The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Critical Appraisal
Mohamed
Jawhar
This paper seeks
to make a critical appraisal of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its
contribution to regional security. Specifically, it will look at the following
aspects:
1. The standards to be applied when a
regional organization like the ARF is assessed, because this is critical to a
proper assessment of the ARF.
2. The strategic backdrop against which the
ARF functions, because an appreciation of this strategic environment is important
to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the ARF, its successes
and shortcomings, and what should “fairly” be expected of the ARF.
3. The place of the ARF in the regional
security architecture.
4. The achievements and shortcomings of the
ARF.
5. ARF links with the Organization for
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the lessons learnt from the OSCE’s
CBM experiences.
6. The future potential of the ARF.
The question of
standards is a key to much of the controversy and disagreement regarding the
ARF’s accomplishments and failures. If we assess the Forum though the prism of
the OSCE, it compares poorly. If we appraise the ARF from the perspective of
the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a much older and
smaller process, we are more encouraged. Which is the “fair” or “correct”
yardstick for the Asia Pacific region? Can there be one in the first place,
given the fact that there is much room for differences along a continuum of the
maximalist and minimalist positions?
Differing
expectations based on differing assumptions also contribute to the controversy.
If “realist” assumptions are employed, then the ARF is a failure because it has
failed to address, much less resolve, any major flashpoint like the Korean
conflict or the cross-Straits problem. If “institutional” assumptions are used,
the ARF fares poorly as well. It does not even have a permanent Secretariat
after 7 years of existence. However, if “constructivist” assumptions are
applied, then the ARF has a fairly creditable past and room to grow in the
future.
This paper takes
a “realist” picture of a different kind. It takes the view that the ARF must be
assessed on its own terms, and not those of others like the OSCE, which the
non-Asian states, and academics are inclined to adopt. The OSCE is certainly
useful as a comparison and as a pointer to what kind of regional security
cooperation may be developed, but it cannot be the standard against which the
ARF should be judged. It cannot be the standard because the strategic
environments of the two organizations are markedly different. To put it more
bluntly, the OSCE would be a non-starter in the Asia Pacific region, and hence
a failure. Similarly, the European states would have abandoned the ARF model if
all the organization has to show after 7 years is what the ARF has now. An
understanding of the strategic environment is therefore critically important.
It helps to clarify not only the setting of the ARF, but also how this setting
is shaping the nature and evolution of the ARF.
The Strategic Environment
The strategic
environment in the Asia Pacific region has a strong influence on the nature of
the ARF, the measures that it considers relevant, and the pace of its progress.
It also heavily conditions its future potential. The key elements of the
strategic environment may be summarized as follows:
1. The sheer geographic expanse and extreme
political, economic and cultural diversity of the region. The membership of
non-regional states in the form of the European Union (EU) and India further
adds to the complexity. Together the 23 participants of the ARF account for
more than half the world’s population. Large and diverse as they themselves
are, Europe’s EU or South Asia’s SAARC pale in comparison.
2. Divergent security cultures. There is
much greater congruence in the European, especially Western European, security
culture than there is in the Asia Pacific region. For many Asian states
security is perceived comprehensively, as encompassing economic, political and
social dimensions besides the military. In their view too security is as much
if not more domestic as it is external, a natural consequence of the many
internal problems which some of them confront. Many Southeast Asian states and
New Zealand also do not perceive any serious external military threat on the
horizon. Developing elaborate external security processes with a “heavy
“military” content are therefore not regarded as very relevant or urgent
agenda-topping matters.
The
Western members on the other hand, rooted in their European experience, see
security generally in very narrow “realist” and military terms, and do not
think much is happening unless this is addressed.
3. The absence of a devastating war which
drives all states to adopt a “never again” stance towards conflict. Asia’s
experience with war in the 20th century was not as cataclysmic as
Europe’s in the 20th century, and the “disarming” of Japan following
the Second World War quelled concerns regarding the re-emergence of an armed
threat from that direction, a factor which might otherwise have galvanized
regional states to construct a regional security mechanism to tame and contain
that country. The all-important political will is therefore less evident in
much of East Asia.
