NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security - Partnership
Stephen J. Flanagan
Note:  This paper was published in the "Washington Quarterly," Spring, 1992, Volume 15, Number 2 

            WITH THE COLLAPSE of the USSR, the future of the relationships of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the Central and East European (C/EE) states, former Soviet republics, and any governmental element of the Commonwealth of Independent States is at a pivotal juncture. NATO's arrival at this strategic. crossroads was most dramatically captured by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's declaration in December 1991 that he regarded his country's membership in NATO as a "long-term political aim."[i] With this announcement, Yeltsin joined all C/EE leaders who have either stated or implied that they share the same goal. Other former Soviet republics are sure to join the chorus. 

At the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO heads of state and government further clarified the Alliance's evolving role as a stabilizing force in the rapidly changing European landscape. In particular, they agreed to expand the scope of the Alliance's liaison program with the three Baltic states and the six members of the former Warsaw Pact. NATO members have decided to both deepen their security dialogue with liaison states and to pursue concrete programs of cooperation that will help ensure the success of their new partners' social transformation. To help oversee and guide this effort, NATO foreign ministers invited their nine liaison counterparts to form a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which held its first meeting on December 20, 1991. It was during this inaugural meeting that a beleaguered Soviet ambassador announced the formal end of the USSR and Yeltsin's declaration of Russia's interest in NATO membership. 

The Alliance will proceed fully cognizant of the risks of further instability or even a reversal of the democratic revolution in the former Soviet republics and in other Eastern countries. As NATO develops this new relationship with the East, all member governments are mindful of the need to maintain the political cohesion of the Alliance, which makes it a key factor for stability in Europe. 

In the months ahead, NATO is prepared to fulfill its pledge, first advanced at the June 1991 Copenhagen foreign ministers' meeting, of developing a true security "partnership" with all these governments. NATO member states are working to clarify the goals of and guidelines for pursuit of the liaison function. The United States and other governments would also like NATO to consider creative new ways to work with other institu­tions to maintain stability and integrate the Eastern states into the new European order. 

The Bush administration approach to liaison reflects the responsibility sharing among European institutions set out in Secretary of State James A. Baker III's December 1989 Berlin address, which first articulated the U.S. approach to building a new security "architecture." No single institution, including NATO, is capable of realizing the president's vision of "Europe whole and free."[ii] The European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) also have important roles to play in integrating the East into the community of free nations. The NATO states remain a driving force in the development of the CSCE. The United States is committed to enhancing certain of its elements, particularly in the areas of promoting democratic institutions, peaceful resolution of disputes, greater openness in military affairs, respect for human and political rights, and adherence to the rule of law. The EC, too, will continue to play a vital role in the economic and political development and integration of the Eastern states. 

Beyond liaison, Allied governments will at some point have to address more forthrightly the question of fu­ture formal "association" or full membership for additional states. The U.S. and other Allied governments have made it clear that it is premature to open NATO's membership rolls. The expansion issue raises fundamental questions about the nature and future role of the Alliance. What would be the criteria for allowing new states into NATO? How would one define the mission of the Alliance if much of Europe belonged? NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner has spoken of NATO becoming the central core of a new, all European security system.[iii] Is it possible in the long term for NATO to evolve from a mutual defense pact of 16, which ties itself to the collective self-defense provisions of chapter VII of the UN Charter, into the core of an all‑European, collective security organization, in the sense of chapter VIII (regional arrangements) of the UN Charter? This essay seeks only to broach these complex questions, which will require much more detailed analysis. 

Although there is a strong consensus in NATO countries that the Allies need to deepen their cooperation with the Eastern states on political and security issues, opinions on future expansion are divided. Some fear expansion could destroy the cohesion of the Alliance or embroil it in various conflicts in Eastern Europe. Others argue that as Eastern states become more like their Western counterparts, there will be no compelling reason for their exclusion nor any inherent risk in welcoming them into the club. For now, Allied governments have deferred the membership question by focusing on development of the liaison program, which can play an enormous role in healing the old division of Europe. But no one is under any illusion that the membership issue will go away as long as NATO is perceived by Eastern states as the bedrock institution of European security. 

Western Interests East of the Oder 

At base, the United States would like all the C/EE states and the former Soviet republics to develop stable, pluralist political systems; balanced, open, market economies; cooperative relations with one another and the rest of the world; and military capabilities proportionate to their legitimate defense requirements. 

