.”[9] The process was started but made only limited progress until the Lahore summit in February 1999, when a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was also signed between the two governments to work jointly on CBMs.

The Kargil episode interrupted the dialogue initiated at Lahore, and still waits to be resumed. The only measure agreed since then was the establishment of a hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of the two sides. The MoU had stipulated that the two sides would consult with each other in working out their nuclear doctrines, but in August 1999, India came out with a Draft Nuclear Doctrine, on its own. Considering how important it is that the two nuclear armed neighbours understand each other, this lapse, that reflects the post-Kargil mindset in India, is truly unfortunate, as is recognized by strategic experts in South Asia and abroad.

Though the official dialogue remains stalled, some urgent CBMs have figured in the non-official dialogue between think tanks on the two sides.[10] The experts in Pakistan and India are aware of the dangers inherent in the ongoing development of missile systems on the two sides. The Pakistan side has addressed the issues of command and control, as well as risk reduction, both at the official and scholastic level. Two Seminars were organized by the Islamabad Council of World Affairs and the Institute of Strategic Studies, on India’s Nuclear Doctrine on November 25, 1999 and on Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, on February 21-22, 2000. An expert from India was invited to the latter Seminar but failed to turn up. The Government of Pakistan set up a Nuclear Command Authority later in 2000 to deal with all aspects of command and control, while a Nuclear Regulatory Authority was established to ensure no export of nuclear materials or technology took place. The need for a nuclear restraint regime that is applicable to both countries is the need of the hour, but cannot be achieved till an official dialogue is resumed.

REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Since the Second World War, the trend towards greater regional cooperation in the economic sphere has proved most successful in cases where serious political differences either do not exist, or have been resolved through mutual accommodation. Indeed, shared security concerns and developmental goals have proved to be inter-related.

The most successful model of regional cooperation both for security and cooperation is to be found in Western Europe. Here, the progress towards integration was possible because the countries involved already shared a basic security perception as evident from their membership of NATO. Indeed, the motivation for economic integration was rooted in the desire to reinforce the economic strength of western Europe so that it could stand up to the threat from the Soviet Union. The other success story in regional cooperation is to be found in Southeast Asia, where ASEAN has not only been successful in economic cooperation, but has also promoted a regional approach to security issues. This organization really took off after the fall of Saigon in 1975, when both the member countries and the US saw the necessity of working together to face common challenges.

In South Asia, the situation is far from propitious for an integrated approach to security issues, because they have not made any significant headway even in economic cooperation. SAARC, founded in 1985, has been virtually paralyzed as a result of the unwillingness of India to let its policy making organs function, since New Delhi is resolved to isolate Pakistan. An Indian analyst has examined the scope for regional integration in South Asia, against the background of European experience. Whereas social and cultural homogeneity and geographical contiguity characterize Europe, there exist “deep-seated differences rooted in ethnic, religious, ideological and political antagonisms between the South Asian states, largely between its two most powerful ones.” [11]

The analyst holds India responsible for obstructing progress towards closer cooperation in the region. “India," he points out, “ has territorial disputes with all its neighbouring countries, excepting Bhutan and Maldives. The outcome of these historical animosities has been an environment of mistrust and suspicion, which has pre-empted any form of integrative mechanism." India’s attempts at exercising hegemony have heightened the apprehensions of its neighbours. ”Hegemonic stability requires of the major power to offer economic and security advantages to other countries, a task which India has not risen to." The writer concludes that the benefits of integration can be reaped “only if states of the region are able to reconcile their political differences." [12]

India, with its great power ambitions, has consistently opposed the inclusion of security and political issues in the charters of regional cooperation organizations it joins. At the first preparatory conference for the creation of SAARC in April 1981, India insisted that all decisions would be unanimous, thus giving India a veto even if all smaller members got together, and that contentious political issues would be excluded.[13] Similarly, India opposed the inclusion of security issues in the charter of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, (IORARC) that was adopted in 1997. The reason behind this approach is that while seeking the advantages of economic cooperation, India does not want to face any constraints in its quest for hegemony in its region.