4. The absence of an overarching and
defining conflict for the region involving essentially two protagonists akin to
the Cold War in Europe, that can focus the concerns of both sides and impel
them to construct a common security mechanism to manage and contain conflict
between them. Having just two sides greatly facilitates agreement, unlike in
the Asia Pacific region.
5. The prevalence of a number of essentially
bilateral disputes especially with regards to territory that does not lend
itself to pan-regional processes for resolution. The states themselves do not
wish to submit to multilateral processes, or avenues are available outside
regional processes in the form of the International Court of Justice.
6. The existence of a number of bilateral
mechanisms for security management among many countries in the region with
essentially bilateral problems that reduces the worth and relevance of
multilateral mechanisms.
7. The suspicion and lack of trust and
confidence among many countries in the region, a legacy of past bitter conflicts
as well as on-going disputes in some cases, such as in the Korean peninsula.
This is a pervasive and dominant problem in the region requiring extended
attention.
8. Concerns regarding intrusion and loss of
sovereignty among many weaker, developing countries should the ARF be given too
much authority. The fact that most of the security problems requiring attention
exist on the Asian side compounds the issue. This is a severe but unavoidable
impediment to substantive empowerment of the ARF multilateral process.
9. Concerns in China that the ARF process
will be used by the United States and like-minded states to contain her and
intervene in disputes that involve her fundamental interests, such as the
cross-Straits problem or Tibet.
No informed assessment of the ARF and its
potentials, or the relevance of CBMs developed in the OSCE and elsewhere, can
be made without due consideration of some of these fundamental ingredients of
the Asia Pacific security environment.
The security
architecture in the region consists of a web of arrangements: bilateral
agreements on security cooperation; military alliances; two sub-regional
processes, ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF, formerly called the South
Pacific Forum); the Five Power Defence Arrangement; and the ARF itself. Of
these, it can be correctly noted that bilateral arrangements are the ones where
substantive security issues are addressed most. The sub-regional processes are
next in significance, and the ARF as a pan-regional construct so far the least
utilized to manage security problems in the region.
Every state has
bilateral agreements with one or more parties covering security cooperation
alone or security cooperation along with cooperation in political, economic and
other spheres. Agreements on security cooperation can relate to specific areas
such as insurgency, drugs, illegal immigration or smuggling, or be of a general
nature. The most common, as expected, are agreements between neighbors.
Examples of these include the bilateral Joint Border Commissions between
Myanmar and Thailand, Thailand and Malaysia, Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines, etc.
It is in the
area of bilateral agreements that cooperation is most institutionalized in the
Asian region. This disproves the notion that East Asian states are generally
averse to institutionalization of security cooperation. They are not. They are
only generally reluctant to institutionalize it at the multilateral security
level, due to some of the factors referred to in the preceding section.
The United
States maintains several bilateral military alliances and defence agreements in
the region, and it is actively seeking to strengthen them further. It maintains
alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. It
also has a pact with Singapore and provides security assistance to Taiwan under
the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States considers these bilateral
arrangements far more important and useful for its security interests than
multilateral arrangements such as the ARF. This perception is shared by Japan,
South Korea, Australia and Singapore, and to a lesser extent by Thailand and
the Philippines.
On a lesser
scale, three other ARF members have entered into strategic partnerships –
though not defence arrangements – with one another, essentially to counter the
perceived growing US military profile in the region. These three are China,
Russia and India. Though these strategic partnerships are unlikely to develop
into military alliances unless the regional situation deteriorates drastically,
this budding bipolarization among regional powers is extremely unhealthy for
regional stability.
