“Possibilities for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Track 2 and Track 1”

Dr. Paul Evans

Luncheon Address, “Multilateralism in Asia Pacific: the What Role for Track Two?”, Pacific Symposium 2001, Organized by the National Defense University, the US Pacific Command and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel, Honolulu, 27 March 2001

It is a privilege to attend the Pacific Symposium and an honour to be invited to present this luncheon address. Dr. Flanagan’s introduction was so flattering that I wish my parents had been here to hear it. My father would have enjoyed it and my mother would have believed it.

All of us are grateful to the Pacific Command, the NDU and the APCSS -- not just for organizing this meeting but also for playing a leadership role in promoting multilateral discussion. The APCSS in particular has put together an impressive team people and a sustained research and training program. Combining the parallel efforts of my alma mater the East-West Centre and the energy of the Pacific Forum/CSIS, Honolulu has emerged as the premier centre for multilateral exchange on Asian and Pacific security matters. This would have been hard to predict a decade ago and is a testament to the hardwork and foresight of many in the room today.

I applaud the organizers for turning to the topic of multilateral approaches to security at this particular moment. Whether under the banner of “security cooperation” or “cooperative security”, multilateral approaches are not longer considered a “solution in search of a problem” or a foreign idea imposed on Asia. In the past two days we have cut into the prospects and perils of multilateralism from several angles: Admiral Blair on the multiple efforts to expand multi-national and multilateral conveyed the host of multinational security cooperation involving the militaries of the region. Panellists yesterday addressed the institutions and processes that governments have initiated in a range of configurations. ASEAN, ARF, Shanghai Five, TCOG, 4 Party Talks, Perry Process. These are new institutions and processes are an undeniable fact of Asian Pacific diplomacy and, I believe, one of its defining aspects.

Yet in the wake of the economic crisis and remaining volatilities, disputes, multilateralism, multilateral dialogues and multilateral institution building need to be revisited. Some in the region are arguing that the decade of multilateral initiatives in Asia and the Pacific has reached a plateau or, worse, stalled. And there is some uncertainty about the approach that the new admininstration in Washington will take to regionalism in light of its rhetorical emphasis on the centrality of alliances.

Moreover, while recognizing that the security architecture of the region is, to borrow Surin’s words, “multilayered, multi-dimensional and multi-pronged”, multilateralism in whatever guise is not the core foundation of regional security. Rather, this is founded alliances, bilateral arrangements, self-help are the key underpinnings of regional security. The region has not embraced collective security, collective defence or a security community. So far as collective action has been required, it has been global institutions, especially the UN, or extra-regional “coalitions of the willing” that have been the coordinating bodies. Dr. Surin described last evening the role of ASEAN in responding to the crisis in East Timor. But at least for the moment, when decisive multilateral action is needed, Asia needs to look beyond Asia.

Our hosts have asked that I concentrate on one aspect of multilateralism, the “track two” activities that have proliferated in the past ten years or so. I accepted the assignment with enthusiasm and trepidation. Enthusiasm because track-two is dynamic and important, what I feel to be the backbone of multilateralism in the region. Trepidation because for any audience, especially one like this composed of people of action, “talking about talking” can be the mother of all yawns.

I had prepared a text before leaving Vancouver, but based on our discussion over the past two days shelved it this morning. Let me focus on seven questions about “track two” that have been implicit or explicit in the discussions so far.

First, what is “track two”? In general terms it refers to non-governmental or semi-governmental processes for analysis of security problems and preparation of policy responses. Participants are normally policy experts of various sorts, academics, researchers, retired officials, occasionally journalists and politicians, plus, and this is crucial, government officials in their private capacities. This fiction of private capacity is essential. It has permitted mid and senior officials plus political leaders including foreign ministers to pursue some ideas with a little more flexibility and creativity. Ambassadors sometimes function as academics and academics as informal ambassadors.

There has been a lot of debate about the origins of the different “tracks”. Let me try to put it into context: track one is governments; track two is about policy experts who want to work with and influence government; track three is informed citizens who want to criticize governments; and track four is activist groups that want to overthrow governments. Put that way, it is not surprising that officials prefer track one and track two.

Second, how much “track two” is there? Decade of dialogue is catalogued, albeit imperfectly, in Dialogue and Research Monitor. Since 1994, DRM has produced reports on about three hundred track one meetings but more significantly four hundred and fifty track two meetings conducted on a multilateral basis. Our rough guess is that these meetings have included about 15,000 participants, though if we look at the numbers closely we’ll find that Bob Scalapino, Ralph Cossa and Jawhar Hussan and Jusuf Wanandi represent about a quarter of the total participants. If we factor in bilateral track two, I’d guess that number would double or triple. To paraphrase the immortal Jerry Lee Lewis: “There’s a whole lot of talkin going on” and, in some cases, “a whole lot of listenin” too.