The Yugoslav civil war, the disintegration of the USSR, and stirrings of democracy in the former Soviet repub­lics leave the West with the opportunity and challenge of confronting head-on the issue of whether maintenance of stability and democratic institutions in the East is becoming a vital Western interest, one that might someday even warrant extension of security guarantees. Instability in Central and Southeastern Europe was the prelude to two world wars in this century And the source of many - crises since 1950. Allied heads of state and government agreed in the November 1991 Rome Declaration that "our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.[iv]

Some analysts have argued that most of the C/EE states are of marginal interest to the West and that deepening ties to the region would only ensure the West's involvement in a number of insoluble ethnic and regional conflicts. They recommend a new policy of containment, attempting to insulate the West from the East's turmoil and economic problems. Such a policy is shortsighted, impracticable, and morally indefensible. 

It will be difficult to insulate Western Europe from these emerging instabilities, as the Yugoslav crisis has already illustrated. Several Central and Southeast European states have ready had to deal with disrupted transportation and energy supplies, refugee problems, and military incursions as a result of the Yugoslav civil war. Moreover, how can we speak of having achieved a new European order when the images of the slaughter at Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and elsewhere in Yugoslavia are on the front pages of newspapers and on the conscience of the Continent? 

The NATO Rome Declaration also noted that '~'our common security can best be safeguarded through the fur­ther development of a network of in­terlocking institutions and relation­ships."[v] This architectural vision is not entirely satisfying to the C/EE govern­ments. The small group of neutrals between the two blocs in the Cold War was arguably a factor for stability. A vast zone of countries from the Oder to the Russian Republic (or Russian ­dominated commonwealth) without effective security guarantees could, however, create a power vacuum that governments would seek to fill through new alliances or development of an all European collective security system. Indeed, as Polish President Lech Walesa commented during his visit to NATO in July 1991, the people of Central and Eastern Europe "resolutely reject any ideas of 'gray' or buffer zones. They imply a continued division of the continent Without a secure Poland and a secure Central Europe, there is no secure and stable Europe.[vi] 

Walesa's observation raises a critical question: Would Western interests and European stability really be jeopardized if the C/EE countries and former Soviet republics adopted a strat­egy of ententisme? The Trojkat countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ICSFRI), which already cooperate on security issues, or the Baltics might seek guarantees from some or all of the Allies and some or all of the former Soviet republics. But such a web of incomplete and overlapping security guarantees in Central Europe could recreate a system not unlike the one that facilitated the outbreak of World War I. 

The C/EE states no longer face a high risk of Soviet military  intimidation or involvement in their internal affairs. Even Russia no longer controls all the economic assets that could have been used for concerted political lev­erage over C/EE states, which had been moving to develop their ties to republic governments even before the August 1991 attempted coup. Near­-term military security problems could arise as a result of regional problems, transnational ethnic tensions, or spill over from instability. Some of the former Soviet republics contest their bor­ders with their neighbors as do some of the C/EE states. 

Many officials and analysts are convinced that the stability and viability of democratic political institutions in the East will hinge on the progress of economic development. They contend that gradually deepening ties to the EC and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries will be decisive in this regard. Some observers have also argued that priority be given to integrating the Eastern democracies into the EC and to an effective European security identity. 

Some conclude that the CSCE, with its comprehensive membership, broad purview, and new dispute settlement mechanisms, is the more appropriate venue for addressing the East's emerging security problems. Others have suggested that the end of bipolarity should lead to the recasting of the CSCE into a concert-based collective security organization, led by a "security group" of major European powers.[vii] One should also consider how NATO can adapt, in the near and long term, to deal more effectively with these emerging challenges. 

The Liaison Program 

NATO allies agreed early on not to pursue liaison in ways that could cause delay of Soviet withdrawals from for­mer Warsaw Pact nations or do anything to even appear to isolate reformers in the republics. A rush by NATO now to forge closer ties to a few C/EE states could not only alarm defense officials in Russia and other republics but, more important, could undercut republic reformers who are arguing for more cooperative security relationships with the West. A number of NATO states were at first reluctant to develop the liaison program beyond information exchanges and increased, contacts to actual programs of cooperation. There remains resistance to the notion that NATO should pursue differentiated liaison activities. 

Liaison has a function of fulfilling the commitment of NATO states under article 11 of the North Atlantic (Washington) Treaty of 1949 to promote the values and norms of state behavior enshrined therein. Each NATO member is forging new relationships with the East, but joint NATO programs could be developed when possible to maximize resource effectiveness and where common policies exist (i.e., aspects of arms control and conversion policy). 

