Cooperation
Among Small Island States : The Bougainville Crisis
Lieutenant General H.C. Stackpole, president, the
Asia-Pacific Centre For Security Studies, Dr Stephen J. Flanagan, Director,
Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, fellow
panelists from the Asia-Pacific region, distinguished guests, ladies and
gentlemen.
It is an honour and privilege to have been invited to
this symposium. Let me take this
opportunity therefore to thank General Stackpole, Dr. Flanagan, and those
behind the scene for your kind invitation, welcome reception, and hospitality. I am greatly touched.
On the eve of my departure from PNG, two (2)
important issues were, and still are being discussed in the country: the first
is the endorsement by the government of certain recommendation in the “review
of the PNG defence force," that was conducted by the “Commonwealth Eminent
Persons’ Group”. Basically it
recommended for structural reforms within the PNGDF, among them the
streamlining and downsizing of the PNGDF to a sustainable level.
I believe that these structural reforms being
carried out by the government on the PNGDF is relevant to regional security
cooperation. As PNG downsizes its
military capability, this must be compensated for through regional arrangements
that will ensure similar level of security and the rule of law.
The other prominent issue of significance to
regional security cooperation is the Bougainville crisis. Talks are currently being held between all
parties involved including the government of PNG, on the question of increased
autonomy and the surrender and disposal of arms in possession of the
Bougainville revolutionary army (bra).
These talks are either encouraged, facilitated, and observed by
Australia, New Zealand, the UN, as well as the peace-monitoring group (PMG),
which comprises a number of regional countries.
To me these two (2) issues have a lot of significance
and relevance to the theme of this year’s (2001) Pacific symposium, which is
“enhancing regional cooperation through new multilateral
initiatives." I believe, both
issues do underline the importance of multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
region in approaching issues, which have security implications.
Ladies and gentlemen, my presentation today is on
“lessons learned from security cooperation: a process perspective”, with
particular focus on “cooperation among small island states (SIS): the
Bougainville crisis”.
The Bougainville crisis has been in existence for
well over a decade. The underlying
causes of the crisis can be attributed to number of factors, the catalyst of
which relate to the land and environmental issues and the consequential demands
by the Panguna landowners for massive compensation.
What started then as an environment/land
compensation issue between the Panguna landowners and the developer CRA, which
later involved the provincial government and of course the Papua New Guinea
(PNG) national government, later deteriorated into a bloody rebellious
secession issue.
This presentation does not necessarily reflect the
official perception of my government, it however, is based on extensive
consultation that I have with a number of senior government officials who have
had some role in dealing with the issue.
This presentation is in four
(4) parts:
Cooperation
among SIS that precipitated the Bougainville crisis
Ladies and gentlemen, in September last year, whilst
being a fellow at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS), I
proudly told my class about PNG, as the largest Pacific island country, being
blessed with so many natural resources and of incomparable cultural diversity.
Yes, PNG has six (6) copper, gold, and nickel mines,
six (6) petroleum, oil and gas fields, and many logging projects, etc. However, like we experienced in the
Bougainville crisis, these same resource projects are potential
flashpoints. Today, not a single day
passes without news about disputes between landowners and either, the developer
and/or the state.
The Bougainville crisis commenced in 1988. However the roots of the crisis can be
traced back to the 1960s, the period in which PNG, and almost all the SIS were
still under various colonial administrations.
It was in the same period when the Bougainville
copper agreement was negotiated and signed between the then colonial
administration and the CRA, the developer.
It would appear that the agreement reflected little or nothing about the
cultural and emotional attachment between the land used for the Panguna mine
and its owners, a prevalent phenomenon in almost all SIS, in which land
represents wealth, power and security.
So when PNG achieved independence in 1975, already a
recipe for a crisis, insofar as Bougainville was concerned, was already in
place. The first sign of discontentment
was seen in May 1975, just a year before independence, when certain company’s
installations and properties were vandalized by elements of the landowners.