Track two activities come in multiple shapes and forms. One species is the ambitious effort of CSCAP complete with it own charter, member committees, secretariat and working group. Others are ongoing multi-year projects like the South China Sea workshops and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue. Most common are ad hoc meetings on a specific problem. We can document more than 124 sponsoring institutions.

Third, why does track two exist? Two answers. The first is to assist governments and nascent multilateral processes such as the ARF. Policy relevant debate and advice.

The second is to build international society, a critical mass of non-governmental players who are informed, inter-connected and actors in their own right. This might support government initiatives but has a life of its own.

Fourth, who are the leaders? When we talk about track one leadership we refer to nations and not individuals. Track two is the reverse. It is easy to identify individuals who have played the role of what my students call “policy or norm entrepreneurs”. We can point to some pivotal individuals, in this room Jawhar Hassan, Ralph Cossa, to name just two. Most are associated with research institutions, universities or think tanks. The institutions are numerous and many, even beyond Honolulu, are familiar to you such as the ASEAN ISIS, the JCIE or the Australian National University. Some might be less familiar but let me single out one, the Institute for Strategic Studies in Mongolia. It has organized no less than five multilateral conferences on regional security over the past twelve months.

The leaders of track two have a commitment to dialogue but themselves reflecting the diversity of the region, at least regarding security concepts.

Fifth, what has track two contributed or accomplished? We wrote a book on this two years ago which I’d be happy to share.

a. Language and vocabulary. Two and a half languages of Asia Pacific dialogue: English, English as a second language and Australian. More importantly, it has helped create a shared vocabulary of technical terms (eg CBMs) and concepts (eg. cooperative vs. comprehensive security, engagement). Vocabulary, story of the lexicon. Movement to a shared meaning and amplification in indigenous languages.

b. Explore the ground where governments are unsure or divided. Numerous examples but let me mention the case for multilateral dialogue in the creation of the ARF and preventive diplomacy.

c. Essential element of engagement across ideological divides.

d. Debating and creating regional norms. Example of transparency.

e. Part of the education of future officials. Surin and Jim Kelly.

f. Assist with management of specific conflicts. Eg. South China Sea.

g. Legitimate military-to-military activities.

Sixth, where has it gone wrong? Europe as comparison at the expense of Latin America. Lack of patience. Hesitancy to broaden the base beyond the usual suspects. Failure to take on a leadership role on two key issues: arms control; history and memories of history.

Seventh, where is track three going? Three challenges.

1. The unfinished agenda of cooperative security. North Korea and a multilateral institution in NEA/NP. Two ongoing track-two processes: NEACD and CSCAP’s NPWG.

How to involve North Korea. Surin story of ARF entrance. This combined with patters of new diplomatic relations opens a window not just to get NKs at meetings but to work with them systematically in preparation for those meetings.

2. The emerging agenda of human security. We have heard eloquent appeals for broadening the agenda of regional security discussions beyond the national security agenda. Not just an expanded array of threats but the major shift of looking at security from the perspective of the individual. This is a tough challenge in a region where state-building is the name of the game. That said, the issues are deniable. These open up possibilities for both the agenda of track two and its process. On agenda, deepen the debate on norms and principles and individual cases. Matters of ethnic conflict and successionist movements can be discussed among policy elites, not just on CNN. On process, new connections to track three, the NGOs and other civil society actors who are lalready deeply engaged in the human security area, even if from perspectives that are very different than the pro-market, pro-liberalization orientations of most the current track two leaders.

3. The emerging East Asian Institutional Identity. Identity, counter-balancing. Does it have a security component? Not yet, at least in conventional terms. Does it have security implications? Line in the Pacific, counter-balancing, a prototypical alternative to alliances? Drawing attention. Divided reactions. School one: sound the alarm. School Two: take a valium. Not going anywhere. School Three: see the positives Might be something that is valuable.

Conclusion

Even as we acknowledge the accomplishments of track, we must be modest about its accomplishments and prospects. In the short-term it is about proposing solutions to governments about managing practical problems and learning how to live together. In the longer term it is about building an international society. In looking at its long-term contribution to building peace and stability in the region, I remember the paradox presented to me by some Chinese colleagues after a long debate about alternative security frameworks. One said that multilateralism is desirable but unachievable. Another said, “multilateralism in Asia Pacific is impossible but inevitable”. Turning the impossible into the inevitable is the real task of track two. Thank you.