ASEAN
ASEAN is the multilateral arrangement
dedicated to enhancing peace, security and stability in the Southeast Asian
region besides strengthening political, economic and social cooperation. It has
many weaknesses and shortcomings, and is the subject of considerable criticism
in the region and elsewhere. ASEAN is still in the process of development, and
for the present is encountering some difficulties due to the effects of the
financial crisis and the instability and crises afflicting its largest member,
Indonesia. Nevertheless, it remains the most successful initiative for
multilateral regional cooperation after the EU.
Unlike the EU
and the OSCE, it involves a much lower level of integration by pragmatic
choice. It does not seek to supplant bilateral mechanisms for security
management, but to supplement and complement them. Its primary contributions to
regional security have come by way of enhancing trust and confidence through
inculcating a habit of intense consultation and a degree of cooperation among
its members on political, security, economic and other issues. The multilateral
forum has helped smooth the edges of bilateral frictions among its members, and
empowered otherwise small and vulnerable states by providing them a collective
voice and influence far in excess of their individual capacities. The measure
of ASEAN’s achievement is that both due to its own assets as well as by
default, it anchors the largest regional security process in the world.
The PIF attracts
less attention and controversy compared to ASEAN (it would be interesting to
examine why), but is clearly a pale copy of the latter. It is even larger than
ASEAN in terms of numbers (16 compared to 10), but it too is committed to
comprehensive cooperation with an underlying political motive – to empower the
Pacific community of mostly little island-states with a weightier say in
international affairs. The PIF has grown in credibility and stature since its
formation in 1971, and has gradually increased its areas of cooperation and
linkages with countries and institutions outside the region. However it remains
largely marginal in impact except as a forum for Pacific Islands dialogue. Its
fundamental handicap is the negligible economic weight of the majority of its
members, and the relative strategic obscurity of the region.
The relative
marginalization of the Forum can be adduced from the fact that the Forum is not
a participant in the ARF process, and only Australia and New Zealand are
members.
The FPDA makes a
limited and specific contribution to security in Southeast Asia. It provides
the framework for valuable military exercises for Singapore, Malaysia and
Brunei; it makes available a common platform for security cooperation for Malaysia
and Singapore which have difficulty in forging close bilateral military
collaboration; it calms some of Singapore’s nerves regarding perceived threats
from Malaysia and Indonesia; and it enables the United Kingdom and Australia to
project their formal security presence in the area. Beyond these limited uses
to the various parties, the FPDA does not contribute much to larger regional or
sub-regional security.
The ARF is the
first and only pan-regional security construct for the Asia Pacific. With the
inclusion of North Korea it may be said to have become fully inclusive in terms
of membership. It has modest and pragmatic objectives (too modest for some,
especially those of the West): to foster constructive dialogue and consultation
on political and security issues; to contribute to confidence-building and
preventive diplomacy; and to strengthen political and security cooperation
within the region as a means of enhancing peace and security. It is essentially
a complement to the prevailing security architecture in the region, in
particular to the bilateral security arrangements and to ASEAN. The ARF at
present is focused mainly on confidence-building while it explores the
possibilities for preventive diplomacy in the region.
While it has many
shortcomings, its great contribution, not to be under-estimated, is its ability
to bring together under a single security umbrella not only China and the
United States, two large powers hitherto not well disposed to perceived
constraints by regional multilateral processes, but the entire Asia Pacific
community of major, middle and lesser powers. Further discussion on the ARF’s
significance and place in the regional security matrix is conducted in the
ensuing sections.
Extended engagement
in the ARF over a number of years has helped sensitize skeptics among
officialdom, mostly officials from the West,
to the practical difficulties involved in managing the complex interests
involved in the ARF process. They are less cynical or critical of the ARF now.
Skepticism still runs high however among academics and outside observers. The
observations made in the section on the strategic environment in the Asia
Pacific will assist in arriving at a balanced assessment of the performance of
the ARF thus far.