At the June 1991 Copenhagen meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Secretary of State Baker ad­vanced some principles to clarify the objectives and guide the development of the NATO liaison relationships in the years ahead, most of which were endorsed by the Rome Summit later that year. Secretary Baker noted that the goal of liaison is to reach out to the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and demonstrate NATO's genuine concern for their legitimate security interests and for the restructuring of their societies. NATO liaison complements activities in other forums and can help build the network of ties that will further integrate Eastern Europe with the West. Although NATO's liaison functions are neither designed nor intended to signal a security guarantee, they can foster greater security throughout Europe by building trust and reducing misunderstanding. 

Secretary Baker went on to offer five principles that could guide future liaison efforts: 

·        First, liaison efforts should open up new channels for the Eastern countries to interact with the members of the Alliance. The aim is to build trust and reduce misunderstanding by providing former adversaries with a better understanding of NATO's nature, policy, and operations as well as the political values that are its foundation.

·        Second, liaison relationships should be designed to promote a better understanding of the security concerns and policies of all participant states.

·        Third, liaison relationships should be especially active in areas where NATO has specialized technical expertise for coping with common problems.

·        Fourth, liaison should be a flexible instrument, responsive to evolving needs on a differentiated basis that reflects the degree of democratiza­tion and demilitarization of these changing societies.

• Fifth, NATO liaison activities should complement the activities of the EC, the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the OECD, and the Western European Union (WEU).[viii]

Eastern Interests in Liaison 

What the C/E E states have been seeking, and were seeking even before the Soviet coup, is a clear roadmap for their full reintegration into the West­ern security system. The volatility of the situation in parts of the former USSR has intensified this search for Western ties. Western policymakers must ultimately decide whether such integration, which could include extension of explicit or implicit security guarantees, is in their interest. 

The visit of Viclav Havel, president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Re­public, to NATO in the spring of 1991 was a watershed. Resistance within the Alliance to the issuance of a joint NATO/CSFR statement on basic principles of relations at the end of the Havel visit appears to have sent a message to other C/EE capitals and prompted decisions not to press too hard at the NATO door for now. But it also raised concerns in C/EE capitals that NATO governments were much more interested in allaying Soviet concerns than in helping them emerge from the legacy of Communist rule. Still, some of the C/EE countries have already asked how long they-who had their historical ties to the West disrupted by communism-have to be democracies before membership is an option, if NATO is an alliance of democracies with historical ties and common values. 

Governments of the former Soviet republics have accepted NATO as a key element of the new European architecture. The Soviets became active participants in liaison and encouraged the discussion of cooperation and links among various European institutions. The first evidence that the current Russian leadership was comfortable with NATO and appreciated the Alliance's capabilities in management of political crises came when President Boris Yeltsin called for political support from NATO by telephoning Secretary General Wörner from the Russian "White House" during the special NAC on the Soviet coup in August 1991. 

Other former Soviet republics may soon be raising the same questions about closer NATO affiliation that Yeltsin and the C/EE governments have already asked. The information and public education functions of the NATO liaison program may have their greatest potential impact on attitudes and policies in the former Soviet republics, which have hitherto been so isolated from Western contact.

Whither Liaison? 

In the fall of 1991, the liaison program was at a critical juncture. It could remain focused on dialogue and informational activities or become a vehicle for direct cooperation with the East. But C/EE and republic leaders understood NATO was not a threat, applauded its central role in European stability, and were reassured that the West was not indifferent to their security concerns. Indeed, many Eastern governments saw liaison as one of a growing web of relations that reinforced the notion that they were part of Western Europe.  

The Bush administration, however, was convinced that the Alliance had reached the limits of dealing with the C/Et states through diplomatic liaison as defined and practiced up until then. The administration believed that it was no longer adequate for NATO simply to laud the transformation of the East and express its political support for this process. These states will require concrete Western advice and assistance if they are to succeed in their restructuring efforts and become members of the emerging Euro-Atlantic community of free nations that the United States and its NATO allies are working to develop. The essential ele­ments of this community are the Atlantic link, European integration, and cooperation with the East. The CSCE and the EC have unique roles in this community's development in helping to both widen and deepen the reach of prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law. 