PAKISTAN’S APPROACH TO SECURITY ISSUES:

Pakistan has paid a high price in standing up to political and military pressures from India over the years. Thus far, it has maintained a credible deterrent both in the conventional and nuclear fields, but with India building up its capabilities from a bigger and expanding resource base, a continued arms race could prove disastrous. Since the Kargil conflict in 1999, India increased its defence budget by 28% in 2000, or by $3billion which is equal to Pakistan’s total defence budget. A hike of another 16 per cent or $1.6 billion has been proposed for the budget estimates submitted in March 2001. As a Pakistani economist saw it, “Indian budget drafters have laid down a deliberate trap," and any effort to match the Indian defence budget would push Pakistan to a point of no return, so that India would prevail “without dropping a bomb or firing a missile." [14]

India’s approach to nuclear capability is also a potential source for anxiety. Although the Nuclear Doctrine adopted in August 1999 seeks a “credible minimum nuclear deterrent”; it envisages “ a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets."[15] If implemented, this programme would result in India acquiring over 400 nuclear warheads capable of being delivered by air, land, or sea. This triad of nuclear forces would exceed in strength those of the UK and France, and might be greater than even those of China.[16] With India also going in for an ABM system, with help from Israel and Russia, the strategic balance would tilt heavily against Pakistan, compelling it to reinforce its nuclear strike capability, and lowering the thresh-hold for resort to nuclear weapons. Pakistan is therefore strongly in favour of nuclear restraint and risk reduction, which was the topic discussed between the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and the Delhi Policy Group (DPG) in 2000-2001.

The Indian government has been dragging its feet on the resumption of a dialogue, since Kargil, capitalizing on its sense of outrage over the violation of the “spirit of Lahore." It also exploited the assumption of power by a military government in Islamabad to weaken Pakistan’s international standing so that it could negotiate from a position of strength. While Pakistan has showed readiness to resume a dialogue at ant time, any place, and any level, India has continued to link such resumption to the ending of “cross-border terrorism” in Kashmir. However, non-official think tanks have started a dialogue, and several Track-2 exercises are in progress.

The Delhi Policy Group recognized the importance of fresh efforts on the Kashmir issue in its report entitled “Jammu and Kashmir, An Agenda for the Future," issued in March 1999, after the Lahore summit but before Kargil. Its recommendations in the sphere of Foreign Policy bear a striking resemblance to what Pakistan would also like to happen to end the long chapter of confrontation between the two countries: [17]

1. Reconvene the Foreign Secretaries meetings and hold talks on Kashmir.

2. Pursue a programme of military cooperation with Pakistan, including a no-war pact, confidence building measures, defensive defence and a nuclear safety, assistance and collaboration zone,

3. Reopen the negotiations on Siachin and also on Sir Creek and Wular disputes.

4. Engage Pakistan in economic issues including trade and energy

5. Encourage a range of track two contacts with Pakistan

6. Pursue a cooperative agenda with various third parties that could influence Pakistan, including the US, China and various Muslim countries.

In the post-Kargil phase, the hawks in the BJP appear to be in the ascendant, and the resumption of a dialogue is not yet in sight. The Indian announcement of a unilateral ceasefire in November 2000 appeared to be a forward step to which Pakistan responded with a commitment to exercise maximum restraint along the LoC. Although the cease-fire was extended twice by one month, and then by three months, there has been little evidence of a reduction in repression by the Indian security forces. Pakistan also took the additional step of withdrawing some of its forces from the LoC. However a return to the kind of initiatives recommended by the DPG is imperative if the slide towards greater violence is to be arrested. Perhaps the “innovative” steps Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee promised in his New Year musings would include such initiatives. He did imply readiness to resume dialogue at any level, and softened the demand for an end to “cross-border terrorism” to the creation of a conducive environment. [18]

The basic fact in the contemporary situation is that India not only feels strong, with its buoyant economy, but is also encouraged by the recognition it now appears to enjoy as the regional great power. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his testimony to the US Senate recognized such status with a role beyond its region. Pakistan believes that the security situation in South Asia is fraught with serious dangers to peace, and would like to see multilateral involvement in tackling such problems as Kashmir and the nuclear issue. Left to itself, India takes arbitrary decisions, as evident recently from its dealings with the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) the umbrella organization of 23 political groups in Kashmir. After first encouraging it to play a role, it refused to issue travel documents for its proposed visit to Pakistan. Even a decision to enter into talks with Kashmiri groups on local autonomy appears to have been revised. Reliance on the use of force to suppress the Kashmiri struggle could precipitate a conflict between two nuclear powers with horrendous consequences. Even Indian military commanders have stated openly that a military solution is not possible.

As the stronger party that is also enjoying recognition as an emerging great power, India has adopted an intransigent attitude that shows scant regard for the norms of responsible and reasonable conduct. Pakistan, as the weaker party, has always relied on the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. India has been violating those principles, as well as its solemn commitments, with impunity. The international community, and the US in particular, has a major role to play in promoting multilateral efforts towards resolving the security issues in South Asia.