The
Achievements
1. The first step is always the hardest.
Considering the original opposition to the idea of the ARF especially from the
United States whose superpower status made it more comfortable with
unilateralism and bilateralism, the very initiation of the multilateral ARF
process must count as one of the outstanding achievements. The ARF was only
possible after the US dropped its opposition in 1994 and saw the ARF as a
useful adjunct to its bilateral alliances. The formation of the ARF consisting
of more than half the world’s population, nearly half the world’s gross
domestic product, at least five important regional powers (the US, China,
Russia, Japan, Russia and India), and now 23 states with often widely divergent
security perceptions and interests, is an exceptional outcome by any standard.
2. Considering that the Forum is only 7
years old, has modest objectives, and is operating under severe strategic
constraints, its output so far has been truly impressive. Gradually, the
groundwork for credible and extensive multilateral security cooperation is
being laid. Among the accomplishments so far are the following:
·
Despite
underlying differences, basic consensus is developing that the Forum should
proceed incrementally, from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and
“elaboration of approaches to conflict”, with preventive diplomacy moving in
tandem with confidence-building where the measures overlap.
·
The ARF has
established a number of Inter-sessional Support Groups (ISG) and Inter-sessional
Meetings (ISM) on CBMs, Search and Rescue Coordination Cooperation,
Peacekeeping Operations and Disaster Relief. Besides the substantive output of
these meetings, which suggest areas where security cooperation can be advanced,
the meetings are themselves socializing all members in a nascent regional
security community.
·
There is a
widening practice among members of issuing annual defence policy statements and
publishing the equivalent of white papers on defence. This widening practice is
injecting growing transparency and openness in a region where it is not the
traditional culture.
·
Political
and security dialogue on security issues, including those considered sensitive,
is gradually being enhanced. For instance, the Seventh ARF Meeting in July last
year discussed Myanmar, the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula, as well
as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, implications of ballistic
missile systems, and the need to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and eliminate nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).
·
The annual
ministerial meetings, the SOMs, the inter-sessional activities and the numerous
Track I and Track II Meetings are creating a series of vast networks throughout
the Asia Pacific. These networks form a “social capital”, a stock of trust,
familiarity, ease and comfort that can be an important investment for crisis
situations.
·
Military
and defence officials have been engaged in ARF deliberations, and military
exchanges including staff college training have begun. ARF members are also
beginning to look more positively at notification of military exercises and
sending of observers.
·
The Seventh
ARF Meeting in July last year saw two further advances: the establishment of
the ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons to be used by ARF members on a
voluntary basis in conflict situations, and the first publication of the ARF
Annual Security Outlook (ASO). The ASO contained the contributions of 13 member
countries – Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, ROK, Mongolia, New
Zealand, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and the United States. These are
significant if small initial steps towards greater transparency and confidence
building as well preventive diplomacy.
·
There is
active Track I and Track II collusion between Russia and the ASEAN-ISIS to
produce a set of norms and principles for security cooperation, in the form of
a Pacific Concord. If such a body of norms is agreed upon it will add to the
normative foundation of CBMs and security cooperation in the region.
The main ones
may be summarized as follows:
1. The Third ARF Meeting in July 1996
identified the “geographical footprint” of the ARF for key activities as
covering Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania. No mention was made of the
region covering the US and Canada. This exclusion is disingenuous in at least
two respects. First, it ignores the fact that the US is an integral part of the
security dynamics of the region. The US is very much a part of any security
solution (for example the Korean Peninsula and arms control including nuclear
disarmament), and sometimes it is a major part of the security problem in the
region (for example the cross-Straits issue, arms expenditure and enhancement,
and Sino-American relations). Second and perhaps more importantly, it gives the
impression that East Asia is the “object” and target of security measures in
the region, thereby increasing apprehension and resistance towards greater
institutionalization and elaboration of the security agenda of the ARF.
2. As noted above, there is less
dissatisfaction now among some ARF members about the perceived slow pace of
progress in the ARF, or that it is not much more than a talk shop. (It may be
noted in passing that the same criticism is sometimes leveled at the UN and
even the EU and OSCE). Nevertheless, it is hoped by many that progress towards
the second, preventive diplomacy phase can be achieved sooner than later,
initially in areas considered not threatening to the interests of any party.