Out of this incident, the “provincial government
system” was introduced. The island of
Bougainville became the first in PNG to test it out. In essence this concept entails decentralization of certain
administrative powers from the central government in Port Moresby to the 19
provinces throughout the country.
The actual violence, destruction and atrocities
started in earnest, 1988 and reached its peak in 1990 when the government
decided to withdraw its security forces hence government service to the
island. This was the course chosen by
the government following massive destructions, killings, and the complete
breakdown of law and order.
During this period, PNG had already established
bilateral relations with many SIS and hence became an active member of a number
of regional organizations, including the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific
Forum).
Also, it had already assisted in the formation of
the Melanesian spearhead group, a political sub-regional organization,
comprising the four (4) Melanesian countries – PNG, Vanuatu, the Solomon
Islands and New Caledonia. Fiji was
admitted in 1998.
Today the situation in Bougainville has improved
considerably. The people on this island
are now beginning to enjoy basic government services. The economy of the island is slowly being revived, especially in
the area of agricultural cash crops like cocoa and copra.
The process of achieving this much-improved
situation was not an easy one. It was a
protracted and pain-staking one. This
was because the crisis reached the level where it divided my people; adversely
impacted on our economy; adversely affected our bilateral relations with one of
our important neighbors; and raised questions about our otherwise clean record
on human rights issues, etc.
Yes, ladies and gentlemen, the Bougainville crisis
is to date the biggest internal security concern since my country’s
independence. It still has a lot of
implications on my country’s unity and sovereignty.
Some level of peace and normalcy commenced towards
the end of 1998 following a number of events, among them the deployment of the
peace-monitoring group (PMG), as peace observers on the island.
This was about ten (10) years after the beginning of
the crisis, and after so many lives had been lost. Many of us now tend to believe that such loss would have been
minimal had there been a regional peace mechanism in placed before the crisis,
which would have enabled PNG to request regional assistance at the early stage
of the crisis.
Initiatives
to create cooperation among SIS and avoid crisis
Countries in the Pacific region, other than the USA,
are already taking initiatives in creating and promoting cooperation amongst
themselves in relation to matters of security concern. Perhaps the most notable security initiative
creating regional cooperation among the SIS is the “Aitutaki Declaration On
Regional Security," signed in 1997 by forum island countries (FICs), and
subsequently amended through the “Biketawa Declaration," 2000.
It took almost eighteen (18) years since the Santo
rebellion was put down; ten (10) years since the Bougainville crisis began; and
almost ten (10) years since the first coup in Fiji, before the Pacific island
leaders recognized the importance of such regional initiative.
The first demonstration of the significance and
usefulness of regional security cooperation took place in 1980. In that year, Sir Julius Chan, then PNG
prime minister responded to a call from his Vanuatu counterpart, Fr. Walter
Lini for an intervention to quell the Santo rebellion in Vanuatu in order to
prevent that country from breaking up.
An initiative to formalize regional security cooperation was put to the
1981 South Pacific Forum. It was not
well received.
Since then various leaders in my country have
expressed support for a similar concept especially in view of environmental and
security concerns that the SIS countries have recently been confronted with.
Ladies and gentlemen, in November 2000, the chief of
PNG Defence Force, Brigadier General Carl Malpo, on the occasion of Chiefs Of
Defence Force of Asia-Pacific region conference, presented a paper on the
“Management Of Security In The South Pacific Region” With Focus On “Regional
Peace Keeping Force Option,” here in this same building.
I, and a selected number of Pacific island students,
then studying at the APCSS found this initiative timely, given recent security
and environmental developments in the Pacific island region. We were unanimous in expressing support for
it. I hope that governments in our
respective countries will recognize the serious challenges facing us today and
agree to arrangements such as that proposed by my country’s Commander Of The
Defence Force.
I wish therefore to also take this opportunity to
again make mention and support my commander’s proposal for a regional
peacekeeping force as an important initiative that will create cooperation and
avoid crisis among SIS.