It was this conviction in Washing­ton, shared by the German government, that led to the joint statement by Secretary of State Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on October 2, 1991. In this document, the two ministers noted how the changes in the East and the president's nuclear arms reduction initiative had transformed the European security landscape. Their statement focused on how NATO could continue to contribute to the establishment of a strong democratic Europe. In particular, they advanced for consideration at the Rome Summit several proposals to develop NATO's relationship with the East. Most of these were subsequently adopted in NATO's Rome Declaration. 

·        Formalize the liaison relationship by establishing a more routine set of meetings among the 16 members of NATO and the liaison countries, perhaps as a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. (These consultations could facilitate communication and oversee development of liaison and multilateral cooperation programs.)

·        Have such a council meet regularly at the ambassadorial level, periodically at the Ministerial level, and at other times as the NAC agrees circumstances warrant.

·        Welcome periodic liaison participation in meetings of the NATO Political and Economic Committees and policy planning sessions of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG), as well as routine participation in NATO Civilian Emergency planning (SCEPC) sessions and in the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).

·        Encourage new civilian and military exchanges designed to promote Western concepts of civil-military relations.

·        Consider the dedication of NATO resources as available to the opening of NATO information offices in Eastern capitals. (These offices could serve as interlocutors with host governments, provide local oversight of cooperative programs, and sponsor public information activities.)

·        Offer to start planning with liaison countries for joint action on disaster relief and refugee, problems and pledge NATO's support for the CSCE in dealing with these and other new security challenges in Europe.

• Examine on a priority basis the contribution that NATO governments can make to support efforts to convert defense industries in the emerging democracies to civilian production.[ix]

With regard to this last point, conversion must be a comprehensive undertaking. Eastern governments must free their economies from their debilitating focus on military production and reduce the military's role in society. NATO activities to support this effort might include:

·        working groups and technical advisers on defense planning and budgeting and on civil-military relations;

·        new civilian, legislative, and military exchanges, designed to promote Western concepts of civil­military relations and legislative oversight of defense policy;

·        technical advice and assistance on dealing with economic dislocation and environmental problems (to in­clude destruction of conventional and nuclear weapons) associated with the elimination of major mili­tary installations and production facilities or their conversion to civilian uses; and

·        assistance on development of a civil air traffic management system, to include possible Eastern integration into the existing Western system. (This would fill some of the void created by the collapse of the Soviet air defense system and provide states with information on all air movements over Europe.) 

Liaison could be developed to play a more formal role in crisis management and the maintenance of. stability throughout Europe. Perhaps one could envision at some point a formal agreement to convene joint meetings of NAC permanent representatives and liaison ambassadors if the NAC agreed that the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any liaison country were threatened. 

All of the liaison cooperative programs could be pursued in a differentiated fashion, linked to the degree of democratization and demilitarization in the participating state. In this way, liaison could be used to reinforce positive changes in Eastern societies. As a reflection of international acceptability, differentiated liaison relationships and cooperative programs could offer some leverage over Eastern internal and foreign policies. This differentiation could be operationalized by varying the scope and depth of the programs NATO pursues with the six former members of the Warsaw Pact. For example, dialogue on force restructuring and training might take place with all liaison states, but technical advisers would be offered only to developed democracies. 

At the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in De­cember 1991, it was clear that liaison states were anxious to give real content to this program. All of the Eastern foreign ministers attending the meeting, and Russian President Yeltsin through his letter to the ministers, made it clear that they believed NATO remained the most effective security institution in Europe today. There was remarkable support among all the Eastern states for the Alliance and for the continuing value of the transatlantic relationship it enshrines, linking security in Europe and North America. 

The NACC participants agreed to: 

·        hold annual ministerial-level gatherings, bimonthly meetings at the ambassadorial level, and ad hoc sessions, as circumstances warrant;

·        hold regular meetings of the NATO Political, Economic, and Military Committees, the APAG, and the NATO military authorities with liaison states;

·        focus their consultations on such is­sues as defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management, science and the environment, and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes;

• undertake new efforts to distribute information about NATO in Central and Eastern Europe through liaison channels and the embassies of member states.[x]

In his intervention, Secretary of State Baker held out the NACC as an example of the kind of integrating structure that could serve as a model to the East, one that could be helpful in stemming the devolution of the nation-state and the danger of disintegration. He suggested that the NACC could function as the primary consultative body between NATO and liaison states on security and related issues; assume oversight of the liaison program; and play a role in controlling crises in Europe. For example, the NACC could be used to communicate NATO crisis responses to liaison states and give liaison states access to NATO deliberations.[xi] 

Beyond Liaison 

Satisfaction with liaison has not diminished the eagerness of several C/EE countries and former Soviet republics to develop closer ties with NATO and even pursue possible membership. Of course, the CSCE Charter of Paris and the Declaration of the 22 NATO states and members of the former Warsaw Pact on improving relations, adopted in November 1990, recognize the right of states to belong or not belong to an alliance. But what happens if one of the liaison countries wants to exercise this right vis-à-vis NATO? 