Some of the CBM measures on which there is virtual consensus, such as the
enhanced role of the ARF Chair and the Register of Experts/Eminent Persons,
border very much upon preventive diplomacy. All that remains is for some states
to actually decide to have recourse to these options.
3. The ARF has not been able to play a
substantive role in moderating or resolving any of the prevailing conflicts in
the region. However this is not fair criticism, because the ARF has
deliberately chosen to focus on CBMs in the present phase.
4. There is great institution-deficit in the
ARF. Not only does the ARF have no Secretariat of its own to lend support to
year-long activities, even ASEAN does not have a unit/bureau to oversee ARF
matters. Coordination within ASEAN rotates annually among the current ASEAN
Chair who becomes the ARF Chair, and the ASEAN Secretariat plays no role.
5. Though the ARF has formally reiterated
its support for ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF, dissatisfaction continues to
be expressed by some members who would like to see a sharing of leadership. It
should be noted here that ASEAN is not alone in wanting to retain the
leadership. China is among the states which is more comfortable with ASEAN in
the chair
Contacts with
the OSCE, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations were
initiated by the ARF in 1999/2000 when Thailand was in the chair. The contacts
however have only been informal, and in the nature of exchanges of views. The
Seventh ARF Meeting agreed to consider “how these links could be further
followed up by exchanging of information and sharing of experiences”, but the
present ARF Chair has yet to initiate moves in this direction.
The lack of
formal contact between the ARF and OSCE however should not give the impression
that little is being done to actively consider the relevance and usefulness of
OSCE’s experiences with CBMs. The OSCE’s experiences are imparted and discussed
extensively in many Track I and Track II seminars and conferences in the ARF
region as well as in Europe, and vice versa. Examples include the ARF Track II
Conference on Preventive Diplomacy co-organized by IISS of the United Kingdom
and IDSS of Singapore in 1997 with sponsorship from their respective governments;
the ARF Track II Workshop on “Cooperative Security in Europe and Its Relevance
for the Asia Pacific” held in Singapore on 31 May-2 June 2000; the ARF Seminar
on Approaches to Confidence Building held in Helsinki on 1-4 October 2000; and
the OSCE-ROK conference held in Seoul on 20-21 March 2001, which focuses on the
CBM experiences of the different regions.
The OAS
experiences were also discussed in these forums, and a seminar with the OAS to
discuss the subject was held in Bangkok in early 2000.
It
should be noted that the CBM measures being practiced or considered applicable
in the ASEAN and ARF regions are quite akin to the Basket 1 type of the OSCE’s
CBMs, although the CBMs in the former are less comprehensive and less
extensively applied. These include exchange of military personnel, exchange of
observers, exchange of annual calendars of military activities and prior
notification of major military maneuvers. The OSCE CBMs, which are considered
less applicable given the prevailing circumstances, include risk reduction
measures, constraining provisions on military activities, compliance and
verification measures, and principles governing arms transfers.
The
following are some of the factors explaining why East Asian members of the ARF
generally are more receptive towards “first generation” CBMs only:
1. “Second
generation” measures with strict compliance measures are more intrusive. The
catalogue of norms, rules and institutions which the OSCE has developed, such
as those impinging upon “good governance”, assumes that a whole range of
internal affairs are legitimate concerns for other countries and the
institution itself. As the section above on the strategic environment in the
Asia Pacific region indicates, East Asian members generally do not welcome such
approaches.
2. External
military threats are a major concern only for states in Northeast Asia, the
United States, Canada and Australia. Southeast Asian states (with the exception
perhaps of Singapore) generally do not consider such threats upon themselves
very likely. Military-oriented CBMs are therefore generally considered
unnecessary in the ASEAN region, and efforts to impress upon the regional
states the wisdom of these measures would be largely futile. They would appear
to be solutions in search of a problem.
3. Basket
II CBM regimes would be relevant for Northeast Asia, but the generally
conflictual perceptions and conflicting interests prevailing there makes it
difficult for their acceptance.