Ladies and gentlemen, in the beginning of this
presentation on the Bougainville crisis, I recognized the need for regional
assistance, which would help minimize the impact of the crisis on my people and
country.
At the early stage of the crisis, the only kind of
“co-operation” PNG receive were from both the New Zealand, Australia, and
Solomon Islands, in brokering, hosting and facilitating peace talks in their
countries, between PNG government and the BRA.
The latest of such talks was in February 2001, in Australia.
It is, in fact, through these initiatives that
resulted in the involvement of the peace-monitoring group (PMG), which to me
had made a lot of difference to achieving peace and normalcy on the island.
The PMG comprises Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and
Vanuatu who together contribute more than three hundred (300) personnel –
unarmed women and men, civilian and military.
It also includes a small three-person United Nations observer mission.
The PMG provides reassurance and helps to create an
environment in which mutual confidence displaces former threats and fears. The UN observer mission on the other hand,
reinforces the integrity of the peace process by providing the means by which
actions of all the parties are monitored.
The contributing states consult with each other and
Papua New Guinea through the peace process steering committee. The government maintains contact and
cooperates with the parties on the ground in relation to peace process related
issues through the peace process consultative committee.
By invitation of the parties, the UN observer
mission provides a neutral chairman for the PPCC.
While the PMG reports regularly to both the peace
process steering and the PPCC, its command is quite independent; its day-to-day
activities are not subject to direction from outside.
Both the PMG and the United Nations observer mission
are in Bougainville at the national government’s invitation.
Both play their roles within the framework of
agreements – and operational arrangements – to which Papua New Guinea is a full
party.
While the national government issued the relevant
invitations by agreement – and continues to consult – with the parties on the
ground, both the PMG and the United Nations observer mission recognize that PNG
is their official host.
The decisions to invite the PMG and the United
Nations observer mission were carefully and deliberately made.
The risks, which they originally seemed to entail –
and the costs involved – meant the invitations were also carefully and
deliberately accepted.
As the PMG countries and the United Nations Security
Council have repeatedly stated, the continued presence of the PMG and the
United Nations observer mission cannot be taken for granted.
They will not remain in Bougainville
indefinitely. They are there on specific
assignments – to provide assistance and support, consistent with their
respective mandates, for continuing progress towards lasting peace.
In my opinion, reasons behind the Bougainville
crisis can be attributed, by and large, to land, environment, and
ethnicity. These are salient factors in
the lives of the Pacific islanders.
It should be noted that these factors are prevalent
in almost all the upheavals in the region; i.e. the Santo rebellion in Vanuatu;
the coups in Fiji; the independent struggle in New Caledonia; the ethnic
rebellion in the Solomon Islands; and of course the Bougainville crisis. (the same can also be said about the
independence struggle in West Papua).
Land, in PNG and almost all SIS, is the most
valuable commodity. It represents
wealth, status, power, and security.
Before western contact land was owned by clan and not by any single
person, and was transferred only through inheritance.
Ladies and gentlemen, the probability of a future
similar crisis in my country, or any SIS for that matter, is therefore very
high. Land in our region has been
associated with many serious conflicts even before the Bougainville crisis, and
still is today, as clearly demonstrated in recent security developments in the
region.
Additionally, the probability of a future
“Bougainville – type” crisis in PNG and the region can also linked to other
factors. Emerging issues, for example
like bad governance; political instability; lack of transparency; lack of
accountability; inequitable distribution of wealth and resources; corruption;
etc are issues that have the potential to provoke similar crisis.
How
can outsiders better understand the situation in SIS (and thus be a cooperative
partners)
Ladies and gentlemen, the only suggestion I would
like to advance in this regard is the need for increased bilateral dialogue or
exchanges between countries in the region and those from outside the region.
This could take the form of visits, seminars,
conferences, symposium like this one, etc enabling the “outsiders” to
appreciate our situation(s).
Additionally, this can also be achieved through the
use of key multi – lateral framework that are currently in existence. For example, PNG through its observer status
in the ASEAN, can use this opportunity to brief ASEAN members about any such
issues.