The issue of additional members would have, to be preceded by a re­consideration of how the core functions could be applied to a broader group of states. A gradual expansion eastward would, over time, require a recasting of the Alliance. But if dem­ocratic gains are solidified throughout Europe, the following question will arise: Could an enlarged NATO serve as the basis for an all-European regional collective security system in the spirit of chapter VIII of the UN Charter or work as a patron of the CSCE in this capacity? NATO Secretary General Wörner broached this issue in his speech in Washington in October 1991, when he called NATO the core of the emerging European security system.

If NATO is an alliance of democracies with historical ties and common values, what is the basis for excluding other such countries in Europe who request membership? Can NATO develop a set of criteria for membership that would serve as the light at the end of the tunnel sought by Eastern states? Would democracy be the only criterion? What other geostrategic and political considerations need to come into play and how could these be articulated? Hans Binnendijk has advanced an illustrative set of criteria that any new members of the Alliance might be expected to meet: acceptance of the rule of law; renunciation of all territorial claims; support for self­determination of subnational groups; willingness and capability to offer mutual assistance to other member states; and acceptance of some limited decision-making authority (not a full veto) in NATO for a certain transition pe­riod.[xii] 

How would an expanded Alliance define itself? A definition of NATO's mission might evolve from the criteria for membership: shared values, com­mon political systems, and largely convergent interests. Thus, an expanded Alliance might be designed to protect the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty and the CSCE Helsinki Final Act from any unstable, antide­mocratic forces that might threaten these institutions. This transformed NATO might lend its support to implementation of UN or CSCE-sanctioned actions to maintain interna­tional or regional peace and security or to isolate gross violators of international law or norms of state behavior. NATO's collective self-defense obligations and military integration would be designed to avoid renationalization of defense policies and to take concerns about each other out of the security risk calculus of member states. 

Any European states outside the Al­liance would not be excluded by a geostrategic gambit; rather states would exclude themselves from the new collective security pact by their failure to realize or uphold the ex­panded Alliance principles. Given that the emerging states in the East seek integration into Western institutions, a deepening liaison relationship, and perhaps ultimately membership, might be offered on the basis of the degree to which a given society had completed its transformation. 

If many of the emerging states of the East are successful in transforming themselves Into Western-style, peaceful democracies, one could envision a gradual merger of the CSCE's and NATO's membership, wherein NATO took over the hard security problems: peacekeeping; enforcement of UN or CSCE sanctions; and dealing with any external threats. Some might worry that such an all-European regional, collective security organization might be perceived elsewhere as an alliance of the European and North American haves against the have nots of the Southern Hemisphere. But a constitutional linkage to and support of the UN could make it clear that this new organization- was an element of an emerging global security structure. 

If at some point the Allies agreed that formal association or membership for some or all Eastern states were de­sirable, how could it be achieved?  Could bilateral "association agreements" be developed as codicils to the Washington Treaty through which states would adhere to articles I through 4 but not the mutual defense obligations of articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty? This would only oblige members to consult "associates" when threats to the peace arose. Would it be possible to have "associate" members of an expanded Council? Would such an expanded Council be given any authority to make decisions on behalf of the entire membership or would the Council retain all decision-making authority? 

Two years ago one could easily have dismissed these questions as of such remote possibility that they were not even worthy of consideration. As President Yeltsin noted, Russian membership is a long-term goal. It is a development difficult to imagine so long as Russia possesses so many nuclear weapons, which still pose an existen­tial threat to Western security. But we in the West should be chastened, however, by the pace and sweep of recent changes in the European landscape and begin to consider these difficult issues, which may well confront NATO governments sooner than they expect 

This article is based on a paper originally prepared for the "Congressional-Executive Dialogue on the Future of NATO, " sponsored jointly by the Congres­sional Research Service and the U.S. Information Agency, October 10, 1991. The views expressed in this article are the author’s, and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of State or any other U.S. government agency.