4. East
Asian states are not used to a culture of transparency in the military and
defence spheres. For militarily weak states transparency exposes their
vulnerability and undermines rather than enhances their perceived
security.
5. Basket
II and even some Basket I CBMs involve cession of a degree of sovereignty to
external parties which many Asian states find unacceptable.
6. Unless
CBMs address the fundamental issue of arms control and resolve questions of
military parity, they do not really address the concerns of militarily weaker
states and tend to benefit the stronger states more.
The ARF’s Future Potential
There
is a great need to lower expectations of the ARF and desist from constantly
using the OSCE as a benchmark because the circumstances which prevailed in
post-War and Cold War Europe, that were conducive to the formation of the CSCE,
simply do not exist in the Asia Pacific region. If the CSCE/OSCE did not exist,
and one was proposed for Europe today, it would in all likelihood also be a
non-starter.
Nor
should the security experience and accomplishments of Europe be over-rated. The
ex-Warsaw Pact part of Europe including Russia is a shambles. Parts of Eastern
Europe are burning and there is little the much-vaunted OSCE architecture can
do in terms of credible confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, conflict
resolution or peace-building. Northern Ireland has been festering for close to
a century now, and the OSCE appears to be completely irrelevant there. This
should sober those who think that the European way is the superior way.
This
having been said, it must be acknowledged that the security situation in the
Asia Pacific region (and probably even more in the years ahead), can indeed
benefit from a more developed ARF process, and that the ARF can indeed learn
lessons from the painstakingly built European experience. And despite all the
criticisms, the ARF does possess great vitality and promise, its considerable
collective capacity buttressed by the Council for Security Cooperation in the
Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and other Track II and Track I processes.
Below
are some proposals regarding the future direction of the ARF which are
considered relatively do-able:
1. ASEAN
should increase its institutional capacity for managing the ARF. A first step
would be the creation of a modest Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat that
focuses on ARF work. While the Unit is to be led by an ASEAN individual, it
should draw on expert support personnel from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources.
The participation and contribution of the latter will help provide a sense of
ownership to non-ASEAN members besides enabling access to expertise from that
quarter.
2. CBMs
and preventive diplomacy measures which are perceived as non-threatening should
continue to be the main focus of the ARF in the medium term until the ARF
matures enough to consider substantive conflict resolution approaches.
3. A
sub-regional body broadly similar to ASEAN should be encouraged for the longer
term for the Northeast Asian region (involving only regional states) or the
North Pacific region (including US and Canada), depending on which is
politically feasible by the parties concerned. A dedicated sub-regional process
for security cooperation would be most pertinent given the special strategic
situation prevailing in the area. If this body can be successfully established
the ARF can be the umbrella body for three sub-regional process (ASEAN and the
PIF being the other two), each attuned to the special requirements of their
respective situations. The demands on the ARF to evolve structures and measures
closely relevant to the situation in all three sub-regions will then become
less compelling. Unfortunately, as in the case of ASEAN, which could only be
formed after the ending of konfrontasi,
a sub-regional organization in the north may only be feasible when tensions in
the Korean Peninsula are significantly attenuated.
4. The
ARF should also facilitate strong instruments and processes for bilateral
security cooperation in Northeast Asia. As in Southeast Asia, bilateral
arrangements are much easier to foster and can be more substantive than
sub-regional or regional processes. They can be critical foundations upon which
ARF cooperation can be built.
5. As
a CBM measure besides their intrinsic value, the ARF should also focus its
attention on mobilizing security cooperation in non-military matters, such as
peacekeeping, AIDS and trans-border crime. The ARF should not be too fixated on
CBMs in the hard security areas alone, which are more difficult to construct.
Conclusion
The
ARF is still in its embryonic or early development stage. If the ARF
participants are patient and pragmatic but determined in their pursuit of
regional cooperation for the benefit of all and to the serious detriment of
none, the Forum can have a promising future.